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Elke Bippus, Anne Ganzert, Isabell Otto
“Taking Sides – Theories, Practices, Cultures of Participation in Dissent” explores
different perspectives on dissent, while understanding practices, cultures, and the-
ories of resistance, dispute, and opposition as inherently participative.The concept
of side-taking is hence investigated in different facets. Firstly, as assuming a posi-
tion/opinion in opposition to another or even affiliation with a cause or (unpopu-
lar) standpoint. Secondly, in a play on words, thinking about side-taking also often
includes the taking of sites as a manner of protest, occupation, appropriation, or
acquisition.Thirdly, taking a side implies an active decision, a process of subjectifi-
cation and identification, in which the subject and the position it takes are equally
produced.
Under these preliminary considerations, questions arise of how dissent can
be embodied in thoughts separately from actions. Is there an option to oppose
without automatically participating in acts of opposition? In this collection, we are
conscious of the fact that any re-sistance also re-peats, re-instates, and re-iterates
that which it turns against. It could even be argued that any ‘contra’ inevitably
reiterates or even reinforces its ‘pro’. The affirmative aspect of practices of dissent,
when they are inscribed or want to be visible in their respective discourses, hence
also demands attention.
Additionally, historic and contemporary moments in which dissent becomes
resistance or in which dissent is dissolved are compelling. Are self-proclaimed ‘al-
ternatives’ really distinct, or are they merely substitutes that automatically turn
into standards over time? And doesn’t objection to something further close an is-
sue rather than opening it up as resistance builds? It is also debatable, who or
which processes mark something as the antipode of an issue, which is then auto-
matically made the norm. How can we describe the processes of taking place when
“being against” draws a line that halts or hinders fluctuation?What binarisms (such
as inclusion/exclusion, participant/non-participation, for/against) and contradic-
tions arise when we take a position? Is it possible to take a sid/te in a non-binary
way of thinking and acting?
In June 2018, members of the research group “Media and Participation. Be-
tween Demand and Entitlement” invited participants from Germany, Switzerland,
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Austria, France, Greece, Canada, and the US to come to Konstanz for a conference
on “Taking Sides | Taking Sites”.
Early career researchers and principal investigators from Konstanz Univer-
sity, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, University of Hamburg, and Zurich Uni-
versity of the Arts each focus on different aspects of media and participation in
five subprojects. Research unit 2252 investigates media-cultural processes of Teil-
habe (participation), positions these in an interdisciplinary framework, and devel-
ops a theory of media participation.1 At the conference four keynote speakers, two
of which are also contributors in this collection, gave inputs for the following in-
tense workshop sessions. Athena Athanasiou (Athens) asked, how can we rethink
the political implications of crisis/critique/criticality in instating a possibility for
decolonial, counter-nationalist, feminist/queer, anti-fascist, social, and political
life in our times (see Section 3). By connecting the humanities and academia to
the #BlackLivesMatter movement, Athanasiou evoked a concept of the humani-
ties (with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak) as a space of potential action, as space to
breathe when “I can’t breathe” has become a widely recognized idiom, 2014 with
Eric Garner, reflected 2018 at our conference, and 2021, when we are writing this
introduction and have entered a new intense time of protests, following the killing
of George Floyd.
Emma Pérez (Tuscon) anecdotally questioned the coloniality of feelings, which
she defined as feelings that emerge from the darker side of the U.S. political terrain
during the historical “Trump moment”. She identified racism, sexism, homopho-
bia, transphobia, and ableism as the colonization of feelings, which must be de-
colonized to create a hopeful future. She emphasized the “will to feel”, which goes
against bourgeoisie, capitalist, automated, and dystopian tendencies of our times
and positioned this against more pessimistic, glum descriptions of the epistemi-
cally violent status quo while herself taking a strong side for hope (see Section 1).
Gabriella Coleman (Montreal) turned to hacker-based politics, activism, and
hacktivism that forms solidarities across causes to probe the theme of the con-
ference: taking sides. She analysed instances of successful hacker cooperation, re-
gardless of political stance, making very clear that “Anonymous is not unanimous”.
She mapped some of the distinctive characteristics defining hacker political ac-
tion as well as some of the possible causes behind, and limits to, hacker political
intersectionality.
1 The German term Teilhabe is used in differentiation to everyday understandings of partic-
ipation and stresses that part-taking is simultaneously inclusive and exclusive, connecting
and separating. By taking part (or having part, which would be closer to Teilhabe), the par-
tial emerges at the same time as the participant. The project researchers hence emphasize
that any call to partake is always connected to the interpellation of subjects, to promises of
benefits from the participation, and at the same time to demands towards the subject.
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Judith Revel (Paris) talked about resistance and subjectivation and described
processes that shift ideas, affects, and activities from “I” to “We”, the latter not being
predetermined but emerging. She explored ideas of community, the communal,
and individual freedoms within power systems.
The conference hugely benefitted from the impulse papers participants handed
in in preparation for the workshop sessions –most of which have since been devel-
oped and turned into the chapters of this collection – and from the closing panel
of the event: The German performance collective “geheimagentur” sent two of their
secret agents to facilitate an alternative ending, reflecting on the insights and dis-
cussions beyond being a resume or round for questions.With cut up keynote power
points, temporary tongue tattoos, and movement of bodies and minds, the confer-
ence participants went on to become contributors to this collection.
By focusing on four different fields of dissent, we want to discuss aspects of
the body as a political instance, the identity und subjectivity building of individuals
and groups, (micro-)practices of dissent, which can also focus on the importance of
the (social) media, and theories of critique. The collection therefore touches upon
contemporary issues, recent protests and movements, artistic subversion and dis-
sent, and online activism as well as historic developments and elemental theories
of dissent.
The four sections of the book are “Queer Thinking”, “Decolonizing Knowledge”,
“Media Activism”, and “Theories of Critique”. Each is composed of papers by
academics from international universities and early career researchers, as well
as framing commentary from the editors. “Queer Thinking” includes aspects of
the body as a political instance, the problematizing of identity and subjectivity
building of individuals and groups by gender hierarchies, two-gender hegemony,
or heteronormativity. In this section, the theories of queer studies are taken up
to explore forms of non-binary thinking about resistance and relate them to case
studies.
“Decolonizing Knowledge” problematizes different aspects of knowledge mak-
ing. Next to the pivotal aspect of coloniality and the related cultural, racial, sex-
ual, and geographical dichotomies we focus on aesthetic and activist practices of
knowledge making. The chapters in “Media Activism” discuss (micro-)practices of
dissent, which can also focus on the importance of (social) media and practices
within social media communities that are directed against industry standards as
well as tactics that are positioned to oppose participation by default.
Finally, “Theories of Critique” enquires into the (im)possibilities of taking up
an external position and highlights an insider critique that reflects on its situation
as ‘ecologies of practices’ and partiality. The discussion will therefore touch upon
contemporary issues, recent protests and movements, artistic subversion and dis-
sent, and online activism as well as historic developments and elemental theories
of dissent.
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This book would not have been possible without people who are not on the
cover but have done crucial work. The editors would like to thank Kristina Jevtic






What if instability, or rather the indetermi-
nacy of in/stability, is the condition for the
possibility of taking a stand? (Barad 2012:
80)
Autonomy and independence are associated with being a self-sufficient “I”, a per-
son who can act according to her own convictions, make decisions, and be self-re-
liant.This concept of personal autonomy reproduces the model of a self-governing,
sovereign being, who can choose who she wants to be. Various feminist thinkers
have problematized this concept, which is based in Enlightenment philosophy.
In her 1988 essay Situated Knowledges, Donna Haraway outlines the production
of knowledge in its local dependence and exposes the transcendent status of ob-
jectivity as already partial: “only partial perspective promises objective vision. […]
Feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledge, not about
transcendence and splitting of subject and object. It allows us to become answer-
able for what we learn how to see.” (Haraway 1988: 583)
Noting the plural in Situated Knowledges, it becomes obvious that Haraway’s
stance far from idealizes knowledge as situated. On the contrary, she writes:
“There is a premium on establishing the capacity to see from the peripheries and
the depths. But here there also lies a serious danger of romanticizing and/or ap-
propriating the vision of the less powerful while claiming to see from their posi-
tions. To see frombelow is neither easily learned nor unproblematic, […]. The posi-
tionings of the subjugated are not exempt from critical reexamination, decoding,
deconstruction, and interpretation […]. The standpoints of the subjugated are not
‘innocent’ positions.” (Haraway 1988: 584)
If, as Haraway writes, “‘subjugated’ standpoints are preferred because they seem to
promise more adequate, sustained, objective, transforming accounts of the world”
(ibid.), the question is, whether we are able at all to decolonize modern episte-
mology and recognize the world from another point of view, whether from be-
low, the periphery, or a marginalized position? I want to interrogate this through
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thinkers such as Donna Haraway, Achille Mbembe, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak,Grada Kilomba, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, and others not explicitly
named. By focusing on epistemology and critique, I seek to describe in/stability,
am/bivalence, and in/between as conditions of taking a side that are based in an
ethical stance andmove beyond colonial models of knowledge production and their
epistemic violence.
Haraway’s concept of situated knowledges articulates a vehement opposition
to Western epistemology. This was not, as Evelyn Fox Keller puts it, to make a dif-
ferent science but to make “difference in science” (Keller 1987). This difference in
science matters if it disrupts modern epistemology. From Linda Tuhiwai Smith
we learn that the quest for knowledge is deeply embedded in imperial and colo-
nial practices. She states that the “word itself, ‘research’, is probably one of the
dirtiest words in the indigenous world’s vocabulary. […] The ways in which scien-
tific research is implicated in the worst excesses of colonialism remains a powerful
remembered history for many of the world’s colonized peoples.” (Smith 1999: 1).
Counting, measuring, and classifying were the methods used to gather knowledge
about the other. In his published lecture Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of
the Archive given at the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER),
University of theWitwatersrand (Johannesburg), philosopher and political theorist,
Achille Mbembe identifies three central aspects that in-form our understanding of
knowledge: the knowing subject, an impartial subject, and an objective univer-
sal knowledge. Global injustice and inequality make the urgency of decolonizing
knowledge evident. But what does it mean to decolonize knowledge? Is it possible
to constitute a situation that allows us to produce knowledges that neither follow
the totalizing versions of claims to scientific authority nor various forms of rela-
tivism? What side are we able to take in knowledge-making?
How can we emancipate ourselves from the hegemonic notion of knowledge
production which frames our thinking? And which “actively represses anything
that actually is articulated, thought, and envisioned from outside of these frames.”
(Mbembe 2015)
Because research is not an innocent or distant academic exercise, the modal-
ities of knowledge-making and research are essential. By modalities, I mean re-
search methodologies but also research related issues – in the sense of what is
accepted as a topic that we should know. I also have in mind the subject – who is
empowered to be a researcher? Or, like Grada Kilomba puts it, “whose knowledge
is acknowledged as such?” (Kilomba 2010: 13) Linda Tuhiwai Smith mentions more
of such critical questions (Smith 1999: 10). I want to close with a remark related to
the question of representation: How can or how “should one speak about what has
been silenced?” (Kilomba 2010: 13), what has been objectified, what is researchable
within the colonized research field?
Segment Introduction 17
Even if decolonizing knowledge is condemned to fail, it is of worth to practice
the (im-)possibility of decolonizing knowledge. Efforts that go in this direction can
be found, for example, in the field of education in demands to have more Black,
Indigenous, People of Color-Professors, in the culture of commemoration through
monuments or street names, and in a postcolonial remembrance, that integrates
colonialism and as well novels by PoC into school curriculums. In the existing con-
stellation of power, which stabilizes the hierarchy between indigenous and Euro-
pean concepts of knowledge, the efforts of decolonizing are connected with the
problem of cultural appropriation. Therefore, we must ask what silenced memo-
ries are included and “who is served by the inclusion of those memories.” (Frank
2015)
The normative and established narratives are crucial in representing colonized,
marginalized, and oppressed histories, aesthetics or epistemologies. In this re-
spect, mere inclusion is not possible, but it requires critical reflection on processes
of ‘othering’, and an awareness of how our experiences and perceptions are shaped
by colonial legacies.
Decolonizing knowledge confronts the person who seeks to do so with the pit-
falls of their blind spots, and their own privileges. In what follows, I would like to
mention some practices that sound promising to a white, European-educated per-
son who has developed her thinking in the context of post-structuralist and femi-
nist theories andwants to work critically on knowledge in the field of aesthetics and
artistic practice. The following reflections are not so much about a decolonization
of knowledge as an attempt to step aside from the legacy of modern epistemology
without appropriating the so-called other side.
The Subject of Critique: Reparative and Paranoid Reading
In the essay Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re So Paranoid, You Prob-
ably Think This Essay Is About You Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick points out the affinity be-
tween themethodological centrality of suspicion in critical practice and the concept
of paranoia. A precarious kinship, Freud already noted between “the systematic
persecutory delusion” (Sedgwick 2003: 125) and the psychoanalytical theory itself.
In problematizing the “hermeneutics of suspicion” (ibid.), understood as a method
of detection which privileges an idea of paranoia that had become almost synony-
mous with critique itself, Sedgwick develops an alternative: the reparative reading.
While paranoia tends to construct symmetrical relations, in particular symmet-
rical epistemologies, and to form a strong theory, the reparative is additive and ac-
cretive. Like a classic camp performance, the reparative is sustained by passion, ex-
cessive erudition, or a “prodigal production of alternative historiographies.” (Sedg-
wick 2003: 150) Yet, Sedgwick is far from privileging the reparative andmarginalize
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the paranoid. Using Melanie Klein’s notion of position, that is built on instability
and mutual inscriptions, she succeeds in discussing paranoid and reparative criti-
cal practices as changing and heterogeneous relational stances instead of ideolog-
ical theories.
A comparable figure to Klein’s notion of position as read by Sedgwick seems
to me to be Spivak’s adoption of Gregory Bateson’s concept of double bind. Along
with Jay Haley, Donald Jackson, and John Weakland, Bateson developed the theory
of the double bind, a dysfunctional paradox (of a common, pathological) pattern
that occurs in the communication or interaction between parent and child. The
phenomenon of double bind arises from a conflict between two messages or a “sit-
uation in which no matter what a person does, he ‘can’t win’.” (Bateson 1956: 1)
Spivak employs the double bind in her book An Aesthetic Education in the Era of
Globalization. The double bind plays an important role in her effort “to use the Eu-
ropean Enlightenment from below.” Spivak applies “the expression ‘ab-use’ because
the Latin prefix ‘ab’ saysmuchmore than ‘below’. Indicating both ‘motion away’ and
‘agency, point of origin’, ‘supporting’, as well as ‘the duties of slaves’, it nicely cap-
tures the double bind of the postcolonial and the metropolitan migrant regarding
the Enlightenment” (Spivak 2012: 3f).
Spivak’s sympathy for the European Enlightenment calls her to a subversive
and critical engagement with this heritage. In other words: Her relationship to
the Enlightenment is a kind of double bind that prevents her from taking a single
side: for or against it. Unlike a classical ideological (paranoid) critique that seeks
to reveal the false consciousness and unlike militant decolonial concepts that claim
an independent, a non-Eurocentric knowledge, Spivak seeks to learn the double
bind. Not to talk about it, or “resolve double binds by playing them” (Spivak 2012:
1). Rather she advocates facing the double bind, naming the contradictions, e.g.
those of the Enlightenment, or of Aesthetics. For her, it is a training for the habit
of the ethical, which she also found in the thinking ofMelanie Klein, among others.
The double bind is not a logical or philosophical problem that can be solved. It is
an experience, and it is not possible to remain in it. Spivak insists that a double
bind “is the condition of possibility of deciding”. To decide in this double bind is
“the burden of responsibility.” (Spivak 2012: 105) The double bind is not resolvable
and therefore the decision is not that of a self-confident, sovereign subject. “The
typecase of the ethical sentiments is regret, not self-congratulation.” (Spivak 2012:
105)
What can we learn from Sedgwick’s and Spivak’s proposed readings of the no-
tion of position and double bind in relation to the decolonization of knowledge
and taking side? For me, the readings open up a way to confront the dilemma, the
contradictions in knowledge production in a postcolonial globalized world. Taking
sides means considering my lack of knowledge, my partiality, and an ethical sense
of regret.
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The authors of this section reflect on the decolonization of knowledge and side-
taking on the levels of theory, methods of translation, aesthetics, or critical activist
strategies.
Emma Pérez attempts to queer decolonial imaginaries with the intention of de-
veloping a transformative and liberating decolonial method.The “decolonial imag-
inary” is for her “an interstitial space in which political and social dilemmas are ne-
gotiated and deconstructed.” (23) The way Pérez characterizes this space, reminds
me of Sedgewick’s concept of positions as opposed to normative spaces ordered
along binary patterns.The decolonial imaginary opens affective knowledges, espe-
cially for “brown imaginaries of femme, of butch, of trans, of gender-nonconform-
ing selves, of gender-fluidity, and of sexual desire’s fluidity.” (Ibid.) Theorizing her
approach using Gloria Anzuldua, Sara Ahmed, and Francisco Galarte, Pérez desig-
nates her technique as phenomenological, “autohistoria teoria”, that will “emerge
from unseen and unheard life stories.” (24) To prevent the decolonial having a col-
onizing effect, Pérez suggests entangling intersectionality with queer and trans-
imaginaries. By relating a personal experience with her daughter, Pérez evolves
a decolonizing potentiality that resides within the imaginary and which provides
orientation, in particular for queer oriented bodies who are confronted by disori-
entation in the heteronormative spaces the world is mostly comprised of. Pérez
calls her way “the will to feel” (26).
Elke Bippus problematizes taking a side through the notion of double bind. In
her close reading of the Artworks Funk Lessons by Adrian Piper and Iris Kensmils
three-part installation for the Dutch Pavilion 58th Venice Biennale in 2019, Bippus
discusses side-taking as an attempt to understand a situation in all its ambiva-
lences and contradictions, while dealing with them without dropping into an any-
thing-goes attitude. According to Bippus the art works critically address the sys-
tems of organization and representation of knowledge, and focus on what becomes
visible and sayable through them, what is hidden and concealed through them.
While Adrian Piper does not claim an external standpoint for art or the artist, she
pursues the attempt of a change within using micro-practices.The artist confronts
us with the double bind and reveals the construction of habitual ways of thinking,
deconstructs them, and opens a site beyond them. Kensmil’s critical reading of the
Western European (art) does not undertake a better art history. Her intervention
into the “aesthetic regime” asks instead which exclusions, repressions, and exotifi-
cations accompany the aesthetic sensibilization of modernisms and the division of
the sensual. In doing so, she raises cultural, political, and ethical questions within
the aesthetic dispositive that is not reduced to art.
The notion of corpoanarchy as a form of protest is central to Kamran Behrouz’s
text, which is based on two installations of his artwork. Corpoanarchy, connected
with bodily disobedience, is described in a diagram by Behrouz as “body without
leader” (57). Proceeding from the effects of biopolitics on normalization and con-
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tainment of the corporeality of trans/queer/non-binary bodies, through the neolo-
gism ‘corpoanarchy’, Behrouz suggests a performative refusal on a molecular level.
In his involvement with the historical picture of August Landmesser, a German cit-
izen who refused to perform the Nazi salute, he visualizes on one side “the corpore-
ality of ‘corpoanarchy’” (53), on the other side he problematizes the untranslatability
of the word anarchy, or the lack of a precise word to address transgender in Farsi
and interrelates that to subjectivation processes through language. His research
is an attempt at re-translations that seek to include the trouble of untranslatabil-
ity during the act of translation instead of focusing on smoothing contradictions
and removing ambiguity to avoid “cultural discombobulation”. The second instal-
lation reflected on by Behrouz is a tribute to the unspeakable deaths of queer and
trans people in Iran. As transition in Iran is a “normalization process: an obligatory
rule for transgender people to turn into ‘corrected bodies’” (60), and the histories
of bodies who refused to be normalized in this way or who never came out have
never been documented, queer and trans bodies have disappeared from the Iranian
collective memory of queer culture.
Magdalena Goetz examinates strategies that de-/colonize established rational
knowledge in both institutionalized and everyday lives. In her engagement with
the technofeminist strategy of noisification, used by the artist group #purplenoise
for dealing with social media, Goetz expounds that queering becomes a tactic of
‘feminist dissent’, which subverts social media norms and proposes alternative
practices through their emancipative knowledge-processes. Some of these prac-
tices work with contradictions to create disturbance “in order to challenge exist-
ing power relations surrounding social media” or apply affective infrastructures
to expose how “affect is (made) infrastructural as well as how infrastructures are
intrinsically affective.” (74) Goetz reads #purplenoise as a highly self-critical group
that is fully aware that social media have become a self-contradictory ‘site’ “where
not just ordinary users but also the political establishment, […] and hate groups
can develop their greatest impact.” (69) Through their manifesto these artists illus-
trate the double bind character of social media platforms. Unravelling the various
practices of taking sides and sites #purplenoise negotiates practices of dissent and
understands the internet as an extended site of feminist resistance.
The contributions of this section explore subtle knowledge practices which are
difficult to grasp as such at first glance. Some elude language by making use of
other forms of articulation. They can occur in non-propositional forms of knowl-
edge building, for instance, through the use of objects, technical instruments, and
digital media or in political activism.
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Affecting Knowledges
Decolonial Brown Queer and Trans Imaginaries
Emma Pérez
One of my projects has been to queer decolonial imaginaries and through that
queering apply a decolonial method that is both libratory and transformative. This
move has led me to locate brown queer imaginaries within a decolonial affective
mode. I have argued elsewhere that to decolonize history, a deconstructive method
that I named “the decolonial imaginary” may be taken up (Pérez 1999). In my early
monograph,The Decolonial Imaginary, is an interstitial space in which political and
social dilemmas are negotiated and deconstructed; it is a space in which one is not
merely oppressed or victimized, nor is one only oppressor or victimizer. Rather,
one negotiates between and among one’s identities in favor of the identity that is
most viable for that specific political, coalitional, historical moment.There is a way
in which these multiple self-identities, constructed around and by an imaginary,
are in and of themselves coalitional and beyond notions of the individualist self. As
a deconstructive tool, the decolonial, to which I ascribe, needs the creativity of the
imaginary to open up affective knowledges, elicited through and from first person
experience, too often negatedwhen the collective experiences are brown, queer, and
transgender. Yet, perhaps if we venture inside decolonial queer/trans imaginaries
we will find the brown imaginaries of femme, of butch, of trans, of gender-non-
conforming selves, of gender-fluidity, and of sexual desire’s fluidity because desire,
after all, is fluid and always already changing, transforming us toward unexpected
twists and turns in which surface effects can dictate the body/mind/psyche.1 In or-
der to approach these imaginaries, this chapter will first turn to Gloria Anzaldúa’s
phenomenology of self, then, I will explore the will to feel as a concept/methodol-
ogy/practice to promote brown queer/trans imaginaries as a method of critique.
1 In The Extractive Zone,Macarena Gómez-Barris (2017), illuminates the hidden, the unseen and
that which is often neglected in submerged ecological terrains. The theorist offers up femi-
nist perspectives for anyone intent upon decolonial theory that definitively prods the “colo-
niality of power.” Her work is one of the first to queer a decoloniality that exposes more than
cis-male-centered studies; her research also fosters decolonial queer “cuir” femme analytics.
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For brown queer/trans imaginaries, the phenomenology of first-person expe-
rience draws from the collective practices developed through Gloria Anzaldúa’s
methodologies of autohistoria and authohistoria teoria (Anzaldúa 2016: 241-142).
These are phenomenological turns that glean from an individual’s personal life
story, a life story inextricably linked to collective transformation. The political and
cultural links to the collective are essential for life stories to matter. Moreover, An-
zaldúa’s autohistorias are also a phenomenological method, or autohistoria teoria,
that, to phrase it with Sarah Ahmed, “emphasizes the importance of lived expe-
rience.” (2006: 2) Both theorists underscore how lived experiences integrate the
mind, body, and psyche to cultivate new ways of knowing and being. These epis-
temologies and ontologies are born deep inside the body, beyond skin surfaces,
beyond the superficial outer layers that are visible and easy to touch, and beyond
what is seen but not grasped because something is always hidden. The knowing is
only a fragment of what lies beneath; the being is only a particle of what has been
and what will be. These are the submerged terrains of the body/mind/psyche triad
that Anzaldúa guided us toward and that Macarena Gómez-Barris expanded upon
as she discussed extraction and the submerged with a decolonial ‘cuir’ femme an-
alytics. In this chapter, I want to propose the phenomenological method of brown
queer/trans imaginaries, which also emerge from unseen and unheard life stories.
Let’s take a look at Anzaldúa again. In her celebrated Borderlands/La Frontera,
Anzaldúa offered up affective methods long before affect was being theorized in
larger academic venues. When she asked us to feel the intuitive guise of la facultad,
or to sink into the abyss of the Coatlicue state or to embrace the shadow beast lurk-
ing inside our psyche seeking freedom from self-abnegation, Anzaldúa asked us to
feel our lives intimately.2 She not only asked us to feel our lives deeply, she also
summoned us to respect the affective methods that lead to our transformation.
Nepantla, that in-between state that we inhabit, became the method for traversing
an affective life filled with cultural emotion. Andwhen she asked us to acknowledge
our writing as a sensuous, feeling act that could satisfy the psychic unrest in which
writers dwell (Anzaldúa 1985: 71-73), we realized again the libratory and transfor-
mative methods she recommended through the very act of writing. But she also
reminded us that writing was a privilege not to be taken for granted, given where
we come from and how our brown, poor communities must struggle to have access
to writing.
When I turn to brown queer/trans imaginaries, I am also consulting trans-
gender scholar, Francisco Galarte, who argues: “to trans our approach is to in-
vite change and transformation.” (Galarte 2014: 118) It is a method that answers
2 Anzaldúa defines her concept, la facultad, as “the capacity to see in surface phenomena the
meaning of deeper realities, to see the deep structure below the surface.” (Anzaldúa 1987: 38)
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Anzaldúa’s call for a decolonial reality that is willing “to change or reinvent real-
ity” with an imagination that encourages transformation (Anzaldúa 2016: 44). The
method pays heed to Anzaldúa’s call to “listen to what your jotería is saying.” (An-
zaldúa 1987: 85)3 I would add that we must also discern what queer/trans folks are
feeling, gesturing, and experiencing. A brown queer/trans imaginary is grounded
in decolonial disruption of white, colonialist, hegemonic, necropolitical heterosex-
uality and capitalism. And by acknowledging brown queer/trans imaginaries, de-
colonial defies heteronormativity, patriarchal relationships, and gender norms.
At this point, I would also argue that one cannot examine race/class/gen-
der/sexuality if queer and trans imaginaries are absent. In other words, if we
neglect brown queer and trans imaginaries, we are defying a core definition of
decolonial, which is to strip away at colonialist hierarchies. Without queer/trans
imaginaries, the decolonial is not decolonial at all but instead another coloniz-
ing, occluding methodology without inclusive practices. At the same time, it is
important that just as we contest gender as a social, colonial, raced construct, we
must contest ‘sex’ as a social, colonial, raced construct. We have been much too
invested in gender and ignored the way in which ‘sex’ is ordained as biological and
unchangeable and as a result have discarded sex from a tangible critique. In the
same way, it is relevant to interrogate desire as a colonial, sexed matrix. But how?
Perhaps decolonial brown queer/trans imaginaries will allow us to contest ‘sex’ and
to contest our notions of ‘desire’ as we challenge the symbolic order of patriarchy,
of coloniality, of sex-gender systems that still split into false binaries in which sex
is natural and gender is a social construct (Butler 1993: 16). Is desire dictated by
a coloniality of feelings – that which holds us back, repeats itself in old, familiar
habits and patterns of racialized and gendered hierarchies? Our desires are so
often rooted in our past, ingrained in our bodies/minds/psyches, and fixed in our
present that we become stultified perhaps only reacting to the present, which is
imprinted by our past and perhaps equally imprinted with historical trauma.
Sara Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology shows us the way in which bodies feel and
experience how they are gendered, sexualized, and raced by how they “extend into
space.” (Ahmed 2006: 2) In other words, she asks that we pay attention to the role
of repeated and habitual actions in shaping bodies and worlds. Moreover, queer
orientation, how we as queer/gender-non-conforming People of Color orient our-
selves toward the something that appeals to us, attracts us, makes us whole, is not
an easy task in a straight world in which straightening devices are all around us
(Ahmed 2006: 72). Heterosexual, cis-gender, then, is not concerned with being ‘ori-
ented’ because they are already deemed ‘natural’ in their desires, their feelings. In-
stitutions are always already straight and act as straightening devices in the same
3 Historically a pejorative term, “joteria,” can be translated to “queer” and has been reclaimed
by Chicanx/Latinx queers in the same way that “queer” was reclaimed.
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way that hegemonic institutions are always already white, heteronormative, and
colonialist, imposing a universality of a white world that denies queer and trans
People of Color their/our right to be. To just be.
Anzaldúa understood this. She repeatedly reminds us in her writings that she
is/was a brown queer lesbian working-class Chicana/Tejana from the U.S.-Mexico
border, born in the mid-twentieth century when segregation, poverty, and homo-
phobia were the norm. When she called herself jota, marimacha, tortillera, she em-
braced brown queerness, recognizing that the queer, trans, lesbian, butch, femme,
brown body is worn down and worn out by spatial temporal limits of whiteness
and of a heterosexual regime. The state of Tejas (Texas) in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury was not a fun place to be a brown queer/trans body oriented toward other
brown queer/trans bodies. But Anzaldúa instructed us to pay attention to what it
feels like to inhabit the world as a brown queer/trans body. What does it mean to
have to be in certain spaces, when those spaces are overwhelmingly white or het-
eronormative? For Ahmed, disorientation is overwhelming for the queer body that
is oriented elsewhere, but an elsewhere that is often hidden from sight, occupying
interstitial glances and gazes as we try to discern who is or who is not really queer.4
I can say that the queer butch brown body, which I myself inhabit as a gender
non-conforming brown butch, is in constant battle with spaces that are normalized
for cisgender, heterosexual folks. And it is not simply an issue of not being com-
fortable or disoriented in heteronormative spaces since, after all, that is the world
for the most part. Instead, what is important is the way in which those spaces are
so normalized that a specific kind of universalism grounded in a colonialist, white,
heteronormative regime is privileged over and over again. Only through collective
action and collective voices of brown queer/trans folks can those privileges be ex-
posed and, once exposed, the changes and transformations are possible. But again,
that spatial temporal universalizing that is invisible for so many, whether white or
heteronormative or both, takes a harsh toll on queer/trans, butch, femme, gender-
fluid, brown, and black bodies.
The Will to Feel
In this brief chapter I have been hinting at how decolonial Anzaldúan methods
inform what I am developing as ‘the will to feel’. By turning to the will to feel, I
want to propose this other facet that resides within the imaginary and that has
the potential to decolonize, dismiss or eradicate oppressive regimes. For now, I’m
calling this mechanism ‘the will to feel’.
4 Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology (2006). Refer to pages 157-165 of the conclusion, “Disorienta-
tion and Queer Objects.”
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Let me begin with a personal story, my own phenomenology of spirit and mind
that compelled me to linger upon will and willingness. In September 2017, I wit-
nessed my daughter drop twenty-two pounds in the span of four weeks. In a way,
she eluded her will to live, choosing instead to control calories, defy hunger, and
entertain suicide. She had lost her appetite. No hunger, no craving, no life. No will.
She fluctuated between depression and anger and the only will she had, was her
willfulness to defy the very thing that would keep her alive – food. Her heart rate
dropped so drastically that she had to be monitored nightly in the hospital for over
a week. Only eleven years old, she had become a statistic, part of an epidemic that
overwhelms the First World nations filled with hypocrisy and contradictions. “Eat,
but don’t get fat.” “Consume food, drugs, alcohol, bright shiny things – but don’t
gain weight, don’t be an addict, don’t be greedy.” “Be sexy, but don’t be sexual.” Or
in other words: abide by patriarchal double-standards that still press down upon
you in the twenty-first century despite the decades of the 1960s and 1970s that at-
tempted to advance rights for women, for girls, for LGBT folks, for People of Color,
for those on themargins.Wemade some headway but regressed afterthe 2016 elec-
tion of Trump, aproblematic, bigoted President of the United States.
Eating disorders continue to rise and have not been tackled or resolved since
they received national attention in the 1970s. The media has given minimal regard
to the disorder and only places at its center young, white, middle-class teenage
girls. I discovered after seven weeks in the Children’s Hospital of Denver that al-
though most of the patients were girls from nine to eighteen years old, and many
were white and middle-class, there were also Latinas, teenaged boys, including
one from Mexico, girls from working-class backgrounds with single mothers, and
a teen girl from Africa. The teen boys presented somewhat queer but clearly had
no permission to present in anything other than the white, cisgender heteronor-
mative, far-right Christianity of intolerance seemingly practiced by their families.
I have no intention of speaking at length on anorexia or about my daughter. I will
say that therapy – both family and individual – gave us the tools to be willing to
heal and she has demonstrated a willingness to face the monsters in her head.
My point in raising this brief, personal narrative is to introduce the notion of
will in its various forms as I make an argument for the will to feel within the brown
queer/trans imaginary: will, willfulness, willful subjects, willingness, will to power,
will to know, will to truth, will to live.5
5 What of the “life unworthy of being lived” for those who “have neither the will to live nor
the will to die.” In his chapter, “Life That Does Not Deserve to Live,” from the book, Homo
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Giorgio Agamben (1995) cites Karl Binding’s Pamphlet in
Favor of Euthanasia published in Germany in 1920. See pages 136-143. Agamben posits that the
pamphlet urged the question of sovereignty over one’s will to live or die vis-à-vis the “value
or non-value” of life.
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Friedrich Nietzsche articulated the will to power, “an ideal that simultaneously
brings with it its own form of universalization: war and conquest.” (Moten 2018:
3)6 Michel Foucault compelled us to consider the will to know and the will to truth,
or we could say, the will to know the truth (Foucault 2013). We were challenged
to become truth-seekers of knowledges and to question how assorted disciplinary
knowledges came to be. The will to live can be attributed to Arthur Schopenhauer,
a philosopher I have not read closely and have only thought of him in reference
to a brief scene in the film Frida (Taylor 2002). There is a clever moment on the
part of the scriptwriter who invokes the will to live for Frida after an accident that
challenged her into yet more difference in an ableist world.7 I ruminated about my
own daughter’s loss of a will to live and her resilient willfulness to individuate in
ways harmful to her as she willfully toyed with death.
In Cruising Utopia, José Muñoz cites Theodor Adorno and Ernst Bloch who re-
mind us, “[w]hat is really important here is the will that is different.” (Muñoz 2009:
39) What if the will to feel is the will to be different as ‘feelings’ compel us to express
differently in a world that anticipates ‘logic’, the ‘rational mind’, and unfeeling to
explain our lives, even when there is no logic, no rationale, no real explanation
that can fulfill expectations grounded in that which is not part of one’s experience
or phenomenological way of being. The fact is, however, that there is no hard and
fast methodology, practice, or theory that can avoidmisuse,misinterpretation, and
misrepresentation.
The will to feel, I am proposing, is its own hermeneutics, its own method and
theory. At least, that is what I am attempting in this brief meditation that borrows
from phenomenology to make my point. The phenomenology of the first-person
experience has a long history with various intellectuals, writers, and philosophers,
particularly as I have shown above in the works of Chicana theorist Gloria An-
zaldúa, as well as Sara Ahmed. What happens when we use those feelings, the
woundedness and painful hurt to drive critique and analysis consciously, with an
6 Moten questions the phenomenology of “individuating” that emerges from the usual sus-
pects, Friedrich Nietzsche, Edmund Husserl, etc. (Moten 2018: 4) I am fascinated by Moten’s
phenomenology because he is pointing us toward the communal aspects of a concept that
has relied too much on the soloist as alone instead of always already part of a collective.
7 In the film Frida, with Salma Hayak, we see the tragic accident that debilitated her body
and how she coped with disability for the rest of her life. When she is initially recuperating
at home and struggling with extreme physical pain, her college boyfriend, played by Diego
Luna, brings her a stack of books to readwhile she is bedridden. One of the books is a philoso-
phy tract and as he hands her the book he says: “Schopenhauer because it’s good for you.” For
decades that comment riddled me until finally, after thinking about ‘will’ in its many forms
andmy own impulse to theorize and actualize our understanding of the will to feel, it hit me:
Her boyfriend wanted Frida to begin to feel a will to live again.
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astute awareness? That is to say, what happens when we implement affective emo-
tions that move us to act or react in the first place? Are we only writing subjec-
tivities, not rational, not Lockian or Western European Cartesian, but instead, an
argument and thesis guided by emotional affective intelligence grounded in will-
ingness to feel what has shaped the mind/body/psyche. In The Birth of Biopolitics,
Foucault posits, that we must “start from the decision that universals do not ex-
ist, asking what kind of history can we do,” instead of “using history as the critical
method” that questions universals (Foucault 2008: 1-3).
In a sense, I am arguing that we turn to the will to feel as an antidote that strips
away at false notions of universal objective science to promote brown queer/trans
imaginaries as a method of critique. The rational mind can lie to itself and rely
on objectivity as if one is not influenced by regionalism, history, culture, gender,
sexualities, race, and class background. However, when we take brown queer/trans
imaginaries into account, the will to feel as a deconstructive hermeneuticmay open
new avenues as we attempt to decolonize affective knowledges.
References
Agamben, Giorgio (1998): Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press.
Ahmed, Sara (2006): Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others, Durham:
Duke University Press.
Anzaldúa, Gloria E./Keating, Ana Louise (eds.) (2016): Luz en lo Oscuro, Light in the
Dark, Durham: Duke University Press.
Anzaldúa, Gloria E. (1987): Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, San Francisco:
Aunt Lute.
Butler, Judith (1993): Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”, New York:
Routledge.
Foucault, Michel (2013): Lectures on the Will to Know: Lectures at the College de France,
1970-71,New York: Picador.
Foucault, Michel (2008): The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-
1979, New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Galarte, Francisco J. (2014): “Transgender Chican@ Poetics: Contesting, Interrogat-
ing, and Transforming Chicana/o Studies”, in:Chicana/Latina Studies:The Journal
of MALCS, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 118-139.
Gómez-Barris,Macarena (2017):TheExtractive Zone: Social Ecologies andDecolonial Per-
spectives, Durham: Duke University Press.
Moten, Fred (2018):The Universal Machine on Phenomenology, Durham: Duke Univer-
sity Press.
30 Emma Pérez
Muñoz, José Estaban (2009): CruisingUtopia:TheThen andThere of Queer Futurity, New
York: New York University Press.
Nietszche, Friederich (2018): The Will to Power, Scotts Valley: CreateSpace Indepen-
dent Publishing Platform.
Schopenhauer, Arthur (1966): The World as Will and Representation, Mineola: Dover
Publications.
Taking Sides and De-Colonizing Practices of Dissent
Elke Bippus
In her book An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization, Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak concentrates on aesthetics, despite all the problems with this legacy. In her
view, the space of aesthetic education “allows us to survive in the singular and
the unverifiable.” (Spivak 2012: 2) “Aesthetic education is Spivak’s call to ab-use
globalizing oppression through the epistemological.”1 (Gershon 2015: 5) Affiliated
to that focus on aesthetics is Spivak’s idea “that can be described as sabotaging
Schiller.” Therefore, it is urgently required
“to find something relating to ‘our own history’ to counteract the fact that the En-
lightenment came, to colonizer and colonized alike, through colonialism, to sup-
port a destructive ‘free trade’, and that top-downpolicy breaches of Enlightenment
principles are more rule than exception.” (Spivak 2012: 4)
It is the imagination that can be trained by aesthetic education. But that implies
that we have to
“learn to do violence to the epistemo-epistemological difference and remember
that this is what education ‘is’, and thus keep up the work of displacing belief onto
the terrain of the imagination, attempt to access the epistemic. The displacement
of belief onto the terrain of the imagination can be a description of reading in its
most robust sense.” (Spivak 2012: 10)
Gregory Batson’s phrase “double bind” is fundamental for Spivak’s concept of aes-
thetic education. A double bind involves a binary in which two subject positions can
simultaneously oppose, yet inform one another. Spivak describes the double bind
as “learning to live with contradictory instructions.” (Spivak 2012, 3)
In respect of the double bind Spivak follows neither classical ideological criti-
cism, or the “hermeneutics of suspicion,” (Sedgwick 2003: 124) nor does she claim
1 Instead the formulation to use Enlightenment from below, Spivak suggests the expression
“‘ab-use’ because the Latin prefix ‘ab’ says much more than ‘below’. Indicating both ‘motion
away’ and ‘agency, point of origin’, ‘supporting’, as well as ‘the duties of slaves’, it nicely cap-
tures the double bind of the postcolonial and the metropolitan migrant regarding the En-
lightenment.“ (Spivak 2012: 3f)
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an essential other knowledge outside the European framing, like some radical de-
colonial attempts do. In contrast to Friedrich Schiller,who “tried to undo the double
bind of mind and body by suggesting the Spieltrieb,” (Spivak 2012: 19) Spivak tries
to be aware of the double bind. This has the effect that art is not conceptualized as
a balancing act that will save society, like it is in Schiller’s thinking.
I would like to describe the double bind as a side taking that is not understood
as a position opposite another. Confronting the double bind means recognizing
contradictions and dealing with ambivalences. It is not a side taking that posi-
tions oneself on the assumed right side, but an attempt to understand a situation
in all its ambivalences and contradictions and to deal with them. Due to this per-
spective, the question arises: How can we differentiate side-taking and distinguish
it from a binary concept of inside/outside on the one hand and from an ambiva-
lence, or an ‘anything-goes’ attitude, on the other hand?With the following analysis
of art projects by Adrian Piper and Iris Kensmil, I want to elaborate a side-tak-
ing which deals with the double bind of aesthetics. They reveal aesthetic practices
in their ‘dispositif ’ constitution in contrast to an (autonomous) ‘aesthetic regime’
(Rancière 2011),2 meaning to expose the entanglement between aesthetics, politics,
and ethics.
During our Symposium in 2018, the starting point of the book at hand, Athena
Athanasiou mentioned that to take sides means to involve, to situate oneself in
space and time, it signifies to act from a specific and local background, refer to
local knowledge, and to feel and to think what’s at stake. In the following text, I
focus on aesthetics in relation to epistemology and ethics. Therefore, I remove the
idealization of art or the essential connection between art and resistance which one
can find in Schiller’s concept of aesthetic education. I follow Spivak’s attempt to
think of aesthetic education not as a resolve of the double bind, or a sensual practice
which is able to collapse binaries like mind and body, but as a call for displacement.
She writes: “my task is to undertake such a displacement.” (Spivak 2012: 32) She
ab-uses binary constructions, to reverse and displace them. My perception and
reading of artworks by Piper and Kensmil, which follows brief reflections on the
term criticism, focuses on practices that cause such ab-use.
2 According to Rancière, the “aesthetic regime asserts the absolute singularity of art, and at the
same time, destroys any pragmatic criterion for isolating this singularity. It simultaneously
establishes the autonomy of art and the identity of its forms with the forms that life uses
to shape itself. Schiller’s aesthetic state, which is this regime’s first manifesto (and remains,
in a sense, unsurpassable), clearly indicates this fundamental identity of opposites. The aes-
thetic state is a pure instance of suspension, a moment when form is experienced for itself.
Moreover, it is the moment of the formation and education of a specific type of humanity.”
(Ibid. 23f)
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Displace Critique through (Micro-)Practice
In the 1990s, post-structuralism, with its new take on traditional concepts, was
regarded as an independent, radical form of social critique, which led to a then
highly suitable formulation of critical theory. Affirmation played a central role in
Jacques Derrida’s attempt to “imagine another historicity,” (Derrida 2006: 94) and
Jean-François Lyotard countered the aesthetics of negation and examined desire
as the driving force of the political (Lyotard 1993), while Gilles Deleuze and Félix
Guattari thought of transformation as an essential characteristic of existence that
equals a constant process of becoming (Deleuze/Guattari 1983). In recent years,
however, the post-structuralist form of critique has come under attack.The concept
of critique, developed in sociology, distinguishes itself from post-structural cultu-
ral analysis of complex power constellations and knowledge systems, and declines
the problematics of subject, truth, and great order, in favor of the investigation of
“society as a whole.” (van Dyk 2012: 186) Sociologist Silke van Dyk notes that “the
preference for (self-willed) micro-politics, complex culprit relations, and interpre-
tive struggles [...] in (recent) social criticism is [...] considered obsolete in the face
of the great crisis.” (Ibid.) According to one argument, post-structural critique lost
its political clout when it became politically established, escaping into academi-
cally harmless abstraction and rhizomatic textures. It is only about the exchange
value of an academic theory but not about its usefulness as a socially critical in-
strument as a consequence of which there is no genuine social commitment. In
contrast, post-structuralists complain that academic philosophy continues to ig-
nore post-structuralist thinking and that it has become accepted only in cultural
studies (Lorey/Nigro/Raunig 2011: 18).
The (political-theoretical) opposition entails the risk tomiss a significant aspect
of post-structuralist theory and critique: i.e., the critical potential of aesthetics as
a cognitive instrument both analytically and performatively. This is equally impor-
tant for art and art theory. Post-structuralism has led to new perceptions of art, not
only based on biographic or reception aesthetics, but rather on the material and
formal nature of aesthetic practices. In favor of a new criticism, post-structuralist
thinkers reflected the aesthetic structure of theory itself, and questioned the nor-
mative notions of knowledge and science. In the 1960s, Roland Barthes posited such
a criticism, defying the reading instructions of traditional French literary studies.
While the traditional function of criticism was judging,
“the true ‘criticism’ of institutions and languages does not consist in ‘judging’
them, but in perceiving, in separating, in dividing. To be subversive, the critic does
not have to judge, it is enough that he talks of language instead of using it. What
new criticism is reproached with today is not so much that it is ‘new’, but that it is
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fully ‘criticism’, that it re-allocates the roles of author and commentator and in so
doing attacks the linguistic order.” (Barthes 2007: 3)
Barthes understands criticism as a performative writing-thinking-act:
“We know that old criticism cannot write in any other way unless it begins to think
in some other way. For to write is already to organize theworld, it is already to think
(to learn a language is to learn how one thinks in that language).” (Barthes 2007:
12)
Similar objections to traditional forms of criticism are also found in American and
British conceptual art of the 1960s. Conceptual art, with its self-critical reflection
and analysis of the conditionality of artistic practices, attacks the formalist prin-
ciple of modernist reduction and the accompanying normative framework. One
goal was to uncover prevailing authoritarian art paradigms, which are considered
natural, through analytical procedures.
While the group Art & Language paradigmatically advocated an analytic-theo-
retical and linguistic-oriented perspective (Burn/Ramsden 1974), conceptual artists
such as Robert Smithson and Adrian Piper combined a deconstruction of the nor-
mative rules of artistic practice with new aesthetic procedures. Piper, whose per-
formances are discussed in the following paragraphs, focuses on functional issues.
She is self-critical and criticizes the conditionality of artistic practices and hierar-
chies, while working on normative boundaries and releasing a poetic force of aes-
thetic practices, procedures, and modes of presentation. My analysis of her Funk
Lessons embraces the concepts of affirmation, transformation, and critique, and
creates a concrete analysis of Piper’s project, from a post-structuralist perspective
as a political micro-practice.3 Bymeans of aesthetic practices, the artist put up nor-
mative notions of social and artistic aesthetic reality for negotiation, and opens the
possibility of new ways of thinking and acting. Adrian Piper and Iris Kensmil are
artists of color. The choice is not accidental, to the contrary. Both artists develop a
critical perspective that goes beyond an ordinary institutional critique.Their works
confront me with my blind spots when examining art in its normative framework
and draw my attention to my privileged white perspective and the effects of un-
conscious identifications. I hope to fulfill the responsibility that correlates with my
choice.
3 This formulation is a shift from micro-politics to the micro-practice of aesthetic procedures,
which by practice aim at reflection in contrast to political action.
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Funk as a Participative Collective Medium
Adrian Piper (*1948 in New York City) is a first-generation concept artist. Participa-
tory practices play a major role in her work, which is based on artistic processes, as
in the tradition of the Cage School, and the action events of Fluxus andHappening.
Such participatory approaches, which integrate the audience through instructions
to the production process, are fundamental to those artistic works which critically
examine the divorce of art and reality (cf. Kravagna 1999). Piper remarks, that igno-
rance and xenophobia have shaped the audience’s perception of her performances
from the outset, especially in relation to the aesthetic language of a black working-
class culture (Piper 1996: 201). She points to a fundamental connection between
art and reality on the level of perception and understanding. Accordingly, it is not
surprising that she does not take side inside or outside the aesthetic regime. On
the contrary, she entangles the practices she is using in the social field with those
in the artistic field. In doing so, she reflects her artistic work in the social field of
community back into the art world, in order to disrupt and transform the inherent
and unconscious patterns of perception in each case.
Figure 1: Adrian Piper, “Funk Lessons”, 1983, Video, 00:15:17. Edited and directed by Sam
Samore, produced by Tom Oden. Documentation of an audience-interactive performance of
Funk Lessons at the University of California, Berkeley. Details: Stills # 250#.
Figure 2: Adrian Piper, “Funk Lessons”, 1983, Video, 00:15:17.Edited and directed by Sam
Samore, produced by Tom Oden. Documentation of an audience-interactive performance of
Funk Lessons at the University of California, Berkeley. Details: Stills # 251
Collection Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin. © APRA Foundation Berlin
Between 1982 and 1984, Piper performed her piece Funk Lessons, which was a
collaborative experiment in cross-culture transfusion, seeking to combine politi-
cal content with pleasurable experiences. She started this project about the history
of African-American funk and soul music shortly after finishing her PhD in phi-
losophy at Harvard University in 1981. Under the title “GET DOWN AND PARTY.
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TOGETHER” she then exercised the work with participants from the university, the
surrounding neighborhood, and those in the art field. A 15-minute video, directed
by Sam Samore and made from footage of Piper’s Funk Lessons at the University of
California, Berkeley, begins with images of a jukebox, focusing on the music appa-
ratus and its mechanics, which is a bit reminiscent of Dziga Vertov’s imagery.This
is followed by a short sequence from the American TV Show Soul Train, a program
which was produced by People of Color for a black audience. From a close-up of
dancers from the show, the video switches to Piper’s performance at U.C. Berke-
ley.4 The subsequent recordings are accompanied by displayed didactic sentences
such as “FUNK IS MODULAR”, “FUNK IS IMPROVISATIONAL”, or “SHOULDER
SHRUG.” The cinematic presentation of Funk Lessons is a montage of insights into
the performance, as it combines sequences from the dancers in Soul Train, Piper’s
later explanations from an interview, video music clips by James Brown and Aretha
Franklin, and a documentary recording of a racist attribution to Rock ’n’ Roll music,
uttered by a representative of the Alabama White Citizens Council, who predicts
whites becoming black through Rock ’n’ Roll.5
Thewhite middle-class’s widespread racist rejection of the Funk idiom as black
working-class culture was the point of departure for Piper’s didactic approach to
her lesson with Funk as a collective and participatory medium of self-transgression
and affection (Piper 1996: 196), and a means of acquiring insight into cultural and
racist barriers. With ‘Funk’ and ‘Lesson’,6 the artist assembles two concepts that
are connoted opposites.
In 1985, according to Piper’s later published comments on her performances,
Funk, a typical expression of black culture in the 1970s, originates with black pop
music and a dance style. Piper describes Funk as “a language of interpersonal com-
munication and collective self-expression that has its origins in African tribal mu-
sic and dance.” (Piper 1996: 195) Funk is a shared pleasure and a dance, based on “a
system of symbols, cultural meanings, attitudes, and patterns of movement that
one must directly experience in order to understand fully.” (Piper 1996: 195) She
continues:
“[…]whereas social dance inwhite culture is often viewed in terms of achievement,
social grace or competence, or spectator-oriented entertainment, it is a collective
and participatory means of self-transcendence and social union in black culture
4 Cf. Funk Lessons (excerpt) http://www.adrianpiper.com/vs/video_fl.shtml, last access
3.25.2020.
5 In the documentary recording, the speaker states: "[...] the obscenity and vulgarity and the
rock 'n' roll music [...]. It is obviously a means by which the white man and his children are
driven to the level of the Negro [...]. It's obviously Negromusic." (Funk Lessons 1983, 00:06:11)
6 'Dance lesson' is a standing concept, 'lesson' is not solely the (lecturing) lesson, but alsomeant
to be an exercise.
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alongmany dimensions, and so is oftenmuchmore fully integrated into daily life.”
(Ibid.)
In her performances, typically addressing more than 60 people, physical experi-
ences of basic elements of musical dance intermix with cultural background infor-
mation, such as in relation of funk to other, ‘white’ music. The performance not
only conveys a shared experience, it also combines experience and reflection. The
affirmation of funk does not invite mere identificatory intoxication, it also inter-
rupts with affective power. Piper’s method is comparable to Bertolt Brecht’s model
of epic theater, which, according to Walter Benjamin, is able to make readers or
viewers participate and invites the actors to comment on their own roles. Accord-
ing to Benjamin, this reflection is caused by the principle of interruption, which
he describes as a method of montage. The interruption has an organizing func-
tion that emancipates itself from a stimulus reaction: “It arrests the action in its
course, and thereby compels the listener to adopt an attitude vis-à-vis the process,
the actor vis-à-vis his role.” (Benjamin 2005: 778)
Piper transforms the original learning situation of the Funk lesson into a “di-
dactic basis for cooperation” through discussions in small groups7 and “social union
replaced the audience-performer separation.” (Piper 1996: 196) The artist tries to
make it clear that what she “purported to teach was revealed to be a kind of funda-
mental sensory ‘knowledge’ that everyone has and can use.” (Ibid.)The performance
does not “aspire to experience black culture sympathetically or through participa-
tion,” (Piper 1996: 208) nor is it acting as a work of art or interactive art, nor is
it intended to create a dull sense of community. The participants are rather ad-
dressed as always already partaking; in the sense that they are part of a historical
and cultural dispositif, in which they subjectivize themselves, their identity, their
thinking, their perception, their ideas, and their attitude. Piper does not reduce the
processes of subjectification to cognitive processes. On the contrary, in her perfor-
mance she reflects the interplay between self-practice and discursively conveyed
norms and attempts to detach Funk from its normative constriction by breaking
it down into individual exercises in order to make it effective for individuation
processes in a new way. This is what it says in a handout distributed for the Funk
Lessons:
7 According to Piper, the triggered reactions succeeded in parallel, organizing the groups to
articulate dismantled beliefs. “The result was often cathartic, therapeutic, and intellectually
stimulating.” (Piper 1996: 198)
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“1. Relaxed back [...].
4. Isolation of body parts: feet, knees, hips [...].
7. Personalistic: variation and play on fixed dance conventions for individual self-
expression. […]
9. Participatory and nonexhibitionistic: dance as an involving communal event,
not entertainment for a spectator audience. […]
12. Repetitive: patterns repeated multiply, or until they become second nature.
13. Improvisational: simple units of physical movement lead into different move-
ments, gradually or instantaneously transforming extended pattern.” (Piper 1996:
213)
Funk Lessons as a Reinforcing Practice
Piper wants to “restructure people’s social identities by making accessible to them
a common medium of communication – funk music and dance.” (Piper 1996: 198)
In Funk Lessons, body and thinking practices are related, affects are interrupted,
and new feelings and transformations become possible. According to this, affects
become cognizable as structured and determined by historical, cultural or social in-
terpretive patterns.8 By dividing Funk into individual physical exercises, she also
fragments the unified and self-assertive image of Funk that has elicited different
responses from middle-class white and black college graduates. She dismantles
the affirmative identification, as well as the aversive racist dimensions of this im-
age, and transforms Funk into a cultural medium of communication that is not
oriented towards stereotypical patterns, but rather questions essentialist attribu-
tions based on dichotomies. Piper relates experience to analysis and a pleasurable
to a critical attitude. She creates a milieu (the communicative medium of Funk) in
which subjectifications on a micro-practical level are carried out in the exercise of
a shared “physical language that everyone was then empowered to use.” (Piper 1996:
195) Consequently, Piper’s Funk Lessons can generally be described as a critical anal-
ysis of representation and as an exercise in self-empowerment. Instead of a critical
mode of operating against racism, Piper moved to a creatively subversive one. She
takes side not from an outside, but from within, she opens a position which deals
with the
8 According to Butler, we are “already social beings, working within elaborate social interpre-
tations both when we feel horror and when we fail to feel it at all. Our affect is never merely
our own: affect is, from the start, communicated from elsewhere. It disposes us to perceive
the world in a certain way, to let certain dimensions of the world in and to resist others. But if
a response is always a response to a perceived state of the world, what is it that allows some
aspect of the world to become perceivable and another not?” (Butler 2009: 50)
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“double bind: The anxiety and fear response to what is perceived as alien and
threatening carries with it the implicit belief that theOther is superior: in strength,
cunning, endurance, and understanding – hence the myth of blacks as bigger,
stronger, cooler, sexier, wiser, hipper, meaner, and so on. White Americans then
get to feel inferior, not only to what they are not (European) because of what they
are (African-influenced) but also to what they are (African-influenced) because
of what they are not (Afro-American). Blacks become an object of fear, loathing,
admiration, and awe.” (Piper 1996: 208)
The heterogeneous and diversified social community, sought by Piper, was at odds
with U.S. society in the 1980s, which was characterized by homogenization and as-
similation, and in which, by adapting, black Americans succeeded in achieving a
certain political, economic, social, and economic equality. Inclusion in the (white)
community was linked to the exclusion of certain cultural life practices. Thus, as
a medium of cultural communication, Piper had to abandon Funk, which she de-
scribes as central to her life and her identity as a black woman. She responded to
this unreasonable demand by sharing “this idiom with my audience so I could use
it successfully in my work as a recognized and comprehended medium of com-
munication, or shared language.” (Piper 1996: 202) Piper’s affirmation of Funk is
indebted to a critical view of the norms taken at face value by white society and its
high culture as well as her refusal to subordinate or adapt herself to its value sys-
tem. Piper had to radically question the understanding of her role as an artist and
her status as a relatively privileged member of (white) society in order to refer to
Funk as “an unbelievably rich and enriching art form” and seize it “for the cultural
benefit of my largely white, upper-middle-class audience.” (Piper 1996: 203) Piper
had to emancipate herself from the social hierarchy and not to be subsumed by it
in order to realize that “black working-class culture […] has invaluable gifts to offer
that audience, and not just the other way around.” (Ibid.)
Piper reflects on the conditions of inclusion or exclusion in reality and art.
On one hand, she addresses the demands, requirements, and impositions linked
to the offer to participate and be part of the white culture and community, and,
on the other hand, the often unconscious acts required to adapt to the values of
the culture in which one wishes to participate. In her performances she confirms
and explores the various cultural dimensions of her identity. She uses the different
communication rules and expressions that she has
“learned in the process ofmyacculturation intowhite culture: the analyticalmode,
the formal and structural analysis, the process of considered and constructive ra-
tional dialogue, the pseudoacademic lecture/demonstration/group participation
style, and so on.” (Piper 1996, 204)
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Instead of side taking in an oppositional style her aim is to switch back and forth
between the different processes of the cultures with ease.
The superimposition of socio-cultural experience and analytical reflection in
Funk Lessons reveals American culture as African-American, which suppresses its
elements of blackness, constructing them as an alien and threatening Other in or-
der to reinforce white identity. The Funk Lessons performances aimed at becoming
different, by being disturbing and becoming existentially tangible for the partici-
pants. The aesthetic translation into the medium of video embodies and performs
the implicit, fundamentally sensory knowledge that is Piper’s point of departure,
and inserts it in the realm of art – as a text in itself, as well as a highly composed,
cinematic montage of image and text material from different sources. In doing
so, the medial turns against the medial, meaning that it is reflected as a medium
and cannot be reduced to the function of a mere transmission. In other words, the
video communicates its performance, interrupts referential references and, refers
to what escapes representation, and at the same time becomes open to multiple
discourses. In this way, Piper’s Funk Lessons could be described as a micro-political
critique.These micro-politics, as envisioned by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, re-
fer to a political experiment and political commitment, which responds to the cap-
italist-led neutralization of “revolutionary politics” and the “revolutionary subject”.
Since the 1970s, “capitalism develops an economic order that could do without the
state.” (Deleuze/Guattari 2005: 454) The disciplinary society is thus replaced by the
control society, and the formations of power which become effective within it oper-
ate through flexible normalization requirements. As a result of these changes, the
tactics and strategies of a revolutionary policy, which oppose repressive normaliza-
tion become ineffective. The individuals adjust their behavior accordingly, for the
norms are no longer imposed repressively, rather they emerge as changeable from
the abundance of social differences and deviations and serve as guidelines, which
are rejected as desired.
Piper seems to be particularly interested in these self-styling practices, when
she associates her aesthetic procedures with physical self-practice. In order to tease
out the importance of working with an individual body, I will further introduce
the concept of micro-practice.9 For even if there are many links and overlaps be-
tween micro-politics and micro-practices, the term micro-practice can also focus on
those power procedures of governmentality that are aimed at the individual body.
Self-practices are utilized in the family as well as in institutions – such as schools,
9 I owe the considerations ofmicro-practice tomy joint researchworkwith Sebastian Dieterich
and Wiktoria Furrer in the project “Micro-practice. Forms of Resistance and Commitment”.
The research project was carried out at the Zurich University of the Arts and was at the same
time a sub-project of the research group “Media and Participation.” (Phase I, 2015–2018), htt
ps://mediaandparticipation.com/about/?lang=en, last access 2.12.2021.
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hospitals, and companies, so that the individual refers to themselves in an irre-
ducible way and subjectivizes him/herself. In contrast,micro-politics can be related
in particular to the bio-politics, which is directed at the population, and thus at
the generic body, as the object to be controlled and influenced and which becomes
effective, for example, through discourse practices and the epistemological rules
of production of fixed knowledge. This differentiation does not imply that micro-
practices are independent of discourse practices. On the contrary, physical micro-
practices are always accompanied by mental representations. Developmental psy-
chology shows that micro-practices are cultivated through initial contact with the
caregivers, and as they develop further “social physical micro-practices are intro-
duced, which are socially normative, and in a sense, learned nuances.” (Downing
2006: 335)10 Thus, micro-practices are profoundly ambivalent. They allow the indi-
vidual to conform to a system, via the body, and they can also work with resistance
as a way to open up internalized and normalized body practices, allowing them
to become permeable to new afflictions. Piper’s micro-practices mobilize the am-
bivalence of physical knowledge. With her exercises, Piper interrupts internalized
perceptual pathways, interferes with their affective effectiveness, and opens up the
possibility of new afflictions. In other words, the aesthetic processes do not re-
duce the bodily affect as a stimulus-response, but activate diverse affinities, giving
the possibility of subjectifications, beyond binary patterns. The exercises can liter-
ally set hardened habitualized body practices into motion, rendering the norma-
tive notions and attributions of Funk on a micro-practical level ineffective. On this
physical basis, forces can mobilize which resist the power of norms, and keep the
dualisms and the optimization of differentiations and individualizations in check.
The artistic-aesthetic practices in Funk Lessons correspond to basic assumptions
of micro-political thinking in several ways, for instance: a political project cannot
be severed from a way of life; that changed behavior of individuals can shape the
world; and the awareness that “no situation is ever fully predetermined by ideo-
logical structures or codings.” (Massumi 2009: 7) Micro-politics attribute a central
function to an event. In contrast to this Piper relies on a micro-practice, which
works on a physical and sensory level, as it modifies The Distribution of the Sensible
(Rancière 2011) and produces sensitivity to (micro-)events, it may also have micro-
political effects. Thus, Piper’s performances unveil the effect of a happening, as
they are influenced by this micro-political perspective: opening up new possibil-
ities of action and new forms of subjectification. Following Maurizio Lazzarato,
this “instantaneous subjective change is an act of both resistance and creation,
10 Physicalmicro-practice is described in developmental psychology as a competence of its own
kind, as embodied skills. It stands for “what is sometimes referred to as procedural or implicit
knowledge, a ‘knowledge-how’ as distinct from a ‘knowing-that’.” (Downing 2006: 337)
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resistance to power and creation of possibilities whose limits are not clearly estab-
lished.” (Lazzarato 2011: 3) Themicro-practice which has been described here, leads
to an unstable state and overrides existing laws, norms, and values – that makes
micro-practices comparable to the event. It opens up subjectification processes
whose “modalities of existence and action are still undetermined.” (Ibid.) From this
perspective, micro-practices can be described as an opening, as an event, “a pos-
sibility for self-transformation and, consequently, of changing the socio-political
situation.” (Ibid.)
Affirmation – Transformation – Critique
Piper’s affirmation transforms what is supposedly affirmed, and this is precisely
where her critical potential lies. The transformant traverses the dichotomous at-
tributions of Funk and thereby takes its basis from the logic of affirmation and
negation. Piper transforms the image of Funk without dissolving the specifics of a
Funk practice. Piper’s project is impressive, in that it makes the interlocking of art
and reality recognizable on the level of perception, thinking, and critical faculty.
Here, the artist does not limit her artistic practice to the studio, nor to the
individual work on the material, nor to the mere production of an object, and
does not rely on the division of labor between practice and theory. On the con-
trary, she actively participates in the discourse about her work. It exposes racist
value judgments and perceptions in art, marks blind spots, and makes restrictions
and unconscious cultural and social ideas visible, tangible, and reflective. Such de-
limitations between artists, art theorists, and critics are among the principles of
conceptual art.
Actively she takes part in the discourse of art, creates a time-diagnostic instru-
ment and acts as a medium of thought and action, which, referring to Barthes’
quoted formulation, organizes the world in a certain way. Piper uses her methods
to address the strategies of emancipatory concepts of the avant-garde: the creation
of a specific experimental situation, which Benjamin once referred to as Brecht’s
dramatic laboratory in contrast to a total dramatic artwork (Benjamin 2005: 779).
Piper’s micro-practices do not fit into the notion of a (spectacular and dramatic)
event. Nevertheless, the moment of interruption is just as inherent to them, as is
the disruption and irritation of internalized emotions. As a result, the micro-prac-
tices exercises can develop a resisting potential. The criticism/politics of Piper’s
project is not judgmental and not revolutionary in the sense of a radical change.
The micro-practices transform the subjectivization apparatus, and thus theorize
and discuss these practices in the aesthetic translations, in video and associated
image, and text materials which are exhibited. Piper performs with them as it were
the discursive becoming of her practice. Piper’s praxeological analytical approach
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conveys itself, as a radical aesthetic process that begins with a fundamentally sen-
sory knowledge, which dissolve the physical disciplines that follow the reduction-
ist notion of Funk as an immediate affective expression, and transforms Funk into
an affective communicationmedium, interpersonal communication, and collective
self-presentation. Piper’s aesthetic process, thus realizes an immanent critique in
line with Brian Massumi – as a critique that differentiates and pluralizes in the
tradition of post-structuralist thinking and thus actively changes its conditions of
origin: instead of judging, instead of side-taking against something, Piper’s mi-
cro-practice involves a displacement and a becoming. The artist does not take an
external standpoint, art does not become an idealized entity which can resolve all
the problems, but pursues the attempt of a change within. Her micro-practices
confront us with the double bind, at the same time, she reveals the construction of
habitual ways of thinking, deconstructs them, and opens a site beyond them. The
double bind does not dissolve through this, but it becomes more understandable.
A De-Colonized Aesthetic Site
Comparable to Piper’s micro-practice work, Dutch artist Iris Kensmil (*1970 in Am-
sterdam) addresses demarcations, polarization, and in- and exclusions of the aes-
thetic regime. In her project for the 58th Venice Biennale in 2019 she tackled West-
ern European art history, and with that corresponded to Spivak’s term of ‘ab-use’.
She dismisses traditional demarcations of the art system regarding history, genre,
and aesthetics. Instead of a linear narrative she creates relations, mixes genres,
and defies categorical distinctions of such as abstraction and figuration.The Dutch
pavilion at the 58th Venice Biennale hosted the exhibition The Measurement of Pres-
ence by Iris Kensmil and Remy Jungerman (*1959 in Suriname) (fig. 3), curated by
Benno Tempel.
The exhibition’s concept was developed in exchange with the artists, and aims
to address the Biennale’s history, the specific space and questions about identity
beyond nationality. In an announcement in e-flux about the Dutch pavilion, this
non-national idea of identity is connected to a danger of assimilation and negation
of differences:
“Places and societies are becoming ever more interconnected in our globalised
world. But, on the whole, globalisation also causes alignment, and imposes pre-
vailing principles. As a result, we risk losing the specific. The Measurement of Pres-
ence will be a post-national presentation that reassesses and debunks these no-
tions and mechanisms.” (Dutch Pavilion 2018)
The artists, both People of Color, live in the Netherlands and have connections to
the former Dutch colony of Suriname, reference 20th century Modernism through
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Figure 3: Left and Back: Iris Kensmil, The New Utopia Begins Here # 2, 2019, ink and
acrylic paint on wall, 580 × 390 cm. Right: Remy Jungerman, Visiting Deities: Kabra
Tafra, 2018–19, wood, cotton textile, kaolin and dry river clay860 × 260 × 70 cm; Horizontal
Obeah GEENGESITONU I, II, III, 2018, painted wood, cotton textile, kaolin, yarn, mirror
and nails, 910 × 370 × 260 cm. 
Photo: Simone Ferraro, © Mondriaan Fund.
their visual language of form and references. A spectator with a Western European
trained and formalized viewpoint towards art can identify these references tomod-
ernism almost immediately: Piet Mondrian, De Stijl, the Russian avant-garde.This
immediate visibility is due to the aesthetic regime ofWestern European art history,
that has marginalized and demarcated anything that deviates from that norm as
problematic. This veils how the processes of in- and exclusion that construct iden-
tity need a constative ‘outside’, which always is also part of the identity that is to
be produced.
Aesthetics, art history and theory have themselves gained their identity and
legitimization through such othering. For instance, when they started to include
‘native art’ in the late 19th and early 20th century in order to legitimize ‘their own’,
non-canonical art. This in turn also meant marginalization: the ‘strange’ artefact
of the ‘others’ were framed as ‘primitive’ or as “ritual-magical or practical objects.”
(Kunst der ‘Primitiven’ 2018: 322)
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My reception of Krensmil’s work aims to show, how she emphasizes this consti-
tutive double bind of aesthetics, by refusing to oppose the aesthetic regimewith the
deconolonial other as well as rejecting to be partial to that other. Instead, as Okwui
Enwezor puts it for postcoloniality, Kensmil makes “empire’s former ‘other’ visible
and present at all times, either through the media or through mediatory, spectato-
rial, and carnivalesque relations of language, communication, images, contact, and
resistance within the everyday.” (Enwezor 2002: 45) Not in a post-modern manner
for “relativizing historical transformations and contesting the lapses and prejudices
of epistemological grand narratives, postcoloniality does the observe, seeking in-
stead to sublate and replace all grand narratives through new ethical demands on
modes of historical interpretation.” (Ibid.)
Kensmil uses the reflexive potential of the (aesthetic) double bind, as did Spivak
and Piper. Her work is hence not about conflict within the aesthetic regime in art,
and not about a better art history. It is about raising cultural, political, and ethi-
cal questions within the aesthetic dispositive. I want to distinguish the aesthetic
dispositive from Jacques Rancière’s aesthetic regime in so far, as it not only relates
to aesthetics in art. It is not about the identification, of “what we call art”, which
is the goal Rancière wants to achieve through the three regimes of ethics, poetics,
and aesthetics (cf. Rancière 2011). In the aesthetic regime, which mostly relates to
romanticism and modernism, “the identification of art no longer occurs via a divi-
sion within ways of doing and making, but it is based on distinguishing a sensible
mode of being specific to artistic products.” (Ibid.: 22)
This ‘way of being’ has been described as genuinely iconic, especially with the
pictorial or iconic turn. Polarizations of the visual and the verbal, image and text,
visible and sayable have been promoted and potential indistinguishabilities or per-
meabilities have been omitted, for the sake of pure “iconic difference.” (cf. Boehm
1995)
Even if the sayable and visible can be described as mutually exclusive, as what
we see is not equivalent to what is said and vice versa, they are still related to
one another. They are a specific corpus within the discursive practices of a his-
toric era, which becomes evident under specific conditions. “For visibilities, in the
light of historical formations, form scenes which are to the visible element what
a statement is to the sayable or readable.” (Deleuze 1988: 80) Statements cannot
be separated from their formations and visibilities cannot be separated from their
apparatuses, that is organizations and functions that let us see anything.
The aesthetic and the visible hence are not only sensory, but also evoke the sen-
suous and sayable. As such, the aesthetic is structured by knowledge and structures
it as well as producing processes of subjectification. Different to the merely sen-
sory, the sensuous is – according to Rancière – a sense connected to meaning (both
sens in the French original), something that can be interpreted and evaluated (cf.
Rancière 2008: 43). It is important to stress that “each historical formation sees
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and reveals all it can within the conditions laid down for visibility, just as it says
all it can within the conditions relating to statements.” (Deleuze 1988: 59) Because
of this conditionality, content, form, and expression, visible and sayable coalesce
in creating knowledge – despite their different ways of being. Furthermore, it is
noteworthy that the aesthetics of art, i.e., the iconic difference is historic as well.
The visible, as sensuous and sayable, is – despite the explained differences – con-
ditioned by hegemonial powers of construction and definition, who make things
become visible and sayable and connote themwithmeaning.Countering strategies,
aiming to redistribute the sensuous and mobilize the knowledge-power-complex,
can be employed precisely because of this connection.
Im-Proper Perspectives
Kensmil’s three-part installation (fig. 4)TheNewUtopiaBeginsHere # 1,TheNewUtopia
Begins Here # 2 and Beyond the Burden of Representation evokes positions that can be
sorted into classic categories of artistic/activist and different genres in a traditional
manner.Beyond the Burden of Representation shows books fromBlack Culture Studies
and PoC authors on a bookshelf next to a publication by artist Stanley Brouwn: from
Darby English’s How to See a Work of Art in Total Darkness (2007), to Kobena Mercer’s
Welcome to the Jungle: New Positions in Black Cultural Studies (1994), Adrian Piper’s Es-
cape to Berlin. A TravelMemoir (2018), bell hooks’Ain’t I aWomen (1987),Octavia E. But-
ler’s Parable of the Sower (1993), Carole Boyce Davis’ Left of KarlMarx:The Political Life of
Black Communist Claudia Jones (2008), Joyce Moore Turner’s Caribbean Crusaders and
the Harlem Renaissance (2005), Audre Lorde’s Sister Outsider (1984), Suzanne Césaires’
The Great Camouflage: Writings of Dissent (1941–1945) (2012), and Édouard Glissant’s
Poetics of Relation (1997).
Furthermore, there are paintings of installation shots of exhibitions and art-
works representing artistic positions since the 1960s, which have been particularly
focused on developing a radically anti-subjective yet bodily-material or processual
language or which have taken a postcolonial-activist stance.These pieces are based
on images a simple google image search will put out. They show, all in oil on can-
vas, Charlotte Posenenske’s 1976 Offenbach exhibition, the Impossible Objects exhi-
bition by Brouwn from 1976 at the Van Abbemuseum in Eindhoven, On Kawaras’
work One Million Years as exhibited at the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam in 1999,
David Hammons’ Untitled (Basketball drawing + stone) which was part of the 2006
exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, New York and an installation from the A
Synthesis of Intuitions, 1965–2016 exhibition by Adrian Piper at the New YorkMuseum
of Modern Art (cf. Tempel 2019). The gathered artists each problematized their po-
sitions within the artistic regime and tried “protecting his/her authenticity against
institutions and critics.” (Tempel 2019: para 3)
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Figure 4: Left: Iris Kensmil, Beyond the Burden of Representation, 2019, acrylic paint on
wall, oil on canvas, books on shelves, 580 × 390 cm, back: Remy Jungerman. 
Photo: Gerrit Schreurs, © Mondriaan Fund.
Posenenske turned against the idea of the original singular masterpiece with
her serial works, and ended her artistic career in the late 1960s for her path in social
sciences. Adrian Piper addressed racism and xenophobia in the art world in many
of her works. The artist and professor of philosophy, who emigrated to Berlin in
2005 due to mobbing at work and racist and sexist discrimination, did not attend
the retrospective of her work, which was hosted at the Museum of Modern Art in
New York and is what Kensmil painted here.David Hammons was active in the civil
rights movement and, as an Afro-American artist, has been ignored by the white
art world. He uses his art works as means of communication.The work referenced
by Kensmil, Untitled (basketball drawing + stone), was made by repeatedly dibbling
a dusty, graphite covered basketball on a white sheet of paper. On Kawara, like
Brouwn, rejected the author-centered biographical reception of artworks.
There, undoubtedly, are even more aspects to be mentioned about the artistic
strategies and practices employed by these artists, and the positions they are as-
cribed in Kensmil’s work.They all brought institutional norms to the fore,which are
shaped by cultural-political, economic concept, and, certainly not only, aesthetics.
And they questioned the apparent unfoundedness of inequalities.
48 Elke Bippus
Across the room from Beyond the Burden of Representation, Kensmil shows large-
scale portraits, also in oil, of black feminists, authors, and activists (fig. 5).
Figure 5: Iris Kensmil, The New Utopia Begins Here # 1, 2019, Acryl, Öl, 550 × 1596 cm. 
Photo: GerritSchreurs, © Mondriaan Fund.
Some of whom are also present on the bookshelf mentioned before, but all are
at least represented there through their lives’ work and impact. The portraits also
reference utopias of black, female intellectuals. Kensmil researched, in cooperation
with The Black Archives11, black utopists from the Caribbean’s, North-America, and
Europe.The portraits show feminist and panafricanist Amy Ashwood Garvey (1897-
1969), who founded the Negro World Newspaper with her former husband Marcus
Garvey, and who was active in the feminist movement that formed around Sylvia
Pankhurst; communist and activist Hermina Huiswoud (1905-1998), who fought
for Suriname’s independence; journalist and activist Claudia Jones (1915-1964); sur-
realist and anti-colonial author and activist Suzanne Césaire (1915-1966); Science
11 “The Black Archives is a unique historical archive for inspiring conversations, activities,
and literature from Black and other perspectives that are often overlooked elsewhere. The
Black Archives documents the history of black emancipation movements and individuals in
the Netherlands. The Black Archives is managed by the New Urban Collective.” The Black
Archives: http://www.theblackarchives.nl/about-us.html, last access 3.13.2020.
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Fiction author Octavia E. Butler (1947-2006); literary scholar bell hooks (*1952); and
DJ and singer Sister Nancy (*1962), whose song Bam Bam became a world-wide
success in 1982.
On another wall – which stretches into Jungerman’s installation (fig. 3) – Kens-
mil’s third workTheNewUtopia Begins Here # 2 is placed: a portrait of author and ac-
tivist Audre Lorde (1934-1992), done in ink and covered with black bars and squares.
All portraits distinctly express that they are not trying to fulfill aesthetic mark-
ers of quality, neither regarding their motives nor their painting. They resemble
simple portraiture photography and do not aim to individually characterize the de-
picted, instead they leave the burden of representation behind for their symbolic-
referential function.
In an interview Kensmil mentioned that the acrylic wall paintings in the
Measurements of Presence installation were inspired by Mondrian and Kasimir
Malewitsch, and their abstract forms and ways to use light, space, and form in
their works (Jocks 2019). The artist describes the avant-garde’s utopia as a one-
sided ideal and places another utopia – that of black, female intellectuals – next
to it: playing with the relation between ground and figure Kensmil overlays her
references of modernist avant-garde and anti-racist activism with each other.
Sometimes the portraits of the activist, philosophers, authors, and musicians
overlay the abstract forms of the wall painting and then Audre Lorde’s portrait
is covered with the rectangular shapes. This balancing of figure and ground is
different to modes of hiding, emerging, uncovering, or unveiling often present in
biased and hierarchical depictions. Figure and ground are clearly separate and yet
equally worked upon, so their relation remains indifferent.
Kensmil perforates the Western European aesthetics of modernism, includes
aesthetic-political activist and by that refers to historic and geopolitical interfer-
ences and penetrations of the aesthetic dispositive. The non-European traditions
are not added as new additions of the aesthetics of the global south in a presumably
new, globalized art world. Instead, they are marked as immanent counter move-
ments and transnational interlacing of modernism and mobilize the narrative of
the aesthetic regime.
The narratives that become possible are not oriented at the writings of mod-
ernism’s history, instead (historic) readings of colonial hegemonies and anti-hege-
monies unfold in the aesthetic dispositive.
History and knowledge, it can be said, in regard to Kensmil’s work, depend
on a becoming, a becoming visible and sayable. The art works described here crit-
ically address the systems of organization and representation of knowledge, and
focus on what becomes visible and sayable through them, what is hidden and con-
cealed through them.TheWestern European knowledge dispositive is explored and
shaken up regarding its aesthetic configuration and mediation. The disruption of
the aesthetic regime’s representation patterns by including references shines a light
50 Elke Bippus
on the dispositive structure of aesthetics and therefore reveal its connection to po-
litical, economic, and historic factors. The specific conditions of a time regarding
what can be said or seen can then be scrutinized. The interruption of the usual
shows the power-knowledge-complex that determines – through an interplay of
forces, strategies, and counter-strategies – which knowledge gains space, is ac-
cepted and who can articulate that knowledge.
The artist apparently does not only want to extend the canon of the visi-
ble/sayable. Instead, she problematizes the aesthetic dispositive, which deter-
mines what can be seen or said, but also can render things invisible or unsayable
through in- or exclusion. Kensmil’s critical reading of the Western European (art)
history asks, which exclusions, repressions, and exotifications come alongside the
aesthetic sensibilisation of modernisms and the division of the sensual.
Aesthetic sensibilisation is, as Ruth Sonderegger explained in her analysis of
Immanuel Kant’s aesthetics in the context of colonial capitalism, based on Kant’s
assumption,
“that some people are impervious to sensibilities, as in the sensus communis, and
hence insensible to aesthetic experiences and opinions. These skills are […] a dis-
tinction, which the bourgeoisie and its intellectuals claimed for themselves in the
18th century. This includes both a distinction towards the inside and the lower
class, who still need to be made sensible, as well as towards the colonial other,
which is only partially eligible for any pedagogic sensibilisation.” (Sonderegger
2018: 122)
Colonialism, social hierarchies, marginalization, repressions, and demarcations
are at the core of the distribution of the sensible in the aesthetic regime. Kens-
mil’s art work create the space for an aesthetic that needs to be de-colonized, and
that enables a reading of the invisible/unsayable in theWestern European (art) his-
tory. Her work does not perpetuate an iconic difference, but becomes a “modality
of expression” (Foucault 1993: 74) that functions as a re-distribution of the sensuous
and necessarily ‘ab-uses’ aesthetics.This ab-use of aesthetics removes the certainty
of taking the right side by shifting binary logic.
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Corpoanarchy: A Molecular Act of Refusal
Kamran Behrouz
This chapter is based on an artistic research, attempting to connect interrelated
parts of two multimedia installations1 together in order to unfold the notion of
‘corpoanarchy’ as a form of protest. The artworks were based on research about
the effects of biopolitics on normalization and containment of the corporeality of
trans/queer/non-binary bodies. In several cases within authoritarian states (e.g.,
Iran), such effects resulted in the disposition of bodies in diaspora, camps, and ex-
ile, which introduced these bodies to new rigid forms of borders and necropolitics.
This process reveals the failure of the universality of human rights.Under neoliberal
capitalism, pharmaceutical industries commodified health and the representation
of bodies and sexuality – what Michel Foucault analyzes as “the constitution of the
market as site of the formation of truth” (Foucault 1990-98). Preciado calls it the
“pharmacopornographic” era (2013: 23), where identities and even pleasure are co-
dependent on the dosage of our intakes provided by the market (e.g., performance
enhancers, antidepressants, or hormones). ‘Corpoanarchy’ suggests a critical way
of dealing with this matrix through a performative refusal on a molecular level.
The main visual reference in both installations (see fig. 1 & fig. 2) is a hand
painted and digital printed piece of transparent textile, similar to skin, resembling
a glossary page defining the meaning of the phrase ‘corpoanarchy’, alongside a
painting based on a famous historical photo, taken on June 13th 1936. The image
presumably shows August Landmesser (Eckler 1996), a German citizen who refused
to perform the Nazi salute at the launch of the naval training vessel Horst Wessel.
This project utilizes the historical photo as a microscopic metaphor to visualize the
corporeality of ‘corpoanarchy’. (see fig. 3.)
1 The first multimedia installation was exhibited in Raumstation, Zurich, December 2018. The
exhibition titled, Corpoanarchy: A (trans)lational tale, is my attempt to reflect on the politics
of language and Biopolitics. The second iteration of this multimedia installation titled, Cor-
poanarchy: the politics of radical refusal, was exhibited in Helmhaus, Zurich, September 2019.
My aim in this work is to identify and unfold the different forms of corpoanarchy as they ap-
pear in contemporary history. There are several interrelated fragments connecting these two
installations, which this chapter attempts to analyze in depth.
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Figure 1: Corpoanarchy: A (Trans)lational Tale, Raumstation, Zurich, 2018, detail.
Figure 2: Corpoanarchy: The Politics of Radical Refusal, Helmhaus, Zurich, 2019, detail.
Figure 3: Left: original image of August Landmesser 1963, photographer unknown. Right:
manipulated and hand-painted version of the image, 2018, Kamran Behrouz.
It attempts to raise a series of questions: What do we call such acts of re-
fusal? Could it be resistance? Persistence? Civil courage? Or resilience? Or do we
need another word to express a complexity as such?
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Somatic Translation and Untranslatability
The term corpoanarchy is a neologism; it wants to claim existence as a new word,
whilst also revealing the process of translation and ‘untranslatability.’ The word
itself follows the semiological structure of the phrase corporeal or corporeus in Latin,
which means “from the body” (from corpus “body”). Here, ‘real’ has been replaced
with ‘anarchy’, and the combination is defined as: “the performative refusal of the
body on a molecular level”.
What is crucial in this research is the untranslatability of the word ‘anarchy’ in
Farsi. The etymology of the word ‘anarchy’ goes back to its Greek roots: Anarkhia –
“lack of a leader, the state of people without a government” (from an- “without”, and
arkhos “leader”). However, the translation of the word anarchy in Farsi is “chaos”.
It is a fascinating gap which might accidentally reveal a crucial piece of Persia and
the Persian language’s history, that is an indisputably monarchical history. From
the Madian (650-330 BC) to the Sassanid empire (224-651 AD), to the Qajar (1789-
1925) or Pahlavi dynasties (1925-1979) and even contemporary history, the figure
of king or ‘supreme leader’ has never been, even temporarily, eliminated from the
social imaginary. Even the history of Persian literature is filledwith figures of rebels
and heroes who lead the nation towards freedom or peace. Could this explain the
untranslatability of the word anarchy in Farsi? How does history reveal itself in
language? And how do languages forge psycho-political structures?
Languages shape and create not only subjectivity, but subjectivation. Accord-
ingly, when subjects lack specific signifiers to register or to express their experi-
ences (for any cultural and/or historical reason), the notions and subjects have been
bent and compromised themselves in other familiar signifiers, which at some point
perpetuate the lack and normalize the absence.
This issue is similar to the lack of a sufficiently precise word to address trans-
gender people in Farsi. Likewise, the crucial distinctions expressed by the words
sex, gender, and sexuality are conflated in Farsi into one single term: jensiat.The term
jensiat is thus very similar to the Latin word genus.
Moreover, sex and gender as keywords in trans-Atlantic feminist theory, have
always been at the center of untranslatability in queer-feminist discourses within
different languages. “Take the English term ‘genre,’, which like Greek genos, French
genre, or German Geschlecht is an Untranslatable prime” (Apter 2013: 145). Genre in-
terfered with the translation of “gender” in Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble (Butler
1990-99) when the book began to appear in different languages. As Butler men-
tioned themself:
“Like ‘genus’ in Swedishwhich implies species-being, so Geschlecht in German im-
plied not only a natural kind, but a mode of natural ordering that served the pur-
poses of the reproduction of the species. That early German translators of Gender
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Trouble chose to translate ‘gender’ as ‘Geschlechtsidentität’ (sexual identity) may
have been an effort to move away from species discourse, or perhaps it was a way
of responding to those emerging queer arguments that claimed that binary sex
was understood to serve the purposes of reproducing compulsory heterosexual-
ity (Rubin, Butler). The problem with that choice, however, was that it confused
gender with sexual orientation or disposition. And part of the analytic work of
understanding gender apart from biological causality and functionalism was pre-
cisely to hold open the possibility that gender appearance may not correspond to
sexual disposition or orientation in predictable ways.” (Butler 2014: 1040)
As Brad Epps has noted, “Gender Trouble, in a global frame, needs to be at once
supplemented (in the deconstructive sense) and recast as ‘translation trouble’ or,
better yet, ‘language trouble’.” (Najmabadi 2014: 8) Drawing on these arguments,
my research is an attempt to challenge the existing methodologies, to re-translate
these terms, or to even come up with new terms as a solution for avoiding ‘cultural
discombobulation’2. In other word: “staying with the trouble” (Haraway 2016) of
untranslatability during the act of translation.
Figure 4: Etymology and Translation of the word Corpoanarchy in English
and Persian.
2 Persian readers may find it helpful to reference: Ashouri, Daryoosh, Rethinking Persian Lan-
guage, Nashr-e Markaz, Tehran, 1993
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In the present research, ‘corpoanarchy’ is translated into Farsi as nafarmani
badani.This phrase is very similar to nafarmani madani, whichmeans civil disobedi-
ence. However, the word ‘civil’ (madani) is replaced by the word ‘bodily’ (badani). At
first sight this may seem to be merely a cosmopolitical word play between madan
(‘cities’) and badan (‘body’), but in fact it also fits the meaning of the concept of
corpoanarchy as it has unfolded in archives of trans, non-binary, and queer bodies
in diaspora, exile, or refugee camps.Nafarmani badani translates back to English as
“bodily disobedience” which might be the closest equivalent in Farsi to the concept
of corpo+anarchy (body without leader) as a form of civil disobedience on a molecular
level of concrete, embodied practice(s). (See fig. 4.)
Semiotics (Translation) and Somatics (Performance)
The other fragment in this constellation was an installation called A room of her own,
which was a tribute to the unspeakable death of queer and trans people who silently
disappear from the collective memory of queer culture.When I first read about the
case of Mahtab3 – an Iranian transgender asylum seeker (cf. Shakhsari 2013: 565),
who found themselves stuck in the Kafkaesque political dispositive of borders, it
immediately reminded me of Virginia Woolf ’s essay “A Room of One’s Own” (Woolf
1929). In Mahtab’s case, it seems that their daily existence and comfort had been so
profoundly unsettled that death itself came to hold a promise of comfort: death as
the only room of one’s own; death as a performative refusal. (See fig. 5)
The installation depicts Mahtab’s room shortly after they took their life silently
in their apartment, with a storyteller stating an androgynous manifesto projected
on top of their deathbed.4
Archive
In 2016, while I was doing research at the archives of Iran’s Human Rights Docu-
mentation Center5, looking for cases and testimonies of trans and queer refugees,
as well as the rates of suicide amongst these groups, I accidentally came across
3 “[Mahtab]waswaiting for several years to be recognized as a legitimate refugeeby theUnited
NationsHigh Commission onRefugees (UNHCR) and the Canadian embassy. In 2008, not too
long after arriving in Canada, [Mahtab] quietly took her life in her apartment, which she was
asked to vacate as the terms of her subsidized housing had come to an end.” (Shaksari 2014:
565)
4 Cf. http://www.kamranbehrouz.com/corpoanarchy/a-room-for-her-own/, last access,
01.01.2020.
5 Cf.: https://iranhrdc.org/, last access 1.07.2020.
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Figure 5: Corpoanarchy: The Politics of Radical Refusal,
Helmhaus, Zurich, 2019, detail.
Mahtab’s case6, which led me directly to Sima Shakhsari’s work and their crucial
essay Killing me softly with your rights (2014). The story of Mahtab outlines an un-
speakable death, which Shakhsari analyzes in depth, and sadly, this story is not
6 Sima Shakhsari (2013: 565) referred to Mahtab in: ‘The transgender studies reader Vol.2
edited by Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle’ as “Naz” in order to protect their privacy.
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the only one: there are several similar cases regarding the necropolitics of queer
displaced bodies.7
Iran has a peculiar and paradoxical history of gender and sexuality:
“Some of the conceptual distinctions among gender, sex, and sexuality within
the Anglo-American context, including the distinction sometimes made between
transgender and transsexual (based on surgical modifications to the body), have
been shaped over the past decades by the identity politics of gender and sexuality
as well as queer activism and queer critical theory. Transsexuality in Iran has not
been shaped by such developments.” (Najmabadi 2014: 8)
Contemporary narratives affirm that transgender people are legally accepted as
“correction cases”, and in fact they must go through long and absurd interviews
and examinations called ‘diagnostic test’,8 in order to be separated from homosex-
uals. (In contrast to ‘correction cases,’ homosexuals are considered deviants, and
as a group find themselves systematically and relentlessly discriminated against).
Sometimes these interviews consist of utterly absurd and gender-normative
questions such as: “Do you squeeze your toothpaste tube in the middle or from the
bottom up?”9 (Najmabadi 2014: 30) And some of these random questions determine
one’s gender identity as well as the fate of an individual’s body. Some of these
random questions determine which hormones belong to which bodies and which
bodies will be illegalized or degraded.
Surprisingly, in such a conservative country, after this process, transgender
people are legally accepted and have the right to go through transition, hormone
therapy, and surgery and even get a new identification card or passport. However,
transition in Iran is not a matter of liberating choice but rather a ‘normalization
7 Cf.: https://iranhrdc.org/in-memory-of-marjan-ahouraee-an-iranian-transsexual-refugee/,
last access 01.01.2020.
8 According to the Iranian Public Conscription Organization of NAJA's last updated list of var-
ious grounds that can exempt men [assigned male at birth] from obligatory Military service
(02.01.2021), Transsexuality (written only in Latin as TS without any translation in Farsi) is
mentioned under “Chapter 5: Psychiatric Diseases, Section 12: Gender Identity disorder (TS)
that is certified by Legal Medicine organization and confirmed by the Armed Service's medi-
cal centers (ASMC) is ground for permanent exemption”.
Even though according to Iran's Islamic penal code, “Article 234, homosexuality (in case of
male-male penile-anal intercourse) is punishable by death”, paradoxically, in the same Chap-
ter 5: Psychiatric Diseases, Article 7 states: “Perversions that violate the social and military
codeof conduct (such as sexual perversion andhomosexuality)warrant a 6monthdeferment.
After 6 months deferment, and upon confirmation by the ASMC, the applicant is eligible for
a permanent exemption.” Cf. http://vazifeh.police.ir , last access 02.01.2021 (The website is
only accessible in Iran or via VPN)
9 “The presumption is that females are neat and press from the bottom up; males just squeeze
the toothpaste tube randomly, usually from the middle.” (Najmabadi 2014: 26).
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proces’s: an obligatory rule for transgender people to turn into ‘corrected bodies’.
So, what we have as an archive of transgender people in Iran is limited to those
who accepted and completed this process.What has never been documented or has
simply been erased from the archive are the histories of those bodies who refused
to be normalized in this way or who never came out as a transgender person.
If this is biopolitics, how should we map it? A condition that forces transgen-
der people to either transition or leave their home country – and thus deal with
other forms of necropolitics, biopolitics, or border policies, highly charged by new
right-wing policies such as the U.S. Muslim-ban? A condition designed to make
you depressed while you remain suspended indefinitely within the necropolitical
borders.
By contrast, ‘corpoanarchy’ suggests a molecular resistance in such cases, by
rejecting the forces of substances as a molecular disobedience. Along with com-
pulsory hormones, substances such as strong antidepressants, which come with
the explicit warning: “suicidal thoughts might be the side effect of this medica-
tion” have been often (ab)used as a technique of normalization. The problem is not
necessarily the negative impact of substances (e.g. antidepressants) but the pres-
sure applied. In other words, instead of seeking another solution or addressing the
root of the illness, substances are forcefully prescribed to make people functional
as quickly as possible.
Phenomenology of the Red Virus
As I previously argued, ‘corpoanarchy’ suggests a critical way of dealing with a
matrix of thoughts, a performative refusal on a molecular level.The model is based
on the performance of an ‘antibody’ in confrontation with a virus. Here, red virus is
a metaphor for the ‘politics of fear’ perpetuated by right-wing populist politicians
of today (see fig.7/6).
In the final section of this chapter, I examine the performativity of social move-
ments through the lens of the behavior of such micro-organisms. The phrase (cor-
poanarchy/ ) itself might be understood as a proposition for a sys-
tematic form of “micropolitics” (Paar 2005: 164).
The third fragment of my research is an animation showcased in both multi-
media installations. (See fig. 6/7) In the first installation, the video is placed next
to the painting of Chelsea Manning, carrying the message of “I would prefer not
to” (Melville 2009) on her hat,10 as an attempt to sum up the notion of refusal as
taking a side. In the second installation, exhibited in Helmhaus, Zurich (2019), an
10 Cf. http://www.kamranbehrouz.com/corpoanarchy/phenomenology-of-the-red-virus/, last ac-
cess 8.4.2021.
نافرمانی بدنی
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Figure 6: Video still of the animation ‘Phenomenology of the Red Virus’, Kamran Behrouz,
2018.
animation is projected on sheer fabric next to the death bed of Mahtab. This work
analyzes the performance of the red virus and creates a bridge between the work-
ings of populist movements and the notion of the “banality of evil” introduced by
Hannah Arendt (1978: 148).
The animation shows a red cap with the words “banality of evil” written on it,
resembling the MAGA (short for ‘Make America Great Again’) hat, used in Don-
ald Trump’s election rallies. The hat endlessly spins around, and an otherworldly
voice narrates the following story:“Then suddenly a red virus emerged, nobody
knew who was the patient zero exactly, but it outbursts quickly. Some of them
were panicked, most of themwere infected. It was really amessmy dear, you can’t
believe that. You know, it always needs a host: a body, a brain, a political narrative,
circulating on social media and news and a brain and the news and the brain, and
the news... like a Red Virus, but on the other hand there was this meme saying:
‘you can’t spell the hatred without red hat’... I found it genius.
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Figure 7: Painting, Acrylic and ink on paper, Kamran Behrouz, 2018.
But the virus, you know, is not something new, you know that, we thought we’ve
been vaccinated, we never did, we never really been cured. Now once again a
shiny new red virus, dismembering our memory. A very simple and banal mon-
ster. Arendt calls it the ‘banality of evil’: something like the inability to think, to
giving in your thoughts to those mad men. Haraway calls it ‘thoughtlessness’, I
kind of like it... My grandma on the other hand used to say ‘evil will repeat itself
without compassion, will repeat itself ruthlessly and thoughtlessly till it destroys
itself’... (sigh) you know evil can’t reflect and that’s the T. So, I step back to rethink
everything again: am I a virus? Or am I an antibody?”11
It fades to the painting (see fig. 7) while the Song for the Unification of Europe by
Zbigniew Preisner plays in the background (Behrouz 2019).12
The story ends with an open-ended question and harks back to the notion of
reflection and thoughtlessness, which is perfectly outlined by Hannah Arendt in
The Life of the Mind: “The sad truth of the matter is that most evil is done by people
who never made up their minds to be or do either evil or good.” (1978: 148)
11 Ibid.
12 Cf. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SH_8C_p1VsE&feature=emb_title, last access
01.01.2020.
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This brings me back to the first line of this paper. Can we consider the notion of
refusal, or better, of ‘micropolitics of remaining still’, as a form of political protest?
Or in other words, how is it possible to utilize the corporeal act of refusal as a form
of occupying space or even a radical form of protest? (See fig. 8)13
Figure 8: Contemporary examples of corpoanarchy: Kamran
Behrouz, Helmhaus, Zurich, 2019, detail of the installation pol-





13 Three paintings part of the installation the politics of radical refusal. Right: August Landmesser
(May 24, 1910–October 17, 1944). Left: Thích Quảng Đức (1897–June 11, 1963), who was a Viet-
namese Mahayana Buddhist monk who burned himself to death at a busy Saigon road in-
tersection on 11 June 1963, to protest Vietnamese government led by Ngô Đình Diệm. In the
middle: Sahar Khodayari: (c. 1990 – September 8, 2019) also known as the Blue Girl, was an
Iranian woman who disguised herself as a man to get into the stadium in order to watch
her favorite blue team. After she was arrested, she set herself on fire in protest of her prison
sentence, in front of the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Tehran. She remained unsupported
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Feminist Dissent
Taking Sid/tes in Making ‘Purple Noise’
Magdalena Götz
Illuminated in purple, a noisy concert filled the workshop space of Hartware Me-
dienKunstVerein in Dortmund early on a Sunday morning in February 2019. While
live-streaming the concert on Periscope via smartphones, other devices were used
to take photographs of the side-swapping performers and audience, and uploaded
on Instagram. Tweets got published on Twitter, and pictures of diversified gender
symbols spread on the social media channels of the techno-feminist artist group
#purplenoise. During all this, a new hashtag and concept was created: #noisefemi-
nism. The so-called ‘noise concert’ was the result of participants of the workshop
#imakenoise – Playing with störfaktors1 experimenting with the distorting of sounds
they had recorded in and around the art space. Together with three members of
#purplenoise,2 the aim of the workshop was to discuss and practice “noisification
as a technofeminist strategy for dealing with social media”3 as Cornelia Sollfrank,
initiator of the art project, summarized. Following the practices and discourses of
the art project, I argue that #purplenoise combines participatory tactics and femi-
nist claims for their taking of various sites and sides. It makes use of digital mobile
media to critically reflect on the harmful normalization of social media practices
while using these very media to do so. Thereby, #purplenoise aims at collectively
disobeying what they frame as ‘algorithmic despotism’ that entangles its users in
complex power relations through social media and its platforms. Siding with femi-
nist convictions, various offline and online sites are claimed to be occupied with so-
1 The workshop #imakenoise – Playing with störfaktors took place as part of the exhibition
Computer Grrrls that brought together “more than 20 international artistic positions that
negotiate the complex relationship between gender and technology in past and present.” The
exhibition was curated by Inke Arns and Marie Lechner and on display at HMKV Dortmund
from October 27th, 2018 to February 24th, 2019, cf. https://www.hmkv.de/exhibition/exhibiti
on-detail/computer_grrrls.html, last access 5.17.2021.
2 The workshop was conceptualized and carried out by Charlotte Bonjour, Johanna Thompson,
and Cornelia Sollfrank, all members of #purplenoise.
3 Sollfrank, Cornelia (2019): Twitter-Post by coco sollfrank @csollfrank, February 25, 2019, http
s://twitter.com/csollfrank/status/1099960295559229441, last access 5.17.2021.
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called ‘purple noise’, with social media content going viral. In doing so, #purplenoise
intends to queer the norms of and propose alternative practices for and by using
social media in ways that I would like to frame as ‘feminist dissent’. Understand-
ing dissent as an “interfering, interrupting modality,” (Bippus/Ochsner/Otto 2016:
275) it can be conceptualized as “disruptions in participation processes, which can
be located in the media configurations themselves.” (Bippus/Ochnser/Otto 2016:
262) Accordingly, ‘queer thinking’ and the practices of queering become a mode of
dissent. As such, queer thinking constitutes a tactic to think and act critically in
contrary to ‘straightening’ concepts and aims at destabilizing gender hierarchical,
heteronormative, binary conceptualizations.This article traces the techno-feminist
art project #purplenoise across various sites and sides of dissent, online and offline
alike. Exploring how these artistic discourses and practices engage in strategies
of participation, dissent, and queering, the analysis reflects the interrelations be-
tween art and digital, mobile and “affective infrastructures,” (Berlant 2016: 414). As
the focus point, I pose the question: How can the taking of sides and sites be en-
visioned and put into practice in participatory art as ways of queer thinking and
feminist dissent?
“Techno-Feminist Intervention”: Art Practices of #purplenoise
In its manifesto, #purplenoise defines itself as “an erratic techno-feminist interven-
tion operating on a global scale to noisify social media channels.” (#purplenoise
2019a) Initiated by Cornelia Sollfrank, net-artist and cyberfeminist in the 1990s,
researcher and technofeminist till today, and realized together with Janine Sack,
Christina Grammatikopoulou, JohannaThompson, and Isabel de Sena, all situated
in the fields of art, culture and research, the self-proclaimedmovement launched in
2018 with a street protest. Invited to the City of Women Festival in the Southern-
German city of Esslingen, they took the opportunity to put their manifesto into
practice: they claimed the streets, wearing purple-colored clothes and so-called
‘feelers’ on their heads, holding protest signs featuring new hashtags and self-cre-
ated gender symbols, using megaphones to declare their demands while simulta-
neously producing ‘noise’ in form of, mainly visual, content for their various social
media channels (see fig 1).4
Sollfrank explains this doubled intervention as follows: “We organized a street
protest and worked on the representation of this protest on social media in order
to investigate the dynamics between the two spheres that have grown together into
4 A video of the protest can be found on YouTube: Purple Noise (2018): “Purple Noise Demon-
stration in Esslingen”, uploaded October 21, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AloTcI
umf_o&t=24s, last access 6.06.2019.
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an ‘expanded space’, as Grammatikopoulou calls it.” (Sollfrank 2018: 7) Organizing
events in physical sites, like street protests and workshops in art institutions, and
at the same time inviting participants to join in on their producing and sharing
of online content for and on their social media sites, constitute core practices of
#purplenoise. In variousmanifestations, they occupy these diverse sites with a range
of tactics in order to pursue their declared aim, namely the “feminist noisification
of social media” (#purplenoise 2019a). These techno-feminist aims, practices, and
tactics include:
Figure 1: Twitter-Post with a picture showing Cornelia Sollfrank
and Christina Grammatikopoulou proclaiming demands of #pur-




“The desire to fuck over social media, to bring down platform capitalism, to recon-
quer public space, to escape the social control exercised by monopolies, to refine
political manipulation, to use affect in order to build the common, to turn power
into care, to producemore just realities, towin thebattle overDonnaHaraway, and
to create new narratives about the future. The explosive mix of #purplenoise con-
sists of real anger, ruthless action, social (dis-)information, technical intelligence,
political radicalism, and true love.” (#purplenoise 2019b)
According to these wide-ranging, theoretically charged aspirations, #purplenoise in-
tends to dissent from the capitalism-driven side of socio-technical infrastructures
that social media platforms and its few powerful corporate monopolies constitute,
and to fight for inclusive public rights, spaces, and commons, by using affect and
care as ways to create new feminist narratives for possible futures. Their alleged
strategies to do so make use of various affects and consist of political, social, and
technological practices.
“Noise On All Channels”: Virality and (Purple) Noise
On their Twitter account, #purplenoise connects its self-definitionwith a call for par-
ticipation: “We are a new global feminist movement. Use this platform to say some-
thing about gender imbalance in this world, and you will be heard! NOISE ON ALL
CHANNELS!“ (#purplenoise 2019c) By referencing to feminist topics and intend-
ing to spread these widely, this introductory reveals the main objective summed up
by the artist group’s name: the critical and large-scale feminist dissenting of gen-
der iniquities. As such, its naming evokes connotations: the color purple is, among
others, associated with feminist and counterculture movements, as the Women’s
Suffrage movement. Noise, as a term, is used in diverse fields such as music, com-
munication (studies), and technology to broadly describe wanted or unwanted dis-
turbance of signals. #purplenoise claims to use two main concepts, noise and viral-
ity, which can be understood as strategies of dissent and participation. According
to Sollfrank, the use of these notions are inspired by art theorist and #purplenoise
member Grammatikopoulou’s text Viral Performances of Gender (Sollfrank 2018: 7).
In it, she analyzes interrelations between protests and contemporary feminist art
and their online and offline interventions, framing them as “viral performances
of gender” and specifying “viral noise” as their common communicative strategies
(Grammatikopoulou 2019: 89). More concretely, she defines noise as “the intercep-
tion and confusion introduced deliberately across communication platforms in or-
der to make a message less clear to its recipients” (ibid.: 90) and virality as content
“shared horizontally […] from a source to users who then re-share it millions of
times” that “can express and reproduce existing power structures, but also trans-
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forms them in unexpected ways.” (Ibid.: 91) As tactics, virality and noise can thus
be employed by diverse actors pursuing contradictory aims. Feminist artists in the
digital age “seem to be aware of the contradictions emerging in the conflict area
between activism, trolling and marketing, and use exactly these contradictions as
an integral part of their work.” (Ibid.: 90) Inspired by ‘viral noise’, #purplenoise sit-
uates its practices at these blurry borders within and beyond social media, aiming
at creating disturbance in order to challenge existing power relations surrounding
social media. #purplenoise, consequently, intends to use ‘viral noise’ as a tactic, and
at the same time as a tool for spreading feminist objectives as well as to dissent
against suppressive social media practices.
“The Site” Of Dissent: Social Media and Smartphones
In holding workshops, giving talks, and organizing interventions such as the
street protest and events held at (media) art institutions, #purplenoise creates in-
frastructures for generating content to distribute on their social media channels,
via Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and the like. This large-scale sharing
and spreading is first and foremost made possible through social media platforms
and digital mobile devices, mainly smartphones. Acknowledging the all-encom-
passing ubiquity of these, #purplenoise aims at finding strategies to utilize, while
challenging social media platforms as well as their related actors and practices:
“To use social media or not to use social media is not the question any more. They
have become ‘the site’ where not just ordinary users but also the political estab-
lishment, law enforcement, secret services, marketers and hate groups can de-
velop their greatest impact.” (Sollfrank 2018: 7)
As “the site,” social media platforms constitute the central infrastructure and site
of negotiation of #purplenoise. By claiming to dissent suppressive social media
practices, they aim at disobeying social media understood as “private enterprises,
driven by greed and hunger for data and power, being elusive, non-transparent,
secretive and unpredictable.” (Sollfrank 2018: 7) Via the strategy of ‘viral noise’,
the art project aims at dissenting the control of information, actors, and practices
implied by the algorithms at the core of social media by practicing disobedience:
“We click, we feed and we disobey/algorithmic despotism!” (#purplenoise 2019a)
Interconnecting practices of participation and dissent, #purplenoise, consequently,
poses the questions: “What is the disturbing noise you produce? How can we
join forces beyond the despotic rule of algorithms?” (#purplenoise 2018) In order
to analyze how this cooperation takes place and in what ways sites and sides of
dissent are taken, I want to have a closer look at the concrete practices and tactics
of #purplenoise.
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“Nonspecific Disturbances”: Viral Imagery and Queering
Positioning social media as sites of private and public, corporate and activist ne-
gotiation, #purplenoise appropriates strategies of social media for their very own
purposes. In order to use social media in a way that allows for their aim of noisifi-
cation, the initiators of #purplenoise applied the “reverse engineering [of] success-
ful campaigns” and, thereby, noticed the need for “certain recognizable elements,
amongst them hashtags, iconic imagery, a manifesto and memes.” (Sollfrank 2018:
7) Thus, invitations to participate in #purplenoise are articulated by means of writ-
ten and visual levels, distributed in public and online spaces. In order to spread
and localize their claims across platforms, #purplenoise uses hashtags such as #pur-
plenoise, #imakenoise, #iusemyfeelers, and #algorithmicdespotism.These are mo-
bilized on their channels, in print media, performances, and their manifesto. Us-
ing activist strategies, purple-colored manifestos, postcards, and stickers are dis-
tributed, protest signs are created, and posters are hung, featuring visual elements
and/or hashtags. The website of #purplenoise as well as its social media channels,
especially Instagram and Facebook, feature photographic material taken during
workshops and protests as well as graphics specifically produced for #purplenoise’s
visual strategy.The latter consists of mounted photographs of a smartphone being
held by a human hand with the index finger of the other hand touching the screen
showing a hashtag or a ‘noisified’ gender symbol on its interface (see fig 2).
Figure 2: Website title picture of #purplenoise showing gender memes and
hashtags.
http://artwarez.org/projects/purplenoise/, last access 5.31.2019. #purplenoise
can now be found under: https://purplenoise.org/
Represented as such, and used to document the artistic practices and activities
via photographs, videos, and audio including live recordings, smartphones are an
integral, ever-present, and seemingly self-evident part of #purplenoise as both focus
and strategic tool alike. Smartphones encourage engagement and invite participa-
tion, they structure, coordinate, organize, and document participatory practices.
Thereby, the smartphone becomes a mobile media of storage, communication, and
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distribution, inviting participation, and constantly producing and synchronizing
communities practicing dissent.
#purplenoise adopts social media’s strategic use of viral imagery by creating its
own in form of “iconographic signs of infinite gender variations:” newly created
gender signs based on the mostly binary used gender symbols created in ‘do-it-
yourself ’-mode as well as their so-called “feeler meme” (#purplenoise 2018), in-
spired by multispecies feminist and science theorist Donna Haraway.5 The feel-
ers, which #purplenoise creates with participants in ‘feelers-tinkering workshops’
for example at transmediale festival in 2019, titled #iusemyfeelers – How to Grow and
Use Your Feelers6 (transmediale 2019), are self-created wearables to be worn on the
head (see fig 3).
They are supposed to function as an “extended human sensorium” inviting par-
ticipants to speculate about possible futures for themselves and beyond (Sollfrank
2018: 7).Themaking of and tinkeringwith feelers and gender symbols, could be also
described as a form of what media researcher and activist Sophie Toupin frames as
“feminist hacking” (Toupin 2019). Accordingly, she defines it as hacking in a doubled
sense: firstly, as hacking technology by adding a critical material dimension to tradi-
tional technofeminism and secondly, as hacking gender by challenging heteronor-
mative understandings. As a form of collective resistance it creates new spaces and
feminist infrastructures beyond online and offline dichotomies. (Cf. Toupin 2019:
31f) Consequently, ‘feminist hacking’ can be seen as a form of dissent and queering
normatizing practices impaired by gender and technological hierarchies. The cre-
ation of gender symbols and feelers in workshops or performances and their virtual
and spatial distribution as visual along with textual representation across various
sites including art spaces and social media, serves as artistic strategies to ‘add to
the noise’ in a disruptive manner: “The feeler meme and the iconographic signs of
infinite gender variations inspire us to tell and share little stories. These mix as
nonspecific disturbances with the noise of social media.” (#purplenoise 2018) This
re-thinking of the future in narratives that transcend notions of her-story cross
and thereby queer binary logics: gender, then, is not limited to two but instead
infinite options. In transcending the various sites, #purplenoise, further queers the
5 In Donna Haraway’s so-called Camille stories, one follows – in an act of “speculative fabula-
tion” – the fictitious character Camille, half-human, half-butterfly and genderless, over five
generations between the years 2025 and 2425. The Camille of the second generation decides
to get “chin implants of butterfly antennae” – feelers – “as a coming-of-age gift” helping in
the “becoming-with” the human partner (cf. ?
6 The workshop #iusemyfeelers – How to Grow and Use Your Feelers was conceptualized
and carried out by Cornelia Sollfrank, Charlotte Bonjour, Christina Grammatikopulou, Jan-
ina Sack, Johanna Thompson and Isabel de Sena. Additional performers: Nina Stuhldreher
and Gerog Gläser, for the performance () Opting out Is Not an Option! (Cf. https://archive.tra
nsmediale.de/content/opting-out-is-not-an-option, last access 17.05.2021).
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Figure 3: Participants of the workshop “#iusemyfeelers – How to Grow
and Use Your Feelers” experiencing transmediale festival with their ‘new
sensorium’.
Screenshot of Instagram-page of #purplenoise: https://www.instagram.com
/purplenoiseup/, last access 5.17.2021.
thinking in spatial binaries. As such, the queering of spaces can be conceptualized
as a feminist taking of sid/tes, in that it questions the binary logics of gender.
“Share Your Emotions”: Already Engaged Participants
In a participatory mode, #purplenoise aims at “reaching out – to connect with you!”
and invites “real people with real time/users, digital naїves/using platforms, being
used” to participate in their “feminist noisification of social media” (#purplenoise
2019a). The manifesto, thereby, points to the double bind character of social media
platforms that use the users using them. Participants are positioned as ‘naïve’ and,
thereby, as easily available via direct requests. Prompts that are stated across the
manifesto read much like imperatives akin to social media appeals: “Donate your-
self/share your emotions/share your confusion/turn it into noise”, “Produce more
noise./Channel your noise./Feed our channels./And get in touch.” “Add your per-
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sonal flavor to purple noise,/join us on our social media.” (Ibid.) These demands
necessitate the users’ ability to join in by having access to social media platforms
in the first place. Further, they hint at the need for participants’ willingness to
contribute to the project on a personal and emotional level. Hence, participation
is directed at social media users that are already familiar with the strategies and
practices of sharing, liking, joining, producing content, and feeding social media
channels thus at users already participating. In reflecting on social media and its af-
fordances with means of digital infrastructures itself, #purplenoise can be described
as situated in the “post-digital” (Cramer 2014) that positions participants as “al-
ready engaged” (Tyżlik-Carver 2014), as “always-on/always-on-you” (Turkle 2008),
and thereby affected by the ubiquity of mobile technologies and structures of con-
nectivity. Followingmedia and art theoristMagda Tyżlik-Carver, post-participation
“assumes participation as a condition present everywhere and enacted by humans
and non-humans participating together and being already part of something re-
gardless if it is a desired outcome.” (Tyżlik-Carver 2014). Consequently, positioning
oneself in a matter of taking a site – by interacting with social media platforms –
and of taking a side –by siding with feminist notions –means becoming situated in
a post-digital, post-participatory condition: within the omnipresence, the continu-
ity, and the becoming self-evident of digital or participatory practices, processes,
and technologies.
Feminist Dissent as Common and Affective Infrastructuring
Feminist dissent in #purplenoise unfolds as based on a doubled shift: firstly, in
artistic practices situated as post-digital and post-participatory and secondly, in
contemporary feminism “defined by the cross-pollination of digital and physical
space, generating new tools of resistance through visual and media culture.”
(Grammatikopoulou 2019: 105) Both shifts are premised on changes brought about
through large-scale digitization and datafication and their interrelations with
everyday practices and offline spaces. In #purplenoise these ‘new tools of resistance’
take shape in form of artistic feminist practices, producing visual and textual
content and mobilizing it via social media channels, making them sites of dissent.
In utilizing the participatory structures of social media platforms for dissenting
those themselves, social media is positioned as one possible and necessary site of
resistance. In their co-created manifesto, the Feminist Principles of the Internet, “a
series of statements that offer a gender and sexual rights lens on critical internet-
related rights,” the internet is defined as
“a space where social norms are negotiated, performed and imposed, often in an
extension of other spaces shaped by patriarchy and heteronormativity. Our strug-
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gle for a feminist internet is one that forms part of a continuum of our resistance
in other spaces, public, private and in-between.” (Association for Progressive Com-
munications 2019)
Understanding the internet as such an extended site of feminist resistance, #pur-
plenoise is negotiating the practices of dissent in taking sides and sites. In using
social media channels and in taking to the streets and to art institutions with the
aim of noisifying them, they become sites for artistic practices of feminist dissent.
Thereby, the techno-feminist art project intends to interfere with and thus queer
the sites and logics of algorithmic governance of corporate players, shifting power
relations towards more equal access and rights. However, the project of critically
intervening in power structures is a complex process affording time, endurance,
and personal involvement. Accordingly, Cornelia Sollfrank describes the impacts
of social media and its (infra-)structural repercussions, that affect the members
and participants of #purplenoise on a personal and affective level:
“We knew all of that before, but experiencing it on a daily basis, physically and
mentally, and understanding how time consuming and manipulative the struc-
tures themselves are, was extremely frustrating and even depressing. I would say
this first lesson was a hard one to learn. Luckily, we also had a lot of fun in the
course of our collaboration.” (Sollfrank 2018: 7)
As such, #purplenoise is shaped in its core by what cultural theorist Lauren Berlant
describes as “affective infrastructures” (Berlant 2016: 414). The affective dimension
of “‘infrastructure’ as that which binds us to the world in movement and keeps
the world practically bound to itself” (ibid.: 394) critically considers, how affect is
(made) infrastructural as well as how infrastructures are intrinsically affective. In
introducing the concept of the common, Berlant stresses “its power to retrain af-
fective practical being, and in particular […] its power to dishabituate through un-
learning the overskilled sensorium that is so quick to adapt to damaged life with a
straight, and not a queer, face.” (Ibid.: 399) #purplenoise challenges affects created by
social media, for instance, by proposing a new ‘sensorium’ through creating feelers
or gendermemes for negotiating social media practices. In doing so, the art project
critically questions, how social media, its diverse users, and its infrastructure could
be and act(ed upon) otherwise. Arguing for collective practices, Berlant calls on “all
world-creating subjects in common struggle” to “build affective infrastructures.”
(Ibid.: 414) #purplenoise as an artist-group is continuously reshaping itself by vari-
ous constant and interchangingmembers coming and working together for partic-
ular projects, thereby forming what could be described as an ‘affective affiliation.’
Taking sides and sites, consequently, can be conceptualized as a communing, es-
pecially of infrastructures of social media, through dissenting strategies that work
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against these very parts of the infrastructures that impede empowerment of female
and queer persons, diversification, and queer thinking.
Taking Sid/tes as “Always Figuring Out What’s at Stake”
Taking sid/tes calls for self-reflexively considering the positionality of oneself in
relation to others and other sides, as well as in relation to one’s own and other sites.
Or as social anthropologist Athena Athanasiou puts it, bridging situating and par-
ticipatory practices, “taking sides involves becoming situated in space and time
through the collective work of always figuring out what’s at stake.” (Athanasiou
2018: 6) Becoming situated as collective and processual practices, taking sid/tes in
#purplenoise and its practices of feminist dissent can be described as a range of
participatory practices and as an active process of constantly and collectively nego-
tiating the straightening practices of social media. More concretely, the practices
of #purplenoise aim at a critical unraveling of the power relations involved in so-
cial media through appropriating their practices and ‘tinkering’ with them. Thus,
the feminist taking of sides and sites in #purplenoise is experimental in nature and
constitutes a tinkering with possibilities of dissent and the questioning of posi-
tionality. These processes describe a circular movement of probing and adapting,
of trial and error with the aim of disentangling what the relations (with)in (affec-
tive) infrastructures of social media are and entail.
The taking of sides and sites, as conceptualized in its threefold way, can be lo-
cated in #purplenoise and its practices. Firstly, taking a side, by positioning oneself
in opposition to another, speaks foremost to the taking of a feminist standpoint.
Secondly, taking sites “as a manner of protest, occupation, appropriation or acqui-
sition” (Bippus et al. 2018: 1), is realized in #purplenoise in manifold ways: by orga-
nizing a street protest, partaking in festivals, exhibitions, and workshops within
art institutions, or occupying social networking websites as a means of ‘feminist
noisification of social media’. Thirdly, taking a side as an active decision-making
including processes of positionality and subjectification can be found in partici-
pants’ willingness to personally join in on the practices proposed by #purplenoise
as well as in situating the project within feminist theories and practices, thereby
inviting participants to position themselves within those. In challenging gender
hierarchies and heteronormativities, for example by creating new inventive gender
symbols and sharing them via social media channels, participants become person-
ally involved, and at the same time form part of a larger movement.
Feminist dissent in #purplenoise, then, opens in a twofold way as appropriating
strategies established within digital infrastructures that display dissent by disturb-
ing normalized social media practices, that also affect these very infrastructures
and their participants by deconstructing the ways in which ‘affective infrastruc-
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tures’ construe power. Rather than existing as amere disturbance, #purplenoise thus
actively intervenes in the status quo and constructs new narratives, thereby becom-
ing a productive strategy in the collective fight for queer-feminist causes. In this
way, we can see feminist noisification as a path into dissenting and common af-
fective infrastructuring, with feminist dissent comprising a tactic for productively
taking sides and sites by appropriating and loudly opposing any noise that is not
purple at its core.
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Taking a side, understood as supporting a distinct position in an argument or de-
fending someone against oppression, inherently carries a slight difference and dis-
tance between the initial conflicting parties and those who then – somewhat later
– take a stand. Taking a site however, is more immediate, can be spontaneous or
planned, and is certainly a practice in the context of resistance, political activism,
and protest that has manifested in a multitude of ways. In either case, individuals
share a concern, resources, spaces, and practices.This section brings together four
contributions that look at these processes in the context of media activism.
Taking a side and taking a site, as they are understood in this edited collection,
enter an interesting relationship when we turn our attention towards contempo-
rary media.The discussion can escalate rapidly by including commentary on hard-
ware and software, online and offline media, and digital and (simulated) analogue
media as well as the press and so called social media. Depending on how wide we
extend the frame, one could consider any activism in today’s world as media ac-
tivism. To establish a sense of coherency in the discourse, the contributors in this
section focus on the contexts of journalism, law and public opinion, the dark web,
and fandom in exploring taking sides or sites.
When we discuss different areas or genres of activism, the majority of which
take place outside of academic or intellectual discourse, material infrastructures
arise at every instance. Infrastructures of bodies, spaces, and technology, and in-
frastructures of a more volatile variety, of micro-practices and skills, comparable
across situations, demand to be viewed as modes of immanent critique and in con-
text of the media they employ and are shaped by.
Discussing media activism then also implies a debate of center and margin,
power structures and resistance. What is the activism aimed at, against, or for
whom are people active, and who is activated or affected by the media activism of
others or simply by mediated activism? We must consider how we can think about
these topics without using overly simplified linear poles or without understanding
power and resistance as a simple binary, and possibly include discussions on a
more ambient concept of dissent.
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In the media activism workshop held at the “Taking Sid/tes” conference, an
instant shift to multiplicity happened when we sat down to discuss the topic and so
the event’s name instantly changed to media activisms – emphasizing the plurality
and heterogeneity.Working on uncovering the connecting thread of the papers and
people at the table, the focus was drawn towards instances in which bifurcations
happen and new and potentially opposing branches of a former (perceived) unity
break off. These spin-offs or splits are especially interesting if an image of unity
is upheld and used as a strength and strategy to convey power. These bifurcations
also pose questions such as ‘where to draw the infamous line’ – in language, violent
behavior, adherence to the law, common practices – what does such a ‘line’ mean,
and what are the implications of it? When does slacktivism become activism, and
when does activism become criminal or labeled terrorism? And in which way does
collective dissent require a mode of self-care in order not to self-destruct?
Or, employing the intensely discussed image brought to the discussion by Julia
Ihls: When does a ship’s crew become pirates, who says so, and why? This thought
or image of pirates carried the idea of a crew engaging in mutiny in order to fight
their battle against all authorities and nations, the elements, and even each other,
for example for resources or power. It also led the discussion to hone in on the fact
that if infrastructures and care are directed at the inside of the boat, community, or
bubble, they need to be maintained and defended by a spectrum of means, and so
the pirates need to occupy or destroy elements outside their shared space in order
to take a stand or become self-sustained, to make a statement, to take a side.
The authors in this section sat at said table, and offered their unique perspec-
tives. Discussions with Gabriella Coleman, one of the keynote speakers at the “Tak-
ing Sid/tes” conference, revolved around activism, hacktivism, and how online ac-
tivism is often labeled slacktivism. The simple and pre-structured action of over-
laying one’s profile picture with the colors of the French flag after Charlie Hébdo
were stood in strong contrast to the DdoS attacks on Scientology carried out by
Anonymous in 2008 or the ongoing whistleblowing cases in the US. Participants
left the discussion table with the open question: How can media activism be prag-
matic without being arbitrary? Can we or need we be involved in media activism
and how can we study it?
Coleman argued that hackers distinguish themselves through their avid em-
brace of political intersectionality and exhibit a high degree of tolerance for work-
ing across ideological differences. In many projects, pragmatic judgments or other
considerations often trump ideological ones – leading to situations where an anti-
capitalist anarchist might work in partnership with a liberal social democrat with-
out much friction or sectarian infighting. Writing this introduction some time af-
ter the conference, these words can be directly transported to the many political
fights and conflicts worldwide that have arisen or been rekindled since. The “ide-
ological elasticity” Coleman diagnosed for hacker groups such as Anonymous is
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effective, but it does have its limits and can exclude certain people from becoming
active within the larger effort. Nonetheless, these activity or activism based tempo-
rary conglomerates of people are highly interesting as they are organized without
being an organization, meet on- and offline without being a group, and only rarely
engage in activities common to social media networking platforms. In addition,
Christoph Brunner identified “community” as the major buzzword within social
media discourse, which confronts us with the problem of inclusion and exclusion.
The co-presence of bodies, the being-together, has changed with mobile media and
the Internet. But, similar to any other human habitat, specific spaces emergewhere
online community crystalizes and actualizes.
Many authors and articles have emphasized that access to these online spaces
is not distributed equally around the globe, even though early utopian ideas some-
times still shine through today’s conception of the Internet. Media activism thus
can also be very excluding when meaningful voices don’t have access to the media
channels that could share them.
This may be a matter of geography, as with China’s social media politics and
economic wealth concerning the distribution of hardware, connectivity, ableism, or
even language dominance. It can also be platform immanent when specific chan-
nels or hashtag are jammed with expressions of sympathy, prohibiting for example
the #blacklivesmatter from informing people about protest, news, and develop-
ments because the sheer utterance of support by people using that hashtag clouded
its purpose (2020).
But generally speaking, online communities, or rather ‘the users that come to-
gether on a platform for reasons highly variable’, have proven to be extremely suc-
cessful in the sharing and developing common practices or micro-practices. Teach-
ing, coaching, and sharing are built into these spaces, seemingly evenmore so than
in offline contexts.1 In fandom research the passing of knowledge and skills has
been studied quite extensively, bringing insights about knowledge communities
that can be transferred to many other settings and media activist efforts. Research
on fan fiction has especially shown how media literacy and programming skills in
connection to gendered discrepancies foster learning communities amongst peo-
ple actively engaging inmedia production.This links directly to topics Louise Haitz
brought to the discussion and to this collection regarding YouTube Investigations
such as those carried out in the context of sexual violence cases. The ascribed or
acquired credibility of people or accounts on social media platforms, the power and
truth they yield, emphasized the double entendre of media activism,meaning both
1 This is by no means meant to disregard communities of learning, or urban gardening, or
repair cafés etc. which are all aiming to bring people together and sharing knowledge in order
to take a standagainst or for their causes. But chat roomusers, fans, and socialmedia vloggers
and micro-bloggers primarily are involved in these processes of information exchange.
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the activism of human actors as well as media processes. And it posed the question
of morality, of right and wrong and of truth, which are so very close in the realm
of activism when it is framed as productive or destructive, peaceful or violent, or
simply as good or bad. Yet, when a marginalized (by the media and public state-
ments) space like the TORBrowser,which is distinctly linked to the deepweb, starts
a fundraising campaign, how do we distinguish the community without knowing
the individuals, the morals, and the fringe perspectives?
By closely reading the Leaving Neverland documentary (2019), the 2017 G20
summit in Hamburg, “The Harry Potter Alliance”, and the Darknet’s Silk Road,
Louise Haitz, Christoph Brunner, Julia Ihls, and Anne Ganzert discuss media ac-
tivisms in four distinct settings. Each enquire whether dissent, resistance, or ‘being
against’ is always both inherently personal and collective by focusing on aspects like
affect, connection, greed, lawfulness, and guilt. By describing the fluctuant com-
munities, the emerging subjectification and collectives that come into being, and
which change because their individual parts constantly change in relation to each
other, this section discusses how activisms are produced, reproduced, mediated
and re-mediated. And the contributions show how modes of becoming, of being
produced, strategies of being, and strategies of being against constitute the mul-
tiplicity that can be discussed as media activism.




How does affect relay at a distance? How can one consider research as a militant
practice and witnessing as a form of intervening in another time-space? Which
role does sensuous experience play in forms of political struggle? And where does
an act resonate across different strata of sense and the sensuous? What constitutes
an act in the first place?
Let’s start in the supposedly concrete: During a conversation with a friend in
Montreal, we came to discuss the events of the so-called Maple Spring (printemps
érable) in 2012 – a large-scale confluence of different political interests which
achieved the resignation of the Liberal provincial government in Québec through
massive forms of social protest. One of the strong resonators for us were the
casseroles, a practice used in Latin American protests of the 1970s and since
deployed in many social movements around the globe. My friend told me, how it
blew his mind, or rather senses, when people of all backgrounds went out on the
streets, banging their pots to express their disagreement with the government’s
passing of Bill 78, an emergency law against picketing or protesting near uni-
versities that requires police approval for public protests (larger than 10 people)
throughout Québec.2 I remember the banging pots and protests going viral on
streaming-media (live and recorded) and myself, not living in Montreal at that
time, being completely fixated by the sound.3 The sound of banging pots and pans
1 I want to thank Aikaterini Genidogan for her very thoughtful and precise reading of an earlier
version of this essay pushing me to be more careful and time-sensitive. I also want to thank
Sophie Peterson for bringing up the importance of “fugitive community” in relation to this
chapter.
2 For further information see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Quebec_student_protests,
last access 2.14.2020.
3 Together with Roberto Nigro and Gerald Raunig, we explore some of these affective dimen-
sions through Félix Guattari’s concept of post-media (Brunner/Nigro/Raunig 2013).
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reverberated and resonated from the balconies, streets, and screens of 2012 into
our embodied present and presence in a café eight years later.
During the G20 summit in Hamburg, 2017 (July 7-8), I was involved with orga-
nizing the alternative international media center, FC/MC, housed in the Ballroom
at St. Pauli Stadium, in close proximity to the Hamburg Fair where the summit
took place.4 Before and during the summit, the city was zoned by the police to
guarantee so-called ‘transportation corridors’ for heads of states and diplomats,
leading to massive displacements of people unable to access their urban environ-
ment, with many leaving town. From above, the sound of at least three or four
helicopters penetrated the entire inner-city area; wherever you went, a searchlight
appeared in the night’s sky and the banging sound of the spinning rotors rever-
berated. This sound haunted those of us who inhabited that zone during the heart
of the summit for months after the event. Ever since I am immediately brought
back to this violent seizure of urban life by the police and other military operators
whenever a helicopter flies over my head.
The sonic resonances which effect and capture through the bodily capacities for
sensing are what amplify a politics of affect (Massumi 2015). Rather than addressing
the sonorities as mere phenomena subjected to human perception, their material-
ity as resonant matter opens up an affective field of sensation which exceeds the
individual human capacity to perceive sound.The following exploration of the term
activist sense pertains to how a field of sensation, rather than individual meaning
structures in “deliberative forms” or “reasoned argument,” play a constitutive role
of what Judith Butler terms alliance and supported action.5
I conceive of the term activist sense as both a description of a specific move-
ment in thought and an analytic tool for better grasping contemporary affective
politics. In this framing analysis does not mean revealing foundational truths but
rather functions as a pragmatic device for the construction of an affirmative affec-
tive politics. Such politics acknowledge the power and activity of truth-making
as part of contemporary mediated politics. However, the struggle over truth can
become abusive from either side: from the predators of fake-news-talk and from
the identity-fraction propagating a normative conception of truth. In times of a
reactive, redundant, and deeply reactionary deployment of affective populism, af-
firmation designates a specific engagement with embracing complex relations as
4 A good overview of its function and structure can be found in (Bergerman/Grimm/Keil/Leis-
tert 2017). I explore the work and activities of the FC/MC in two longer articles (Brunner 2019,
2020).
5 On the role of affect in public protests, see the insightful publications on “affect space” and
“the zombie public” by Eric Kluitenberg (2015, 2017, 2020).
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a non-predetermined activity of sense-making rather than truth-making, that is,
activist sense.6
I want to stress that many contemporary political struggles and social move-
ments engage in practices of naming, identifying, and calling out forms of vi-
olence, subjection, oppression, and repression. By doing so, they do not merely
constitute alternative truths but weave different stories and narratives attentive to
aspects of earthly survival expanding the scope of human rights towards a differ-
entiated account of living and co-inhabiting (Haraway 2016). Without wanting to
devaluate the relevance of struggles based on human rights and the more recent
shift towards transformative justice, the emphasis of activist sense resides in the
way activity and the power of activation through the sensuous enable an expanded
conception of politics and political struggle attentive to affective relations as key
to building transversal forms of resistance. I perceive such shifts integral to aca-
demic writing in the works of Saidyia Hartman (2019), Christina Sharpe (2016),
and Kathryn Yusoff (2018) as well as recent discourses on pluriversal perspectives
of non-Western decolonial ontologies (Rivera Cusicanqui 2018, De la Cadena et al.
2018) and their dialogues with North American pragmatist conceptions of the term
(Vallega 2014). Both the redressing of the power of narrative and the pluriversal
ontological politics (Escobar 2020, xv-xvii) provide a veritable ground for thinking
activist sense beyond (but not without) the ‘human’ in relation to sense and sense-
making. While the main discussion of this chapter engages with the work of Ju-
dith Butler and draws on affect theory, I want to stress the political alliance and
resonances with decolonial thought and black studies in their multidimensional
engagements with alternative modernities and their specific temporalities of the
more-than-human. A shared point in these perspectives is their redressing of the
concept of what constitutes the realm of the human, where a categorial difference
between the human and the inhumanI propels a racializing modernism, while the
pluriversal notes points of differential cohabitation as constitutive of human as a
factor which always exceeds modernist capturing. Without promoting a divisive
opposition between strands of thought, I am interested here in the affective and
activating powers of existence (Massumi 2011) which foregrounds a resistant life
“in the wake” (Sharpe 2016) and “blackness” (Yussoff 2018) as “fugitive community”
against colonial capture (Harney/Moten 2013, 29-30).
In the following I will engage with processes of sensuous activation and their
more-than-human capacities in the writings of Butler on social movements and
their mediated states. I will look at her concepts of spaces of appearance, support,
and alliance in order to carve out a relational thinking of sense and activity as tem-
poralizing political procedures. Rather than a performative materialism, I conceive
6 On the relation between affirmative politics, affect, and activism, see Braidotti 2009.
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of Butler’s politics of the streets as one possible step towards a politics of undoing
which occurs at the fringes of an event’s sensuous and sense-making.
Preliminaries on Undoing as Perishing
To begin from a more-than-human point of departure, I wish to think of act, ac-
tivism, sense, and sensuous as placed along an affective-relational continuum.This
continuum, being extensive (Whitehead 1987) and relational (James 1996), defines
experience as neither just a singular experience, a particular instance of percep-
tion or a moment, nor just a person’s experience of “being-in-the-world”, meaning
exterior to embodiment.7 Worlds do world – forming a worlding of sorts (Har-
away 2016; Stewart 2010) in polyphonic (Guattari 1995, 6; Bempeza et al. 2019) and
pluriversal (Escobar 2018) ways. They do not provide a ground or offer substances
for action to seize or build upon. Rather, they engage an overall processual con-
tainer through which action as mode of experience becomes felt. This is a non-
linear and non-causal logic of the event. Experience designates the very ground or
fabric through which “matter comes to matter” (Barad 2003) across the sensuous,
social, and physical modes of existence constitutive of many worlds. In their event-
ful contractions, these matters make sense while resisting a hegemonic capture of
the human perspective of what is designated meaningful. The art of an affirmative
affective politics or activist sense pertains to the modes of participating as quasi-
humans in the welter of experience, activating specific resonances, and thus co-
fabricating collectively potential forms of sense.
In this processual account of worlding with and through experience, ‘being’ de-
fines a minimal zone of a passing and fleeting present in which ‘things’ seem to
happen (cf. Massumi 2011, Deleuze 1993).8This passing, however is neither a fleet-
ing present of ‘one’s’ experience, nor does the sphere of politics define it exclusively.
It is shot through with a pastness and futurity that are constitutive of the actual oc-
casion of an experience without having to actualize one.They are an activating lure
for actualization. “In-acting” (Manning 2013, 21), temporalities of the not-yet and
7 For a clarifying note on the difference between worlding in this more posthumanist concep-
tion of experience and difference from a Heideggerian phenomenological subjectivism, see
Haraway 2016, p. 11.
8 Deleuze explores the difference between ideal events and states of affairs in relation to tem-
poralities, focusing primarily on the difference between Chronos and Aion, in Logic of Sense
(1993).
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have-been are the real immanent spheres of a politics of becoming, not a politics
to come but what I call a politics of undoing.9
Undoing means opening, unknotting, to cut but also to relay in that very pro-
cess. Undoing is like a “perishing” (Whitehead 1987, 60), which differs from van-
ishing. An undoing is a terminus (James 1996, 13-14; Massumi 2011, 140; Manning
2009, 224; Manning 2013, 12), the most actualized state of an event before it re-
news into a different becoming. In perishing it gives its immanent power to the
time of the past and future, ready to inhabit another present. Perishing describes
the undercurrent of a present’s movement into a different state, not in a successive
manner but in a folded temporality of process lines conjuncting and disjuncting.10
A perishing is the marker of an event to maintain its own shape shifting active as
a mooring in a worlding process always under way – it manifests the event as a
singularity beyond actual states of affairs. It is a local sign of an event’s activity as
moving through experience (Massumi 2011, 128). The local sign might be the aes-
thetic variant of what Haraway terms situated. A tying of relations into a concrete
manifestation whose relational ecology nevertheless seeps through the actualized
form of an event. In perishing, this undoing of the event makes the sign flash in
all its texture as a felt and embodied experience that cannot but be sensed with-
out being rationalized. The time-form of undoing is not an instance in the overall
event but the qualitative tonality that renders an event felt in a particular way (in
French it would be sens), thus eluding chronological temporalization through its
own affective power of existence.
Undoing as perishing is a process that celebrates a completion without clo-
sure. It is this very process of a perishing of the events’ actualizing dimension,
where it becomes palpable both as a felt and embodied experience and in its tend-
ing towards a different emergence in experience.11 Operating on the thresholds
of perishing means constantly reworking the future-past tendencies of matter in-
forming concrete embodied experiences (that is, effects). This is what Massumi, in
a speculative-pragmatic gesture, terms the “politicality of process” (2011, 13). Such
9 In the following, I will further explore the question of act and action in the work of Judith
Butler. I do sympathize with her writings on undoing in Undoing Gender (2004); however, I
will not further engage with that particular aspect of her writings.
10 On William James’ conception of conjunction and disjunction in digital media, see Anna
Munster 2013 and Adrian Mackenzie 2010. Elsewhere I explore this power of what might be
called a “concatenated commons” in relation to activist media platforms (Brunner forthcom-
ing).
11 It is crucial though to not confuse events with actualized, empirical states of affairs. In Logic of
Sense, Deleuze opposes the ideal event as singularity to the Platonic notion of essences and
thus revolts against a split between the empirical and the ideal, which he continues to prob-
lematize in Kantian empiricism (and aesthetics, I would add) and Husserl’s phenomenology
(1993, 51/96-97).
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a speculative pragmatism of process foregrounds a sense of activity and potential
activation as immanent force in a field of sensation. Affective politics engage an
“alter-accomplishment” (Massumi/McKim 2009) to the repetition of events as the
same, not as a rupture in the ordinary, but a lure for the sense of difference in the
midst of habit.12 While in human perception, we come to name and classify such
changes as after-effects, as a denotation of what happened, and how such happen-
ing yields concrete effects, sense follows its own operational logic. In sense, undoing
hints not at a simple more-than or difference from concrete states of affairs – both
are simplified conceptions of potential – but point at a time much smaller and
much more extended than the time of human perception. Undoing is the cleaving
of an openness in the apparently homogenized structure of empirical worlds, not
as a mere rupture but as that which was always there and will always become, a
difference beyond mere distinction – a becoming. How to embrace such temporal-
ities of undoing as activating and sensed complexity of worlding? And how could
such politicality of process become an ethics in the making?
Brace for Activity
The two examples outlined at the beginning highlight what I call an “affective relay-
ing” of mediated events through the bodily capacities of sensuous experience and
their distribution across different platforms (Brunner 2013). The complex nexus
of mediated experiences creates a relational field (Brunner/Fritsch 2011) through
which practices of political struggle are shared and, as Judith Butler claims, only
gain their translocal relevance in times of globalizedmedia infrastructures through
mediation (Butler 2011). In the following I want to further unpack and mobilize
Butler’s work on politics in the streets and the role of action and sense as part of
what she develops through her understanding of alliance. While Butler wants to
rework the question of what constitutes spaces of appearance in a (post-)media
era of global social movements and their media ecologies, my interest in develop-
ing the notion of activist sense will foreground the temporal layering immanent to
affective politics. I will do so by drawing on Butler’s thoroughgoing engagement
with Hannah Arendt. At the same time, I aim to extend their theories towards a
12 The ordinary is a crucial termwhich could not be further developed here. It hints at a ground
of affective relationality in mundane experience as the locus of ontological politics of differ-
ent modes of existence in a pluriverse. It also links to the remarks on Christina Sharpe and
SaidiyaHartman and their writings as engaging inmodes of narrating the ordinary of (mostly
female) black existence and the erasure of thismode of existence fromhegemonic discourse.
On the ordinary and affect see Stewart and Berlant (2019).
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more-than-human dimension tied to the temporality of undoing in the politics of
affect.
Butler pitched her conception of bodies in alliance during the lead up to the
Arab Spring and just before the major events of the Occupy Movement in 2011 and
2012. Working through Hannah Arendt’s political writings on the polis, which she
calls “space of appearance” (1958, 199), Butler carefully recasts Arendt’s conception
of the public. Arendt conceives of the polis as the realm in which a public can be
constituted by those who appear and speak. Butler contends that these spaces are
based on a presumed social dimension of “appearing for another,” an act exclu-
sive to male citizens in Ancient Greece (2011). Butler emphasizes that this notion
of appearance, requiring a “divine performative allocated to the human form,” is
opposed to the material, physical, and institutional practices on which the value of
this form of appearance is based. Her critique of Arendt pertains to the very power
and act of appearance itself. In contrast to Arendt’s rather human-centered inter-
subjective concept of relationality, Butler conceives of the space of appearance as
utterly embodied, material, and reliant on the support of the physical environment
as well as the care for bodies to walk on them in a protest. These material and em-
bodied conditions effectuate spaces of appearance as the performative instance of
political struggle.
Arendt’s conception of the space of appearance is tied to speech and human
action. She writes: “The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical
location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking
together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no
matter where they happen to be.” (Arendt 1958, 198) Butler gently subverts Arendt’s
argument, insisting on embodied and physical matter (the physical location) as
supportive infrastructures of action to occur. She wants to ensure a situated and
embodied hold against unbounded abstraction through language. The concern of
action, while taking on organizational qualities in Arendt and pertaining to an
enabling materialism in Butler, nevertheless holds on to the power of human indi-
viduals in either conception of the term. As Butler states “acting together […] opens
up time and space outside and against the temporality and the established archi-
tecture of the regime, one that lays claim to materiality, leans into its supports, in
order to rework their functions […] such action reconfigures what will be public,
and what will be the space of politics.” (2011) A sense of togetherness and partici-
pation in such action moves through Butler’s notion of the body, as developed in
Bodies that Matter (1993). These are bodies as related to non-human life, their very
organic and in-organic composition.
Public protests, as analyzed by Butler, render “the material insurgencies of the
body the political concern of the square.” (2011) I wonder, if this conception of the
body, whether material or social, remains on a liberalist stratum in Butler’s writ-
ings, taking the body and the surrounding space as support for action that is a
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volitional human action? At the same time, the “constituent power” (Negri 1999)
immanent to both Arendt and Butler in their understanding of appearance un-
derlines the temporal and translocal potential of the act of emergence of such a
“space of appearance.” Appearance, the way I would like to think following Butler
and Arendt, is different from representation. It pertains to temporal activations
that come to the fore in collective forms of organized struggles. These activations
have constituent power since they insert a shift into the tonality of an overall event
that resonates across different bodies. The constituent power in Arendt and But-
ler’s conception of appearance becomes a felt and sensed activation through which
a different “sense” of the overall event occurs. The task for thinking activist sense
pertains to adhering to such constituencies while refraining from their reduction
to an inter-subjective social act amongst human individuals.
On the one hand Butler states that participating in the spaces of support gen-
erates action in alliance “precisely between those who participate, and this is not
an ideal or empty space – it is the space of support itself – of durable and livable
material environments and of interdependency among living beings.” (2011)13 On
the other hand, she claims “that the alliance is not reducible to individuals, and it is
not individuals who act.” (2011) When the alliance is what acts, and acting together
constitutes action, then such notions of act and action require a radical alterna-
tion from the human confinements at the heart of Butler’s proposition. Shifting
from human action to bodies in alliance adds a materialist foundation of intra-
individual interdependence to Arendt’s notion of action. Butler further extends
this intra-individual dependency to “living beings” and claims to include the mate-
rial environment as the supportive ground. What remains less explored in Butler’s
recasting of action into a more-than-human domain is the mode of relationality
at stake when it comes to participation. Participating as human subject becomes
possible through the support for action which is bodily andmaterial, dependent on
physical space and its affordances, all of which constitutes a space of appearance.
In relation to the temporality of undoing, I wonder how “those who participate,”
as Butler writes, are really including not only human and living beings but also the
temporalities imbued in the matter that surrounds those beings. Put differently,
how canwe account for a theory of assembly as constitutive of spaces of appearance
in the sense of embodied manifestation of a public based on the temporalities of
13 In this respect, it is worth visiting Arendt’s own deployment of the term “support”: “It is the
people’s support that lends power to the institutions of a country, and this support is but
the continuation of the consent that brought the laws into existence to begin with … All po-
litical institutions are manifestations and materializations of power; they petrify and decay
as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them.” (1972, 140) Butler extends
Arendt’s social conception of support towards thematerial environment but does not change
the overall conception of action beyond the human embodied subject.
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activation and their capacities of rendering felt and making sense differently from
the normative enclosures of late liberalism?14
Arendt writes: “The reason why we are never able to foretell with certainty the
outcome and end of any action is simply that action has no end.” (1958, 233) This
is because action “though it may proceed from nowhere, so to speak, acts into a
medium where every action becomes a chain reaction and where every process is
the cause of new processes […] the smallest act in the most limited circumstances
bears the seed of the same boundlessness, because one deed, and sometimes one
word, suffices to change every constellation.” (1958, 190) Two readings of such a
conception of action and deeds arise in Arendt. Deeds, while boundless, are hu-
man deeds or deeds that constitute social interdependence as the basis for spaces
of appearance and the material support required to make sense of human activity.
On the other hand, such boundless deeds and actions extend beyond the human
realm granted that one considers politics in the polis a more-than-human activity
to begin with. Butler follows this temporalizing line without necessarily picking
up on Arendt’s remarks on action in relation to unpredictability and irreversibility
(1958, 232-233). I want to stress Arendt’s terms as crucial for a politics of undoing.
While Arendt certainly talks about ‘man’ and ‘his’ deeds as yielding unpredictable
effects and their irreversibility, the processual undertones can be cast beyond the
human actor. Thinking of the pluriverse as a continuous relational field of activity
levels the asymmetry between human and non-human – the reason why I prefer
more-than-human. The materialist conception of embodied and supported action
in Butler requires a further affective supplement. It is the temporality of affect, as
I will explore in the next section, that extends the more-than-human not only to all
life-forms and physical matter. The activation of the sensuous and its differential
ways of making sense require a continuous affective temporalizing infrastructure
as part and parcel of the material and embodied alliances and assemblies that But-
ler explores. The local sign of a successful mediated social movement, as I outline
at the beginning and the way Butler stages such movements in her writings, can-
not sustain its relevance if it does not take its affective envelopes into account.
Appearance is not only a spatial affair but comes with a whole relational field of
temporalities that constitute an assembly of bodies along their situated and timely
capacities to affect and be affected. Action and activity underline the movement
character of an affective field while nudging its potentials into embodied andmate-
rial effects. The relaying of potentials for activation and their actualization defines
the key operation of activist sense in relation to multiple temporalities.
14 Such a refined and ecological conception of participation can be found most prominently in
the work of Gilbert Simondon (2005, 29).
94 Christoph Brunner
The Powers of Affect
The force of emergence in action, if considered a more-than-human force, res-
onates strongly with the way Brian Massumi emphasizes the autonomy of affect
(1995). Affect ensures a sensation of progress or time as passing present, that is, of
materialized bodies in time and space while itself remaining a potentiality. While
such informing procedures towards the making of a time that is the embodied
and felt present arise through an affective relational field, the autonomy of affect
maintains that we cannot know how such a relational field will cause effects. Affect
engages the bodily and physical realm as a becoming, a process. Process is a mode
of activation which ensures that each instance of the present as bodily felt emerges
from and recedes into an affective and actively temporalizing field. Put differently,
affect is not of the body or the senses but defines a field of sensation capable of ac-
tivating situated forms of perception, thus rendering perception a relational force
constitutive of subject and world. Affect is then an aesthetic operation because of
the way it generates relays between movement, perception, and embodiment as
intensive time-forms. Act and activity engage this affective aesthetic field in its ca-
pacity to process the key operation of a field of sensation. This fielding operation
provides an outline of emergence in time and space as contractions of affective
forces acting in resonance.15
Considering affect as autonomous does not mean it is relative. On the contrary,
if conceived as a field activity, affect is relational and thus always engaged inmatter,
that is, forces relating under specific conditions. Affect enables emergence while
eluding the very passing of such emergence in its embodied effects. Action and
activity are the movements of affect entering instances of sensation constitutive of
the time of bodily experience.This movement however, is exactly what is constantly
shaped and reshaped and defines the operation of an affective politics (Massumi
2015, 117). Activity and processes of activation exceed the sensory-motor scheme
of action-reaction, inserting a sense of the field of sensation’s multiple, tempo-
ral textures. These textures become affectively felt through the more-than-human
relationality of different materials acting in alliance, as Butler outlines. From an af-
fective angle we need to include to these processes ofmaterial support for actioning
a temporalizing quality which casts the moment of action, of bodies in alliance and
the politics of the streets, beyond its representational value. Appearance as emer-
gence resonates not just throughout the mode of sensation across different bodies
but also their felt temporalities – often leading to variations of making-sense of an
embodied experienced over time.
15 On the notion of the field, see Massumi (2011, 160-163/2015, 116). On the specific aesthetic
understanding of affect see Deuber-Mankowsky (2017, 68-71).
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Arendt’s irreversibility concerns the necessity of actualization as the processual
vortex through which potentialities activate; its degree of quasi-order imprints an
affective-relational signature onto a specific realm of experience in time and space.
Arendt’s conception of the term action resonates with Deleuze’s and Guattari’s
(Guattari 1995, 59/96; Guattari 1996, 180; Deleuze 1988, 88/97/126-127) deployment
of the concept of finitude as borrowed from the work of Michel Foucault (1989,
p. 340-346). Finitude is not finite. It is a tendency of emergence to move towards
a certain completion or fulfillment in expression – a terminus becoming felt in
a processual undoing. In this temporal relaying, an affective yet material concep-
tion of action or activity occurs where indeterminability courses through all modes
of existence. It is action fabricating a time of felt experience and its variations of
memory as a fleeting present informed by a future-past. Such future-past defines
a time-form of its own, where the contemporaneous is not a mere contraction of
a past towards a future, but where process as duration activates a time of affective
consistence immanent to subjective embodied experience. At the same time, these
affective enablements of emergence become finite in the way that they pertain to
a completion or actualization, that is a manifest expression with concrete bodily
effects. The mutual entanglement of affect and expression, indeterminability and
irreversibility, are the very movements through which undoing receives its political
relevance. Attending to undoing as the interval between indeterminibility and ir-
reversibility renders it activist as power sui generis, beyond human action but not
without its capacity for activation through the more-than-human. The pragmatic
question I would like to outline for the rest of this text pertains to how to engage
creatively with such activating forces of activity without reducing these forms of
engagement to a notion of participation and agency tied to identified entities and
their mere inter-connection?
The Matter of Sense
Butler writes about different practices of care and support during the first wave of
the Arab Spring at Tahir Square in Egypt. She emphasizes practices such as “mak-
ing the material insurgencies of the body the political concern of the square” rather
than a mere discursive and perceptual concern, that is phenomenological and dis-
cursive, as would be the case in Arendt’s spaces of appearance (2011). Butler herself
provides a crucial opening beyond human deeds through a temporal conception of
act, action, and alliance:
“The bodies on the street redeploy the space of appearance in order to contest
and negate the existing forms of political legitimacy – and just as they sometimes
fill or take over public space, the material history of those structures also work on
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them, and become part of their very action, remaking a history in the midst of its
most concrete and sedimented artifices.” (2011)
The practices of political struggle move through the fielding operation supported
by the affectivemateriality of the physical environment and its ingrained temporal-
ities. Rather than just hinting at the historical semantics of such situated activity,
for instance the role of architectural history of urban spheres, the different tempo-
ralities amplify and augment each other, constituting an affective field of political
struggle through mutual activation. Such activation equally includes the time of
individual memories and sensations and the time of gathering on the streets and
protesting. Bodies redeploying the space of appearance means inserting a quality
of collective resonance which builds on the material-temporal support of bodies
and physical space into an affective field as much as constituting a quality of al-
liance that extends the possibilities of resistance. Alliance then is a crucial term if
considered beyond its intersubjective tendencies.
When Butler writes “it is the alliance that acts” while stating “action in alliance
happens precisely between those who participate in the space of support itself”
(2011, emphasis added) her position potentially contradicts the very potential of al-
liance as more-than-human constituent power. As far as Butler is concerned, those
who participate are acting in alliance. Such alliance beyond consensus pertains to
the works of Jacques Rancière on dissensus (2010) and Chantal Mouffe on agonistic
politics (2016). However, both retreat into a human-centered idea of the who that
participates in these practices.While Rancière allows for a somewhat sensuous ex-
pansion through his notion of the “distribution of the sensible” (2010, 36 passim),
the forces of that distribution pertain to the human faculty to perceive as the basis
of contemporary politics.
I want to suggest including the more-than-human elements into Butler’s con-
ception of alliance. An affective politics, as I want to develop here, moves not only
beside or underneath the human relationality of alliance, dissensus, and agonis-
tic politics but defines a relational movement constitutive of but not finitely tied to
material expression.With the activating field of affective forces as the foundational
movement of expression, the question of alliances resides in the way a situation or
a field enables openings for participation in a sphere where participation is the
constitutive plane for alliance to emerge. Put differently, the fielding power of af-
fective relationality becomes the plane through which one has to address questions
of alliance and participation. Such alliances are based not on willful decisions by
subjects but on the capacity to attune and amplify the affective field’s potential
for certain expressions to constitute an appearance. However, and this is crucial,
the appearance is not for the human, for human perception, but first and fore-
most for itself. It is existence “self-enjoying” its very occasioning (Whitehead 1967,
177). Participating in that general “creative advance” of existence, in its duration,
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means to conceive of alliance as something beyond ideological alignment (White-
head 1967, 210). Such processes of “differential attunement” to an affective fielding
operation is both immediate and determined (Massumi 2011, 123). Different from
total contingency (relativism) the process of a differential attunement is processu-
ally open, towards a different becoming, while expressing itself in a determined
manner as a concrete situation. A politics of undoing as a temporal invention per-
tains to the capture and opening of affectively constituted alliances in their very
movement. Undoing is not an individual act but the interval where shifts and open-
ings in the field can be engaged with, where potential alliances grasp the bodies
and support alternate futures.These waves of amplification nesting in the undoing
of an event are the immediate and immanent affective lures towards an alter-en-
gagement or alter-effectuation, a counter-power, against dominant and redundant
forms of capture in hegemonic politics (Massumi 2015b, 42).
The temporalizing role of digital media provides a vital ground for exploring
the durational modes of participation towards different temporalities as affective
alliances in a politics of undoing. Before the lacuna of writings about the relation
between social movements and social media (for instance Gerbaudo 2012), Butler
stages the importance for spaces of alliance to resonate beyond specific territories,
thus contributing to such events to make sense through the sensuous. Media are
not just forms of mediation and representation of the protests; they activate new
modes of making sense through the sensuous by putting localized protests into a
globalized perspective of alliances (Brunner 2018). Butler writes:
“The street scenes become politically potent only when and if we have a visual and
audible version of the scene communicated in live time, so that the media does
not merely report the scene, but is part of the scene and the action; indeed, the
media is the scene or the space in its extended and replicable visual and audible
dimensions” (2011).
The shift from media as conveying or communicating content to its co-constitu-
tive powers in relation to live-time for the composition of spaces of appearance is
another hint at the more-than-human assemblages at work in social movements’
expressive powers. While liveness defines a potential for affective engagement in a
political event it disregards the multiple temporalities which digital media actually
enable (cf. Munster 2006, 2013). The relaying capacities of digital media allow for
both live amplification and temporal shifts before and after the event. By doing so
they become archives of the immediate as much as multiplications of temporalities
informing the present through sensuous mattering. In relation to the introductory
example such a temporal folding and its affective relays come to the fore. While we
both were live witnesses of the events in 2012 in Québec, the translocal connection
through mediation allowed for us to converge on differential points of the overall
event envelope that is termed Maple Spring. The actual embodied encounter in a
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café in 2020 and our respective memories revolving around the lived experiences
adds new temporalities to this texture. The question of activist sense then is how
to make the relays felt beyond a specific notion of liveness and move it towards a
lived continuum of resistant practices and their shades of sensation.
While Arendt promotes the emergent character of space constituted by speech,
Butler expands this casting materially and in reference to the temporalities imma-
nent to such material environments. The bodily matters of support and action are
human as much as more-than-human, but they remain tied to their constitutive
spatial connotations. Both Arendt and Butler tie a conception of becoming to a
space – once emerging through discursive subjects and once as materially given.
Butler’s notion of support is the key to awhat I call a transductive conception of alliance,
but not if it remains tied to the material or to actions as subjective deeds. Support
– as transductive and temporalizing force – resides in the activating power that
moves through the mattering effects of sensation. The mattering effects of sen-
sation constitute bodies in alliance while at the same time eluding them in their
material expression. Such a notion sensation exceeds the human as much as the
mere appearance in a perceptual or perceived present. An insistence on the “time
of the interval” and a cast of appearance as a “necessarily morphological moment
where the body appears” as well as the proposition of “acting in the midst of being
formed” provide a vital ground for a more-than-human conception of becoming
at the heart of a politics of undoing (Butler 2011). Linked to the mediated reality
of contemporary forms of protest these expressions cannot be reduced to mere
processes of making present or live time. Alliance occurring as support and in the
interval of acting in the midst of being formed all contribute to medias’ activating
powers:
“The media constitutes the scene in a time and place that includes and exceeds
its local instantiation. Although the scene is surely and emphatically local, and
those who are elsewhere have the sense that they are getting some direct ac-
cess through the images and sounds they receive. That is true, but they do not
know how the editing takes place, which scene conveys and travels, and which
scenes remain obdurately outside the frame. When the scene does travel, it is
both there and here, and if it were not spanning both locations – indeed, multiple
locations – it would not be the scene that it is. Its locality is not denied by the fact
that the scene is communicated beyond itself, and so constituted in a global me-
dia; it depends on that mediation to take place as the event that it is. This means
that the local must be recast outside itself in order to be established as local, and
this means that it is only through a certain globalizingmedia that the local can be
established, and that something can really happen there” (2011).
On the one hand, Butler addresses the different modes of production and per-
ception that constitute a translocal linkage, generating a mediated event all of its
The Politics of Undoing: The Movement of Activist Sense 99
own and thus constituting a sense of locality. The temporalities at work in these
processes require equal consideration. If we want to extend Butler’s theory of me-
diation as a constitutive event, we have to take the media infrastructures and their
own operational qualities into account. This media mode of mattering bears po-
tential for temporal cracks to occur in the overall perception of an event, here the
undoing is felt as potential lure for difference. The affective capacities of media
assemblages, which activate and resonate with human bodily capacities of sens-
ing and sense making, rework and modulate temporalities. The live time relays of
mediation are actually life-time: They contain a certain activating vitality of affect-
ing and thus constitute alliances without the requirement of mediated connection
(Parisi 2019).
Sensation and the practices of sensemaking through support and alliance fore-
ground processes of becoming and their affectives, which is temporally potentiat-
ing, defining the core of a politics of the streets. Shifting the spatial constraints
of locality and mediation towards processes of activation and undoing affords a
general ontological shift of how to conceptualize relations. Rather than connect-
ing different entities such as bodies, affect, as time-sensitive and a movement of
sensation, defines the relational tissue through which an actual embodied experi-
ence comes to materialize as a becoming and not a filiation, the way Deleuze and
Guattari differentiate the terms:
“[…] becoming is not an evolution, at least not an evolution by descent and filia-
tion. Becoming produces nothing by filiation; all filiation is imaginary. Becoming
is always of a different order than filiation. It concerns alliance. If evolution in-
cludes any veritable becomings, it is in the domain of symbioses that bring into
play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms, with no possible filiation.”
(1987, 238, emphasis added)
The challenge posed by an alliance as a double movement without descendance
can be transfigured onto the tension between the time of the interval and the
space of appearance. Constitutive of the public are performative acts which gener-
ate “scenes”, in Butler’s terms, and arenas, in the writings of Arendt and Mouffe.
Scenes, however, are composed, whereas arenas are rather fixed. Butler then en-
gages such a double movement when she writes: “The media requires those bodies
on the street to have an event, even as the street requires the media to exist in
a global arena.” (Butler 2011) If scenes were only the mediated representations of
localities, one where bodies gather and one where the gathered bodies are situ-
ated through the media, then it would hardly be imaginable why my friend and
I were both moved by the same event while encountering it differentially. What
moved each of us was not tied to the filiation of actual bodies in alliance but a spe-
cific temporality of undoing. In the semblance of a livedness on screens, I was a
participating affectively just as much as my friend in Montreal. The event moves
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relationally across spaces and times, thus shaping the event’s contour through a
proliferation of sensational lures, of activations that lurk in the cracks of multiple
becomings. These becomings share a capacity of participating in a relational field
which is the support for alliance.
I want to read Butler’s theory of assembly through an operational logic of af-
fect’s temporal powers of becoming. Arenas, agoras, spaces of appearance have
a tendency to privilege discourses of representation – a presence and present as
the face value or currency of truth (cf. Lorey 2016). Alliance in becoming exceeds a
politics of the immediate or mediated, built on the past and leading towards a
(better) future or connecting spaces on and off screen as loci of protest. In the
samemanner Deleuze and Guattari refuse both regression and progression as part
of a conception of filiation that is opposed to the temporal logic of becoming. For
them, regressionwould lead to something “less differentiated”whereas progression
would mean “something more differentiated”, of which neither provides a proper
definition of becoming (1987, 238-239). In their proposition of a “creative involu-
tion,” (1987, 164) rather than evolution, they criticize the chronological temporality
immanent to both progression and regression. Instead, they emphasize that the
temporality of the event of becoming is contemporary, not as a singular but as
“other contemporaneous possibilities” (1987, 273). This notion of contemporaneity
is quite different from using the ‘making present’ or ‘making real’ of mediated par-
ticipation to demarcate an event as real. Deleuze and Guattari thus complicate the
temporality adequate to becoming as being of a different kind than the coherent
time forms of past-present and future. Creative involution describes the element
of concrete form that breaks away and escapes its spatio-temporal confinement in
order to open up an unattended difference which nonetheless was immanent to its
existence. This time-form of undoing harbors a becoming, a way of escaping the
form and eschewing the location, of a movement-character rather than a definite
type. It is creatively involutive because it moves neither forward nor backwards but
sideways (a double movement).
The assumption of progressive politics beingmore differentiatedmight bemis-
leading if it is not considered in relation to the temporal specificity of becoming.
Deleuze and Guattari explain: “but to involve is to form a block that runs its own line
‘between’ the terms in play and beneath assignable relations.” (1987, 239, emphasis
added) Beneath assignable relations there is of a relational field a not predeter-
mined but emergent quality that is differential. Deleuze and Guattari use of the
notion of alliance designates a temporal emergent collectivity as quality in itself,
as becoming, and not the becoming-together of bodies,matter, and spaces. Involu-
tion is the time form of differentiating becoming, whereas the activity of involving
shifts participation away from a willful act. It is more a process of being drawn
into a line or situation which is neither active nor passive. Conceiving the power
to involve as a mode of participation means to open the body to “an inhumanity
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immediately experienced in the body as such […] outside the programmed body”
(Deleuze/Guattari 1987, 273). The inhumanity is not a nonhuman matter but a be-
coming which falls outside of time through human sensuous embodiment. It is
inhumane or more-than-human because it cannot be grasped other than through
sensation.
Activist Sense as Practice of Undoing
Recalling the initial array of a shared and felt activist continuum at the beginning
of this text, I want to close with turning towards the temporality immanent to the
process of undoing as an instance in a process where the creative involution, the
differential act, becomes a lure for “other contemporaneous possibilities.” How can
we make sense of the temporal folding of activity immanent to media ecologies
as a key aspect of contemporary social movements? In the introductory examples
the power of relaying felt experiences across time and space defines but one as-
pect. The narration and sharing of felt embodied states, recalling the events of the
Maple Spring from a disjunctive time and space – my friend living in Montreal,
me being glued to the screen in Zurich – makes up one key element of a politics of
undoing: The affective event-envelopes reactivate memories and provide embod-
ied experiences with a rich and layered sense as constitutive of the contemporary.
In the emergence of a memory, as local sign, the affective texture of activist modes
of existence unfold their extensive continuum across bodies, times, and spaces.
Undoing means to fold and insert, to attend to the edges of an embodied ex-
perience as it verges towards its own remaking. The politics of undoing are not
tied to human-ordered attentiveness of the perceiving subject in the usual phe-
nomenological sense of the term.16The subject and perception are of the situation
and become with it, thus shifting the shape of the event towards an ecological op-
eration that is utterly more-than-human. The more-than-human pertains less to
an orchestration of human, non-human, organic, and nonorganic agents (into an
alliance, as seen from a human perspective), but to the differentiating contribu-
tions of temporalities to the fabrication of the contemporary. It is the “concate-
nated union” of the fleeting present felt at the brink of its undoing, where politics
of the event make sense (James 1996, 107-108). Such sense-making follows a logic of
becoming that moves in a non-linear fashion, constituting contemporary alliances
– alliances beyond entities and inclusive of temporalities undercutting a chrono-
logical coherence.
16 On the general rejection of the subject-centered phenomenological take on sense, see Fou-
cault’s “review” of Deleuze’s Logic of Sense in his text “Theatrum Philosophicum” (1998, 351).
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The problem of an agential and mediating image of thought is its leaping back
into a casting of action tied to a subject. Sense defines the power of the event to
seep into perception while circuiting through multiple (sensuous) matters in their
capacities to contribute to the event. It is here, in the midst of occurrent sense (as
becoming felt and making sense) where undoing unleashes its political potential.
The power of culmination without determination, a crystalline and diffracted im-
age that weaves together the contemporary, underlines the movement of becoming
which is felt when the situation takes hold of the present. It is a fleeting and emer-
gent present as contemporaneity that expands what can be felt and how to move
forwards if the making of sense suspends any preemptive categorization while tak-
ing account of the temporalities of a past informing such a present.17 In this way,
Erin Manning states:
“I think that the biggest mistake we make is to pretend that we can categorize
and compartmentalize events according to pre-established criteria. This is just too
clean. I think that art can do the work of keeping experience complex by creating
an open field for thought in the making. All open fields eventually get captured
in all kinds of ways, but this capture does not negate the trace of the process [of
becoming].” (Manning in Massumi 2015, 145)
What exactly becomes activated through the perceptual and embodied encounters
with such an activist continuum and how does it make sense while moving through
the sensuous? Sense the way Deleuze unravels the term lies before any actual sensu-
ous experience. It inhabits the surface, as he writes, a contour of the event’s poten-
tial unfolding without being resembled by the event. The sonorous contours of the
banging of pots and the helicopter rotation, or the banging of protection shields of
police in riot gear charging the protesting crowd, enter the experiential realm not
as appearance but through an involvement in fields of experience. Such an involve-
ment occurs disjunctively, that is, it activates in resonances with a plethora of other
activations across differentiated bodies, times, and spaces. There is no deduction
or regression possible in these situations – they seize relationally and carry bodies
in their sensuous capacities with them. In this whirling of an unfolding event, the
surface moves in resonance, underneath, without projecting or being actualized.
Sense is a temporality all of its own – Aion or becoming. This temporality shapes
what comes to pass as present but is never grasped other than in its movement
across and underneath. Such a temporality is at work, when the temporalities of
past and present events draw on forces of a life beyond the human-body-sensation-
nexus. It is a futurity as contemporaneous. There is nothing but the event. But the
17 The notion of “taking account” could also be read in the way that Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing
writes about the “art of noticing” (Tsing 2015).
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event is never that what the present assumes it to be, and the present orders and
confines powers, enabling and disabling.
So, how does a politics of undoing play into these temporal complexities? The
media assemblages which accompany and shape social movements around the
globe are far more than amplificatory devices in support of appearance.They carry
the affective powers of “non-sensuous perception.” (Whitehead 1967, 182)18 Non-
sensuous perception is “the immediate past as surviving to be again lived through
in the present.” (Ibid.) Rather than amere linearity of a past conditioning a present,
non-sensuous perceptions are the relays between an event’s undoing and its shift
towards the formation of another event. To lodge this process in perception is a
way to circumvent consciousness as the driving operation of such transitions. Put
differently, Whitehead poses non-sensuous perception as the key-activity in the
process of making sense through the sensuous by applying an affective activation
before conscious recognition puts things into an order. It is here, where Manning
places the power of art, and which I would extend to the general realm of aesthet-
ics, as the relay between sensation and sense-making. How does such an activist
sense operate through the non-sensuous relay of an undoing to become crucial to
a politics of sensation in activist media ecologies?
The media’s capture of social movements for the most part bifurcate. On the
one hand, they are part and parcel of the serious business of calling out acts of
state-directed violence against the freedom of assembly and speech. Here the no-
tion of “alternative media” and investigative journalism derive their relevance from
contributing to the play of politics of appearance and recognition in an overall dis-
tribution of the sensible throughout different media outlets and platforms as well
as archives and juridical procedures, human justice, and human rights practices.19
On the other hand, the preemptive power ofmedia,mostly tabloid andmainstream
social media, focuses on the logic of violence, the front line (Carl Schmitt and Ernst
Jünger calling), and what is widely known as “riot porn.”20 Such logics of violence
capture the discourse at the barest level of activation, harnessing it towards a proto-
fascist aesthetics obsessed with a linear logic of time, of future catastrophe or dan-
ger, as a crucial element of a politics of fear moving through sensuous activation.21
A future fact that predates how it will be cast after the event has happened – the
18 I want to thank Diego Gil for making this important comment.
19 Recognition is another central term in the works of Butler that cannot be further engaged
with due to a lack of space (cf. Willig/Butler 2012).
20 On the obsessive relation to the front and its powers of activation in Schmitt and Jünger see
Wills 2016, 179 passim.
21 Without having further space to elaborate, such a linear logic of future threat or war-mon-
gering liberation has been celebrated by Italian Futurism, most notably, Tomaso Marinetti,
but also occurs in more recent sense-modulating strategies of post 9/11 state-of-emergency
politics as deployed by the George W. Bush administration (cf. Massumi 2005).
104 Christoph Brunner
pitfalls of the regressive and progressive. In the midst of these bifurcating lines the
more ambivalent but also more experimental terrain of artistic-activist creativity
offers an affirmative version of activist sense as a becoming.
A politics of undoing extends the artistic-experimental beyond the institution-
alized confinements of art. Turning towards aesthetic practices, such experimenta-
tions permeate activistmedia practices and forms of protest (cf. Reed 2019). Beyond
the primary reactive conception of alternative media, as a response to mainstream
media and their dominant refrains of violence and opposition, another mode of
aesthetic activation arises.The activating powers of different temporalities, specif-
ically different modes of living and resisting binary captures of opposition, define a
crucial aspect of activist sense in times of redundant refrains of populism. Rather
than just engaging in forms of protest and counter-narrative in order to obtain
recognition, be it social or legal or even a common cause entering the discourse of
politics, these modes of activation operate through the power of undoing. Undoing
is an affirmative process that honors the accomplishment of an event becoming a
concrete and embodied situation, an effect, while accounting for the differences
immanent to such a situation that are felt in their potential. Affirmation is not
an act but a state of openness. It courses through each instance of an embodied
experience, expressing a sense of movement as defining character of an event’s sin-
gularity. Such potentiation is the work of affect and non-sensuous perception. It
accounts not just for the imaginary that ‘another world is possible’ but also for the
unbounded potential for activation in the midst of the contemporary.22 While it is
crucial for social movements to build on reliable infrastructures, to support bod-
ies in alliance and in the streets, such activities are paired off with an entire array
of differentializing (micro)-perceptions with and through the media-shaped tem-
poralities that make up such embodied experiences, both disjunctively and con-
junctively. What is shared collectively through alliance, the alliance Deleuze and
Guattari hint at, is an alliance in the feeling of undoing, the power of existence
through becoming. Becoming is returning. Becoming is the eternal returning of
differentiation in its very own manner, not constituted entities being different.
Acting in alliance, “acting in the midst of being formed,” (Butler 2011) pertains
to the insertion of sense into a collective sensing of becoming, a heterogenous
force operating through the “joy” of sensuous emergence. There is neither a pre-
fabricated alliance among humans or between humans and non-humans. What
accounts for the more-than-human is the very process of sense(making) as the
temporal powers between thinking and feeling, moving and being moved, motion
and rest. The affective politics at the heart of activist sense can be felt in the very
22 In a more extended version of this article, I would engage in Philippe Pignarre and Isabelle
Stenger’smore speculative embracing of theprotest slogan “anotherworld is possible” dating
back to the global social movements stated in Seattle in 1999 (Pignarre/Stengers 2011).
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powers of undoing. Undoing is the potentiation for the banging of pots to reacti-
vate the present, the contemporary, as my friend and I shared eight years after the
Maple Spring. It is the trauma of the helicopter noise hauntingmymemories while
feeding the affirmation of experienced trauma being shared in resistance without
sharing the traumatic experience.While there is singularity to each of these felt in-
stances of actualization, activist sense as a politics of undoing allows for sharing an
activist continuum across times, spaces, memories, and existential territories. It
is the transtemporal and translocal conception of the spaces of alliance that builds
on the disjunctive power of becoming beyond retroactive analysis of urban forms
of protest and their mediated states. It is in this artful activation with and through
sense that a polyphonic bundle of life-forms occur and that do not react but acti-
vate, affirming a different line of life in the present of future-past memories in the
folds of non-sensuous perception. Such life is not free of capture. It will be cap-
tured, but only after its undoing has moved somewhere else, towards a different
and differentiated contemporary.
References
Arendt, Hannah (1972): Crisis of the Republic. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovic.
— (1958)The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Barad, Karen (2003): “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of
How Matter Comes to Matter.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol.
28, no 3, p. 801-831.
Bempeza, Sofia et al. (2019): Polyphone Ästhetik: Eine kritische Situierung, Wien et al.:
transversal texts.
Berlant, Lauren/Stewart, Kathleen (2019): The Hundreds, Durham: Duke University
Press.
Braidotti, Rosi (2009): “On Putting the Active Back into Activism,” in: New Forma-
tions, vol. 68, no. 3, p. 42-57.
Brunner, Christoph (forthcoming): “Concatenated Commons and Operational Aes-
thetics”, in: Stalder, Felix/Sollfrank, Cornelia/Niederberger, Shusha (eds.): Aes-
thetics of the Commons, Zürich/Berlin: diaphanes.
— (2018): “Activist Sense: AffectiveMedia Practices during the G20 Summit inHam-
burg”, in: Transversal Online Journal, https://transversal.at/transversal/0318/bru
nner/en, last access 1.16.2021.
— (2013): “Relaying and Re-Beginning”, in: Transmutations vol. 1, no. 1 http://trans
mutations.org/site/relaying-and-re-beginning/, last access 1.16.2021.
Brunner, Christoph/Fritsch, Jonas (2011): “Interactive Environments as Fields of
Transduction”, in:The Fibreculture Journal, no. 18, http://eighteen.fibreculturejo
106 Christoph Brunner
urnal.org/2011/10/09/fcj-124-interactive-environments-as-fields-of-transducti
on/, last access 1.16.2021.
Brunner, Christoph/Nigro, Roberto/Raunig, Gerald (2013): “Post-Media Activism,
Social Ecology and Eco-Art”, in:Third Text vol. 27, no. 1, p. 10-16.
Butler, Judith (2011): “Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street”, in: Transver-
sal Online Journal, https://transversal.at/transversal/1011/butler/en, last access
1.16.2021.
— (2011): Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.”, New York: Routledge.
— (2004): Undoing Gender, New York/London: Routledge.
Cadena, Marisol de la/ Blaser, Mario (eds.) (2018): AWorld of ManyWorlds. Durham:
Duke University Press.
Deleuze, Gilles (1988): Foucault. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Deleuze, Gilles et al. (1993):The Logic of Sense, New York: Columbia University Press.
Deleuze, Gilles/Guattari, Félix (1987): A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophre-
nia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Deuber-Mankowsky, Astrid (2017): Queeres Post-Cinema: Yael Bartana, Su Friedrich,
Todd Haynes, Sharon Hayes, Berlin: August Verlag.
Escobar, Arturo (2020): Pluriversal Politics: The Real and the Possible. Latin America in
Translation, Durham: Duke University Press.
— (2018): Designs for the Pluriverse: Radical Interdependence, Autonomy, and theMaking of
Worlds.NewEcologies for the Twenty-First Century, Durham:DukeUniversity Press.
Foucault, Michel (1989):TheOrder ofThings: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, Lon-
don: Routledge.
— (1998): Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology. Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984,
New York, New Press.
Gerbaudo, Paolo (2012): Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary
Activism, London: Pluto Press.
Guattari, Félix (1995): Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, Bloomington, IN: In-
diana University Press.
— (1996): The Guattari Reader. Blackwell Readers, Oxford/Cambridge: Blackwell Pub-
lishers.
Haraway, Donna (2016): Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene,
Durham: Duke University Press.
Harney, Stefano/Moten, Fred (2013): The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black
Studies. Wivenhoe/New York/Port Watson: Minor Compositions.
Hartman, Saidiya V. (2019):Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of
Social Upheaval, London: Serpent’s Tail.
James, William (1996): Essays in Radical Empiricism, Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press.
The Politics of Undoing: The Movement of Activist Sense 107
Kluitenberg, Eric (2020). “The Zombie Public. Or, How to Revive ‘the Public’ and
Public Space after the Pandemic”, in:Open! Platform for Art, Culture, and the Public
Domain, https://onlineopen.org/the-zombie-public, last access 1.16.2021.
— (2017): “(Re-)Designing Affect Space”, in: Open! Platform for Art, Culture, and
the PublicDomain, https://onlineopen.org/re-designing-affect-space, last access
1.16.2021.
— (2015): “Affect Space – Witnessing the Movement(s) of the Squares”, in: Open!
Platform for Art, Culture, and the Public Domain, https://onlineopen.org/affect-sp
ace, last access 1.16.2021.
Lorey, Isabell (2016): “Die Wiederkehr Revolutionärer Praxen in Der Infinitiven
Gegenwart.”, in: Ludwig, Gundula et al. (eds.): Foucaults Gegenwart: Sexualität
– Sorge – Revolution,Wien et al.: transversal texts, p. 77-103.
Mackenzie, Adrian (2011):Wirelessness: Radical Empiricism in Network Cultures, Cam-
bridge/London: MIT Press.
Manning, Erin (2009):Relationscapes:Movement, Art, Philosophy. Cambridge,MA:MIT
Press.
Massumi, Brian (2005): “Fear (The Spectrum Said)”, in: Positions: East Asia Cultures
Critique, vol. 13, no. 1, p. 31-48.
— (2015): Politics of Affect, Cambridge/Malden: Polity.
— (2011): Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts. Technologies of
Lived Abstraction, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
— (1995): “The Autonomy of Affect”, in: Cultural Critique, no. 31.
— (2015):The Power at the End of the Economy, Durham: Duke University Press.
Massumi, Brian/McKim, Joel (2009): “Of Microperception andMicropolitics. An In-
terview with Brian Massumi”, in: INFLeXions, no. 3, http://www.senselab.ca
/inflexions/volume_3/node_i3/massumi_en_inflexions_vol03.html, last access
1.16.2021.
Mouffe, Chantal (2016): “Democratic Politics and Conflict: An Agonistic Approach”,
Política Común vol. 9.
Munster, Anna (2013): An Aesthesia of Networks: Conjunctive Experience in Art and Tech-
nology. Technologies of Lived Abstraction, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
— (2006): Materializing New Media: Embodiment in Information Aesthetics. Hanover,
NH: Dartmouth College Press.
Negri, Antonio (1999): Insurgencies: Constituent Power and theModern State, Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press.
Parisi, Luciana (2019): “Media Ontology and Transcendental Instrumentality”, in:
Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 36, no. 6, p. 95-124.
Pignarre, Philippe/Stengers, Isabelle/Goffey, Andrew (2011): Capitalist Sorcery: Break-
ing the Spell, Basingstoke/Hampshire/New York: Houndsmills PalgraveMacmil-
lan.
108 Christoph Brunner
Rancière, Jacques (2010): Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, London: Bloomsbury
Publishing.
Reed, Thomas V. (2019): The Art of Protest: Culture and Activism from the Civil Rights
Movement to the Present, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia (2018): Ch’ixinakax utxiwa: eine Reflexion über Praktiken und
Diskurse der Dekolonisierung, Münster: Unrast Verlag.
Sharpe, Christina Elizabeth (2016): In the Wake: On Blackness and Being, Durham:
Duke University Press.
Simondon, Gilbert (2005): L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’informa-
tion, Grenoble: Millon.
Stewart, Kathleen (2010): “Afterword: Worlding Refrains.”, in: Gregg, Melissa/Seig-
worth, Gregory J. (eds.):TheAffectTheory Reader, Durham: Duke University Press,
p. 339-353.
Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt (2015):TheMushroom at the End of theWorld: On the Possibility
of Life in Capitalist Ruins, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Whitehead, Alfred North (1967): Adventures of Ideas, New York: Free Press.
Vallega, Alejandro A. (2014): Latin American Philosophy from Identity to Radical Exteri-
ority. World Philosophies, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Whitehead, Alfred North/Griffin, David Ray/Sherburne, Donald W. (1978): Process
and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, New York: Free Press.
Willig, Rasmus/Butler, Judith (2012): “Recognition and Critique: An Interview with
Judith Butler”, in: Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory, vol. 13, no. 1, p. 139-144.
Wills, David (2016): Inanimation: Theories of Inorganic Life, Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Yusoff, Kathryn (2018): A Billion Black Anthropocenes or None, Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press.
Dumbledore’s Army, Still Recruiting
Fan & Media Activism as Practice
Anne Ganzert
A group of people are holding banners stating “Terminar con la Detencion de Mi-
grantes”, “End Queer Detention” and “Save Liberty. Act now”, in a picture posted
under the hashtag #DAfightsback. But it is their shirts, stating “Books turnMuggles
into Wizards” or “I don’t go looking for trouble. Trouble usually finds me. Harry”
that might guide the spectator to the realization, that, rather than referring to the
district attorney, DA is ‘Dumbledore’s Army’, a branch of the Harry Potter Alliance,
which is arguably one of the largest fan-activist organizations to date.
Fictional stories throughout the ages have told tales of conflict, resistance, and
the oppressed rising up against far greater powers. A fair share of these texts, plays,
films, or shows have provoked uproars in the public, be it from critics, conservative
guards of moral, or affected audiences; however, fans of specific narratives have
begun to mobilize for causes that are only remotely related to the media product
of their affection.
Therefore, this chapter will focus on activist practices, their mediation, facili-
tation, and narrative framing, as they appear in the realms of pop culture fandom
and fan activism.1 The assumption is that activist or resistant practices emerge
from a seemingly unpolitical background, mobilizing fans into action for various
causes. The chapter will therefore question media activism and the taking of sides
and sites from a perspective based in fandom studies and reflect on the possibil-
ity of having a pool of potential activists, connected through their shared fandom,
ready and willing to engage for multiple causes of differing degrees of personal im-
portance. Additionally, the effect and relevance of these seemingly ‘petty protests’
will become evident as a ground to practice, in every sense of the word, the taking
of sides and sites.
1 Sports fans most certainly also employ strategies of activism or protest, but cannot be the
focus of this chapter.
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‘Petty Protest’
Cornel Sandvoss convincingly stated, that it “has become next to impossible to find
realms of public life which are unaffected by fandom” (2005: 3). Contemporary fan-
dom has presented various levels of media activism, including protests against
a show’s content or cancellation with prime time shows and daytime soaps alike
(cf. Scardaville 2005). Other more clearly political protests, have used pop cultural
references and codes to put across their message, for example the use ofTheHand-
maid’s Tale (Miller 2017) costumes to protest Anti-Abortion law-making worldwide
(see below). The former has in itself become a trope that is reflected within pop
culture and is often framed as futile effort and petty protest by nerdish characters,
when being a fan is part of a fictional character’s traits. One example of this are the
phone calls made by Sheldon Cooper inThe Big BangTheory (Lorre and Prady 2007),
where he demands that the Syfy Channel either continue his favorite TV show or
decrease its quality to help viewers lose interest before it is canceled (S06E21).
The efficacy of such protests, however, are often overlooked or dismissed in fic-
tion. Real life responses to series’ cancellations tend to be socially dismissed as the
actions of those who have no true issues in their lives,2 framed (in the press) as fu-
tile, or occasionally celebrated when, every once in a while, a studio is persuaded to
put out a closing movie for a series or another channel picks the show up for con-
tinuation.3 Fictional depictions of protest, for example the “Gabehcoud” demon-
stration4 shown in Homeland (S05E05, Gordon and Gansa 2011),5 follow more tra-
ditional structures, usually political and leaning to either the left or the right, but
embody strong limitations as demonstrations, strikes, or sit-ins have a fixed dura-
tion and place of occurrence, and they end when either the event finishes, the site
is taken by the police, or the demands are met. Longer lasting resistant movements
that build up, evolve, and change are seldom included in contemporary narratives.
One such outlier is the very popular fictional protest of Panem (from The Hunger
Games series, Collins 2008).
2 Or the other way around, where the younger generation is described as protest lazy (cf. Gafni
2015).
3 I.e. when Universal Pictures decided to wrap up Fox’s series Firefly with a movie, after the
shows cancellation (2005).
4 A crowd of protesters with different modes of disguises, masks, hoods, etc., and signs are
shown demonstrating outside the Russian embassy in Berlin. Police troupes and news teams
flank their chanting, while the camera follows the protagonist through the crowd.
5 Interestingly another form of protest occurred within the show’s production, when street
artists were hired to spray slogans on the set of a Syrian Refugee Camp with Arabic script.
The graffiti read “There is no Homeland” or “we didn’t resist, so he conquered us riding on
a donkey” among other things and clearly went against the production’s guideline of being
apolitical (cf. Heba y Amin n.d.).
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Student protesters in Thailand have employed the signature hand gesture de-
scribed in the books and shown in the movies to signalize their protest against
their government and leaders. Albeit entirely arbitrary, this symbol carries with it
an entire construct of ideas, of small, oppressed groups rising up against an over-
powering government. The mobilization of this protest in a country with a history
ofmilitary coups and political strategizing shows that the iconography developed in
themovies inspired the protest practices ofThailand’s young adults who responded
to the projection of choosing to make a difference (cf. Loughrey 2014)6.
In this light, discarding fan protest as petty protest is most certainly myopic, as
these brief examples convey, how the practices of protest in fandom travel, mingle,
and develop.The fact that most of these instances are based on Hollywood produc-
tions, shows, or movies should not be forgotten, as it also transports ideas about
consumerism, capitalism, and modes of civil engagement to countries and con-
texts that might significantly differ.7 US-American ideas, concepts, and privileges
therefore also manifest where and when these modes of fan protest are used to
take a side, where young people live in lamentable circumstances, yet “these are
the same people that in another corner of the world would instead have the luxury
to argue over [Panem’s protagonists] Gale vs Peeta for hours on end.” (ibid., n.p.)
Turning Fans into Heroes
With these preliminary reflections, let me come back to the case mentioned at the
beginning of this chapter. The Harry Potter fandom, forming since the first book
was published in 1997 (which is also four years after the Internet was made public
domain), has gone through all sorts of wonderful and fascinating twists and turns
(cf. Frankel 2019).
In 2005 Andrew Slack8 started the Harry Potter Alliance (HPA).This was a time
of peak public interest and fan engagement as the sixth and second to last book
set for release that July and the fourth movie for that November. Hence, the HPA
could tap “the existing infrastructures of the thriving Harry Potter fan community”
(Kliger-Vielnchik 2013: 11). More than 15 years later, when writing this chapter, the
Harry Potter Alliance is a well-structured, inviting, and professional organization,
and their efforts have gained a public seal of approval, especially as J.K. Rowling has
6 Pop-culture symbolism has long been intertwined with history and protest, and is a well-
covered topic in the press for example in the context of the 2019 Hong Kong Protest.
7 It certainly also re-iterates engrained structures of classism, racisms, genderism etc.
8 There is no connection to the term of ‘Slacktivism’, even though the latter is closely connected
to social media (Cf. Dennis 2018).
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respectfully acknowledged the alliance’s efforts (her quote is featured prominently
on thehpalliance.org).
Typically for fandom, as can be seen with fan fiction or gaming etc., more ad-
vanced writers, artists, or players, share their ways of doing things with others
through social media or platforms especially created for that purpose. As every-
where, there are hierarchies within the production communities of theHarry Potter
fandom, conflicts, and copyright issues, but fandoms in general, and this one in-
cluded, are understood as transformational, and progressive even if not always
positive (cf. Wojton and Porter 2018; Bennett 2014; Clements 2018).
The HPA, unlike this heterogeneous field of potential fan engagement, aims
to be strictly positive, morally clean, and conflict free at least within its ranks. It
offers a variety of options to engage with its causes. Be it “Accio Books” that has
donated 350,000 books to communities lacking libraries since 2009. Or “Dumble-
dore’s Army” that has recently partnered with RAICES (The Refugee and Immigrant
Center for Education and Legal Services) and been especially vocal concerning the
North-American migration politics. Or the “Granger Leadership Academy”, a re-
treat for fan activists where they can brainstorm new strategies and learn skills.
According to the press kit, the HP Alliance is present on six continents, and has
local chapters in 35 countries.9 While this is impressive in itself, it is not my aim
to list the HPA’s achievements and goals. What I find most interesting is the way
in which potential fan activists are addressed and how they are educated in the
practices. For example: Since its start, and with the more recent sequels and trans-
media stories from the Potter Universe, the HPA has also plugged into the fandoms
of The Hunger Games, Man of Steel, Pokémon, and other popular communities. Most
of these instances tackle a specific issue, like “Hunger is not a Game”10 and come
with handbooks, pamphlets, action manuals, and free training.
For example, they address domestic violence through the fictional character of
Jessica Jones (Marvel 2001),while the Pokémon themed toolkit says:
“Through Pokémon we’re going to explore the following issues: Imposter Syn-
drome, Environmentalism and Respectful Tourism, and Mental Health! […] This
toolkit is designed to help you think like a Pokémon master in order to create a
positive impact on the world around you.” (HPA: 4)
All of these toolkits are downloadable and tailored to different age groups, so that
group leaders, educators, and fans can use them. Additionally, the “Wizard Activist
School” training section on the HP Alliance’s homepage is built like a webinar, with
9 Yet in Rowling and Potter’s homeland, the United Kingdom, only two chapters of the alliance
exist, while in the US 136 are listed online.
10 According to one of Kliger-Vielnchik’s interviewees, the campaign did not resonate as much
in the Hunger Game fandom.
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questionnaires, explanatory videos etc. The HPA defines itself and fan activism as
follows:
“What theHPAdoes is called fan activism: using the power of fandoms to promote
social change. Fandoms can come from books, TV shows,movies, games – any cre-
ative media that people are passionate about. By connecting real world issues to
elements from these fandoms, fan activism uses the energy, creativity, and com-
munity of fandoms to accomplish positive social change.” (HPA: Wizard Activist
School 2019)
Passion, as it is mentioned here, seems to be a driving factor, and a way to dis-
tinguish instances of fan activism from duty or pressure. It also defines the huge
amount of free labor that goes into the HPA’s activities. The whole operation is
based around the idea of the infamous pupils of ‘Hogwarts – School for Witchcraft
and Wizardry’ as presented in the books by J.K. Rowling, and fans’ phantasy of
going there or belonging to a magical world. Additionally, the general idea of the
story is about friendship, belonging, fighting back, and standing up for what you
believe in. Another motivational aspect of the narrative that attracts Harry Potter
fans to activism is the idea that evil can actually be beaten. In an article for the
BBC, Hephzibah Anderson noted that “the core narrative chronicles the attempted
extermination of Muggles and ‘mudbloods’ by Lord Voldemort and his sidekicks”,
making the fight of Dumbledore’s Army there and here one against fascism, and
the causes adaptable to contemporary activism (Anderson 2018: n.p.).11
Structurally, the four school houses in the army have certainly adapted, the
characteristics described in the books influence the way they tackle current issues:
Gryffindors are brave and courageous and Ravenclaws value creativity and learning.
When telling their stories of protest, the HPA members can call upon these at-
tributes to communicate what is needed and to situate themselves within the log-
ics of the fictional world. Notably the HPA rehabilitates the house of Slytherin. As
the home of all dark witches and wizards, who typically have an egocentric or even
cruel approach, the house is included into the positive activities of the HPA, by fo-
cusing on positive attributes such as resourcefulness and ambition. AllHarry Potter
fans tend to, and HPA members are encouraged to, sort themselves into one of
the houses and help gain points for the house cup. These points are given not for
good or bad behavior or magical proficiency, as teachers would award them in the
story world, but through fan activism that is tagged or labeled with the house’s
name or colors on social media, in photos, or other documentation. Additionally,
and especially through the documentation, these activities also take place within
11 Smaller modes of activism, such as SPEW, Hermione’s attempt to improve the life and work-
ing conditions of the school’s house elves, are also very direct sources to look at.
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the contexts of social media platforms, which have their own modes of commu-
nication, politics, and visibility and are sites where fan activists can communicate
with potential members. Henry Jenkins quotes Andrew Slack with the following
statement:
“Without newmedia, I don’t knowwhatwewould be doing. I don’t thinkwewould
exist. We would be like students at Hogwarts without wands. We would be a club
at one or two high schools, […] we probably would have a hard time being an orga-
nization that has 50 clubs that are really active, […] and amessage that gets out to
100,000 young people in Japan and in places...just all over.” (Jenkins/Slack 2009:
n.p.)
Even though many of the posts try to lead visitors to the blog space “This Week in
Wizard Activism”, the commercial aspects and ‘like economy’ of social media are
embedded into the HPA’s activism, and especially in the posts of the members, as
they demand and absorb the time and energy of the users, as well as their data and
other currency.
Similar overlaps can be seen with the shirts mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter. Some merchandise is created for charity, and hence outside WarnerBros.’
economic influence, yet uses fonts, design, and quotes from theHarryPotter brand12
to raise funds for charity work.The community, standing on the base of a common
love for theworld ofHarry Potter, is turned into consumers of brandedmerchandise,
and often presents their fandom to non-fans and each other through the wearing
of shirts, pins, scarfs, or displays of tattoos, stationary, or stickers. Adding to the
variety of items, means a source of income for the HPA and founding for their
activities, and a satisfied need of fans for new themed products. It also means a
commercial infrastructure, which tends to complicate the relationship between the
members and the organization. While this apparent discrepancy between fan club
and administration may be discussed in the fandom that exists outside the HPA, it
is excluded from the discourse around the activism. Typically, when fans sell their
fan art, ormake a living of anything stemming from fandom, conflict ensues.Here,
it might seem even more contradictory, that an activist group based on a massive
commercial success would fight, amongst other things, against media consolida-
tion and “has confronted the very system that has so successfully produced and
distributed the Harry Potter content worlds.” (Brough and Shresthova 2011: para-
graph 4.10)
But many “networked activists strategically draw resources from and at the
same time fight against structures of commercial pop culture.” (Ibid.) Hence, the
HPA are not alone in this contradiction, many examples from fan activism and
12 The issue of fanwork and copyright is a complicated one as is but gets evenmore complicated
when money is generated and then donated to altruistic programs.
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other, non-fictional inspired, instances of resistance and protest are strongly in-
tertwined within the systematics they aim to take a site against. The next section
will therefore focus on these relations.
Systems of Resisting
The connections and contradictions explained above shift the focus to more fun-
damental ideas of power and resistance. To Foucault and many others, activism,
protest, or civil disobedience is inextricably connected to power: “Where there is
power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never
in a position of exteriority in relation to power.” (Foucault 1978: 96) Even though
Foucault describes a “plurality of resistances”, and even though one cannot exist
without the other, a simple difference remains: that one part is in power and an-
other is resistant to it.
In fandom, where the so called ‘powers that be’ describe anything or anyone
that is part of the entertainment industry and somehow positioned opposite to
fandom (Wojton and Porter 2018: 9f), the questions are the same as they are with
any power system, any resistance, oppression, or taking of sides: who gets to call
whom resistant or place them and their needs in the margins? Who is the ‘I’ that
takes a side? Are people enabled to deflect such an ascription and is “at least in
theory, the presence of protest is a marker of individual freedom” (Strate 2018:
232)? Are the processes that make one site the center and another the periphery
the same? And is every act of difference, deviation, or expression against norms
instantly resistance?
There is indeed a danger of watering down all involved parties, of “diluting
our notion of the political to a point that makes it difficult to debate the merits
of different strategies and tactics for civic participation.” (Brough and Shresthova
2011: 3.11) Yet there is resistant potential even in the smallest of things, even if “it
does not necessarily entail a breach of law, but does entail a breach of expected be-
havior, whether social, legal, or moral.” (Ricks 2017: vii) Stellan Vinthagen and Anna
Dahlgren Johansson show howmany authors from sociology and philosophy “agree
that resistance is an oppositional act. Like all acts, resistance is situated in certain
time, space, and relations, and engages with different (types of) actors, techniques
and discourses.” (2013: 12f) When studying fan protests, the situatedness in time
and context can become very complicated, intersectional, international, and inter-
textual.
An example for this can again be found in the HPA as there are various po-
sitions from which to express oneself as fan. Taking a side as a fan in this world
can even mean opting for the darker side of magic, to follow he-who-shall-not-be-
named, even though the vast majority of fans associate with the ‘good’ side of the
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story and sign up as eager students of Hogwarts and members of Dumbledore’s
Army. This decision is relatively clear cut as the plots and values are very straight
forward about what is considered ‘good’ or ‘evil’. Most fans also choose (or have a
virtual sorting hat chose) their house affiliation, thus positioning themselves in al-
liance with specific virtues, values, and skills. The American school Ilvermory from
the Potter sequels also has four houses; however, these “new Houses do not seem
to have the same resonance within the fan community” (Hautsch 2019, 143), and
the American fans are also free to align with the UK Hogwart’s houses. Fans are
also free to choose from a variety of narratives in which to base their experiences,
including the plot of the original books, the plot of the prequels or sequels, whether
Hermione is a WOC13, and whether they join the X-rated areas of fan fiction… As
such, Harry Potter fans may make many decisions in positioning themselves long
before they become involved in the fan activism described above.
This act of positioning oneself may be one of the reasons why some fandom
research frames being a fan as inherently resistant. However, the impulse of being
or calling yourself a fan is not based in opposition but in affect: in the joy, or love, or
fascination for whatever it is a person is fan off. If indeed: “fandom is born out of
fascination and some frustration” (Ito, boyd, and Jenkins 2016, 14), the relationship
between fan and object is indeed precarious. Affection and frustration can eas-
ily become action or resistance, and if the emotional connection to the fan object
wavers, will the motivation to be a fan activist waver with it? What then is a fan ac-
tivist? What significance does the term ‘fan’ bring to the act of activism? Active fans
have been at the core of many studies and are often distinguished from consumers
of the products. (Bielby, Harrington, and Bielby 1999) In this context they are de-
scribed as participating in fan clubs, online message boards, and other channels.
“An activist fan acts strategically, usually in concert with others, to achieve a par-
ticular goal.” (Scardaville 2005: 882) I want to follow Brough / Sherthova and their
broad take on fan activism “to incorporate the range of intentional actions by fans,
or the use of fanlike strategies, to provoke change.” (2011: 2.4) Fandom has been
read as being resistant, as in progressive, even though countless examples of fan-
fiction do not express forward thinking. “Many fans have resisted efforts to bring
politics into fandom, seeing their fan activities as a release from the pressures of
everyday life, or preferring the term charity rather than the more overtly political
term activism to describe their pro-social efforts.” (Jenkins and Shresthova 2012:
paragraph 1.9) But at least from a media focused standpoint fandoms are indeed
oftentimes transformative (obsession_inc 2009), as are fan practices such as “ap-
propriating and remixing content, developing communication infrastructures and
13 The debate about Hermione’s ethnicity is an ongoing topic in fandom, with many art works
showing her as a Woman of Color, and gained new momentum when her role was cast with
actress Noma Dumezweni for the London premier of “Harry Potter and Cursed Child” (2016).
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practices within fan communities, online networking among groups with shared
interests, self-publication in dialogue with popular content worlds” (Brough and
Shresthova 2011: paragraph 2.6). These practices are what is being used when fans
take a site, when they strive to bring change to any sort of situation, and increas-
ingly in highly political contexts. For example, and as mentioned in the beginning
of this chapter, the dresses fromMargaret Atwood’s novel and the ensuing TV show
AHandmaid’s Tale have been seen at protests “from Argentina to the US, the UK and
Ireland, and has emerged as one of the most powerful current feminist symbols of
protest, in a subversive inversion of its association with the oppression of women.”
(Beaumont and Holpuch 2018: n.p.) Taking aesthetic and connoted elements from
other time periods and context is of course a re-mix practice typical of the Internet
era, just think of the genealogy from historical plotter Guy Fawkes, to Alan Moore’s
graphic novel and film adaptation V for Vendetta (1989), to the uptake of the mask
by the hacktivist group ‘Anonymous’. James Cameron’s Na’vi beings from the movie
Avatar (2009) have been aesthetically re-mediated by protesters at the West Bank,
where people in Na’vi costumes and blue body-paint “approached an Israeli mil-
itary barricade, where they were subjected to a tear gas attack. Photographs and
video of the protest were then circulated online, catching the attention of news
media outlets.” (Brough and Shresthova 2011: 2.8) The media coverage and circula-
tion of images is highly important to many forms of activism, and no less for fan
activism, as already described for the efforts of the HPA for internal and external
communication. But it does make a difference whether pop cultural references are
employed in an ongoing protest for media attention or broader communication of
issues or whether a fandom, a community attached through a shared affiliation
with a fiction, a performer, or a team takes up a cause. Lady Gaga fans for example
have been mobilized by the singer, so that the ‘Little Monsters’ have been active for
causes endorsed by Gaga (cf. Bennett 2014). Based on their attachment to the star
and her very direct addressing and appellation of her fans, Gaga can “encourage
an active response to causes from her online fan base that reaches beyond the on-
line currency of simple clicks and retweets.” (Ibid.: 143) Similarly, as the HPA relies
solely on the fandom’s preexisting engagement with the story world, any member
can freely join any of the diverse campaigns.
Membership in the Harry Potter Alliance does not of course automatically
stem from being a fan. New members complete a specific signup procedure and
join a chapter before receiving the newsletter with updates and activities. Kliger-
Vielnchik examined the processes of translation, that move a person and their
efforts from participatory culture to participatory politics and vice versa (2013: 15f).
Through these translations networked individuals, by definition part of different
groups, can develop civic identities that have a voice and political agency or that
are able to take a side. Four mechanisms are mainly involved when these transla-
tions into political activism occur. First, the social and emotional connections that
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fans have for their favored cultural text and for other members of the fandom.
Second, the, well-practiced, modes of creative production and content spreading.
Third, the space of discussion both off-and online. And fourth, the facilitation
of an informal discussion, that goes about “creating and supporting spaces and
opportunities for conversations about current events and political issues.” (Ibid.:
16-17) For the HPA, all of these mechanisms take place both privately and publicly
as well as online and offline. In being active with the HPA, fans communicate
both their fandom and their activism, their belonging to a community and their
affiliation with certain aspects of the story world.
Although fandom is always heterogeneous, it develops subgroups and cells, and
shows gestures of othering as well as being exclusive on economic, political and
sociological levels. Hence, the “We are all Humans” sign, held up at the #dafights-
back protest this chapter started with, may have a much longer shadow when we
consider the modes of protest and media activism connected to fans and fandom.
These modes of community building, mobilization, activation, and practices allow
reflections on media activism and the taking of sides in a realm that is highly po-
litical – despite the magic.
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Man overboard! Instead of an introduction, let me tell you a sailor’s yarn. A story
of heroes and villains, deception and revolution.The story of the digital trade route
‘Silk Road’ – a much debated black market in the Darknet – and the phantom of
Dread Pirate Roberts:
Those who want to talk of the Silk Road, or perhaps rather the myth around
it, will quickly find that there are at least three versions of the story – one by the
authorities, another by the Silk Road community, and yet another by Ross Ulbricht
and his relatives – each of which claims the truth for itself, while all are marked
by rumors and opacities. Accordingly, the following summary is to be understood
as an attempt to build a consensus based on the Darknet market’s forum archival
material, interviews, and reports:
“I began working on a project that had been in my mind for over a year. I was
calling it Underground Brokers, but eventually settled on Silk Road. The idea was
to create a website where people could buy anything anonymously, with no trail
whatsoever that could lead back to them. – Dread Pirate Roberts journal entry,
2010” (Ormsby 2014: Kap. 1.2).
In January 2011, the Tor Hidden Service Silk Road went online under the IP http://
silkroadvb5piz3r.onion: a drug sales platform that for the first time combined the
technology of a ‘.onion’ site with the Bitcoin currency to create a completely anony-
mous market beyond state control.The creator, later chief administrator, and ideo-
logical-philosophical driving force behind the site wasDread Pirate Roberts (DPR),1
who shrouded his identity in anonymity for both sellers and buyers on the Darknet
market. The pseudonym was not chosen without reason, as it refers to the chil-
dren’s filmThe Prince’s Bride (1973), in which the character of the masked Dread Pi-
rate Roberts is portrayed from generation to generation by different protagonists.
1 In the later course of the official investigations, this role was attributed to the identity of Ross
William Ulbricht.
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Accordingly, his attribution of identity is still not completely clear, as the admin
himself stated in an interview with Forbes editor Andy Greenberg that he was not
the first DPR, but instead had inherited the page from his ‘predecessor’ (cf. Green-
berg 2013). After a fewmonths of construction and influx, the platform established
itself as the hiddenmain hub for illegal, mind-expanding chemicals with a product
range of over 300 different stimulants (Bartlett 2016: 158) and a relatively profes-
sional design for the Darknet markets of that time, based on the usual sales sites
such as Amazon and eBay. During the sales process, the customer and the seller
could access a platform internal encrypted messaging program to clarify any ques-
tions while guaranteeingmaximum anonymity.The buyer then transferred the cor-
responding amount of Bitcoin to the intermediate address of the escrow (DPR),2
who – after confirmation of receipt of the buyer’s goods – forwarded the payment
to the seller for a transaction fee. In addition to the sales platform, however, the Silk
Road also saw itself as a social experiment and resistance to restriction by govern-
ments, which contributed to a strong forum community. Thus, the Silk Road users
saw themselves largely as a conspiratorial community, pioneers of an overall social
revolution, which was reflected in various forum contributions on economic and
philosophical topics, decisively influenced by DPR.3 Or as he put it in an interview
with Greenberg:
“We can’t stay silent forever. We have an important message, and the time is right
for the world to hear it. What we’re doing isn’t about scoring drugs or ‘sticking it
to the man,’ it’s about standing up for our rights as human beings and refusing to
submit whenwe’ve done nowrong. Silk Road is a vehicle for thatmessage. All else
is secondary.” (Greenberg 2013)
Attracted by the growing reputation of the site, Gawker magazine reported in June
2011 about the marketplace in the Darknet (cf. Chen 2011), which led to its explo-
sive increase in users. However, this also brought the Darknet market into the au-
thorities’ focus, so that they already started the investigation in the middle of 2011
on behalf of senators Charles Summer and Joe Manchin. While in the following
year the site achieved new turnover records, and was able to cope with occurring
demands such as internal restructuring, difficulties in sales processing, and also
several hacker attacks, a task force of the Justice Department and the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration formed the secret operation ‘Marco Polo’ under the direction
2 The fact that DPR acted as an escrow for the community testifies to the extraordinary trust
that the users had in the character, since he could potentially withdraw from the website
at any time with the collected BTCs, a process known in the Darknet jargon as ‘exit scam’.
Likewise, the clear data of the sellers/buyers were collected by the main administrator.
3 For a detailedbreakdownof the Silk Road Forumdiscussions, see the Silk RoadArchive online:
https://antilop.cc/sr/.
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of Christopher Tarbell. Already inMarch 2012, the investigators planted undercover
agents into the Silk Road community, to get into the inner admin circle and finally
to DPR himself. In July 2012, the agent with the username Nob approached DPR in
order to break down his reserve with the feint of a big deal. DPR responded to the
proposal and referred one of its employees, user-name Flush, to the agents in order
to take over the further processing. Up to January 2013 the negotiations between
Nob and Flush continued, until the latter – in order to simplify the transaction –
gave the investigators his real address for the proposed delivery (anonymous 2014:
76; The Silk Road Tales and Archives 2017). A week later Flush, alias Curtis Green
was arrested by the authorities. When the employee seemingly disappeared from
the scene, DPR suspected a fraud and ordered – probably due to fear of a leak from
internal affairs – agent Nob to eliminate Green for 40,000 USD. While the inves-
tigators apparently followed the instructions by providing evidence pictures, the
FBI located the Silk Road Server in Iceland in February 2012 (cf. ibid.). With the
confiscated data and the access to Green’s admin account, the authorities finally
succeeded in arresting the alleged head behind DPR and Silk Road in October 2013
– the 29-year-old student Ross Ulbricht – in a public library in San Francisco, while
he was logged into the Silk Road back-end. Due to the burden of proof, as well as
the accusation of attempted murder, Ulbricht was sentenced to life imprisonment
in 2015, even though he claimed his innocence until the end of the trial, affirming
that the DPR account had also been used by other users (cf. Wendt 2015). And it
seemed true: Because despite the agencies thinking they cut off the head of the Hy-
dra with Ulbricht’s arrest, numerous new ones grew back – and Silk Road 2.0 went
online less than two months later, based on the copy of a Silk Road backup server.
And even after its closure and the large-scale operation ‘Onymous’ in November
2014, when over 400 illegal Tor hidden services were taken offline, Silk Road no-
ticeably launched an unstoppable movement of decentralized, anonymous (drug)
markets.
Taking Sid/tes
The case of Silk Road and Dread Pirate Roberts, which is just briefly sketched here,
exemplifies a recurring, heroic narrative, which probably finds its modern equiva-
lent in the ‘hacktivist’. The tale goes as follows: An oftentimes controversial charac-
ter enters the public stage and begins the fight against the corrupt establishment
with no less controversial means. This traditional heroic narrative of western cul-
tural history in the style of Robin Hood or Captain Jack Sparrow usually draws its
protagonists as ambivalent and dazzling figures between egocentric self-drama-
tization, anarchistic adventure, and martyrdom in favor of social justice. Thus, in
the course of a media-theoretical examination of participation as well as its refusal
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and associated positioning, the question arises to what extent technological condi-
tions (Hörl 2011) favor, shape, or even make one think of that resistance. Is dissent
in this sense possible at all? Or have the poststructuralim and critical theories not
taught us that there is no inclusion without exclusion, since fixed ascriptions of
identity with clear positions fall short and only produce new hierarchies? Perhaps
it is also the fear of positioning and the consequences it entails that everyone –
including the author of this text – must face. I would therefore like to venture into
a self-experiment of a poetic statement in the confrontation with a net-activist
counter-positioning using the example of the Silk Road – fully aware that such an
endeavor must inevitably fall short and also at the risk of self-succumbing to those
hierarchizing positions and linguistic hyperbolas. At the increasingly permeable
border between phenomenon and language, I hope for an immediate experience
of the very metaphorical shifting (μεταφορέω), which is both the research object
and methodology of the present contribution – a reciprocal entitlement of investi-
gation and (self-)positioning in the erratic shaft play of meaning.
As soon as ‘counter-positioning’ is mentioned, this statement already contains
two assumptions: namely that of an existing establishment and, at the same time,
a demarcating movement against it. If one were to name the established, neolib-
eral status quo within the modern orders of ‘digital cultures’, it could perhaps be
grasped under the dictum of transparency and all-inclusion, which in turn entails
governmental practices such as control and surveillance. So, if we now assume that
those transparent, (unidirectional) mystery-free spheres of politics and economics
represent the dominant position of observation, then we must turn to the subver-
sive potential of the un-representable (cf. Galloway 2011). Upon this,media scholars
Claus Pias and Timon Beyes propose a shift to pre-modern images and forms of
thought in response to the demand for new attempts at representation in view of
the increasing incommensurability of algorithmic structures (cf. Beyes/Pias 2014).
I would like to follow that suggestion and try to strive for an observant interweav-
ing of case study and linguistic reflection, which maintains the tension in the am-
biguity of positioning, be it linguistically, politically, or technologically. Thus, the
digital phenomenon of the so-called Darknet, which is based on decentralization
and cryptographic anonymization mechanisms,4 represents a promising starting
point for the following reflections due to its structural nature and the resulting lack
of transparency. In accepting the Darknet as a technological basis of non-knowl-
edge and enduring dissent, we raise the question of what narrative forms a new
poetics of the digital high seas can take – like an anchor raised from the murky
depths of clandestine information currents. As a first clue, it is worth taking a look
4 For a more detailed technological explanation, see subchapter “The Heads of the Hydra” be-
low.
Dark Sea Pirates 125
at the terminologies of the Internet: the discourse on this phenomenon is charac-
terized bymeaningful linguistic images, especially nautical metaphors, asMatthias
Bickenbach and Harun Maye have worked out (2009). This is the talk of browsers,
data havens, or surfing. The result, however, is less a continuous narrative flow
than a collection of sentences and gaping breaks in the story around the digital
cosmos, between which the metaphors slide back and forth like elusive fish. “The
term ends in mysticism, the metaphor in myth“ (Blumenberg 2007: 75, transl. by
the author).5 So let us dare to drift away on the metaphorical waves in the mythical
writing (μεταφορέιν) – listening to a sea tale, full of mythical figures like the Hydra
and the piratical thinking that never remains in a harbor long, but always pushes
out onto the sea in search of new treasures.
On the (Dark) Seas
When representability reaches its limits, the metaphor – at least in language – is
often resorted to, as it were a taming act of what seems to elude understanding.
Here, however, it must not be forgotten that this trope contributes not only to
illustration but also to the structuring of knowledge:
“If language is not capable of guaranteeing an unmediated and unambiguous ex-
perience of reality, then themetaphor is the reflection of exactly that - of this nec-
essary deficit, which as a contingent world model must allow tolerance towards
others.” (Haverkamp 2009:18, transl. by the author)6
In particular, it should be referred to the theory of the absolute metaphor by Hans
Blumenberg, who explains the designation of those phenomena which cannot be
grasped conceptually or caught up with, as attempts of linguistic illustrations in
a vague semantic context (cf. Blumenberg 2013: 14). In doing so, the philosopher
pursued no lesser claim than to be able to derive a ‘substructure of thinking’ or
rather a ‘zeitgeist of an epoch’ from these linguistic pictures. Although the follow-
ing does not speak of an epochal understanding, it seems to me that these lin-
guistic images contain interesting clues for a thinking of current positioning. But
which metaphors are involved in the implementation of a new medium? Who de-
cides which linguistic images are used for this purpose and what distinguishes
such ‘universal concepts’ from other tropes? In this context, Alexander Friedrich
5 Orig.: “Der Begriff endet in der Mystik, die Metapher im Mythos” (Blumenberg 2007: 75).
6 Orig.: “Wenn Sprache nicht fähig ist, eine unvermittelte und eindeutige Erfahrung der
Dinge selbst zu gewährleisten, so ist die Metapher die Reflexion genau darauf – auf dieses
notwendige Defizit, das als kontingentes Weltmodell gerade eine Toleranz gegenüber an-
deren zulassen muss.” (Haverkamp 2009: 18)
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speaks of “Kulturelle Leitmetaphern” (leading cultural metaphors) which, as collec-
tive testimonies, epistemologically structure social self-understanding and thereby
fulfill a central, orienting function (cf. Friedrich 2015: 10, 381f.).7The structure and
‘dynamics of cultural metaphors as well as their relationship between original or
traditional meaning and contemporary use are of enormous importance in this
investigation. The same applies to the history of water metaphors: accordingly,
the metaphor of water and nautical science origniates in Greek antiquity as well
as in biblical writings. “Schon dort waren ‘Quellen’, ‘Kanäle’, ‘Brunnen’, ‘Ströme’
und ‘Fluten’ gebräuchliche Metaphern für Informationsverarbeitung in schriftli-
cher und mündlicher Form” (Bickenbach/Maye 2009: 11). If we take the early Arg-
onautic myths, the Homeric odyssey or Roman authors such as Cicero and Lu-
cretius, all these stories contain the same narrative of a security-giving, yet finite
mainland and, in return, an uncertain sea as a place of new knowledge but also
of dangerous daring (cf. ibid.: 11f and Blumenberg 2014 [1979]: 33f). The epistemo-
logical content of sailing, shipwrecks, or navigation is thus deeply anchored in our
culturalmemory in the formofmediatingmetaphors.Therefore, it is not surprising
that these concepts have also found their way into modern self-descriptions. Per-
haps as a descendant of the cybernet, which promotes nothing other than the art of
steering in self-regulating, dynamic systems, the surfer or navigator in the infor-
mation-sea is an explorer in an endless space of possibilities. But if the Internet –
again, a discourse on the (fisher’s) net as an ancient metaphor for social knowledge
systems could be unfolded here – has been marked by metaphorical communica-
tion and, in particular, nautical language pictures since its early beginnings, what
does the ambivalent figure of the pirate say about our (self-)understanding of net
activists and their political positioning? For despite all conceptual euphoria, nau-
tical metaphorology forgets the downside of its colonial origins (cf. Friedrich 2012:
19).Thus, the history of seafaring has always had a hierarchically imperialist aspect,
as it is currently also evident in the economic Internet structures of server farms
and data storage facilities. Accordingly, the aspect of piracy seems to be a necessary
element that must be added to our metaphorical considerations regarding (medial)
positioning.
Please allow me a brief excursion into the history of the Atlantic economy of
the British seafaring nation in the 17th century, where we can already find some
promising narrative borrowings from Greek mythology in relation to piracy: There,
the figure of Hercules is a heroic symbol of power, centralizing unification and or-
der. In contrast, the Hydra is used as an antithetical adversary in this attribution.
As soon as one of its heads is cut off, this serpentine, multi-headed water monster
7 In this context, the question of the difference between metaphors and their special form of
catachresis would also have to be discussed. Due to the required brevity, I will stick in the
following only to the concept of metaphors.
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from the lake of Lerna regrows another two and thus is regarded as a symbol of
chaos and resistance. In the Herculeanmyths, the hero kills the monster in the sec-
ond of his twelve tasks. At the beginning of the English colonial expansion from the
early 17th century to the urban industrialization in the 19th century, however, the
imperialists used the legend of Hercules and the Hydra to describe the difficulty of
implementing global labor force systems and also to justify their own violent mea-
sures (cf. Linebaugh/Rediker 2008: 11). In this narrative, the sea monster took on a
wide variety of forms like slaves, displaced land dwellers, and even pirates who op-
posed the capitalist-dominated colonialists. A no less interesting aspect in this brief
historical review is the term ‘hydrarchy’, coined by the parliamentary poet Richard
Brathwaite (1588-1673) to describe the very social orders of sailors in contrast to the
rural population (cf. ibid.: 158f.).This is understood as the free self-organization of
pirates, which is characterized by anarchic and grassroots democratic structures.8
This multinational, egalitarian-alternative way of life, which follows its own rules
and, especially in its illegal activities – whether on land, in the harbor areas or at
sea –, almost escaped any control, represented an inconvenient form of resistance
for the ruling upper class that was difficult to contain.9
The Heads of the Hydra
But let’s get back to the starting point, because what would hydrarchic pirates be
without ships and nautical infrastructures? Hence, in the following – looking back
at the phenomenon of darknets and the Silk Road – the focus will be on the techno-
logical composition of the area in the net which, at least if we follow the common
iceberg metaphor, is located in the darkest depths: When talking about the organi-
zational structure of the Internet, the image of an iceberg is often used as an expla-
nation. Accordingly, the clear-/visible net, the space freely accessible by search en-
gines so to say, is only the small visible tip of an iceberg.The considerably larger part
below the surface is called the deep or hidden web. This includes all non-indexed
or password-protected areas such as archives or closed pages. The lowest part of
the iceberg in this sense, however, is the Darknet.This is generally understood as a
8 One example is the Pirate Council – an assembly in which all crew members had a say and
which represented the highest authority on the ship.
9 It would certainly be too one-sided to stylize piracy merely as a pre-democratic, egalitarian
formof society.Nevertheless, hydrarchic structures often served as amodel for social utopias,
as it is the case with the ideal pirate state ‘Libertalia’ that is mentioned in the second volume
of Captain Charles Johnson’s “A General History of the Robberies and Murders of the most
notorious Pyrates” (1724). Cf. Renate Niemann 2002: 66.
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special form of network,more precisely peer-to-peer overlay networks10, which are
characterized in particular by infrastructural seclusion and a consequential lack of
transparency. Accordingly, the individual network nodes (peers) in a Darknet can-
not communicate freely and publicly with any other node, but only exclusively and
mostly via direct invitations from the respective users. Examples for known dark-
nets are Tor, I2P, Freenet and GNUnet. However, the more common understanding
of Darknet, which can be found inmedia reports time and again, usually refers to a
special network known as the Tor network: This is the most commonly used Dark-
net, which causes a stir in the mass media due to illegal arms and drug trafficking
– as was the case with the Silk Road –murder deals and whistleblowing. But from
a technical point of view, what does this mean for a subversive positioning towards
an all-inclusive, governmental network structure? In order to be able to undermine
such a system, the usual monitoring mechanisms must be levered out. Protocols
and network structures, such as those already extensively worked on by media sci-
entists Alexander Galloway (2004) or Florian Sprenger (2015), are particularly worth
mentioning here. Accordingly, the Internet is organized by standardized protocols,
which – to put it simply – specify the paths that the data packets must take on
their journey from sender to receiver and predetermine which information can be
supplied and evaluated at which point. In particular, the nodes at which the data
is collected and forwarded provide an opportunity for monitoring and influenc-
ing (cf. ibid.: 45). In the Darknet, however, such surveillance mechanisms cannot
be implemented due to end-to-end encryption. For example, the Tor network –
originally developed by the US Naval Research Laboratory to protect military com-
munications and now a non-profit organization financed by donations – is based
on ‘onion routing’. With the help of the Tor client, all data and connections to the
user’s IP address are encrypted in a three-step cryptographic process that changes
every ten minutes so that users can navigate the data-sea anonymously under a
black flag (cf. anonymous 2014: 31). In addition to the unidirectional encryption of
the user IP, which can also be easily used for anonymous Clearnet surfing, there is
also the option of so-called hidden services, which span the Darknet structure in
the Tor network. These are encrypted, anonymous websites that cannot be found
via search engines. These ‘onion sites’ are based on the same code structure as the
Tor client and are therefore included in the Tor browser bundle (cf. ibid.: 34). In
our sea tale, the hidden services therefore represent those secret smuggler bays
in which information and goods can be exchanged decentrally and with complete
secrecy of the person – be it leak data or illegal substances.Thus, data havens such
as The Pirate Bay, Wikileaks, or the Silk Road as well as the Dark Sea Pirates them-
selves escape state or economic control and immediately take a political and ideal
10 Peer-to-peer networks (P2P) are decentralized computer networks in which the individual
computers are structured equally and work together without central servers.
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position, through their black flag, for free, uncensored, and uncontrolled commu-
nication. If a boat is sunk or a haven destroyed, the next one immediately appears
in the eternal cycle of the multi-headed Hydra.
New Shores
But what shall we do with the Dark Sea Pirate? What does the Hydra teach us
watching from the shallows? In view of the fundamental question of what posi-
tioning in the digital age means and whether dissent is still possible in a culture of
all-inclusion, it is probably less about concrete piracy than about a piratic way of
thinking. A quick scan of shows that unhealthy totalitarianism, surveillance, and
radical transparency has rarely had a good outcome in human history. Accordingly,
the pirate does not necessarily occupy a fixed position, but functions as the unloved
disrupter, the fluid element that withdraws any attribution on the mainland and
seeks the openness of the sea. Like themetaphor that carries it, it ensures the open-
ings for transgression. For only where the own opens to the other (cf. Blanchot 2015:
26 and Derrida 1992) does a place of common emerge – eternally remaining on the
horizon as a distant cape and always carried away on the waves of the dark sea.
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Questioning Credibility
Taking Sides on, Instead of Leaving, Neverland
Louise Haitz
In January 2019, the documentary LeavingNeverland (LN), directed byDanReed,
premiered at Sundance film festival. Since then, it has been aired on television
worldwide. At its core the four-hour documentary relies on the stories of two men,
as told in interviews. Wade Robson and James Safechuck, who both were friends
with super star Michael Jackson (MJ) when they were children, relate the detailed
and complex stories of their sexual exploitation by him. Among other locations,
they say it took place on the Neverland Ranch, MJ’s private amusement park, to
which he invited children, some of them he befriended, patronized, and had close
relationshipswith. LN showsmany aerial long shots of the ranch, visiting and revis-
iting the place, as Robson and Safechuck’s memories unfold, describing the estate
as beautiful, best playground a kid could wish for, and as site of their sexualized
exploitation by MJ. ‘Neverland’ refers to the play of Peter Pan (by J.M. Barrie, 2015
[1904]), famously animated by Walt Disney in 1953. It is a story about a boy who
never grows up, can fly and with his little boy friends (“the lost boys”) experiences
adventures at the fairytale island Neverland. MJ publicly identified with Peter Pan,
and used the figure to explain his unconventional, allegedly pedocriminal, relation-
ship to children.1 In the documentary Living with Michael Jackson from 2003,
Martin Bashir interviews the star on his relationship with boys. In one interview-
scene at the Neverland Ranch, MJ sits on a sofa holding hands with 12-year-old
Gavin Arvizo, who later accused him of sexualized abuse.2 In reaction to Bashir’s
question, if it were appropriate for a 44-year-old man to be share his bed with chil-
dren, Gavin eagerly argues, MJ were not 44, but actually four years old, “a child
at heart,” a man who didn’t grow up (Living With Michael Jackson: A Tonight
Special (Shaw 2003, TC: 01:13:10)). LN, too, over more than a decade later, ques-
tions MJ’s relationship to children, yet director Reed does not interview the now
1 For the term pedocriminal instead of pedophile or pedosexual see Gerstendörfer 2007: 46.
2 The first lawsuit against MJ was in 1993, when Jordan Chandler made claims of sexualized
exploitation against him; in 2005 there was a criminal trial against MJ, when Gavin Arvizo
had accused him of the same crime.
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deceased MJ and a boy sitting next to him, clinging affectionately to his idol, but
interviews two boys, who have grown up. Robson and Safechuck calmly narrate and
reevaluate their experience with MJ as one of grooming (that is seduction in order
to sexually exploit a minor). They reprocess their childhood and memory of MJ as
adults, hence, in the process of leaving Neverland.
One of the great twists of LN is that the two men, who today accuse MJ of the
crime of child sexual abuse, had defended him in court in 1993 and 2005. Safechuck
and Robson both were key defense witnesses in the cases against MJ. This change
of statements raises the question: do court hearings or documentaries present the
truth of testimony and personal experience?While the convicting power of the state
lies within the courtroom – which twice acquitted MJ in his lifetime –, the doc-
umentary and resulting public discussion also bear socio-cultural power of judg-
ment, even after death. In this chapter I want to focus on the question of credibility
that rises following the documentary. Therefore, I will analyze the media reactions
and sociocultural negotiation of LN rather than the documentary itself. 
In the first section I show that a common and today dominant reaction to re-
ports of sexualized violence against children, is to question the (alleged) victim’s
credibility. I discuss the truth regime of in-/credibility in its specific processing,
mediation and narration on media sites. To decide on an accuser’s in-/credibility
frames the negotiation of sexualized violence as a quest to take sides, which I de-
scribe as media activism. Thereby I propose an understanding of media activism
as always both, activism of activists, and activism of media processing. The sec-
ond section of this chapter builds up on this understanding, and presents an at
length analysis of one YouTuber’s execution of the media regime of in-/credibility.
The rather unknown YouTuber Rob Ager, whose video I center, questions Robson
and Safechuck’s credibility by differentiating real and fake pain – describing theirs
as fake. Ager introduces an audiovisual construction of expert empathy, serving as
detector for this differentiation. By analyzing his video argument, I exemplarily
carve out the complex audiovisual and sociocultural mediations of empathy to-
wards victims/survivors, linked to the judgment of their credibility. Finally, the
analysis offers an answer to the question as to why it is of social interest to decide
on in-/credible victimhood in the first place, even outside the judicial demands of
decision making. In my conclusion, I will question the necessity to take sides on
the allegations voiced in LN, and ask for a way to, again, leave Neverland, by which




Many of the media’s reactions to the accounts voiced in LN align along the domi-
nant, judicially inspired, organizing principle of investigation: the contrasting pair-
ing of accuser(s) vs. accused that in cases of sexualized violence is usually gendered
as a he said/she said.3 While the narrative of the documentary does not use this
paradigm of contrasting accusation and defense in its montage, it is vehemently
reinstalled in the public discourse (and Dan Reed is criticized for not executing it).
In the New York Times Elizabeth Harris observes the organizing of a large number
of MJ-fans on Twitter, who gathered in order to discredit the documentary and the
accusers. The fans know and fear the power of a good documentary that, as Harris
puts it, “could reshape his [MJ’s] legacy for years to come” (Harris 2019). So, in an
act of social media activism, the
“Devoted Jackson fans had been girding themselves for the documentary, and
through a loose network of pro-Jackson websites and hashtags began planning
to counteract the film.When it began, they overwhelmed the #LeavingNeverland
hashtag with thousands of tweets calling the men liars and the film a work of fic-
tion.” (Ibid.)
Joe Coscarelli, also for the Times, quotes the tweet that gathered the defending
fans:
“#MJFam: Here’s our 2 step plan for the week of March 3rd ‒ March 10th. 1) Flood
the #LeavingNeverland hashtag with rational tweets including the FACTS about
the allegations! 2)WATCH the ‘This Is It’movie on@Netflix and STREAMMichael’s
catalog on any/all streaming platforms. —MJJLegion (@MJJLegion, February 28,
2019” (Coscarelli 2019))4
As to be found in the tweet, one of the successful slogans of MJ’s defenders is,
“facts don’t lie, but people do.”5 In the fight for MJ’s reputation, the defending fans
3 The problematic of gendered power dynamics is studied widely. Patriarchy is framed as the
violent structure that produces femininity as inferior to masculinity, thereby producing gen-
der as a relation, and also violence as a form and enactment of this relational positioning.
4 The account MJJLegion rhetorically evokes the military idea of a collective – a “Legion” – to
protectMJ. It addresses the fans under theHashtag #MJFam, turning fans into fam(ily). Here,
military and family, two powerful sociocultural institutions, are put forth in the endeavor of
countering allegations of sexualized child abuse as told in LN.
5 The slogan was put on buses in London and removed after The Survivors Trust (the UK um-
brella agency providing care for survivors of sexual violence) criticized the advertisement as
inappropriate, because it perpetuates the (rightful) fear among survivors not to be believed
or taken seriously (BBC News Newsbeat, “Michael Jackson ‘innocent’ adverts to be removed”
3.13.2019). See also: https://mjinnocent.com, last access 7.01.2019.
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question the accusers’ credibility and authorize themselves as rational providers
of facts, thereby forefronting the asymmetrical distinction of in-/credibility as the
culturally significant pair of terms indicating fact vs. fiction, objectified fact vs.
humanly lie.
Notably, this paradigm extends beyond twitter. On the TV-Show Good Morn-
ing Britain6 anchor Piers Morgan deems the doubtful questioning of accusers the
only respectable reaction to the documentary. Complying to the ‘he said/she said’
paradigm, Morgan and his peer anchors interview MJ’s nephew Taj Jackson, who
defends his uncle. In alignment with a performed judicial investigation, the anchor
plays the ‘devil’s advocate’ by bringing up other boys, like the child star Macaulay
Culkin, who say they were not sexually exploited by MJ. Relying only on witnesses’
testimony, and no ‘hard evidence’, Morgan deduces that: “you really come down
to the credibility of the accusers” (Good Morning Britain on YouTube, TC: 00:06:11-
00:6:20). MJ’s nephew eagerly agrees to the angle and affirms the framing as basic
fairness and rule of law, “And that’s all we’re asking. We’ve never said: ‘Just believe
us’. We just said: ‘look into them!’” (Ibid. TC: 00:06:27) The differentiation of in-/
credibility is processed here with the difference of due process vs. unlawful media
pillory, again signifying the idea of credibility using cultural concepts of media, i.e.
fact/fiction, courtroom/newsroom.
In the interview, Taj Jackson presents himself as loving and mourning nephew,
pained by the accusations against his uncle and longing for due process against the
deceased. By questioning the accusers’ credibility, the Jackson family hypothesizes
the verity of the accusations and Robson and Safechuck’s pain, while emphasizing
their own pain caused by the reports and the alleged lack of lawful process.Thereby
they produce emotional bonds towards the seemingly just and good judicial pro-
cesses that would spare the Jackson family and their fans the pain and harm of
media reports, that are framed as accusations.
In these examples the correct reaction to allegations of sexualized abuse is pre-
sented as the questioning of credibility and the dilemma of taking sides. The com-
peting actors and institutions of truth and trust, of belief and proof do not come
up automatically. They are the effect of a specific scheme of mediation and narra-
tion. The quest to take a side, therefore is based on a specific site of narrating the
(personal) story of abuse, that structures the possibility of telling and hearing this
story in the first place. The site can be a public courtroom, or the armchair in a
private living-room (the chosen setting for the interviews in LN), it can be a chat
room, a hashtag, it can be a movie, morning TV-show or a documentary interview.
Each of the listed sites set up their own actors, specific paradigms, narratives, per-
spectives, technologies and standards of speaking, writing, (audio-)visualizing and
6  “Michael Jackson’s nephew Taj speaks out over Leaving Neverland allegations”, 3.05.2019. To
be seen on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RUvS9rTdzes, last access 7.03.2019.
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perceiving. They mediate the talking and hearing, they mediate the possibilities of
telling and hearing stories of violence as true or false, as in-/credible. I frame this
as media activism.
What does it mean to include these sites or media processes in the term of
activism, which usually implicates an unpaid human actor, strategically directing
their will towards a political goal, using media as their tool? As I have analyzed so
far, one of the dominant responses to LN is to question the accusers’ credibility and
to discuss the topic of sexualized child abuse as controversy on which one can take
a side. To divide a topic in two (or more) sides and make spectators/listeners into
potential judges, is a way of producing knowledge, linked to the (not only judicial)
idea of impartiality and balance (rather than extremism as is discussed for instance
in horseshoe-theory), and linked to the framing of doubt as neutral (Cf. Oreskes
and Conway 2010). Furthermore, this is a way of acquiring attention and affection
towards a topic, used in TV discussions, journalism, and social media debating –
you affectionately identify with one of the sides or with the non-judgmental posi-
tion in between, staying undecided. Following this paradigm, social discourse is,
inter alia, organized along two sided, asymmetrical differences, as for instance, he
said/she said, fact/fiction, due process/media pillory, in-/credible, left-/rightwing
re-producing discursive rules and subject positions enacting a side or talking point
(Cf. Foucault 1991: 34). Although the examples discussed above appear in different
media (twitter hashtag, journalist article, and TV Show), they all are part of a digi-
tal culture, influenced by social media platforms and their logic. The controversial
structuring of debates as a quest to take sides that includes spectators or users as
participating decision makers, is implemented not only in cultural paradigms, but
in social media sites, too. There is no such thing as media neutrality in the sense
of passive representation or platform. It is commonly understood in cultural and
media studies that mediation techniques always actively do structure, do narrate,
do produce meaning, do subjectivate (cf. Hall 1997, Ochsner 2013, Figge 2016, Seier
2019). YouTube, the platform I focus on in the following, is not only a site for cul-
tural, audiovisual content, where you go to research a topic, to consume content,
comment, share and dis/like. YouTube is also a workplace. The money to (possibly)
be earned is linked to the amount of clicks, to visibility of a video, channel and cre-
ator.Hence, to produce a video that comments on a hot topic likeMJ and his alleged
crimes, making it controversial and a participatory quest to take sides, is based on
attention economy. To take sides on, instead of Leaving, Neverland is the effect
of marketable, clickable media activism. By this I am not implying that YouTube
as private company is activistly interested in doubt-mongering against accusers of
MJ and has built a platform to pursue this goal. But it does profit from and pro-
duces hot, controversial debates, that affect users and motivate them, to click, to
produce content, to comment and share. By calling these conditions and processes
of mediation ‘activist’ I don’t intend to promote the idea of good neutral media and
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bad political and activistly influencingmedia.What I am doing, is emphasizing the
fact that mediation andmedia sites have their own specific workings, which too, as
well as its users, determine what and how something is said, thought, heard and
done, by whom, why and when, in public and private discourse (not only for the
sake of a good argument, but for economic reasons, too). Media activism always
is both, the activism of activists and the activism of mediation. In this case, the
mediation and narrative structuring promote the question of in-/credibility and
negotiate allegations of sexualized child abuse as quest to take sides.
I will now look at one more of these negotiations of in-/credible victimhood,
processed as the differentiation of fake or real pain.
Fake Or Real Pain: YouTube Investigations
Before I start the analysis, a quick remark concerning the usage of the labels “real”
and “false victim”. People who have undergone sexualized violence use different
terms to describe themselves. Many prefer to call themselves survivor, rather than
victim. Others do not mind being called a victim and claim this term for them-
selves. I am aware of the importance of self-determination and of the dilemma of
labeling. Without being able to avoid this problem, I try to use the terms survivor
and victimwithout preference.When I write “real/false victim” in quotationmarks,
I reference either the ideas produced in the example or in broader culture.The quo-
tation marks indicate that this is a sociocultural ascription, not a self-description,
and highly problematic at that.
For LN, the tentative answer to the question of expertise in detecting credible
claims of pain and victimhood – Imean this in a less cynical way than itmay appear
– has appeared in a YouTuber, who posits himself as an expert in detecting “real
victims”.
Figure 1: Thumbnails: YouTuber’s credibility investigations
YouTube Channel Collative Learning, https://www.youtube.com/user/robag88/videos, last
access 7.08.2019.
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Rob Ager is an amateur YouTube film analyst. His channel Collative Learning
lists more than 100 videos, in which he mostly explains Hollywood movies from
the genres of science fiction, war, and horror, often delivering interpretations of
so-called deeper meanings.7 Ager produced three videos on LN. The first is a 17-
minute analysis arguing that the interviews in the documentary are edited and
have not been taken in one shot at one continuous stream of time and talking. The
thumbnail to this video shows James Safechuck sitting in an armchair in the docu-
mentary’s interview setting. To his left and right “Leaving Neverland.Multiple Take
Interviews” is written, branding the image of Safechuck’s interview in the light of
the media manipulation technique that is film editing. The font Ager chooses re-
sembles the aesthetics of the horror genre, the letters italicized and melting creep-
ily, aiming to inflict the idea of melting evidence, of dissolving comfort and trust
in a survivor’s account of abuse. His argument here is that continuity and consis-
tency are only markers of truth in someone’s report of suffered abuse if they are the
spontaneous result of someone talking in a ‘stream of consciousness’ (preferably to
state authorities). Coherent narrative and structure are considered to be markers
of truth and at the same time of manipulation, if they are the visual or detectable
effects of making up a story. Ager seeks “evidence” (as the title indicates) for the
constructedness of the victims’ stories by showing screenshots of the interviews
which indicate that they were not taken in one shot as well as edited afterwards.
He argues that they were taken at different times and maybe even be rehearsed or
completely fabricated.The false dichotomy of unmediated, unnarrated spontaneity
vs. edited, therefore manipulated and possibly false reports, is as problematic as
it is pervasive. If a survivor talks coherently without camera and editing involved,
their statement still can be confronted with suspicions of rehearsal and practicing
–making sense out of an experience by telling a story is discredited as making up a
somewhat fictional story. Another of Ager’s videos continues this argument, while
being more bold yet simple in its title: Leaving Neverland’s suspicious editing
(see fig. 1).
7 E.g. The hidden depths of Silence of the Lambs; A space Odyssey, Meaning of
the Monolith; 10 reasons Jim Camaron’s ALIEN is the best feminism. To be seen
on his YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC9wMJIgU25UtM-V3arDeHDy
A, last access 1.13.2020. Some of the videos have close to half a million views, on average
Ager achieves around one hundred thousand views on his videos. The video I center in my
analysis, I do not consider relevant because of the quantity of views. Rather, I consider the
argument he develops exemplary in the discourse on accusations of sexualized violence.
138 Louise Haitz
Visiting the Trauma Zoo8
The video I focus on in this section is the longest Ager has published on LN. It is an
analysis of nonverbal communication, which he undertakes in order to distinguish
Robson & Safechuck vs real abuse victims. In this 42-minute video argument,
Ager doesn’t focus on editing or making up stories in the process of sense-making,
instead he announces: “In this video, I’ll address the issue of whether the nonverbal
communication fromWade and James actually convey genuine, truthful expression
or whether the two are faking their emotions.” (TC: 00:00:23) Thereby he translates
the differentiation of in-/credibility, which in his other videos is processed by the
media distinction of edited/non-edited film, into the question of real vs. fake emo-
tion and performance.Thus, he executes a common cultural imagination – that one
can, by the trait of rational empathy, decide in the quest of taking sides in cases of
sexualized violence. How does he do this?
Ager sticks to his trade and provides a comparing analysis of film clips. Fol-
lowing popular YouTube genres of reading body language,9 as well as retelling of
traumatic experiences, he compares Robson and Safechuck’s bodily expressions of
pain when talking about their sexual exploitation by MJ, to eight other testimonies
– that he deems credible – in found footage of YouTube Clips, documentaries or
(reality) TV-shows. Acting as a film-anthropologist visiting the trauma zoo, Ager
comes up with a list of observed emotional symptoms that mark “real victims”.
This includes glazed eyes, streaming tears, trembling voice, specific breathing pat-
terns, quivering lips, and running noses (See fig. 2).
He measures these bodily signs of (expressed real) pain against the level of as-
sumed difficulty to reproduce them in an acting performance. To exemplify the
8 The term “trauma zoo” is used by Aubrey Hirsch in a highly interesting panel discussion on
writing trauma with Roxane Gay, Tressie McMillan Cottom, Terese Mailhot, Aubrey Hirsch,
and Saeed Jones moderated byMelanie Boyd at Yale University, https://www.youtube.com/w
atch?v=kWe8F-8tcaY, last access 7.12.2019.
9 On TV-Shows and on YouTube you can find many tutorials to read body language in order
to detect liars in criminal cases or, in an interesting connection to it, to detect someone’s
interest in dating you or not. It is a genre navigating questions of trust and biologistic ideas of
human social nature, that mostly draws on evolutionary biologistic, heteronormative ideas.
(E.g. Former FBI Agent Explains How to Read Body Language, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=4jwUXV4QaTw;Body Language: Brett Kavanaugh Hearing Christine Blasey Ford,
9.27.2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uGxr1VQ2dPI; All the Proof You Need Jussie
Smollett Staged His Attack – Body Language Secrets, 2.02.2019, https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=sH7IalJyMjk; R. Kelly: Clinical Expert Says His Body Language With Gayle King
Raises A Lot Of Red Flags|Access, 3.06.2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=16B6c6kXq
xo; Body Language of Attraction, 1.07.2014 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJ5PF0zqQ4s;
Body Language Amanda Knox- Cold Blooded Killer?, 3.17.2018 https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=4vOmMsDh09c, date of access to all videos, 6.20.2019.)
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Figure 2: YouTuber’s list of nonverbal markers of true pain
Leaving Neverland – Robson & Safechuck vs real abuse victims https
://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hFdnhmRpdFE, last access 7.08.2019.
skills needed to perform trauma as convincingly as his chosen “real victims”, Ager
uses highly praised Hollywood performances. He contrasts the perceived emotions
of Safechuck and Robson with a scene from A.I., a movie directed by Steven Spiel-
berg (USA 2001), and a casting scene from same director’s blockbuster E.T. The
casting scene can easily be found on YouTube, which illustrates the technique of
recontextualizing and clip-montage that is specific for the medium.10 Both scenes
show little boy actors who perform desperate crying, which Ager calls “incredi-
bly convincing” (TC: 00:17:50). His argument based on Haley Joel Osment’s perfor-
mance in A.I. reveals deep insight in the workings andmultiple layers of mediation
concerning assumed credible pain in cases of sexualized violence. In the following
I will take a closer look at the mechanics of the comparison.
Empathy As Truth Detector
The science fiction drama A.I. is a dystopian take on Pinocchio meeting high tech.
The highly successful film narrates a think piece on the human condition to feel
emotions. In the late 22nd century the rich, white, heteronormative Swinton fam-
ily is given a prototype, humanoid robot who has been designed to feel emotions.
The child robot David is imprinted to unconditionally love wife and mother Monica
10 Henry Thomas audition för E.T. "Ok kid, you got the job", to be seen on YouTube https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=tA5giyG8E7g, last access 7.07.2019.
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Swinton. The scene Ager chose to prove that children can fake emotions convinc-
ingly, is the one, in which Monica, whose human son Martin has come back from
artificial coma, tries to abandon her then troublesome, envious artificial son David
in the shadowy woods. Dramatically underlined with piano and strings in minor
key, the little boy begs his “Mommy” not to leave him, to forgive him, to give him the
chance of becoming a real boy with real, i.e. mattering pain.The camera angle puts
the spectator in the position of the mother, demanded to please feel for the child
and not to leave, and in the position of the child expressing his desperate need for
the mother. The empathic identification with the robot (and the mother) are both
produced by the angle-reverse angle montage. She eventually parries off the robot-
child’s painful demand for loving care. Ager edits the scene to end on this dialog:
“[David:] Mommy, if Pinocchio became a real boy and I became a real boy, can I
come home? [Monica:] Oh, that’s just a story!” (TC: 00:18:15), he then comments in
voice-over: “Intellectually I know this is acting. But still, every time I’ve watched
this scene, I feel close to tears myself. That’s the power of good acting. Even if you
know it’s fake, your hard-wired instinct is to empathize unless you’re a psychopath
[sic.]” (TC: 00:18:22).
To understand Ager’s argument, we have to take in one more bit of his analy-
sis. So far there are eight audiovisual clips of people displaying personal testimony
of trauma of sexualized violence in the media formats of YouTube testimonial,
reality TV and documentary interview, which are exemplarily deemed real by the
YouTuber. And there is one particular scene of a boy actor performing “incredi-
bly convincing” crying in a Hollywood movie. The boy plays it so well that Ager
describes himself to be instinctively forced to feel sad and empathize with the sub-
ject’s displayed pain (pathologizing any other reaction than compassionate sadness
and distinguishing himself as a good, compassionate subject).11 Ager uses audiovi-
sual material from the genres of fiction, testimonial, reality TV, and documentary
in order to discredit Safechuck and Robson’s claims. Yet, there is one more filmed
performance of retold trauma, in which Ager considers the expressed emotions as
real. That is Wade Robson’s display of pain during the autobiographical retelling of
his family’s split up. Joy Robson moved with her son Wade and his siblings from
Australia to the US, leaving husband and parents behind in order to live closer to
MJ (who then, as is told in LN, continued to sexually exploit her son). Ager com-
ments on Wade Robson’s nonverbals, muting his voice in the editing process and
literally talking over his crying face, fulfilling perfect circular reasoning: “this is
probably genuine, because if he was able to act this good, why not act it the same
way when talking about the abuse as well? I think this is real stuff here. It’s the
11 My feminist rage against the scenery of calculated demands of motherly care would be
deemed psychopathological by Ager, while it should be either deemed socio-pathological
or rather socio-critical.
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one moment in the whole movie when I really felt empathy like what I was watch-
ing was real” (TC: 00:20:28). Ager executes double twisted discrediting on Robson
and Safechuck, who he accuses of not only performing their (then fake) pain, but
of performing it badly. He jumps back and forth between ascriptions of real and
fake, making himself an expert activist for a dominant truth regime of question-
ing an alleged victim’s credibility. The YouTuber thereby exemplifies the narrative,
filmic mediation, and sociocultural structuring of painful emotions, empathy, and
judgment while remaining oblivious of the medium and narrative he himself uses.
First, Ager installs his ability to be moved, to feel empathy, or not, as a sen-
sory truth regime. He executes the idea of universal feelings towards real pain, by
enacting them in his comments and by guiding his audience to re-feel the true
feelings he expertly detects by watching the filmed (!) pain of others, who he in-
strumentalizes for this purpose.Thus, he naturalizes his felt, emotional reaction to
fiction (A.I.), making it an instinctive fact to negate an emotional reaction to the
documentary (LN), a medium deemed to show facts, making LN not only a piece
of fiction but also fake.
Sentimental Empathy – Feeling For An Institution
I want to argue that Ager does not feel “empathy like what [he] was watching was
real” (TC: 00:20:28), but precisely because what he is watching is fiction (in the
case of A.I.) and in line with a sentimental narrative of heteronormative family
stories. He is not detecting real pain, but connecting to a narrative that matches
the sentimental script of his emotional willingness to empathize.
What the two scenes Ager marks as good performances of (like) real pain have
in common is the idea of family love.The scene in A.I. which always moves Ager to
his private tears plays out a scene of the bad, abandoning mother.The scene in LN,
which moves Ager to believe “this is real stuff here”, is the one, in which Joy Robson
can be and is framed as a failing mother, making the retrospectively condemned
wrong choices. Ager’s display of feelings of empathy are structured by heteronor-
mative sentimentalism. To explain this term, I draw on Lauren Berlant’s critique
of national sentimentalism, in which she links the narratives of politically relevant
pain to the production of nation and privacy (Berlant 1999). Berlant describes the
placing of painful feelings in the making of political worlds through the rhetoric of
national sentimentality, which fetishizes the idea of true, apolitical feelings. Just
as Ager enacts, the ruling idea of the rhetoric is that (real) pain of subaltern citi-
zens is self-evident, and will be felt by every empathic human being as their own
(Berlant 1999: 53). The hegemony of the national identity form then is promoted by
linking the idea of true feeling, through affective identification and universalized
empathy, and thereby across fields of social difference,with the idea of a conjoining
nation state. The pain of subaltern others is therefore felt by “classically privileged
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national subjects, such that they feel the pain of flawed or denied citizenship as
their pain.” (Ibid.) To ease the sentimentally narrated pain we are offered inclusion
in an utopian, good nation, whose law and order guarantee a pain free life.
Ager, by choosing the described examples, uses his acclaimed true feelings in
accordance to the sentimental narrative of the wholesome, happy, heteronorma-
tive family, reproducing the biological family as a safe and desirable place. His
emotional response therefore does not detect true pain so much as the institution
he is strongly affected by, namely motherly love and the “foggy fantasy of happi-
ness” that is family (Berlant 1999: 60). There is no point for someone seeking to
discredit people reporting sexualized violence at the hand of a powerful celebrity
to disbelieve the sadness and reality of pain felt when losing the safety and or-
der of a family, especially if one can easily blame it on an egoistic mother figure.
The institution of the family is very often strategically used against survivors of
sexual exploitation. They are blamed for the damage done to the family by talking
about their pain and the violence, which is often perpetrated by people close to, or
members of, the family. The structures of privacy that are reproduced by, among
others, legal discourse on heterosexual intimacy and family (cf. ibid.: 59-70) often
disguise and enable sexualized violence (for example by isolating the victim and or
traditionally preventing an outsider’s interference in so-called family affairs).
Empathy with someone who shows pain is not naturally caused by its realness.
It is connected to a far more complex framing that redefines the distinction of real
and fake when it comes to sociocultural negotiations of violence. Both fictional and
real stories interconnect with cultural and traditional discourse, that is mediated
norms, standards, images, and desires. Through mediated affective identification
one learns to feel with someone’s pain and doubt the pain of another.12 Therefore
feeling empathy in and of itself does not naturally detect real or fake pain, but
instead re-produces a regime of truth, in which pain only appears to be real, if
it fits the script and thereby achieves the relevance guaranteed by a sentimentally
stabilized institution like family or state of law (Cf. Butler 2009, Ahmed 2014: 21-
41). Obviously, once you have detected an accuser’s pain to be “fake”, the decision
to take sides for accuser or accused is no longer difficult.
So far, I have analyzed how Ager produces himself as a sensory truth detective,
by using his expert empathy which I see as structured and adapted to the emo-
tional scripts of heteronormative sentimentality and backed up by his ostentatious
(technical) knowledge of film production and pseudo-psychological expertise on
body language. I now will turn to the role of the medium of film and the YouTu-
12 In the introductory to Compassion. The Culture and Politics of an Emotion editor Berlant observes
the simultaneity of a training in appropriate compassion and in aversion and withdrawal of
it (Berlant 2004: 10).
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ber’s comparative editing in the production of true feelings and artificial empathy
by again elaborating on the example of the A.I. sequence.
Artificial Empathy13
The scene from A.I., recontextualized by Ager, teaches a difficult lesson on the so-
cial reality-relevance of pain organized by a regime of credibility. The robot-boy
David begs his mother to give him the chance of becoming a real boy with real,
i.e. relevant and credible pain. Being an artificial intelligence, the expression of his
feelings, on the narrative level of the film, are the product of a complex calculating
process. Artificial intelligence acts according to its assessing of context, which has
to be calculable in order to calculate the fitting, deemed intelligent, adaptation to
it. The intelligent computer can filter and adapt to a context, which it then acts
according to. A.I.-David displays contextually suitable emotions, thereby disturb-
ing dominant ideas on human intelligence and nature. Emotions are understood
as exclusive human trait.They are deemed authentic, located inside the body at the
core of our personality, and untouched by culture or politics (Ahmed 2014: 8). Sara
Ahmed, as many in affect studies, proposes: “emotions should not be regarded as
psychological states, but as social and cultural practices” (ibid.: 9). Feeling and emo-
tions are not natural, pure sensory, but they are the effect and enaction of sociality,
culture and politics. We are taught how to express, and repress our emotions (for
example when we are trained to perform gender), and we are taught how to feel
about all kinds of phenomena.
On the level of the medium, film follows the same model of calculating and
producing feelings according to context as the A.I. boy does on the level of story.
The film A.I. does induce spectators to feel something (in my case anger at the
idea of viewers being manipulated into wanting a woman to show motherly love
for a robot, in the case of Ager teary-eyed compassion). By using visual and acous-
tic technology, the film estimates the spectators’ calculable emotional scripts, and
produces a context in which we are made to feel. Concerning the production of
emotions, it seems we, the spectators, are artificially intelligent too. The film im-
agery and scripts of emotions not only acutely produce the context and reaction
that are ‘our’ emotions,14 but also serve as prescript and model for the idea of true
13 For this section’s argument, I thank Lydia Kray, with whom I discussed this chapter andwhose
deep intellectual and personal analysis I very much appreciate.
14 Of course, there is a negotiation process and no automatic affirmation of the proposed cor-
rect emotional reaction to a piece of medium, as Hall describes in the cultural studies model
of encoding and decoding meaning (1973), or as bell hooks observes by describing the oppo-
sitional gaze black women developed visiting cinema (2015).
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feelings (real,moving, credible emotions) teaching artificial, media-cultural empa-
thy and how to perform pain. This, as much of the work in affect studies and post-
structural philosophy does, problematizes the distinction of natural and artificial.
The reciprocal patterns of film and spectators’ expectations of emotional per-
formance have governmental effects (Cf. Foucault 2000: 41-67). Survivors of sexu-
alized violence go to the movies, too. They know the audiovisual performances of
“real victims”, whose pain is verified by narrative and visualization techniques in
cinema (cf. Koch 2015: 103-104), TV, or social media. By consuming these models,
they learn how they are supposed to feel and supposed to show ‘their’ emotions –
which are not naturally inside of them but are social in the way that they are per-
formed and perceived, they are expected and obligatory in an emotional regime of
credibility.15 In a rape condoning, doubting culture, that takes sides rather against
than for accusers, the performance of pain is crucial, the idea being that if you
can move your listeners to empathize, they will believe you.16 As YouTuber Ager
has made very clear, one of the best ways to make people feel with someone and
produce the desired emotion towards something, is film. In a montage later in the
video, he contrasts his material of “real victims” and convincing Hollywood per-
formances with the footage from the police interrogation of then 13-year-old Gavin
Arvizo (which can be found on YouTube). Arvizo was interrogated on his accusation
against MJ in 2003. Ager assesses, “[Arvizo’s] allegation really lacks the convincing
nonverbals of real abuse victims” (TC: 00:21:30).The YouTuber does not “come close
to tears” when watching the police footage of Gavin Arvizo’s interrogation, who ac-
cused mega star MJ of sexualized violence, because the boy does not display the
right expressions of uncontrolled emotions, as Ager implies. And, as I want to add,
because the media documenting Arvizo’s claims is a not a tribute to sentimentally
stabilized institutions, nor a dramatic mise-en-scène, but the recording of a police
15 This does not mean that all survivors can ultimately control their feelings and that trauma
were not a bio-, psycho-, neurological reality, too. It doesmean though, that the ascription of
realness, connected to the complex of what is deemed bio-, psycho- or neurological, derives
its meaning from the differentiation of artificial/natural, or uncontrollable/controlled. E.g.
Ager pseudoscientifically emphasizes ‘uncontrollable’ bodily reactions (mucus in the nose)
as markers of realness.
16 In the alreadymentioned discussion panelWriting Trauma at Yale University, the panelists
reflect on readers’ demands for more, excruciating detail of the survived personal trauma of
the authors. Gay points out that, “part of it is that they don’t believe you and so what they’re
saying is, ‘prove it!’. And you see this all in ways that areminor and small, like idiots on twitter
who are like, ‘debate me!’, like, ‘prove me wrong’, like: ‘Motherfucker, you were born wrong!’
And when you narrate trauma and you don’t [have] dates and times and names, all of a sud-
den, what you have to say is illegitimate, because they don’t want to believe that this kind of
suffering can happen. And it’s a truly dangerous thing. I don’t have to prove to you that what
I said happened, happened. I only had to prove it to my publisher and the legal team there.
But I don’t owe you shit.” (TC: 00:48:00).
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hearing reframed for Ager’s comparing analysis of good and better performers of
pain. These media build different sites for the display and evaluation of credible
pain, organizing the quest to take sides.
Before I finish this analysis, I want to discuss the effects of the framing and
give a possible answer as to why the questioning of accuser’s credibility is deemed
necessary, and activistly executed in the first place.
Real, But Irrelevant Pain
The standards of relevant victimhood are, as Butler puts it in Frames of War. When
is Life Grievable?The result of frames of “recognizability” (2009: 5). To be recogniz-
able, intelligible as a person, and have a grievable life is, according to Butler, the
effect of frames. Literal frames that surround images of war and torture, pain, and
suffering, visual framings that are photographic perspectives and visual aesthet-
ics, and written frames, Butler’s focus, that are the textual embedding or context
of circulating (digital) images. Some of the dominant political, economic, cultural,
and social framings are the broadly acknowledged hierarchic structures of racism,
sexism, classism, ableism, etc.These intersecting framings define the social ontol-
ogy and recognizability, i.e. acknowledgeablity, of being somebody, whose bodily
autonomy and life matters or matters less than (cf. the campaign of #BlackLives-
Matter for example discussed by Butler and Yancy 2015). Whose pain is relevant,
intelligible, and grievable? The frames are never stable. They constitute the very
possibility of circulating, of changing and creating context and therefore meaning
and affect. This means a subject can live a grievable life in one frame, and lose this
position in another. Robson and Safechuck are framed as credible in LN, incredi-
ble on various YouTube commenting videos, and dubious on Good Morning Britain.
With the changing frames the affect towards a content changes, too. As Butler de-
scribes in the example of the torture images of Abu Ghraib: “The conditions are
set for astonishment, outrage, revulsion, admiration, and discovery, depending on
how the content is framed by shifting time and place.” (Ibid.: 11)
Now, the YouTuber Ager merely re-frames audiovisual footage – this is a dom-
inant media practice on the platform, thus also establishes a frame and standard.
Ager uses eight people’s painful stories to hold them against other’s, producing
audiovisual evidence for his own (voice-over) performance of compassionate em-
pathy and rationalized withdrawal of it. Thereby, he produces the position of a
“good judge”, who can be moved to tears (is not cold) but cannot be tricked into
empathy (not too emotional), and invites his viewers to be a good judge, too – to
follow his media activism and channel. The doubting and checking on real pain is
an organizing and hierarchizing maneuver. The question of credibility mediates a
nation’s, state’s, and society’s decisions on not/grievable life, ir-/relevant pain, or
hierarchized legally protected goods.
146 Louise Haitz
In Compassion. The Culture and Politics of an Emotion, editor Berlant reflects on
the same withdrawal of the status to be a human-being with mattering pain. Nor-
matively, she writes in the introduction, the experience of pain is deemed pre-
ideological as “the universal sign of membership in humanity” (Berlant 2004: 10).
A response and the responsibility to other’s pain is deemed obligatory, “but since
some pain is more compelling than some other pain, we must make judgments
about which cases deserve attention.” (Ibid.) To understand the reasons behind
this, it helps to look at Ager’s claim of expertise in being an empathic detective of
fake pain, which he explains extensively in the beginning of his video:
“This is a subject I do have plenty of experience with. I studied tons of psychology
inmy entire life, I worked for 17 years at social care in various roles and in that time
I encountered lots of trauma victims and sometimes abusers, so, I’ve seen a lot of
intense pain expressed by people before my very eyes and have also seen many
instances of people playing the victim and faking their pain, you know, people
trying to get themselves boosted up the priority list for council housing or trying
to cover for the fact that they have actually been abusive to someone else. And
when directing fictional films I’ve worked with actors on set and in auditions and
seen some pretty impressive faking of trauma in those contexts.” (Ager, Robson
and Safechuck vs Real Abuse Victims, TC: 00:00:28)
Ager claims various authorities. The authority of psychology and of being a film
connoisseur, which has been analyzed in the above.The information that Ager was
a worker in social care serves him as marker of the reason as to why question
a victim’s claims. This follows a conservative, economic model of social care. The
“Oppression Olympics” that nowadays are deemed to be played by radical or pop-
culture leftists, actually are a competition hosted by the neoliberal state, organizing
its distribution of welfare. It is logical in a capitalist state to not just give social care
to anyone asking for it – it would interrupt the governing ideas of ‘earning’ your
livelihood. It becomes apparent, that the concept of earning something is applied to
victimhood, too. In cases of sexualized violence the logic of possible welfare fraud
is combined with the judicial weighing of legally protected goods like a man’s rep-
utation vs. a child’s bodily autonomy and it is enacted, even if all a person is asked
to do is to listen and believe, in a non-economical, out-or court context, for exam-
ple when telling a friend of an experienced rape or abuse. The economical rational
translates itself even into the ‘most private’, yet deeply normed and mediated, cor-
ners of the sites to talk about experienced sexualized violence. While watching a
documentary interview like in LN is not the same as being the judge in a court
hearing, or evaluating someone’s need for social care, the necessity of questioning
a survivor’s story is still widely enacted in the media. I would argue that this is,
due to a powerful combination of a state’s harsh fight against the threat of wel-
fare fraud (which is a very useful fear for legitimating antiwelfare policy), and the
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judicial processes that promise rational authority and good reasoning, which are
reinforced by the structuring mediation processes of mass, and social media, too.
In the discourse Ager’s video is part of, to just listen and not question a survivor’s
story is framed as possible welfare fraud,17 or personal trap, and would lack the
attention-drawing controversy to take sides. Ager plays his part in the economic
regime of compassion and credibility, wrapped in media attention economy, and
claims to detect real from fake performances of pain, reproducing them as audio-
visual model for survivors and listening witnesses (YouTube users), while negating
the framing he himself installs, to naturalize his media activist structuring of em-
pathy and trust. To tell your story of abuse under the cultural circumstances ex-
emplified by this YouTuber’s video argument, is an adaptive performance at which
you are likely to fail.
Conclusion
This chapter examined mediations of in-/credibility regarding the documentary
Leaving Neverland.The focusedmedia reactions to the documentary questioned
Robson and Safechuck’s credibility, using various culturally hierarchized opposi-
tions like fact/fiction, due process/media pillory, true/false feelings. The investi-
gations of credibility, this chapter argued, are structured as a quest to take sides,
which as well as the media sites, their particular technologies, rules, actors, and
economic interests, define the possibility to negotiate and speak of sexualized vi-
olence against children. The controversial questioning of credibility was discussed
as media activism, meaning both, the activism of human actors as well as me-
dia processes. The main focus lay on a YouTube video, in which the quest to take
sides for or against Robson and Safechuck was processed as the differentiation of
real and fake pain. The analysis of the complex mediation of empathy, that in the
YouTube video is installed as a tool to decide, lead to a problematization of the
discriminatory power of real/fake, natural/artificial, fictional/factual oppositions.
Deciding on realness or fakeness of a victim’s pain turned out to be linked to the
sentimentally stabilized institution of the family (cf. Berlant 1999); to the economic
idea of having to earn welfare, hence, to earn the status of victimhood (cf. Berlant
2004); the overall framing of grievable life, ir-/relevant pain (cf. Butler 2009).More-
over, the standardizing audiovisual mediation of telling (your) trauma (on YouTube
17 To empathically decide on grievable/not grievable life, or relevant-real/irrelevant-fake pain,
is not only used in cases of sexualized violence. For example, at the US-border asylum agents
are charged with determining an applicant’s claims of “credible fear”, again taking sides on
denial or access to citizenship and social care by various measures on the truthfulness of a
displayed feeling (Democracy Now.org, last access 6.18.2019).
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testimonials, on reality TV, in documentary interviews or Hollywood fiction),18 was
described not only in its impact on people’s empathy or willingness to believe, but
also in its gouvernemental impact on survivors, whose possibilities to tell their
story is governed by i. a. audiovisual performances of in-/credible pain.
By this analysis I did not intend to promote the idea of objective, emotion-
ally uninvolved, judgment – of being neutral by not taking sides. It shall rather
serve to problematize the idea of empathy as a universal, sensory, truth detector,
and the quest to take sides itself. To close this chapter, I want to revisit the idea
of leaving Neverland, rather than taking sides on it, as I insinuated in the title. I
want to ask for a way not to take sides on the claims voiced in the documentary
Leaving Neverland, without promoting ruling ideas of impartiality. Impartiality as
a concept relies on the structure of taking sides. You are impartial, when you are
between or above the sides, and you can overlook the sides, and non-(pre)judg-
mentally stay undecided, only if there are sides to be taken. Neverland has served
the documentary LN and this analysis as metaphor. As LN insinuates, Neverland,
where children never grow up and adventures (with Michael Jackson) are harmless
play, had an exit. The boys left, became adults, and it turned out, the place was no
child appropriate playground after all. Following the structure of taking sides, if
you believe the narrative of LN, you take the side of Robson and Safechuck. If you
do not believe it (like the discussed YouTuber), you take the other side. If you stay
undecided, hold both sides potentially credible, you are on no side, non-judgmen-
tal on moral high ground – a cultural realm where the crime, violence, and trauma
potentially never happened. This, as I want to argue, is a fantasy realm like Nev-
erland. The mediating structure of taking sides, in the case of sexualized violence
against children, builds a realm of escapism and avoidance, where the harm always
potentially was just a story. To leave this sociocultural Neverland, it is necessary to
find another way of negotiating the phenomenon. Where the question of credibil-
ity does not rule the possibility to tell a story of trauma, where empathy is not used
for one, and consequentially against the other side.
References
Ahmed, Sara (2014): The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Edinburgh: Edinburgh Uni-
versity Press.
Artificial Intelligence: AI (USA 2001, D: Steven Spielberg).
Barrie, J. M. (1904, 2015): Peter Pan, New York: Race Point Publishing.
18 For an analysis of literary framings of sexualized violence, with a focus on the topic of rape of
female subjects, see (in German) Künzel 2003.
Questioning Credibility 149
BBC News (2019): Newsbeat. Michael Jackson ‘innocent’ adverts to be removed, ht
tps://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-47551316, last access 4.24.2019.
Berlant, Lauren (1999): “Subject of True Feeling”, in: Sarat, Austin /Kearns, Thomas
R. (eds.): Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics, And the Law, Michigan: The Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, p. 49-84.
— (ed.) (2004): “Introduction Compassion (andWithholding)”, in: Compassion.The
Culture and Politics of an Emotion, New York/London: Routledge, p. 1-14.
Butler, Judith (2009): Frames of War. When is Life Grievable?, London: Verso.
Butler, Judith/Yancy, George (2015): “What’s wrong with ‘All Lives Matter’?”. Inter-
view by George Yancy for The New York Times, the Opinion Pages, last access
1.12.2015.
Coscarelli, Joe (2019): “Michael Jackson Fans Are Tenacious. ‘Leaving Neverland’
Has Them Poised for Battle”, in: The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.co
m/2019/03/04/arts/music/michael-jackson-leaving-neverland-fans.html%202
9.3.2019, last access 3.29.2019.
Figge, Maja (2016): “Einleitung Repräsentationskritik”, in: Peters, Kathrin/ Seier,
Andrea (eds.), Gender & Medien-Reader, Zürich/Berlin: Diaphanes, p. 109-118.
Foucault, Michel (2000): “Die Gouvernementalität”, in: Bröckling, Ulrich/Kras-
mann, Susanne/Lemke, Thomas (eds.), Gouvernementalität der Gegenwart.
Studien zur Ökonomisierung des Sozialen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, p.
41-67.
— (ed.) (1990): “‘Power and Sex’- Interview with Bernhard-Henri Lévy”, in: Politics
Philosophy Culture. Interviews and other writings 1977, 1984, New York: Rout-
ledge, p. 110-124.
— (1972): “Die Ordnung des Diskurses”, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.
Gay, Roxane et al. (2019): Writing Trauma: A Panel Discussion Conceptualized by
Roxane Gay, Yale University published on YouTube, https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=kWe8F-8tcaY, last access 7.12.2019.
Gerstendörfer, Monika (2007): Der verlorene Kampf um die Wörter. Opfer-
feindliche Sprache bei sexualisierter Gewalt. Ein Plädoyer für eine angemes-
senere Sprachführung, Paderborn: Junfermannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
Hall, Stuart (1973): Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse, Birming-
ham: University of Birmingham, p. 128-138.
— (1997): Representation. Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, Lon-
don: Sage Publications Ltd.
hooks, bell (ed.) (2015): “Oppositional Gaze”, in: Black Looks: Race and Representa-
tion, New York: Routledge, p. 115-132.
Koch, Angela (2015): Ir/reversible Bilder. Zur Visualisierung undMedialisierung von
sexueller Gewalt, Berlin: Verlag Vorwerk 8.
Künzel, Christine (2003): Vergewaltigungslektüren. Zur Codierung sexueller
Gewalt in Literatur und Recht, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.
150 Louise Haitz
Leaving Neverland (USA 2019, D.: Dan Reed).
Leaving Neverland – Robson & Safechuck vs real abuse victims, https://ww
w.youtube.com/watch?v=hFdnhmRpdFE, last access 7.08.2019, D.: Rob Ager.
Living With Michael Jackson: A Tonight Special (UK 2003, D.: Julie Shaw UK
2003).
Michael Jackson‘s Nephew Speaks Out Against New Documentary | Good
Morning Britain, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sZcDodItb9s, last ac-
cess 7.08.2019.
Ochsner, Beate (2013): “Lebens-Mitte oder Lebens-Mittel? Zur Produktion von Fet-
tleibigkeit in Film und Fernsehen”, in: Ette, Ottmar /Sanchez, Yvette/Sellier,
Veronika (eds.): LebensMittel. Essen und Trinken in den Künsten und Kulturen,
Berlin: Diaphanes, p. 177-197.
Oreskes, Naomi/Conway, Erik M. (2010): “Defeating the Merchants of Doubt”, in:
Nature, vol 456, no. 7299, p. 686-687.





“I got sick in Paris onWednesday,March 11, before the French government ordered
the confinement of the population, and when I got up on March 19, a bit more
than a week later, the world had changed. When I went to my bed, the world was
close, collective, viscous, and dirty. When I got out of bed, it had become distant,
individual, dry, and hygienic.” (Preciado 2020a)
With these words Paul B. Preciado, philosopher, curator and transactivist, who is
also a thought leader in the fields of queer studies and philosophy of the body, be-
gins his observation of a social transformation a few days after he recovered from
his Covid-19 disease. He describes – in an essay published almost at the same date
in Libération and translated into English in Artforum – an impression “between fever
and anxiety”, according to which a new form of reality had emerged after a ‘great
mutation’, that forever changed the structures of the social and the relationships
and patterns of desire: “The mutation would manifest as a crystallization of or-
ganic life, as a digitization of work and consumption and as a dematerialization of
desire.” (Ibid.)
In a second essay, published in the Spanish daily newspaper El País under the
title “Aprendiendo del virus”, Preciado references Michel Foucault and Roberto Es-
posito in his reflections on the epidemic’s management in light of historical routes
of biopolitical regulation as well as medical and political dimensions of immu-
nity. Noting that a “process of global mutation was underway “before the appear-
ance of Covid-19”, Preciado describes the societal and political change using Gilles
Deleuze’s concept of a ‘control society’ as a process of medial transformation which
leads to more subtle forms of digital surveillance of individuals:
“The subjects of the neoliberal technical-patriarchal societies that Covid-19 is in
the midst of creating do not have skin; they are untouchable; they do not have
hands. They do not exchange physical goods, nor do they pay with money. They
are digital consumers equippedwith credit cards. Theydonot have lips or tongues.
They do not speak directly; they leave a voice mail. They do not gather together
and they donot collectivize. They are radically un-dividual. They donot have faces;
they have masks. In order to exist, their organic bodies are hidden behind an in-
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definite series of semio-technical mediations, an array of cybernetic prostheses
that work like digital masks: email addresses, Facebook, Instagram, Zoom, and
Skype accounts.” (Preciado 2020b)
It is not surprising that both essays are included in the German translation of An
Apartment on Uranus. Chronicles of a Crossing published in spring 2020 by Suhrkamp
under the title “Postscriptum (2020)”. The book includes essays written between
2013 and 2018 mainly published in Libération, which documents and reflects on
daily political and cultural events before the background of Preciado’s transition
fromBeatriz to Paul B.The essays on the corona crisis are thus placed in the context
of a political writing that seeks to grasp the practices of transition in new terms,
in a new grammar. In An Apartment on Uranus, Preciado designs a nomadic writing
self, which in the most radical sense is situated in the in-between, on the jour-
ney between countries and cities, in the transition between differently gendered
statuses of the body.
This writing self struggles with a side-taking in this permanent state of transi-
tion and it oftenmarks the extremes betweenwhich change takes place in a surpris-
ing binary order: between a ‘before’ and ‘after’ of the transition, between different
attitudes towards transformation of a not further specified ‘we’ and a ‘they’, des-
ignated as “gurus of old colonial Europe” (Preciado 2020c: 43): “They say crisis. We
say revolution.” (Ibid.: 44) Even the Corona crisis offers in this way of thinking the
potential to act as a nucleus of political struggle. Preciado’s diagnosis of a social
transformation ends with activist appeals:
“Let us use the time and strength of confinement to study the tradition of struggle
and resistance among racial and sexual minority cultures that have helped us sur-
vive until now. Let us turn off our cell phones, let us disconnect from the internet.
Let us stage a big blackout against the satellites observing us, and let us consider
the coming revolution together.” (Preciado 2020b)
When in this segment “Queer Thinking” is considered as a mode of taking sides,
we want to ask about the dilemmas that arise when positions are taken for and in
transformation. Preciado’s essays stand in the tradition of queer thinking both as
a philosophical practice and as a form of protest, both as mode of thought and a
rebellion against any normalization and categorization of subjects. In this way of
thinking, an ontology of gender is rejected. It is replaced by the performativity of
gender, the play with gender clichés and the constant transgression of the suppos-
edly normal. This way of thinking not only refers to the categorization of gender
but includes all forms of classification and subjectivation based on the hegemonic
consolidations of ‘gender’, ‘class’, and ‘race’.
The authors of this section negotiate two central issues arising from this activist
positioning and theoretical reflection. On the one hand: Taking a side for transfor-
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mation threatens to put a stop to this very change and even introduce new bina-
risms. How can a queer way of thinking, which always includes one’s own position
as a researching, teaching, and writing scientist, avoid leading to new solidifica-
tions and categorizations? On the other hand: Transformation can be understood
as an ambivalent process of de-subjectification, which implies being thrown into
change and puts at risk the security of clear subject positions. How can we think
of change in all its facets and discontinuities?
Athena Athanasiou opens this section with her contribution “Taking Sides as
Taking a Stand: Critical Conditions of Co-Implication and Im-Possibility”. She ad-
dresses fundamental aspects of Taking Sid/tes as a gesture of positioning contra-
diction and equally a violent classification or (self-)categorisation. Athanasiou asks
how the problem of positioning can be dealt with without extrapolating ideas of
a previous, intentional subject and by instead locating positioning, in all its rup-
tures, at the core of becoming a subject itself. Therefore, she explores the concept
of ‘taking a stand in time’, which combines movement and momentary standstill.
She illustrates this with the example of the social movement “Women in Black” in
former Yugoslavia, where standing still is used equally as a physical form of protest
and taking both a side and a (public) site.
Side-Taking as a process of violent (self-) classification is in the foreground
of Lann Hornscheidt’s paper “Re-Nouncing Violence – Differentiating Linguistic
Violence”. Hornscheidt focuses on structural violence based on language, such as
divisions according to gender or nation, appeals, addresses, or attributions. She
shows how fixations of subject positions are effective even in everyday language
use and in this way examines the problem at which queer side-taking is directed.
In a constructivist and discrimination-critical perspective, the article distinguishes
between three forms of linguistic violence: symbolic violence, subtle violence, and
epistemic violence and shows how constructivist speech analysis can make this
violence visible.
The next article in this section focuses on violent categorization of subjects
not only in structural dimensions but also as physical action. In her article “A Side
Taken. Relating to Slavery in Octavia Butler’s Kindred” Ulrike Bergermann designs,
with precise historical references, taking sides as a challenge to all of us, descen-
dants of profiteers and/or victims of slave-owning societies, to be involved in the
history of slavery and thus in a history of violence. In her analysis of the novel
Kindred, Bergmann not only focuses on numerous references to black power ac-
tivism but also takes literary writing itself as a form of involvement in the history
of oppression, in which violence overrides the temporal order of the past and the
present. In Octavia Butler’s novel, as Bergermann shows, ‘remembering’ becomes
a ‘re-membering’, a violent inscription on a black body that sees itself thrown back
into history.
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The theme of writing as remembering is also central to Julia Bee’s contribu-
tion “Writing through the Milieu: Social Mobility and Queer/Feminist Critique as
Existential Practices”. In her discussion of Didier Eribon’s recent theoretical-auto-
biographical books, Bee shows how queerness, as a motor of social mobility, can
escape the power structures of French class society, although the social background
remains inscribed in the body in the form of shame. Bee takes this continuation of
a social side-taking, which is as it were an act of self-exclusion, as an opportunity
to reflect on our own practices of teaching and learning in the German education
system. Bee looks at the practice of writing as an experimental form of resistant
side-taking in order to render social power structures visible and transformable.
The possibilities and limits of transformation through practices of experi-
mentation are discussed by Isabell Otto in her contribution “Change by Changing
Smartphone-Users? The Fairphone as an Experimental Side”. The impulses of
queer thinking are asserted here in order to focus on the complex intertwining of
resistant practices and subject formation for the question of media participation
as a smartphone user. The contribution shows how questions of positioning
and its possible transformation continue in everyday practices and shape our
entanglement with digital networked media.
Sophie Vögele’s article “Dissident Participation and its Post_Colonial Implica-
tions. An Exploriation of Positionalities of Critique Considered in Reference to the
Institution of Higher (Art) Education” closes the segment. The article discusses the
concept of critique in Judith Butler’s reading of Michel Foucault and asks how a
critique understood in this way, which remains closely embedded in the power
structures of subject formation, nevertheless creates possibilities for dissident par-
ticipation. She directs this question to the findings of an empirical study she co-
authored on privileges based on social class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and
body, as can be observed at Swiss art schools. Taking Sides, as the authors of this
segment show, is thus always a gesture that affects us in its challenges and am-
bivalences as scientists in our practices of teaching and writing.
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Taking Sides as Taking a Stand
Critical Conditions of Co-Implication and Im-Possibility
Athena Athanasiou
“No one can write without passion-
ately taking sides (whatever the apparent
detachment of his message) on what is go-
ing wrong in the world”. (Roland Barthes,
“Taking sides”, in Critical Essays, 1972, p.
163-170)
Taking sides takes place as a performative way of inhabiting, re-occupying, acting
and reenacting (in) the world. It takes place in bodily relation to, and potentially
in differentiation from, prevailing frames of subjection, which precede and exceed
the subjects’ reach although do not fully and unilaterally determine these subjects’
positionalities (Butler 1997). As an agonistic engagement with the political, it does
not preexist or exist apart from the complex social fields of intelligibility that are
in place within specific contexts. Rather, taking sides is contingent upon those ex-
isting discursive formations that constrain and orientate in advance the kinds of
“sides” that can appear as available, reachable or sustainable possibilities.
It is this contingency that holds an ineradicable critical potential for resistance
to reigning regulatory social norms and for political transformation. Tracing and
accounting for this critical potential, I argue, requires deconstructing the individ-
ualistic and voluntaristic conception of sovereign intentional subject-formation. In
this regard, the analytics of taking sides would not require resorting to the notion
of an originary self-identical subject who pre-exists the act of side-taking. There-
fore, it should not be reduced to the desire of a pre-discursive constitutive subject
to transgress norms and constraints. From this perspective, the purpose of this pa-
per is to begin reflecting on the critical agency of taking sides as (dis-)continuous
(rather than singular) performative (rather than constative, referential, and inten-
tional) acts, which work to displace the very terms within which they take place and
through which they have been enabled. I am interested in the ways the question of
taking sides comes out of, and indexes, social positionings in our historico-politi-
cal moment, notably collective struggles against rising fascism, racialized violence,
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sexism, neoliberal governmentality, as well as imperialist militarization and secu-
ritization. And so, I would like to think through the question of taking sides as
taking a stand to propel a reflection on instating possibilities for anti-fascist social
and political life in light of the present moment.
What does it mean to be on the same side of a political struggle, and despite
which social cultural inscriptions and ascriptions are the battle lines drawn at any
given time? The social poetics of taking sides denotes a shared affective experience
as a site of intense politicization and performative historicity: a site where the
thoroughgoing relationality between social embeddedness and dissent comes into
being. We are always already posited and positioned within, despite, and vis-à-vis
dispersed discursive matrices through which we are constantly and incompletely
constituted -at once constrained and enabled. We differentially occupy multiple
subject-positions and intersubjective nexuses by excluding -and being excluded
by- others. And we perform these conditions of im-possibility in unanticipated
and incalculable ways, occasionally unconventional and transformative. The ques-
tion is what are the ethicopolitical implications of such melancholic performative
engagement with productive limitations conferred by existing power formations.
It is the urgency of this question, I think, that compels us to attend to the critical
ways the questions “which side are you on?” and “whom you stand with?” are inter-
related with the questions “what we fight for” and “how we come together around
a common purpose.” The words “side,” “stand,” “we,”, “with,” “together,” and “com-
mon” indicate, precisely by not being able to fully capture, the complex consider-
ations occasioned by the question of taking sides. They also, importantly, indicate
the need to be attentive to the nuanced historico-political specificity of struggles
within which this question makes sense. The complex dynamics of this specificity
prompts us to consider the practice of taking sides as a political gesture of re-
sponsiveness and response-ability along the lines of registers such as engagement,
collectivity, loss and comradeship, courage and vulnerability, belonging and unbe-
longing.
Although this account of the subject’s emergence as enmeshed and complicit
in, and passionately attached to, the terms of its subjectionmight seem to diminish
the possibility of taking sides, or to disallow the taking of sides that have beenmade
unavailable or impossible, it is precisely this founding ambivalence and undecid-
able tension at the heart of subjectivation that becomes the condition of possibility
for critical side-taking. Not all acts of taking sides are merely scripted in advance
by power configurations, and the emergence of side-taking agency that eludes or
rearticulates processes of subjectivation is an always undecidable, aporetic possi-
bility. The challenge here is to resist the notion of critical side-taking agency as
standing aside from prevailing modes of signification and subjectivation. Such
perspective compels us to move beyond the liberal understanding of taking sides
in terms of one’s own assumption of an available “option” over another. It would
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prompt us to trouble the calculative, individualistic accounts that posit subjectivity
and subjective agency in terms of sovereign will that masters an array of “choices.”
In this light, a problem that I would like to introduce in what follows is how a think-
ing of taking sides might be allowed to reconsider and reformulate the paradigm
of the will-to-act through the perspective of a critical account of the complicated
intersections between will, power, desire, and subjectivation.
Taking sides raises the questions of how embodied and situated subjects come
tomaterialize and reenact the political, who is fighting whom andwhy, which epis-
temic and political frameworks enable us to take sides, and what other sides are
put aside or left out. In other words, taking sides is brought about in its relation to
multiple forms of undoing and being undone within matrices of power that shape
sides, bodies, and possibilities of worldmaking. It involves becoming situated in
space and time through the collective work of always figuring out what is at stake.
From this perspective,my suggestion here is to think of taking sides in terms of
agonism rather than pure affirmation; in terms of being-with-others as a modal-
ity of strange (or estranged) familiarity rather than ontological identification. The
critical conception of agonism as what remains a troubling force, or a spectral chal-
lenge, is akin to how Foucault has theorized agonism between power and freedom
in his definitive essay Subject and Power:
“The relationship between power and freedom’s refusal to submit cannot, there-
fore, be separated. [...] Rather than speaking of an essential freedom, it would be
better to speak of an ‘agonism’ – of a relationship which is at the same time recip-
rocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyzes
both sides than a permanent provocation.” (Foucault 1982: 790)
In maintaining his critique of the juridical model for understanding power, Fou-
cault posits “the relationship between power and freedom’s refusal to submit” in
terms of mutual susceptibility and ongoing struggle.
Thus understood, taking sides bears suggestive resonances with taking a stand
but also taking of sites as a manner of collective protest, occupation, and critical ap-
propriation. Drawing on those resonances, to address the question of taking sides
includes accounting for bodies mobilized and mobilizing, responsive and put on
the line in concert with others. Thus, the question of taking sides names the pos-
sibility of critically embodying and performing the political through what Judith
Butler has theorized as bodily experience of exposure and expropriation, which
implies both addressing the other from an inescapable perspective of an opaque
self that resists narrativization (Butler 2005) and the corporeal condition of differ-
ential vulnerability and susceptibility as a galvanizing force in plural forms of per-
formative actions (Butler 2015). In other words, I argue here for an understanding
of what it means to take sides through a performative entanglement of criticality
and corporeality.
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In this sense, what concerns me in this essay is the question of taking sides in
relation to the critical and aporetic structure of becoming engaged.Althoughwe are
always already engaged, in spite of all volitional or deliberate acts of engagement,
we can also become critically engaged: that is, answerable to the pervasive social
norms and resources through which we come to be formed as intelligible subjects.
And yet, one’s engagement can never be assumed as entirely one’s own. It can occur
only with others and through others, potentially in critical and agonistic ways. It
is precisely this indeterminate possibility that enables the always unprefigurable,
and potentially subversive, performative politics of critical engagement. What is
politically significant about the performativity of critical engagement is precisely
that it does not entail an absolute rupture between possibility and impossibility.
In this sense, taking sides, it seems to me, prompts us to attend to open-ended
epistemologies of criticality –as both crisis and critique, and as an assemblage
of power, knowledge, and subjectivity. So the very idea of taking sides must be
critically revised in ways that allow for disorienting and decentering the dominant
ways of being in the world and in which we are all differentially tangled up.
Sides not in Place
Those “sides” involved in acts of taking sides, however, are not merely “in place.”
They may be contingent and contentious. Not all confrontations can be reduced to
siding with one of the available “sides” or to an unambivalent distinction between
affirmation and negation.Moreover, the act (which is notmerely singular) of taking
part and taking sides in the political contest does not necessarily amount to staying
on line or to being at home in this “side.” Rather, it may involve taking critical sides
within the side one has positioned oneself, or disrupting and reordering the avail-
able sides or lines of association. In other words, taking sides may involve making
turns, going astray, wandering off, and deviating from assigned lines of demarca-
tion, and even, hopefully, taking apart the apparatuses that generate injurious and
exclusionary lines of demarcation. Indeed, dissent often involves refusing to take
sides between equally injurious and mutually complicit names or norms through
which we are interpellated as subjects. It is in this sense that I am arguing here
that taking sides can be about unsettling the paradigm of taking sides itself and
its designated positions. And so, taking sides may be also about defending the dis-
jointed position of neither here nor there, or the position of being out of line or
out of place.1
1 In a seminar delivered in 1978, in Collège de France, Roland Barthes defined the notion of
“neutral” as that ethical and aesthetic position which “outplays” and “baffles the paradigm”
(p. 6): in other words, as a way of troubling the terms by which a paradigm compels us to take
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Sara Ahmed has offered an insightful account of how family gatherings “direct,”
orientate, or push us along compulsory and idealized positions, lines, and avow-
able affective objects: “For me,” she writes, “inhabiting the family is about taking
up a place already given. … I feel out of place in this place, but these feelings are
pushed to one side.We can consider how families are often about taking sides (one
side of the table or another) and how this demand ‘to side’ requires putting other
things aside” (Ahmed 2006: 88-89). “Sides,” from this viewing point, refer to direc-
tions, demarcations and orderings meant to shape and celebrate the straight body
and desire while blocking other acts of becoming, notably those not aligned with
compulsory heterosexuality and familial genealogy. In this sense, the demand to
side can work to straighten different, eccentric, or queer affects and effects in do-
mestic and public spaces. Such disciplinary straightenings and boundings rest on
ingrained distinctions of sameness/difference such as the ones that play out in an
anecdote Ahmed herself narrates, in which a neighbor called out to her and, pro-
pelled by her homophobic curiosity about two women living together in a house,
asks, in a distinctly either/or manner: “Is that your sister, or your husband?” As we
take sides, in familial gatherings and genealogies, but also in political conflicts and
allegiances, we risk not only being injured for not being commensurate with as-
signed norms and names, but also being taken up by the ambient logic of straight
directionality such as the one underlying that scene of the family table that Ahmed
delineates. The “side” one might come to call one’s “own” is often a site of idealized
social regulation, whose operations are not readily knowable or detectable by the
subject itself.
However, taking sides holds out another crucial political possibility as well:
norms become appropriable and are possibly reworked and altered as a way of cre-
ating critical spaces for responsiveness and dissent – or, responsiveness as dissent.
In other words, injurious address may work to fix us into normative dispositions
and designations, but it may also give rise to unexpectedly enabling and dissident
responses. In light of this problematization of “straight lines,” I would argue that
taking sides involves both being implicated in those unwilled lines of demarcation
that act upon us and the agonistic performative appropriation of injurious terms
against the interpellations they harbour. In other words, this latter form of taking
sides refers to a performative re-taking of sides, which derives its political power
from taking up those prior, assigned registers of subjectivation in new and im-
proper, potentially critical and agonistic ways. As asymmetries of power related to
intersecting race, gender, class and sexuality compromise our capacities for taking
up space, taking place, and thus taking sides, at the same time our taking sidesmay
one side or the other within a binary opposition. For Barthes, the “neutral” does not indicate
the self-assuring, quiet, or “objective” middle-ground or in-between. Rather, it is a manner
to be engaged, to be “present to the struggles of my time.” (Barthes 2005).
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work to unsettle those power configurations (as in siding with political struggles
for equality and justice and against racism, heteropatriarchy and nationalism).
The inherently unstable and ambivalent processes of subjectivation complicate
the possibilities of taking sides.Through a perspective that engages with the co-im-
plication of subjects in crisis and subjects of critique, the question for me is how to
tackle the problem of taking sides without reiterating the terms of self-willed indi-
vidualism set by liberal imaginaries.The act of taking sides does not imply positing
a pre-discursive sovereign ‘I’ that performs its volition as independent from, and
invulnerable to, power formations. On the contrary, it denotes a possibility for a
performative rupture in the regulatory repetition of the norms that sustain and
are sustained by subjectivation. The subject of taking sides, then, does not refer to
a pre-existing and self-determining volitional agent, but rather to a performative
approximate occasion of its subjectivation. It is the space of this approximation
which opens up the possibility of disruptive reworking of the terms by which sub-
jectivation takes place as an ambivalent embodiment of norms – at once formed
by and acting upon them. To understand the act of taking sides as a (dis-)con-
tinuous and incalculable process of subjectivation, one enabled and restricted by
formations of power/knowledge, is to mobilize the critical potential of taking sides
without assuming a primary locus of critique and without taking available config-
urations of sides and lines for granted.
What is at issue in the question how to take sides while disrupting the nor-
mative ways of taking up space is how to think about agonism alongside the po-
litical intricacies of non-sovereign subjectivity, finitude, courage, and responsive-
ness; and how to enact agonism as a contingent occasion to perform dissent while
remaining bound to its aporetic or inherently contradictory condition of possibil-
ity as both possibilizing and impossibilizing. Aporia, writes Jacques Derrida, does
not indicate a failure, a problem awaiting solution, or a mere terminus before an
impasse. It rather indicates the experience of the undecidable, which has perfor-
mative power, as through which a decision can take place (Derrida 1994; 1986). So
the question becomes in what ways the non-linear, open-ended poros (‘path or pas-
sage through’) of taking sides as taking a stand can be precipitated and take shape
each time so that it does not elide or suppress its constitutively aporetic struc-
ture, that is, the encounter with the pathless and the “non-way”: the undecidable
and the indeterminable. This raises the crucial question of whether it is possible
to “take sides” in “ways” not consigned to the habitual linear tropes of fixed “lines”
and “paths.” Howmight this question, then, provoke new, nuanced and transversal
“directions” for knowledge practices of taking-sides to-come?
Taking sides is a complex ethicopolitical performative experience, which in-
volves both the urgent necessity and the imperative move or the event of taking a
stand in time and, at the same time, the perhaps slower, even (too) late, and less
capturable pace of critical reflexivity. In other words, it implies at once motion
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and motionlessness; uprising and contemplation. It takes (its) time to take place at
a given time. Claiming a space beyond the active-passive ontological distinction,
these semantic registers are simultaneous and inextricable components of the po-
litical; they pertain to the interrelated defining features of stasis, which, as Nicole
Loraux has significantly suggested, is constitutive of democracy (Loraux 2002).
What kind of body politics and public intimacy would such work of taking
sides/sites as taking a stand entail? Different activist protest movements work-
ing within and on the limits of the present moment, as they gather and take to the
streets or occupy spaces to contest power configurations of racism, neofascism,
police violence, heteropatriarchy, and the differential terms of neoliberal precar-
ity, have performed the questions: who comes together, who has not been included
in concerted actions of “the people,” and whose lives matter as lives? The inter-
national activist movement Black Lives Matter, which started out through public
demonstrations seeking justice for the shooting death of African-American teen
Trayvon Martin in 2012, struggles against racialized deadly violence and embod-
ied disposability so thoroughly embedded in the ordinary. The Occupy Wall Street
protesters in New York City’s financial district in 2011 and the occupy movements
in Southeastern Europe demanded equality and protested the abusive power of
the ruling financial elites. The transnational Latin American feminist movement
Ni Una Menos (“not one woman less”) contests the conditions of gender-based vio-
lence that turn public space into a fixed landscape of hegemonic, patriarchal mem-
orability.The Istanbul Gezi Park occupation of spring 2013,which began as a protest
against plans to remove a public park and turned into an uprising against author-
itarianism, has defended and opened up the public space against the neoliberal
calculability of bodies and resources. In such street performances, by articulating
and transmitting dissident claims and struggles, political actors assemble in and
reclaim a public space and contest the conditions of possibility for their appear-
ance through norms of gender, sexuality, nationality, raciality, able-bodiedness, as
well as land and capital ownership. The sociality of coming together and taking
sides/sites with others emerges as a performative engagement that defends and
mobilize processes of embodied public dissent.
In these street actions, in all their situated specificity and singularity, activists
do enact plurality and relationality outside of oneselves and along with others in
the public space.They embody their own and others’ precarious belonging vis-à-vis
power assemblages of racism, heteropatriarchy, and neoliberal governmentality. It
is from this perspective that I ask here whether and how the critical agency of tak-
ing sides/sites might be rethought and re-politicized as a critical means to carve
expansive cartographies of dissent in the polis and build new affiliations of political
subjectivity in light of historically shaped collective claims of political self-determi-
nation and freedom.These acts of collecting and re-collecting space are inextricably
bound up with the performative dimension of taking space, also conceived as tak-
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ing position. It is to these emerging spaces akin to bodies together, bodies apart,
and bodies on the line that I now turn.
Taking a Stand
In order to tackle the poetics and politics of taking sides in terms of taking a stand
and as a gesture of stasis (cf. Vardoulakis 2017), I would like to draw on my re-
searchwith the feminist antinationalist movement “Women in Black” in former Yu-
goslavia, whereby the activists position themselves not along the authorized lines
of gender, kinship and national normative belonging, but rather in the side of the
other.2 By means of an agonistic mourning and mnemopolitics for the dead of
the “other side,” they take up the position of the internal enemy. They take a stand
against idealized ways of siding with one’s own and as a political possibility of
being with others across ethno-national lines of (un)belonging. Their political ac-
tion of reclaiming a public space for remembering others and otherwise work to
traverse and transfigure the polis and its normative rituals of remembrance and
recognition.
Through the performative registers of dissident belonging and becoming-en-
emy, these activists mobilize cross-border grievability to counter the biopolitical
economy of enmity, with all its racial, ethnic, and gender inflections. Their endur-
ing attachments to such affective intensities, as they play out in their commem-
oration of the annihilated victims of the “other side,” their acts of camaraderie
with the “enemy” community generate spaces for transvaluating afflicted losses
into possibilities of critical agency. In hauntingly re-inhabiting and thus estranging
the contained place of home, as both kinship and homeland, and in assuming the
gender-marked position of the “internal enemy,” these activists affirm relationality
with disturbing and unruly others situated out of place and estranged as external
enemies. It is through this political performativity of self-estrangement that they
address the disavowed memory of those who have been absented and effaced from
the polis. These activists dress in black and stand still and silently, usually at rush
hour, at central spots of the city and noisy crossroads, or in front of iconic national
landmarks: squares, historic monuments, and fraught dividing lines. It is precisely
the established intimacy of public recognisability that the activists’ black-coloured
appearance defamiliarizes. In making themselves appear to others through their
characteristic black clothing and silent standing, they take on the quality of a spec-
tre in order to perform an unauthorized relationality with those who can no longer
appear.
2 This section draws extensively from my book Agonistic Mourning: Political Dissidence and the
Women in Black (Athanasiou 2017).
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Their ephemerally “monumental” standing-in-silence, as a bodily mode of per-
severance and protest, reoccupies and perturbs the monumental topography of
memory and turns it into a performative field of contention and dissent. Since
the years of the war that lead to the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, standing
in silent actions for an hour, early in the afternoon every Wednesday at the Re-
public Square of Belgrade, had become the trademark of their political activism.
Women in Black actions of stajanje (‘standing still’) resignify the territory of the
memorable, despite and against the normative premises of blood affiliation, fa-
therland, and gender and kinship codes that found and sustain it. Indeed, a public
space charged with contentious narratives of national history and politics, in all
their idealized property and propriety of the “common place” (as a suitable and
familiar space, national fatherland and home), is spaced by these activists’ bodies.
Public space does not come to be presumed as an empty and unmarked container
waiting to be filled with things, processes, and embodied encounters. Rather, it
is reappropriated through a process of becoming that both relates and separates,
as Derrida has shown through his concept of spacing (‘espacement’): “Spacing des-
ignates nothing, nothing that is, no presence at a distance; it is the index of an
irreducible exterior, and at the same time of a movement, a displacement that indi-
cates an irreducible alterity.” (Derrida 1981: 81)
In such events of stajanje as standing and stasis, the activists’ bodily posturing,
steadfastly but also fleetingly counterposed to the national monumental architec-
ture, textures and complicates the imperative to remember by opening it onto the
disconcerting question of whom the remembrance of nationalist war requires ef-
facing. In effect, the activists re-mark what has been established as remarkable
about the monumental landmark.They occupy Belgrade’s central square, perform-
ing a spectralized plurality of bodies, present and absent, living and non-living.
Their silent “stubborn choreography” (Sosa 2011: 70) embodies an acting monu-
ment that defies monumentalization. By re-positioning their political bodies at
the centre of the polis as a means of embodying their own and others’ ambivalent
and precarious (un-)belonging vis-à-vis its demarcation lines, these political actors
become themselves “other” and turn the public space into a scene of dissent. They
publically actualize the multilayeredmodalities of stasis as taking a stance and tak-
ing a stand, standing up for someone or something, but also bearing witness and
giving testimony.
The Women in Black contemplative standing ensemble becomes a restless per-
formative occasion of stasis. In standing at and across the border, in its multiple
tropes of external and internal frontiers, enclaves, refugee camps, routes of mass
expulsion, and states of siege, these political actors embody the polis in ways that
echo what Loraux has described as “divided city,” constituted on the basis of that
which it disavows. As marked subjects of gender, women, Loraux argues, perfor-
matively embody the awareness of this internal stasis –as both division and revolt.
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These activists put into play the ec-static character of political subjectivity as con-
stituted through the address of the other (denoting both being addressed by and
addressing others). As they become “moved” by, through and toward, the disavowed
losses that haunt injurious mnemopolitics, they deal with the question of how re-
sponsiveness might appear in the languages of activism. Stasis, in this context,
involves an embodied practice of inhabiting the public through one’s own and oth-
ers’ dissident belonging. So how might we think activism as taking sides in terms
of responsiveness exercised precisely in conditions of dispossession, rather than in
terms of achieving sovereign autonomy through transcending structures of sub-
jugation? How might we think taking sides as one’s being collectively moved and
moving with others despite and against the powers by which one is subjectified?
In summary, such performative actions of taking a stand articulate dissent as
eventness of social agonism through relating with others. The disquiet these ac-
tivists insert into the reigning domain of intelligibilitymanifests courage –a notion
that Foucault has associated with critical work (Foucault 2012) – as not restricted
to verbal acts of truth-speaking, but rather performed through a multiplicity of
embodied daily acts, gestures, and aesthetics that enable the elaboration of criti-
cal matrices of de-subjugation and relationality. In the words of Holloway Sparks:
“Courage, we might say, is a commitment to persistence and resolution in the face
of risk, uncertainty, or fear.” (Sparks 1997: 92) In the context of our inquiry, then,
rather than a state of individual honorable self-mastery and heroic, manly, moral
transcendence, courage emerges as a historically situated performative ethos of
collective endurance and resistance, necessarily linked to power relations.
This line of inquiry is about the challenge of attending to and accounting for the
aporetic space of taking critical distance and taking a critical stance vis-à-vis the
present order. In this sense, the critical re-elaboration of taking sides as a political
figure here is not about presuming an event (as a singular, time-shattering, apoc-
alyptic event) but rather about enacting multiple and perhaps discontinuous pos-
sibilities for taking up and disrupting the normative social scripts of race, gender,
and class privilege, and enabling other visions and enactments of theworld.The po-
litical performative figure of taking sides indicates a precarious exercise of subjec-
tivation and de-subjectivation,which haunts,while remaining haunted by, the con-
straints of power but also the absent presences of other, de-realized subjectivities.
Simultaneously constituted and constituting, complicit and disengaged, this crit-
ical exercise in taking sides to trouble and subvert regimes of subjection is always
inflected with and strategically reworking these power/knowledge regimes, always
underway and slow-burning, persistently taking place and taking time, bringing
about and calling for the struggles and transformations of one’s time.
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Why is structural discrimination, which I call violence, so enduring, so restabiliz-
ing, so indissoluble, despite countless instances of lip service and political equality
programs? Is the idea of speaking and writing without discrimination hopelessly
utopian?What role does language play regarding the fundamentality and longevity
of violence in society? Or, how are language and violence connected? I will debate
different ideas regarding the latter question throughout this chapter.
My epistemological starting point is a constructivist understanding that sees
all violence as structural discrimination and all language as speech acts. From this
starting point, I argue, that, as speech acts are potentially and complexly violent,
language is never a mere representation of violence but inherently conveys it.
Understanding and Differentiating Violence
Contemporary German-speaking societies mostly understand violence an individ-
ual act or individual suffering: Individuals perform violent acts, and individuals
suffer performed violence.This notion is supported, among other things, by a legal
understanding that primarily penalizes individuals who intentionally perpetrate
violence.This predominantly legal understanding of violence informs societal con-
cepts of right and wrong, guilty and innocent in social discourse and media coverage
to the degree that violence is irrevocably associated with the bodily acts or bodily
harm inflicted and received by individuals (cf. Herrmann, Kramer & Kuch 2007).
Because these societal concepts and implicit definitions of violence are so rooted
in the physical, the idea that speech acts can be violent is barely recognized in the
public consciousness – except perhaps as intentionally uttered Hate Speech. Hate
speech is mostly understood as a precursor to ‘actual’, corporeal violence. Within
this concept, linguistic actions can potentially pave the way for, incite, or mobi-
lize violent actions. But the speech act itself is not considered violence. This is also
closely connected to the fact that speech is is seen as inherently subordinate to
action rather than a central course of action for individuals and groups. The struc-
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turalistic understanding of language, prevalent in our society, therefore subtly de-
politicizes any general understanding of speaking as acting. Only such an under-
standing could render language analyzable or socially perceptible as violent and
thus allow for critical, anti-discriminatory courses of action that could eventually
condition a different legal understanding of speach, language, and speech acts.1
Structural Violence
Understanding violence as structure in a social context, usually a society, makes
it unavoidable for individuals. When this violence is realized through language,
through speech acts which include silence, ignoring, and omission, I call it linguis-
tic violence. Individuals, as part of a society, are exposed to constitutions of struc-
tural violence in multiple ways. From references and appellations, to National or
gender categories, to language-based ratings and gradings, to formal addresses
or lack thereof, to allocations and attributions, and different modes of conversa-
tion. Language conventions in society have to be understood as fundamental and
reiterative to the normalization of structural violence. It is telling that the idea
of structural violence that manifests in conventions and simulations of language
and linguistic systematics has gone widely unrecognized in German and other lan-
guages’ philologies, whereas it has been widely received and understood as highly
relevant in sociological research (cf. Neckel & Sutterluty 2005).2
When discriminated individuals point out the directional violence of specific
speech acts, the public often defames and dismisses such complaints as censorship,
limitation of free speech, or an intervention by the language police (exemplary for a
reflection of these systematics are Sow 2018; Hornscheidt & Agwu 2010; Kennedy
2002). How these speech acts are handled in the public, as well as some of the
linguistic discourse, is based on and reiterates the understanding of language as
merely mirroring reality and subordinate to the ‘real’ actions of people. All of these
things combined have a massive stabilizing impact on public and individual views
on the connection between language and violence. Under this chapter’s lens, con-
structivist and discrimination-critical, structural linguistic violence is therefore
unaddressable and socially un-recognizable. By recognizing violence as structural,
this chapter offers a different perspective on power and predominant understand-
ings of language. I will further differentiate specific dimensions of structural vio-
1 The idea that language, not only paves the way for bodily violence but is violence itself, has
been brought forth and empirically and theoretically grounded in constructivist and anti-
discriminatory linguistic (cf. Frank 1990; Hornscheidt 2014; Hornscheidt & Landqvist 2014),
philosophical cf. Herrmann & Kuch 2007; Kramer 2007; Liebsch 2006), and rhetorical (cf.
Butler 1997) academic positions.
2 This could lead to a longer debate on the disciplinary normalization of topics and their de-
politicization through academic disciplination.
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lence that will be relevant for amore foundational and constructivist take on spoken
realizations of violence: symbolic, subtle, and epistemic violence.
Symbolic Violence
Maybe the most famous concept of language as violence was introduced by Bour-
dieu and culminates under the label of ‘symbolic violence’. Here, symbolic power
is the power to assign meaning. It is about establishing a specific concept of the
social world (Bourdieu 1989).The influence of the individual stems from their sym-
bolic capital, which is “a credit; it is the power granted to those who have obtained
sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition.” (Ibid.: 23) “In
the symbolic struggle for the production of common sense or, more precisely, for
the monopoly over legitimate naming, agents put into action the symbolic capital
that they have acquired in previous struggles which maybe juridically guaranteed.”
(Ibid.: 21) With the concept of symbolic power it becomes clear how general ideas of
meaning are naturalized and conventionalized through discursive processes. Fur-
thermore, the concept opens up the option to investigate which groups of people
within a group of speakers have the prerogative of connotation and can normal-
ize and naturalize meaning (cf. Raijlc 2018). Conventionalized language norms are
hence a form of symbolic violence. At the same time, this subtle exertion of violence
and power remains unrecognizable because it seems so natural and normal.
Subtle Violence
Burkhard Liebsch uses the term of subtle violence and approaches linguistic vio-
lence as a base of human existence with it. Liebsch understands the self as radically
experiencing itself dependent on the perception of language, and therefore focuses
on violence in language rather thanwith language. Aspects like speechlessness or si-
lence as violent speech acts are at the core of his philosophical elaborations. Liebsch
writes about the ineluctability of experiencing a life shaped by inherently violent
language:
“Don’t we constantly move along the border of a double strangeness, inherent to
our own language? On the one hand its original foreignness remains attached to
it, on the other hand we subsequently become an estranged from ourselves as
pre-symbolic beings.We cannot go back, behind language. Even approaching this
border can only ever happen linguistically. Yet, this does not mean that language
is a closed cage.” (Cf. Liebsch 2007: 17, translation A. G.)
What I want to focus on, is the fundamentality of violence within this concept of
language and speech acts, and that Karsta Frank called “Sprachgewalt” (‘linguistic
violence’) in the early 1990s.
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“This archive [of conventionalized linguistic norms] provides new generations
with knowledge, in a twofold way: Firstly, the individual accesses objectifications
saved in the archive (vocabulary) whenever they talk, whenever they objectivize
their experiences, emotions, thoughts, or perception and thus realize them for
themselves and others. Language provides those who speak it with prefabrica-
tions while simultaneously forcing them into its pre-molded patterns.” (Frank
1992: 116, translation A.G.)
At the same time these categorizations and conceptualizations that Frank calls ‘pre-
fabrications’ are perceived as reality, making them hard to become aware of. In a
feminist interpretation of Berger and Luckmann’s “Social Construction of Reality”
(1966) the matter of how specific groups in society use designations and normative
language to make their view of reality a binding norm for all, is of special interest.
In this context, the double meaning of the term “Re-Nouncing Violence” becomes
evident: conventionally it would mean to forgo the use of violence – but also the
metaphorical reference to nouns and annunciations ties it back to language and
speaking as more than a mirroring of corporeal violence. At the same time, it also
underlines, that the majority of societal violence is not announced, not named,
and therefore, in constructivist terms, powerfully perpetuated. This connects con-
comitantly to Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence and the idea of epistemic
violence.
Epistemic Violence
Under this term I want to gather facets of violence and power that are realized
through the production, distribution, and reception of knowledge.What is socially
understood as knowledge and which knowledge is authorized by whom is influ-
enced by social, political, and historical conditions.The idea of knowledge is funda-
mentally ideological. There is huge structural power in the authorizing, audibility,
and nomination – as well as the deauthorization, delegitimization, hierarchizing,
and (de-)valuation – of knowledge. The groups that determine what is considered
knowledge and which knowledge is recognized as a guiding principle for action,
being ethically and morally desirable as well as legally binding, are tremendously
and violently impacting the lives or non-lives of other humans, creatures, and na-
ture. Epistemic violence is therefore all-encompassing, fundamental, and at the
same time evasive, as it is inherent to social structure and a base for our collective
understanding as a society. Very few authors therefore debate the linguistic aspects
of knowledge as an integral part of epistemic power. Because of this I will follow
two different tracks in this chapter’s second half in order to address different areas
of the larger concept of language and make it analytically applicable.
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Knowing Violence
A first dimension of the connection between language and epistemic violence is
the linguistic expression of knowledge. This includes explicit violent speech acts
(so called pejoratization or German: Pejorisierung, cf. Hornscheidt 2011), which are
also possibly closest to an everyday discussion of the idea of linguistic violence.
Widening this approach then also means including not only what is said but also
what is un-said, re-nounced, or de-named.3
A second level of knowing violence in language is the presumed possibility to
talk about violence: violence can be put into words – even if only after the fact – as is
important in the context of epistemic violence. Epistemic violence can be expressed
retrospectively, analytically, andmeta-reflexively.This, problematically, means that
any reflection may be stuck in the paradox that any form of post-phrasing will
necessarily occur in a space of knowledge authorization, e.g. Universities or other
research institutes, that may be an institutionalized or societally legitimized space
of epistemic violence.4
Beyond this assumed expressability there is a third dimension of epistemic
violence where precisely what is deemed unspeakable becomes unimaginable and
unintelligible time and time again.
So, what could this unintelligible exclusion from what is considered to be
knowledge, in a society at a specific time, be? What lies beyond the battlefield of
socially relevant, legitimate, and socially accepted knowledge? Because in omis-
sion, in the denouncing of relevance and validity, and in the de-normalization
of specific modes of knowledge (production) lies a recognition of their existence
through their explicit denomination.This third dimension of epistemic knowledge
through speech acts – knowledge that is made de-un-intelligible – can be precisely
analyzed through constructivist speech analyses.
In the following I will shortly address concrete examples of speech acts and the
re-production of epistemic knowledge, in order to demonstrate the complexity of
violence as such and of its intertwined strategies. This will be exemplified with the
question of verbalized social categorizations.
3 Un-said refers to the omission of priviledged postions, while re-nounced, and dis-mentioned
refers to a refusal or avoidance of acknowledging discriminated positions. The German term
“Entnennung” was coined by Hornscheidt (2005), “Ent-Erwähnung” by Lockward (2010).
4 The bashing of Gender Studies as a research and study subject by rightwing parties and
groups can be understood as a violent expression and a power claim regarding the canon
of what is considered academic knowledge (and what is considered ideology) and what can
or can’t be institutionalized at universities. The highly ideological charge of this attempted
delegitimization of Gender Studies by rightwing actors with a strongly ideologized concept
of knowledge is apparent and comes to the fore as paradox specifically through the attempt




Verbalized social categorizations are the organizational patterns of society. They
enable interactive identification, simultaneously facilitating a sense of belonging
and a specification of difference, thereby demarcating and excluding. Social catego-
rizations are significant to society. The categorizations that I am specifically inter-
ested in are those established through structural violence, or rather those through
which structural violence manifests itself. The levels of structural violence I refer
to here are colonial racism, antisemitism, nationalism, genderism, and dis-abling.
In other words, this means the collective and identificational assignment of people
to groups of race, religion, nationality, gender, or ability.
Verbalized social categorizations that operate through these power structures
are, in my constructivist view, always also re-actions to or the long-term prod-
ucts of structural violence. This leads us to the paradox that we often have to re-
iterate these categories in our language in order to address discrimination. Yet
by doing so, a central dimension of discrimination becomes reified: that of the
linguistic differentiation into distinctly named groups. Social categorizations can
never evade fundamental structural violence, but are in fact conditioned by it, re-
iterate it constantly, and re-affirm its power, even if their aim is to work against
it. Social categorizations as (self-)descriptions would not exist without the struc-
tural violence precluding linguistic differentialization and therefore affirmation.
The current consensus is that sorting people by race is racist. Assuming, and aca-
demically justifying, the idea of different human races – supported by epistemic
violence – is now considered unscientific.5 All categorization of people by race is
at heart racist – no matter how the different groups are then connoted, valued,
and hierarchized. Likewise, any differentiation between abled and dis-abled peo-
ple puts the discrimination, created by that differentiation, onto the people. But
people are not dis-abled, they are labelled as dis-abled by society. The same argu-
ment can be made for gender: sorting people into gender groups is a fundamental
part of structural violence manifesting itself and becoming uncontestable.
As part of structural violence, social categorizations develop their owndynamic.
They are de-historicized and are thus moved towards universal status. Revealing
this process is an important task in critical, constructivist speech analyses and a
crucial part in the deconstruction of epistemic violence.
In the following examples, I will specifically seek out more subtle forms of epis-
temic violence performed in language practices as well as hone in on the linguistic
acts in creating memory as the creation of temporal dimensions.
Let me start with an everyday negotiation of antisemitism in the German
speaking public. In different media outlets, image captions, exhibitions, or school-
5 Science as such is not under scrutiny in this scenario. The system of the authorization of spe-
cific forms of knowledge hence remains intact.
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books we can find statements like: “Because his father was a Hungarian Jew, the
family had to leave Berlin within 24 hours in 1939.”
The social category is established as preexisting and axiomatic, and the struc-
tures of discrimination and antisemitism remain unnamed. Nobody had to leave
Berlin because their relatives were Jewish, they had to leave because Germany was
antisemitic.The personal categorization ‘Jew’ was used as part of antisemitism and
pared down to a definition created by the national-socialist ideology. People were
then categorized in a racist way using this label. As such labels persist in cultural
narratives andmedia, this narrow definition and the genocide of those people cate-
gorized as Jewish following the national-socialist party’s criteria still informs, what
is understood as ‘Jewish’. The implied connotations have engraved themselves and
been engraved into the structures of knowledge and today’s interpretation of what
the personal appellation ‘Jew’ means in German speaking countries.
Structural discrimination violently and powerfully inscribes itself into societal
normalized knowledge about identities and social categories through the specifica-
tion of collective categories that the discrimination created in the first place. They
are then no longer seen as effects of discriminatory structures but taken as a priori
in common knowledge. Why is this relevant? Let me demonstrate my point with a
few quotes from literature using the antisemitically charged category of ‘Jewish’.
Katja Petrowskaja writes about the memories of herself and her family in her
autobiography, titled “Maybe Esther” (2015). In a chapter about a visit in Babi Jar
she reflects on the layers, stories, and histories in the remembrance of violence:
“Does a place stay the same place if, at this place, people murder, bury, blast, hol-
low out, burn, grind up, scatter, hold their tongues, plant, lie, create landfills and
backfills, fill up with concrete, once again hold their tongues, block off, arrest
mourners, and then later construct then monuments, commemorate their own
victims once a year, or think they have nothing to do with it? […] Most people talk
about these victims as Jews, often meaning simply ‘the others’. That is mislead-
ing, for those who had to die were not the others; they were, rather, friends from
school, kids next door, neighbors, grandmas and uncles, biblical elders and their
Soviet grandchildren, who were last seen on September 29 on the streets of Kiev
in an endless train of their own funeral procession along Bolshaya Zhitormiskaya.”
(Ibid.: 164-165)
The social category ‘Jews’ – defined, written in stone, and essentialized by the Nazi
regime, in order to forcefully tie antisemitism as a naturalized attribute to bodies
and people – simultaneously lead to an alienation, an Othering, a distance in the
collective memory. The quote shows how these forms of collective memory seep
into even this smallest units of language’s knowledge production.
“I have never understood”, Petrowskaja continues, “why this misfortune should
always be the misfortune of the others.” (2018: 165) Throung the unchallenged use
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of these discriminatory, absolute social categorizations, racism gains a life of its
own that seems so natural and self-explanatory that the inherent structural vio-
lence is unnoticeable and has become the condition for any conversation about the
discrimination.When people are perceived as primarily part of social groups which
are embedded in a regime of discrimination – and not as individuals or with a fo-
cus on the distinct individual relationship to a person when addressing them – this
can be taken as a tangible linguistic sign of structural discrimination.
One’s own identity is always a battle field when structurally discriminated
against. This becomes apparent in a scene from Marion Brasch’s autobiographical
family story (2013). The author and her father, both living in the GDR, are standing
at Marx’s grave in London:
“‘When we arrived here, I was still a catholic’, my father said. ‘I wanted to become
a priest, do you remember?’
Of course, I remembered.
‘It tookme long time, to bide farewell to my god. I kind of put him in a dinghy and
pulled him along for quite a while, but here I cut the cord’ he says softly. We stood
in silence at the Marx grave for a while.
‘Andwhat about your Judaism, dad?’ I asked him after a while. His gaze came back
to the present.
‘What about it?’, he answered irritatedly.
‘I was only ever a Jewaccording to theNazis’ racial laws. This nevermeant anything
to me. I was a catholic, now I am a communist.’
‘But you had to leave Germany as a Jew. And if it weren’t for that, there would have
been no dinghy, and you wouldn’t have become a communist, right?’
‘Had, were, if’, my father coolly replied, ‘hadn’t I have been a Jew, many things
would have gone differently.’” (Ibid.: 294-295 translation A.G.)
Another linguistically obvious marker for structural racism could be when people
can no longer decide if or how they can relate to a category as it has become so
almighty and unavoidable for their own cognition and that of the others that people
simply cannot avoid it and all its existential consequences.
This holds especially true for the category of gender. First of all, humans are
– usually at birth – categorized by others in one of two, maybe three, groups of
gender, based on medical indications. Second of all, from this moment on there is
no option for a gender free life: regardless of how you define yourself, most people
will project their gender expectations onto you at first glance. There are different
lifestyle, medical, and legal options for changing one’s gender, but there is no way
to opt out of the categorization created by genderism. The categories are deeply
entrenched in our social constructs and receive constant reference an everyone, like
it or not, has to continually realte to them (cf. Hornscheidt/Oppenländer 2019).
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Without language, without the potential to create, use, and take for granted
linguistic categories such as gender, nationality, disability, residency, and solidify-
ing them by describing people as woman, tran*, man, German, Syrian, Somalian, Swiss,
or stateless, the respective structural discriminations would not exist.They can only
exist, if the social sorting of people into these categories continues. This is also
what I read into a paragraph from Deborah Feldman’s autobiography:
“Sitting at the table under the neon lights and cleaning the cabbage from grubs,
that would make it treife, non-kosher, Bubby absentmindedly says, that Yaweh
has only put the other people on this planet so they could hate and persecute the
Jewish people. After all, it is this opposing force that defines us, just like Yaweh
createdday andnight, darkness and light. One is necessary to define the other. Our
Jewishness exists precisely within the framework of the attempts to extinguish it.”
(13, translation A.G.)
Being-Jewish, exists as a racist, violent categorization and valuation because
other, mutually exclusive collective categories exist simultaneously. Collectively
they unfold a difference, often imagined as natural, between racial groups,
national groups, gender groups, and people, who are dis-abled or abled. Such
socially collective allocations are a matter of power. This power is often enacted by
naturalizing structural violence, which becomes indiscernible as violence, against
all of society. This level of subtle, epistemic violence that evades social detection as
violence is the most powerful of all violences.
Shohat/Stam (2012: 92) makes a case for a clearer understanding of social
categories as relational and contingent, always prior, and always embedded into
concrete social and history situations. Similar to how I understand Petrowskaja’s
pledge for the denormalization of social categories. Marica Bodrožić writes in her
travel report Mein weißer Frieden (My white peace):
“People, who never in their lives find their own language, can be easily seduced by
the speeches of the powerful. When they submit themselves to them, they also
acquire access to their power and their (however shaped) ability to speak, that
they themselves don’t have.” (2014: 193, translation A.G.)
Part of symbolic power is the normalization and naturalization of linguistic cate-
gories and labelling of people into collectives. This enables and dis-ables potential
actualizations of people as part of social groups. In this perspective, socially stan-
dardized speech acts are an essential base of collective, and common knowledge.
Petran and Thiel (2012) conclude that a symbolic order is necessary in order
for power relations to stabilize as it makes specific kinds of violence feasible and
then produces and legitimizes such violence. Their example is sexualized violence
against women, lesbian, gay, and trans*people, with the categories themselves es-
tablishing people as open to being hurt.
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In this chapter I have explicitly focused on aspects of symbolic order and how
some of them are stabilized while others are rendered unimaginable because they
are re-nounced. To this end I have employed the concepts of symbolic, subtle and
epistemic violence.
 
Translated by Anne Ganzert
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A Side Taken
Relating to Slavery in Octavia Butler’s Kindred
Ulrike Bergermann
We’re not all here –
the drowned are missing.1
What does it mean, “to take sides”? While the first two decades of the twenty-first
century have seen not only many governments of both the global North and South
overtaken by right-wing conservative to right-wing populist parties but also a rad-
ical turn in polarizations during political debates, the urgency of taking a stand
has dramatically increased for liberals, the left-leaning, academics, and all who
have long managed to keep themselves out of such debates as well. Calls for resti-
tution,2 demands for the return of pillaged cultural goods through to reparation
payments for the destruction of countries, if not even continents, due to the ab-
duction and enslavement of 60-100 million African people,3 and for the genocide
1 Slogan from demonstrations for saving refugees in theMediterranean Sea, 2018, in Germany
and elsewhere (“Wir sind nicht alle, es fehlen die Ertrunkenen”).
2 On the issue of the sum of reparation payments, based on surveys by the United Nations’
Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent 2015, Kehinde Andrews writes: Repa-
rations were paid to the slave-owners; the enslaved received nothing and fell into new rela-
tions of dependence at former slaveholders’ operations as a result of exploitative paid labor;
nations that had been released into “independence” from the colonial powers were forced to
pay enormous sums for the colonial powers’ legacies, something which they are still doing to
this day (between 1825 and 1947 totally impoverished Haiti paid 90million francs to France).
Andrews 2017: n.p.. If solely the wages of enslaved persons in the USA were calculated, the
sum would be 6-14 billion dollars. Historian David Olusoga cites the research by University
College London/The Wales Office, “The Legacies of British Slave Ownership Project”, and a
Slave Compensation Commission: From 1834, compensation equivalent to 17 billion pounds
today was paid out to 46,000 Britons (refinanced through the increased value-added tax,
which in turn affected the poor disproportionately; slaves were forced to continue to work
without payment for years, those in the house for four years, field hands for six), Olusoga
2015. “Slavery Reparations Could Cost Up to $14 Trillion, according to US Surveys”, Craemer
2015: n.p. See also Shanahan 2019.
3 Between the late fifteenth and the end of the nineteenth century, 12.4 million Africans were
kidnapped (two thirds of them between 1700 and 1808). It is not known how many people
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committed against aborigines in Australia as well as in South and North Amer-
ica, are beginning to send shockwaves through the European colonial states. On
paper, taking sides seems feasible for a major proportion of white Europeans: We
condemn the crimes of the past. But deducing from this history today’s extreme
differences between prosperous and impoverished countries, or among population
groups within western nations, and taking action accordingly is less of a smooth
procedure.There are films such as 13th by Ava du Vernay, which traces the continu-
ity of, for example, US slavery and persistent racism into the jail system and up to
Black LivesMatter;4 there are exhibitions on the history of the wealth of specifically
named British merchants and their families due to the slave trade, as at the Bristol
Museum, the Museum of the Docklands London, the Museum of Slavery in Liver-
pool, and others; there are numerous fine art works and projects that work through
the complicated connections between global and individual history up into the here
and now. A rethinking is demanded by the specific relationships between today’s
extreme imbalances and subjectivities: How are we as individuals, in the present
day, to take sides within a history of violence, and how much of this history has
been adopted in the things we take for granted, not only consumption habits, but
also language and worldviews, emotions, and structures of desire?
A further reaching potential of taking sides examines the part of the self as part
of the ‘side’. Privileges and spheres of influence can be in play in this context. After
taking sides, you are not the same. Octavia Butler writes it thus in Kindred (1979),
the novel that connects the US present day with the US history of slavery,5 as the
died on the inner-Africa route to the ships; researchers assume one tenth to up to one half
of all captives. A conservative estimate of 15% yields a further 1.8 million dead in Africa. 1.8
million died en route on the Middle Passage. 10.6 million survivors became forced laborers,
mostly on plantations. A further 15% (or more) died in the first year of forced labor. Across
categories, 5 million people died. In other words, 14 million people were enslaved, and 9
million forced laborers survived (Rediker: 2007, 5). This is also recorded by Michael Zeuske
(1495-1880: 12.5 million abducted; 11-12 million arrived in the Americas alive) (Zeuske 2015:
19).
4 In 2016 Ava du Vernay’s Film 13th (named for the 13th Amendment of the US Constitution
on the prohibition of slavery) illustrated present-day intersections of race, justice and mass
incarceration in the United States in order to demonstrate the hypothesis that slavery has
been perpetuated in practices since the end of the American Civil War through such actions
as criminalizing behavior, disenfranchisement, lynchings, Jim Crow, and the prison-indus-
trial complex. Today there are 2.3 million detainees in the USA, the highest percentage rate
of any national population in the world. Today more black US citizens live under criminal
surveillance than there were slaves in 1850.
5 Prior to American independence, the majority of African enslaved persons (approx.
300,000) was abducted to the British colonies of North America, followed by a further
100,000 enslaved persons between theAmericanWar of Independence and theWar of Seces-
sion. In the Southern states the figure grew to approx. four million enslaved persons by the
end of the War of Secession in 1865. “This forced migration [of the Atlantic trade in people]
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new German translation of the title, Verbunden (‘connected’) (2016, in Berlin’s pub-
lishing house w_orten & meer) suggests, and not only in respect of kin, or related-
ness, although this latter becomes a component of the complicated novel structure.
We are descendants of slaveholder-societies, children of the children of profiteers
and/or victims, not necessarily blood-related, but part of societies that are founded
thereon in economy, culture, and ideology; these lines of descent become tangled,
do not always deliver clear sides and positions, but at the same time they issue
a persistent call to answer for the consequences, even for sides that we have not
sought out for ourselves. These days, presumably, taking a stance on the situation
also means getting engaged in the situation ourselves.
But how fictitious is the involvement of abstract temporal expanses? That Afro-
futurism formats, with their own understanding of time and historiography by and
for Blacks, African people, and people of color, are becoming so popular in the late
2010s6 is perhaps owed partly to this invitation to take sides. Does this history’s
vast scale not surpass individual agency?
Kindred 1976/1815
Dana vanishes in her living room and reappears a few feet away, covered in mud,
just seconds later. As she tries to explain to Kevin what she has experienced, we
the readers are initiated into their relationship, the shocking nature of the event,
and the place where Dana was. The feeling of nausea marks her transition into the
world of the Southern states during the period of slavery, to a farm in Maryland
in the early nineteenth century, far away from the new apartment in California,
of which the couple is currently taking occupancy in 1976. Amid shelves and type-
writers the two intend to try and write their books; that Dana is Black and Kevin
white becomes clear only through descriptions of the way people react to their
made America. Between 1450 and 1830 6-8 million people came from Africa to America, but
only 2-3 million people came from Europe. The indigenous population of approximately 60
million in circa 1600 had shrunk to some 5 million and did not grow to 15 million again until
circa 1850. In the nineteenth century, post 1819/20, another 3-4million people were abducted
fromAfrican regions via theHidden Atlantic [...] and an unknown number was smuggled (es-
timates assume up to one million).” In 1840-1940 more than 30 million “coolies” were trans-
ported from India and China to North America. There was no mass migration of Europeans
to America and Oceania until 1830. (Zeuske 2012: 42. Cf. Baucom 2005)
6 For comments on the popularity and the “strange attractor” Afrofuturism, see: Greg Tate, Rise
of the Astro Blacks, 199-201; Anna Everett, AfrofuturismOnMyMind: Imagining Black Lives in
a Post-ObamaWorld, 251-277; John Akomfrah, Kodwo Eshun, The Secessionist Manifestos of
Certain ReceivedWisdoms, 363-369, and others in: Henriette Gunkel, kara lynch (eds.), 2019.
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wedding.7 For the Black Lives Matter movements of the 2010s, Dana’s time trav-
els would be exactly the plot to form a backdrop for persistent racism. In the 1960s
and 1970s, when the Black Power movements were formulating clear positions, Oc-
tavia Butler becomes a voice of Black literature and the civil liberties movement –
and simultaneously she thinks through existing complicities with the history of
oppression. The sci-fi mechanism of time travel is employed for the protagonist’s
transfer back to the slavery era, and as we read we are led to confront a history of
violence we are reluctant to see, reactions (shock, defense, the attempt to influence
the casting back) are played through for us, and various genre-typical variants are
reworked. During a time when the black civil rights movement in the USA was ever
more clamorously denouncing the persistent discrimination, Octavia Butler wrote
a novel which, for all its critical positioning, also investigates complicities and such
things as ‘minor kinships’ – between present day and past, between black heritage
and white heritage. Where Dana, an independent, feminist woman, lands, she is
considered a slave. Once, when she accidentally takes Kevin along with her, he is
regarded as her owner. Both of them learn how to deal with the horror of being
cast back and the atrocity of slavery society, but are unable to influence the time
travel deliberately – in this instance, taking sides has as its cause no free decision,
no courageous planning out of conviction. But there is a trick.
Dana finds herself in the past whenever Rufus is in mortal danger. First she
saves him, a four-year-old white boy, from drowning; she is almost shot dead by
his father, and lands back in her living room a few minutes later. After the second
and third trip, during which she is obliged to come to the ever-older boy’s aid,
she recognizes the pattern: He seems to call her – and she can return home only
when her own life is in jeopardy. Written from the perspective of the astonished
time-traveler, who attempts to come to terms with what she perceives, with the
emotional confrontations, Dana tries to figure out as much as possible about the
historical slavery context, in order to survive within it. The reader gets entangled
in an exemplary, violence-steeped setting of a specific family history, in an abyss of
ownership structures, contempt for humanity, and acts of rape, and has to reflect
this confrontation: How are we to apply ourselves to this cruel past? Dana has no
choice, she cannot look away, and she realizes that the boy whom she saves is going
to have a child with a black slave, a child who is to be her own great-great grand-
mother. Here, what is a typical figure in the genre of science fiction literature – the
‘grandfather paradox’ (would I have been born had my father not been conceived,
7 For more about the burden of interracial romance, see Parham (2009): 1327: “The couple will
always draw black looks, the black gaze: Don’t you know that they raped our women?”. The
various consequences of the trips for Kevin and Dana are discussed by Donadey 2008. More
about the relationship in Paulin 1997, and about the role of books within the relationship in
Levecq 2000: 528.
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can I influence the course of history, would I ever come ‘back’?) – reveals itself to
be most profoundly political: as a reference to another unspoken element of his-
tory (slaveholders raped female slaves, even for years; the conceived children were
de jure their property and were often sold on, which once again ruptures the en-
slaved’s lives socially and psychically;8 also, women as slaveholders are only recently
coming into focus9); but it is also political in the sense that these impure affinities
depict relationships between oppressor and oppressed, relationships from which
it is impossible to liberate history right to the present day. Dana is not simply an
opponent of slavery, and she is not only a victim in the house of the slave-owning
Weylin family in 1815. She observes Rufus, who as the son and heir is set to assume
the role of plantation master one day, and attempts to weave notions of humanism
and justice into this structure. To do this, she herself must adapt to the structure
of the house and turn collaborator, in order to secure her own life in the nineteenth
and the twentieth century at once. She will persuade Alice to let Rufus enslave her
also sexually, which saves Alice’s life at first, but Alice goes on to see her husband
and children sold, to give birth to two children forced upon her by Rufus, and to
hang herself when the latter (she mistakenly believes) are likewise sold – and Dana
had hoped that Alice would live until the birth of her great-grandmother.This story
exudes complicity from every pore.
Complicity / On Not Taking Sides
Though Octavia Butler was involved in Black Power activism, she was unable to
espouse the anger directed by that movement toward the generations who had not
emancipated themselves, who despised the stereotypes of conformist Uncle Toms
and mammies while in their resentment restated such figures; while Butler works
equally on the erosion of these figures and on the ideals of heroic resistance (Dubey
2013: 34). She prefers to reference the slave narratives that openly professed their
8 The “abolition” of slavery was not only fought for for a very long time, it was also drawn out
over decades and left the wealth with the slaveholders and the servitude with the enslaved.
At first, it was not actually “slavery” that was prohibited, but initially (1808) only the import of
“new slaves” from Africa. The four million enslaved in America largely remained where they
were at first (and the “40 acres and amule” promised to themwere never realized). One of the
consequences of this was the enslaved went on to producemore children, who automatically
were slaves; it is a largely unknown fact that there were at least two large camps for this
purpose in the Southern states, in which women were raped; enslaved men were forced to
this end, sometimes the women’s own relatives. “Two of the largest breeding farms were
located in Richmond, VA, and the Maryland Eastern-Shore”, writes Spivey 2019: n.p.
9 North 2019: n.p.; see also Jones-Rogers 2019; see also Dietze 2013, about white feminism's
relations to Black struggles.
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restricted agency, as did Harriet Jacobs, who was able to hope not for genuine
liberty, but for “something akin to freedom” (Jacobs, in Dubey 2013: 34); skeptical
toward a rhetoric that focused solely on revolutionary agency, Butler formulates,
rather, an “ethics of compromise”. (Crossley, in Dubey 2013: 34)
Complicity means that Dana does not cut a heroic figure; she is no savior, no
liberator of the enslaved, by whom she is even insulted as a “white n*”. (Dubey 2013:
347) When she, the uncompromising and emancipated author of the present day,
subjugates herself to the violent rule of the plantation and notes her inner conflicts,
it becomes clear in the novel’s “double-voicedness of the discourse” (Donadey 2008:
70) that the present-day reader would probably do the same thing.
Practiced neither in subordination nor in survival skills and constantly exposed
to the inner struggle between rebellion and fear, Dana jeopardizes herself repeat-
edly, almost dies of a punishment by the white master, is betrayed by a slave who
is afraid of the consequences of Dana’s forbidden reading and writing lessons to
the black children, and is herself ultimately obliged to fend off attempted rape by
Rufus. Her ruse is to slit her own wrists, in order to set off the mechanism of time
travel when her life is under threat – which absolutely means risking death, since
the journey through time cannot be scheduled with precision.10 Time travel is of-
ten associated with vehicles, with devices or magical places, and the journey itself
is never a matter of life and death. But Kindred is about heritage and descent, no
longer about ‘what if…’ thought experiments and potential variations, but about one
single shared history. Devotion to this past, which has not passed and is embedded
in the present, does not lead to a symmetry, but leaves you one-sided.
It is theminor considerations –will I need to takemy toothbrush? – theminute
practical considerations concerning clothing, the introduction of aspirin to early-
nineteenth-century medicine before its invention, that lend the novel its force of
conviction. What would I do if I found myself in a situation like that? Historical
novels not featuring time travel also draw the reader, for as long as she is reading,
into another world, but here the state of being drawn is itself a constant theme.
This world is, and is also not, different; it is mine without my knowing it, without
my having decided whether or not I want to see it. Colonial crimes and crimes
against humanity are part of the history that defines my culture, my prosperity,
my everyday life.11 I cannot decide against it, the question is only what do I do
10 Of course, what Dana andwe as the readers can not experience is the "Social Death" of slavery
described by Orlando Patterson 1982. I thank Anja Michaelsen for pointing Patterson out to
me.
11 This also applies for epistemological forms after the European Enlightenment, see on the
relation between European philosophy and the slave trade Buck-Morss 2009; Därmann 2009;
Diefenbach 2018 (about Hobbes’ Anthropology of slavery); Därmann 2018; Därmann 2020;
Sonderegger 2018a; Sonderegger 2018b.
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about that circumstance; I barely need to take sides, for the side has already taken
hold. This spatial, physical metaphor is played out in Kindred: Dana will lose her
arm at a particular location.
“I lost an arm on my last trip home. My left arm. And I lost about a year of my life
and much of the comfort and security I had not valued until it was gone.” (Butler
1979/2018: 1)
Thus begins the novel. In the face of the inexplicable history, it is language and sto-
rytelling that yield a meaning. “Not that what had happened to memade sense, but
at least I could tell it coherently.” (Butler 1979/2018: 9) Dana tells Kevin everything
with such precision that she even remembers things she had not been consciously
aware of noticing in the first place. Othermedia from the Gutenberg galaxy are able
to assist (historical books, printed maps, forged passage papers), may be insuffi-
cient (such as the absent documentation of Black life in the official archives, the
covering up of crimes), or are accessories (Gone with the Wind remains intolerable;
a biography of Sojourner Truth must fall victim to a book-burning), but they are
better than television. Experiences afforded by the latter remain second-hand; the
first trips feel like something that Dana has seen on television,12 and no movie has
been able to prepare her for witnessing a whipping (Butler 1979/2018: 32) or getting
whipped herself.
Writing Slavery
Christina Sharpe retraces these connecting lines between slavery and today’s life
reality also in her own family. “I include the personal here to connect the social
forces on a specific, particular family’s being in the wake to those of all Black peo-
ple in the wake; to mourn and to illustrate the ways our individual lives are always
swept up in the wake produced and determined, though not absolutely, by the af-
terlives of slavery.” (Sharpe 2016: 8) The afterlives signify the persistent racist ex-
clusion of Black people and people of color from areas of society associated with
prosperity, from education systems through residential districts to workplaces, ca-
reer opportunities, and the chance to build up material security over several gen-
erations, which is linked with improved health, higher life expectancy, and a lower
likelihood of ending up in jail, for example. ‘The wake’ means: “the track left on wa-
ter’s surface by a ship, the disturbance caused by a body swimming or moved, in
water; the air currents behind a body in flight; a region of disturbed flow” (Sharpe
2016: 2) – Blacks in the USA are in the wake of slavery up to the present day. As
Saidiya Hartman did before her, Sharpe employs her autobiographical examples “to
12 “[...] like something I got second hand”, Butler 1979/2018: 11.
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tell a story capable of engaging and countering the violence of abstraction.” (Sharpe
2016: 8) Here speaks an I that feeds off negation, off the absence of kin, genealogy,
and anchoring in the world.13 The objective is that ‘we’ “encounter the ways we are
positioned through and by them, the ways we occupy the ‘I’ of Hartman’s ‘I am the
afterlife of slavery’” (Sharpe 2016: 33) – here, people of African descent are primarily
addressed in the We, but whites will be obliged to face this issue too.14 This issue
of addressing, being concerned by, and responsibility for this persistent history is
complicated by the fact that the historical lines therein cannot be defined so eas-
ily. Individual family histories may have been preserved that combine abduction,
slavery, and the enslaved’s descendants and provide exemplary narratives; and no
less powerful, in a different register, are the statistics that have mapped the distri-
bution of wealth, life expectancy, social segregation etcetera across the twentieth
century and are able to deliver, in figures and graphics, the probabilities with which
a Black or a white person will land in which part of the pie chart.15
At the same time Christina Sharpe formulates, “terror has a history and it is
deeply atemporal.” (Sharpe 2016: 5) Something does not add up in the spoken nar-
ratives, or in the mathematical proofs either. They come up against blanks, the
un(re)countable, and these are not only the millions of undocumented abducted
dead, the absence of archive material or of people who might remember the dead.
It is also the unthinkable aspect of the whole history, the inhumanity as part of the
normal.
The non-representability of cruelty meets the non-portrayability of temporal
relations in trauma.16 A traumatic event cannot be repeated in the recollection;
it has a lingering presence, but it cannot be taken into consideration directly. For
her book Lose Your Mother Saidiya Hartman bore down as closely as possible on the
traumatic condition of slavery; her writing goes into its interweaving of individual
13 “We are the descendants of Middle Passage survivors. [...] It was the tribe created by the
rapacity of African elites, the territorial expansion of strong states, and the greed, cruelty,
and arrogance of white men possessing the world. It was the tribe of those stolen from their
natal land, stripped of their ‘country marks’, and severed from their kin. [...] A philosopher
had once described it as an identity produced by negation.” Hartman 2007: 103.
14 “This is the afterlife of slavery – skewed life chances, limited access to health and of slavery.”
Hartman, cited in Sharpe 2016: 33.
15 “White Americans have seven times the wealth of black Americans on average. Though black
people make up nearly 13 percent of the United States population, they hold less than 3 per-
cent of the nation’s total wealth. The median family wealth for white people is $171,000,
compared with just $17,600 for black people. It is worse on the margins. According to the
Economic Policy Institute, 19 percent of black households have zero or negative net worth.
Just 9 percent of white families are that poor. Today’s racial wealth gap is perhaps the most
glaring legacy of American slavery and the violent economic dispossession that followed.”
Lee 2019: n.p. See also: Desmond 2019.
16 For “the central paradox at the heart of trauma literature”, see Donadey 2008: 70.
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history and history of the Atlantic, into both archives and the craving for absent
persons and into the present day. “My journey along the slave route is a device,
a vehicle for posing a relation”, a hybrid form comprised of “personal narrative, a
historical meditation, and a metadiscourse on history.” (Hartman 2011: 111) There
is no other way of witnessing. Hartman spends a year in Ghana, visits the slave
jail Elmira Castle, and attempts to imagine the thousands of captives in the dun-
geon there (Hartman 2007: 119) or even individuals, and since this does not work,
she describes herself as a “failed witness” (Hartman 2007: 98), in an impossible
time again, because how could she have witnessed enslavement. Simultaneously
the present day is full of racism, people enslaved in jails, people held back at school,
people receiving deficient medical care, people affected by HIV who possess only
three cents of every dollar etcetera, and that is the present day of slavery: “I, too,
live in the time of slavery, by which I mean I am living in the future created by
it.” (Hartman 2007: 133) “My present was the future that had been created by men
and women in chains, by human commodities, by chattel persons. I tried hard to
envision a future in which this past had ended and most often I failed.” (Hartman
2007: 233)
SaidiyaHartman’s book is a self-experiment. (Hartman 2007: 118) It speaks (out)
of an I that is at once constituted and undermined by what it describes. It learns, it
is self-critical, it sees itself with the eyes of others. It dissolves its own boundaries
with the history of the dead, it links itself with the dead, not in the mode of the
visual but, at crucial points, via hearing. “[W]hat could I remember after hundred
years of forgetting?” is an impossible question that equates the I with a part of the
enslaved We and ignores the temporal leaps. (Hartman 2007: 157) An impossible
combination of the unmanageably big and the subjective. The necessity of repre-
senting what we cannot represent must be affirmed as the impossibility that con-
ditions our being able to know something about the past.17 Storytelling is crucial
for this undertaking, because it produces a relationship between past, present, and
the futures. (Hartman, 2008: 13) Hartman’s writing does not intend the text func-
tions of objectivity and subjectivity as narration in the sense of the closed form of
exposition-climax-dénouement (and not the narration reconstructed by ElaheHas-
chemi Yekani as the medium of bourgeois class identity18). A journal is an identity-
giver; a historical record refers to the truth; an account means: report, reckoning,
17 “The necessity of trying to represent what we cannot, rather than leading to pessimism or
despair must be embraced as the impossibility that conditions our knowledge of the past
and animates our desire for a liberated future.” (Hartman, 2008: 13)
18 The slave novel is part of “the emerging novel of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century. The act of reading as empathetic identification with Others – accelerated by the
technical revolutions and increased literacy at the time – becomes the principal means of
emotional access to this middle-class identity [...]”, Yekani 2016: 117-134; among other points
she refers to the convention of describing atrocities (as marker of authenticity and affectivity
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perhaps counting of slaves, counting of dead. Lose Your Mother counts/recounts all
of that (under an imperative that does not address all in equal measure). Hartman
describes her writing method as “critical fabulation” (Hartman 2008), in a combi-
nation of historical research, critical theory, and fictional forms.19
Historians, too, problematize the limitations of scientific writing, the forms of
representation for information, for things past, for facts gleaned from documents.
Marcus Rediker’s book “The Slave Ship” (2007) begins with a scenic description of
an abducted Black woman; his book too alternates between facts, analysis, political
categorization, and narrative elements, while his repeated notion of ‘drama’ is less
a critical reflection on his own writing than a marker of the combination of univer-
sal and individual, and it functions metaphorically: ’it was a drama’, in the sense of:
’it was bad’. Between his extensively researched passages on the “global history of
the slave trade in the Atlantic region”, as well as on what he described as the “Hid-
den Atlantic”, Michael Zeuske also works repeatedly with biographical passages,
kept more sober than empathic, in order “to complement”, as a contrast or a jux-
taposition, a “history devoid of people” (Zeuske 2015: 235) with the method of “mi-
crostoria”, for, he writes, the history of slavery is not narratable (also not filmable)
– not, for instance, for lack of documents, but because these are disparate, form
no narrative, and are “decaying” (Zeuske 2015: 1).20
White male representatives of the discipline of history consider slavery in a dif-
ferent time than Black female scholars do. For Hartman and for Sharpe the past has
not passed, it is captive in our time; what they miss (rootedness, life, equal rights)
is here and now. The one time has passed and has consequences for the present
day; the other time is always with us, like the call from a dying family member
can come at any moment. Christina Sharpe depicts family photographs, deploying
captions like this one: “Everyone in the photograph is now dead.” (Sharpe 2016: 23)
Saidiya Hartman says of the museum in Elmira Castle that, amid all the objects
and documents of the slaveholders, the slaves were missing. (Hartman 2007: 116)
If she ever does succeed in placing herself in relation to the past, then it is not via
trigger), to forms of self-representation in reaction to prejudices (125) as well as to the role
of the genre in the construction of British nationality (123).
19 She also sees a tool for dealing productively with the given ruptures and leaps in working
scientifically; cf. Hartman 2008: 11. Cf. Hartman 1997. For an attempt to think and write the
non/reification of human beings, see Moten, in: ibid./Harney 2016; for the question of vio-
lence and academic writing see Bergermann 2020.
20 Zeuske 2015: 1. Cf. by contrast: “Schauen wir - indemwir uns vorstellen, wir stünden in einem
imaginären Raumschiff mit riesigen Panoramafenstern etwa über dem Zentrum des At-
lantiks - auf die räumlichen Strukturen des Meeres, so ergibt sich eine klare Gliederung.”
(“Let’s have a look – imagining ourselves standing on an imaginary spaceship with enormous
panoramawindows approximately above the center of the Atlantic – at the spatial structures
of the sea, a clear structure thus emerges.”) (Zeuske 2012: 39)
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the eyes but while hearing. Her book (although it comprises photos) ends with a
song, which she hears with her eyes closed. (Hartman 2007: 235) This is the time
of the present day. Hartman thinks and feels her way to the others’ position, the
slaves’ position, against the background of kinship, of genealogy. Here, the em-
pathic woman is the depicting/writing woman herself. Reading can appeal to or
alter one as a subject, and this I is also never complete, it can remain character-
ized by an open desire, as Hartman formulated it in relation to the historical crime
and the ever-absent slaves: “[...] missing the dead was as close to them as I would
come.” (Hartman 2007: 135) Despite this, with these unreachables she forms a we in
a common country: “Wemay have forgotten our country, but we have not forgotten
our dispossession.” (Hartman 2007: 87) An exhortation to all of us whose kinship
with the past is yet to be comprehended.
Kin and the Nation
In the 1960s and 1970s critical historians and the Black Power movement applied
themselves to a “history from below” and to antebellum fugitive slave narratives.
(Dubey 2013: 346) Subjective testimonies of slaves were pronounced to be historical
evidence for the first time, and there were heated debates over who in the literary
fieldmay speak on behalf of the slave.Movies and television shows offered a specific
perspective on slavery, usually filtered by white narrators.Themost popular shaper
of national remembrance of slavery was Alex Haley’s neo-slave narrative Roots: The
Saga of an American Family (published 1976), which was translated into more than
twenty languages, received the Pulitzer Prize, sold almost nine million copies and
was adapted into an eight-part, ABC televisionminiseries (1977) that attractedmore
than 130 million viewers from all over the world. (Mitchell 2002: 33) Madhu Dubey
opines that Roots “established slavery as marketable material for mass entertain-
ment” and crucial for “the post–1960s process of national reconciliation.”21 Nadine
Flagel considers it an irony that Roots aimed at “genealogical and psychic comple-
tion and wholeness, achieved though contact with and knowledge about one’s an-
cestors”22, while Kindred stages a wounded, disfigured, unwhole character. Where
most neo-slave narratives dealt with healing, Kindred dealt with maiming – get-
ting close to the past is dangerous, and the wounds of slavery are still open. (Flagel
2012: 232) Additionally, Kindred alternates between familiar scenes of the modern
21 “Haley’s genealogical saga fed black nationalist pride through its recovery of African origins
for contemporary African American identity, while his ‘up from slavery’ narrative endorsed
the promise of the American Dream, impressing upon viewers the long distance traveled
from slavery to the post-civil rights present.” (Dubey 2013: 347)
22 Flagel 2012: 232, and she quotes Butler: “I couldn’t let her come back whole”, 233.
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present day and a defamiliarization of American life: “Sharing the bleak view of
racial progress that impels the neo-slave narrative genre, Butler revisits slavery in
order to dispute dominant public narratives of the civil rights movement as inau-
gurating a postracial phase of national history.” (Dubey 2013: 360) Numerous dates
inKindred refer to the national historiography of the USA, the self-conception of the
USA as awhite nation, in an “intersection of a science fiction of the bodywith Amer-
ican history”which Benjamin Robertson read as a biopolitical one. (Robertson 2010:
363) Dana embodies a history of the nation based on rape (she is alive only because
Rufus raped Alice), she is unable to change the course of things, she involuntarily
assumes shared responsibility for a violent history that causes her problems to this
day (“that she is white as well as black; that she is American and not American”),23
although Dana’s final trip takes place on July 4, 1976 and hence on the day on which
the bicentennial of the founding of the USA is to be celebrated, the independence of
the thirteen British colonies. (Mitchell 2001: 52f.) Is slavery, are the slaves’ descen-
dants part of this history, of this nation? It can be a nation only if it embraces its
entire history, and US-citizen Dana “cannot become fully American through syn-
thesis or by ignoring that part of her that is understood as an impurity in a nation
defined by whiteness.” (Robertson 2010: 375) But at the same time it can be argued
that precisely “[t]his split between competing forces within one’s own body condi-
tions what it means to be American.”24 Hence it would be precisely Dana who is
American, and the true America will have only one arm, being obliged to regard its
maimed state. Dana is as little capable of dissuading Rufus from committing his
crimes as a trip from the American present day into his story is capable of changing
the course of history, but the trip can accomplish a turn to taking responsibility for
the crimes. Anne Donadey read Kindred as a “national allegory” and found further
allegorical dates, for instance the year 1819, the period of Dana’s third trip back in
time, another bicentennial since, after all, the first enslaved persons arrived from
Africa in Jamestown, Virginia, in 1619; and she indicates Juneteenth, June 19, 1865,
which is regarded as the day slavery ended, African American Emancipation Day
23 Robertson 2010: 374. “When I got into college [...], the Black Power Movement was really
underway with the young people, and I heard some remarks from a young man who was the
same age I was but who had apparently never made the connection with what his parents
did to keep him alive. [...] He said, ‘I’d like to kill all these old people who have been holding
us back for so long. But I can’t because I’d have to start with my own parents.’ [...] That was
actually the germ of the idea for Kindred. I’ve carried that comment with me for thirty years.
He felt so strongly ashamed of what the older generation had to do, without really putting
it into the context of being necessary not only for their lives but his as well.” (Octavia Butler,
cited in Parham 2009: 1320)
24 Ibid. “(In some sense, Butler here offers a solution to the problem of e pluribus unum, the
individual within the collective.)” (Robertson 2010: 376)
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(Dana comes back for the final time on June 19th, 1976). (Donadey 2008: 67) More-
over, Dana’s and Kevin’s last name, Franklin, is a reference to Benjamin Franklin,
one of the founders at once of the nation and of the history of slavery (he “owned”
two slaves, granted them freedom, and advocated for the abolition of slavery and
education of the freed in 1790). Finally, Donadey asks why California and Mary-
land were chosen as plot locations; after all, they cannot be so easily located in the
“Northern states v. Southern states” contrast (California did not become a federal
state until 1850 and was not a slave state; in many Americans’ perceived geography,
Maryland is more of a state of the North or the East than of the South); Donadey
posits that it can be interpreted that all Americans are addressed, from coast to
coast: “By choosing states that cannot be easily identified today as North/Yankee or
South/Rebel, Butler is intimating that the entire country is implicated in the need
to confront the history of slavery. In particular, racism should not just be seen as
something other regions can easily eschew responsibility for by blaming it only on
the Deep South.”25 A feminist reading will be obliged to note in addition that the
two defining people in Dana’s life are male and white – allegorically, the instances
of agency remain more immutable than the institution of chattel slavery.
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Dana realizes that she and Kevin are able to adapt to plantation life because they
feel like actors who can return home at some point.26 The year 1976 seems to be
a kind of ‘cushioning’, and yet Dana states that she is not always able to maintain
this double consciousness.27 What is more is that she feels herself, in a certain
25 Donadey 2008: 68. Angelyn Mitchell offers a slightly different interpretation: “Although be-
low the Mason-Dixon line, Maryland is often not remembered as a state of slavery, even
though it is the birth state of the self-emancipated Frederick Douglass and Harriet Tubman
as well as the state fromwhich they both escaped. By choosing the setting of Maryland, But-
ler reminds her readers of how widespread slavery was and that slavery was not confined to
the deep South. Her choice of setting also allows Butler to dispel the notion of ‘deep South
slavery’ as the worst, when in fact, any type of slavery is barbaric and inhumane.” (Mitchell
2002: 52)
26 “And I began to realize why Kevin and I had fitted so easily into this time.Weweren’t really in.
We were observers watching a show. We were watching history happen around us. And we
were actors. While we waited to go home, we humored the people around us by pretending
to be like them. But we were poor actors. We never really got into our roles. We never forgot
that we were acting.” (Butler 1979/2018: 104)
27 “... most of the time, I’m still an observer. It’s protection. It’s nineteen seventy-six shielding
and cushioning eighteen nineteen forme. But now and then [...] I can’tmaintain the distance.
I’m drawn all the way into eighteen nineteen, and I don’t knowwhat to do.” (Butler 1979/2018:
107)
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manner, drawn toward Rufus; at any rate, she does not hate him on account of his
cruel conduct – until, ultimately, his proprietorial ambition extends to her as well,
whereupon she demurs as in veiled intimacy before she stabs him. Then, her side
is taken.
“He lost his hold on my hand for a moment, but caught my arm before I could
get away. Then he brought up the fist of his free hand to punch me once, [...] he
collapsed across me, somehow still alive, still holding my arm. [...] I pushed him
away somehow – everything but his hand still on my arm. Then I convulsed with
terrible, wrenching sickness. Something harder and stronger that Rufus’s hand
clamped down on my arm, squeezing it, stiffening it, pressing into it – painlessly,
at first – melting into it, meshing with it as though somehow my arm were being
absorbed into something. Something cold and nonliving.
Something... paint, plaster, wood – a wall. The wall of my living room. I was back
at home – in my own house, in my own time. But I was still caught somehow,
joined to the wall as though my arm were growing out of it – or growing into
it. Form the elbow to the ends of the fingers, my left arm had become a part of
the wall. I looked at the spot where flesh joined with plaster, stared at it uncom-
prehending. It was the exact spot Rufus’s fingers had grasped. I pulled my arm to-
ward me, pulled hard. And suddenly, there was an avalanche of pain, red impos-
sible agony! And I screamed and screamed.” (Butler 1979/2018: 291f.)
Kevin, who is unable to return without Dana and is obliged to stay in the past for
five years by his own time calculation, comes back not physically, but psychically
‘maimed’. Turning to (even one’s own) history leaves scars. Why is it the loss of
the arm, in Dana’s case? To what purpose serves the disfiguring transition? Not
only the white man Rufus, the past too has Dana in its grip. She loses a limb. Arm
and hand, which she could use to make a grab, are lost precisely where a separa-
tion is accomplished, in a wall between two rooms, in a presumably white wall,
dismembered. Does one grow into history, does one grow out of it? How is one
absorbed, how is one melted, meshed into it? Screams cannot explain; written lan-
guage plays a role in the novel’s epilog, when Dana and Kevin travel to Maryland in
order to research the plantation’s history in archives.28 They reconstruct one more
small piece of history, the demise of the farm, the covering up of Dana’s murder,
and Hagar’s path, but all in all the violent nature of the history of slavery remains
largely undocumented – and in a certain manner, unwritable. What remains is a
side taken.
28 Donna Haraway uses the term Plantationocene (alongside Anthropocene, Capitalocene and
Chthulucene) for her concept ofMaking Kin, in order to emphasizes the plantation system as
a historical era that is just as significant as the oft-mentioned Anthropocene. (Haraway 2015:
160; Haraway 2016)
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Marisa Parham offers the following interpretation for the fact that time passes
at different speeds in the two rooms:While one person is in the past, for the person
in the present as much time passes as is required to read the history of the past.29
On all levels,Kindred thematizes the unavoidable mediacy of conjointness, the body
as archive, but within it also the “privileging of daily, bodily, lived experience [a]s
central to the African American expressive tradition: Shit is real.” (Parham 2009:
1322-1323.)
Mediality of Genres
For perception of the novel and for perception of slavery equally, realism plays a
major role. Its markers are physical pain and the portrayal of pain. Pain guarantees
testimony, both Dana’s and ours. Long passages are devoted to the constant threat
of whipping,30 the witnessing of whipping and of one’s own experience of pain:
Dana has arrived in slavery, and Butler never dismisses us from the presence of
29 A “[...] radical temporal disjuncture between the two timespaces. When Dana and Kevin are
together in either timespace, they experience time in the same way. But when only one is
in 1815, for instance, the one left behind in 1976 experiences the other’s absence as roughly
equivalent to the amount of time it would have taken for him or her to read about what tran-
spired in the other’s life in the past, thus illustrating within Kindred the difference between
the time of living and the time of reading.What to Dana feels like two hours in 1815 feels like
just minutes to Kevin, feels just as long as it would take to read this page.” (Parham 2009:
1322)
30 Recent research links the exploitation strategies and biopolitical economies of the planta-
tion system with the factory and the history of management. Here it is not yet about bodies
having to adapt to machines, but about measuring and notation systems. During a record-
ing process not yet appraised to its full extent, daily notes were taken for every single slave
of howmuch cotton he or she had picked, thus gauging individual performance that yielded
a personal “quota”; this taking of measurements by the overseers very quickly transitioned
into a penal system, for after weighing of the daily yield per person, every downward de-
viation was punished by a defined number of lashes; then the master transferred the yield
to a ledger and the slate was wiped clean again (ledgers and slates were produced in the
Northern states, which indirectly also profited from slavery in many ways), and a new quota
was set for the next day. Quotas rose and rose, and between 1800 and 1860 plantations’ pro-
ductivity grew to meet the increased demand for material by the new spinning machines in
Manchester. The complexity of measuring bodies (also noted according to age and gender),
measurements, accounting, whippings, and mutual inspection levels is viewed by Desmond
as a vast test bench for the future violent subdivisions of capitalism. “During the 60 years
leading up to the Civil War, the daily amount of cotton picked per enslaved worker increased
2.3 percent a year. That means that in 1862, the average enslaved fieldworker picked not 25
percent or 50 percent as much but 400 percent as much cotton than his or her counterpart
did in 1801.” (Desmond 2019: n.p.; Ott 2014)
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violence,31 the effect of which is all the stronger for Dana’s repeatedly asking herself
how she is meant to shift and manage the translocation from her time into the
present of the past, which is likewise our question when we apply ourselves to this
journey as we read – in the to and fro between experience (it must be “real”, Dana
insists, because “it hurts too much not to be”, Butler 1979/2018: 44) and mediality
(“As real as the whole episode was, it’s beginning to recede from me somehow.
It’s becoming like something I saw on television or read about – like something I
got second hand”, Butler 1979/2018: 11). Although Kindred is comparatively Butler’s
most realistic novel, she employs time travel and,with it, ameans for a reflection on
distance and the necessity to translocate that allows neither progressive storytelling
nor other forms of illogical conclusion.32
Timelines are suspended, while even identities appear no longer clear-cut (in
Rufus’s eyes, Alice and Dana seem to be one being; Dana sees similarities between
Rufus and Kevin) and desire and descent move into proximity with incestuous re-
lations when Rufus tries to rape Dana, but has conceived her great-great grand-
mother prior to that…33 What kind of temporality is that meant to be? Neither
31 “I could literally smell his sweat, hear every ragged breath, every cry, every cut of the whip
... I had seen people beaten on television and in the movies. I had seen the too-red blood
substitute streaked across their backs and heard their well-rehearsed screams. But I hadn’t
lain nearby and smelled their sweat or heard them pleading and praying, shamed before
their families and themselves. I was probably less prepared for the reality than the child
crying not far fromme. In fact, she and I were reacting very much alike. My face too was wet
with tears. And my mind was darting from one thought to another, trying to tune out the
whipping.” (Butler 1979/2018: 33 (original ellipsis). Cf. Flagel 2012: 235f., Dubey 2013: 351)
32 One illogical conclusion is performed and immediately rejected again: Now and again, with
critical irony, Dana’s colleagues call their Californian workplace a “slave market”. “Yet the
novel contains several tricky moments that elicit, only to then cast doubt on, reading proce-
dures that too neatly conflate past and present. In a much-cited passage that appears early
in Kindred, Dana carelessly uses the phrase ‘slave market’ to describe the casual labor agency
through which she seeks employment. Critics have unanimously interpreted this analogy as
evidence of historical continuity between antebellum chattel slavery and the late twentieth
century, but Dana immediately corrects herself: ‘Actually, it was just the opposite of slavery.
The people who ran it couldn’t have cared less whether or not you showed up to do the work
they offered. They always had more job hunters than jobs anyway’ (52). Clarifying that the
labormarket in Dana’s present ismarked not by shortage, as it was in the antebellum era, but
by the existence of a vast pool of surplus workers, this passage highlights the critical shifts
in the dynamics of inequality that get obscured when the present is viewed as essentially
continuous with the past.” (Dubey 2013: 349)
33 “The sexual encounter between master and slave is necessarily a rape, evacuating erotic and
loving desire. Additionally, Dana expels the thought of incest. While genealogical relation-
ships can be creatively reinvented and inverted in Kindred, incest needs to be avoided at all
cost. The novel is full of genealogical reversions and new offshoots that turn descendants
into ancestors, and twohundred-year-old elders into same-age siblings.” (Loichot 2009: 44)
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linear nor non-linear, no straightforward continuity but still, a deep entanglement
of centuries – linear slave narratives interrupted by the unpredictability of sci-
ence fiction time travel.34 The blending of genres shakes up the individual genre’s
conventions; the realism of the biographical slave narrative is opposed by the fan-
tastical aspect of science fiction. An array of authors wrote in this new genre of
the ‘fantastic neo-slave narrative’ in the 1970s; Kindred ranges between identifica-
tion perspectives for readers (through the first-person perspective) and distanced
reflections.35 Kindred tells the story of a Black American who has ancestors among
both the enslaved and slaveholders, the great-great granddaughter of a métissage;
the book itself is a métissage of two popular forms, slave narration and the sci-fi
novel. (Flagel 2012: 217) Kindred hybridizes genres. (Cf. Loichot 2009: 40)
In the early twenty-first century several literary critics drew a link between
Kindred and African and Afro-diasporic traditions, for instance the West African
concept of sankofa, which says, “one must return to the past in order to move for-
ward.” (Donadey 2008: 77; Mitchell 2001: 51) Stella Setka recently situated the novel
in a “phantasmic reincarnation” of Igbo cosmology and claims that Dana corre-
sponds to the Ogbanje figure, a spirit that journeys between worlds.Thereby, Setka
proposes, Butler refers to African traditions, rejects the Western concepts of de-
scent and linear time,36 and utilizes Afro-centric epistemological forms that have
34 “Crossley argues that Dana’s unexplained time travel may be ‘the vehicle that looms be-
hind every American slave narrative, the grim death ship of the Middle Passage from Africa
to the slave markets of the New World. In her experience of being kidnapped in time and
space, Dana recapitulates the dreadful, disorienting, involuntary voyage of her ancestors’
[...] [Dana’s] disorienting nausea and fears of her travels owe as much to speculative fiction
as they do to slave narratives.” Flagel 2009: 1321. Toni Morrison wrote that authors of slave
narratives such asOladuahEquiano, FrederickDouglass, andHarriet Ann Jacobswere obliged
to address a white audience, in her view; however, she sees her task in representing even sex-
ualized violence and other unpopular topics regardless of a white audience’s expectations.
(Morrison 1995: 91)
35 “The 1970smarked the emergence of a new genre of African American literature – the fantas-
tic neo-slave narrative, which draws on nonrealist devices such as time travel and supernat-
ural possession to revisit the history of slavery. This genre includes literary as well as mass-
market novels by writers including Stephen Barnes, Charles Johnson, Toni Morrison, Phyllis
Alesia Perry, Ishmael Reed, and Frank Yerby and is generating a proliferating body of critical
scholarship. According to critical consensus, contemporary novels of slavery disrupt realism
in order to challenge established norms of historical representation but nonetheless retain a
stable sense of their referent – that is, the historically specific institution of American chattel
slavery.” (Dubey 2013: 345)
36 Setka 2016: 93f. She refers to two Black scholars, who however do not write about Butler:
Christopher N. Okonkwo, A Spirit of Dialogue: Incarnations of Ợgbañje, the Born-to-Die,
in African American Literature, Knoxville (University of Tennessee Press) 2008. Okonkwo
teaches African American and African literature at the University of Missouri. See Chikwenye
Okonjo Ogunyemi, An Abiku-Ogbanje Atlas: A Pre-Text for Rereading Soyinka’s Ake’ and
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been oppressed, Setka writes, by the European Enlightenment (Setka 2016: 95).37
But Butler does not simply side with a Black heritage. Just as little is time travel a
“metaphoric Middle Passage” (Mitchell 2001: 52).
Re-membering
“Allegorically, Dana’s severed arm can also be interpreted as a reference to limbs
that were broken off family trees through the discontinuities caused by slavery,
both because of the silences of history around the prevalence of white male rape
of enslaved black women and because black family members were purposefully
severed from one another through being sold to different owners”, writes Don-
adey (2008: 74), thus aligning with the common interpretation that sees the arm
as a ‘member’ and speaks of a dismembering38 or also disarming39 in reference to
Kindred. While the destruction of Black parenthood by white slaveholders effects
‘amputations’ in the illustrated family tree on the one hand, trees are generally no
longer fitting symbols since “slavery troubles the clear distinction between blood
Morrison’s Beloved, in: African American Review 36.4 (2002), 663-678, idem., Africa Wo/Man
Palava: TheNigerianNovel byWomen, Chicago (University of Chicago Press) 1996. Onguyemi
analyses Nigerian women’s literature. The Black scholars produce no link to Kindred; a white
researcher undertakes that a decade later.
37 Setka 2016: 95. Regardless of the fact that no statement on the subject by Butler appears in
her numerous interviews, this interpretation seems to be very deliberate and there is not
really any evidence for it in the text, unless the Igbo figures were to be expanded so that
ultimately, one could use them to explain every time-journey in every novel or movie: “Tradi-
tionally understood, ogbanje is an Igbo term used to signify spirits who manifest themselves
in human flesh by taking over or causing a pregnancy, are born into the human world, and
die young, only to begin the cycle all over again.” Setka 2016: 99. “The sense of connectedness
through time and across generations that arises from Dana’s ogbanjism reflects the African
cosmological view that all entities are rooted in a ‘cosmic totality’ that links everyone and
everything together as inextricable parts of a cosmic whole” (Setka 2016: 98f.). Strictly speak-
ing, the character of Dana does not at all correspond to the more detailed description of the
Ogbanjes, this embodiment of a mischievous being who is “not him/herself human and who
has little interest in committing to a human lineage”; the rebirth of ogbanjism always com-
pletes a full life cycle (with reference to Christie Achebe idem.), which is not the case here,
etcetera. However, one can interpret the desire for such a reference as a symptom.
38 “The slave family is marked by a series of amputations: an immense and abrupt severing
from original African roots and memory; a dismemberment of family units by practices of
kidnapping or selling; literal amputations of limbs of fugitive slaves; splits between bodies
turned into economic tools of production andmind; substitution ofmothering and fathering
by breeding; and attempted disassociation of humanity from black subjects.” (Loichot 2009:
41).
39 “The loss of Dana’s arm [... shows] that history can disarm the present.” (Flagel 2012: 224)
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and law in kinship constructions because biological filial relations betweenmasters
and slaves, for instance, are complicated by the master’s legal position as owner.”
(Loichot 2009: 42) Rather, new terms take effect in this situation, such as “fictive
kinship” (Patterson) or “plantation kinship”, creating a “w/hole” (Brathwaite)40 and,
often enough, offshoots from the severed limbs. Valérie Loichot even speaks of a
“poetic of limbs” (which she even sees visually reflected on the cover of the first
edition, right down to the typography, see fig. 1).41
One part of 1976 stays in 1819. Dana and Rufus remain connected through a
dead limb. Organic and inorganic fuse in the wall, they are unable to fully detach
themselves from the past, the arm is not here and not there, not inside and not
outside, it is on no side; but the wound also opens the body to new growth, a pos-
sible “bidirectionalmovement: growing out and growing back in.” (Loichot 2009: 45)
Where there is no written archive of slavery, Dana’s body remains the ‘the primary
signifier’, marked by the whip and by amputation in the ‘hole’ of the ‘w/hole’, the
‘whole’ paradox of which is sketched as a “matching strangeness” (Butler 1979/2018:
24). Dana looks at Rufus and asks herself what their connection consists of.
“Looking at him confusedme. But he had to be the one. There had to be some kind
of reason for the link he and I seemed to have. Not that I really thought a blood
relationship could explain the way I had twice been drawn to him. It wouldn't. But
then, neither would anything else. What we had was something new, something
that didn't even have a name. Some matching strangeness in us that may or may
not have come from our being related.” (Ibid.)
Here the rejoining of limbs, ‘re-membering’, the capability of remembering are one
with the experience of dismemberment, according to Therí A. Pickens. (2015: 170)
The arm with no place links anniversaries that are meant to celebrate founding
myths of freedom and equality, but Dana’s disability marks these myths as wrong
and dangerous. (Pickens 2015: 171) National belonging relies on a normalcy that
excludes missing members and needs this exclusion to function.42 Whereas, as a
40 Ibid. Loichot quotes the notions from Kamau Brathwaite and fromOrlando Patterson in Slav-
ery and Social Death (2018).
41 “Butler’s oeuvre, fromKindred toXenogenesis, is also traversedby this poetics of limbs,which
are severed from an original body, or which, by growing back again, create unexpected links.
Images of dismemberment and of regrowth of amputated bodies abound in Butler’s science
fiction novels. The title of Kindred itself performs a severing. On the cover of the 1988 edition,
“Kindred” graphically appears as ‘KiNdre d’. The title itself therefore textually contains the
severing that is at the basis of the family reconstruction”. (Loichot 2009: 43)
42 “Given that enslavement is historical fact and disability a natural corollary thereof, the con-
clusion would be that the integrity of the nation requires disability to function as whole.”
(Ibid.)
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Figure 1: Kindred, book cover of the first edition
rule, national allegories are represented by white women’s bodies, it is a disfig-
ured Black woman who is genuinely able to symbolize the nation.43 Or better: who
has thwarted the nation of white lines of descent. Who conceives kinship out of
different blood, violence, and responseability.
 
Translated by Alexandra Cox
43 “Dana’s traversal of both worlds on the eve of the bicentennial, prompted as it is by nation-
wide remembranceofAmerica’s origins, positionsDana’s particular racialized, gendered, and
abled experience at the crux of any memory of the nation-state.” (Ibid.)
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Writing through the Milieu
Social Mobility and Queer/Feminist Critique
as Existential Practices
Julia Bee
In this paper, I will discuss Didier Eribon’s recent books Retour à Reims, Société comme
verdict andmore specifically, his more conceptual collection of essays Principes d’une
pensée critique in relation to my own teaching and writing as well as in regard to
modes of writing in academic contexts. Both teaching and writing are key sce-
narios of taking a side/site. I want to propose re-thinking forms of academic and
biographical writing like Eribon’s as an “existential territory” (Guattari 1996: 134)
which is not simply a place but a milieu for new individuations or subjectivities to
emerge. By producing situated knowledge of and from the side/site of his social
background, Eribon entangles two operations: in considering his social milieu he
both affirms his background and investigates it as a place of departure or ‘anchor-
ing point’ by leaving this place of shame and self-destruction. Thus, Retour à Reims
is at once both a return and a new becoming, an entanglement of past and future
acts of subjectivation (Foucault 1986, 2005).1
Eribon’s more recent work is situated in a genealogy of Pierre Bourdieu’s so-
ciological theory and is markedly influenced by the latter’s Sketch for a self-analyt-
ics / Esquisse pour une auto-analyse (2004). The notion of the side/site in Eribon can
be traced in at least three ways: First, in his biography as he, at least institution-
ally, transgressed social classes by becoming a university professor. Secondly, in his
combination of social and queer theory. Thirdly, and specifically of interest here,
in his style of writing through experimentation with combining theory and biogra-
phy, thinking and feeling, the personal and the political in the very same text. His
project of self-analysis is the reason for his return to Reims after the death of his
1 In this regard Iwant to acknowledgeMaxWalthers current PhDproject at the graduate school
media anthropology at Bauhaus-Universität Weimar. In his dissertation he shows how femi-
nist writing constitutes acts of subjectivation in the work of SimoneWeil, Chris Kraus, Kathy
Acker and Annie Ernaux. Particularly self-reflexive literature not only constitutes biographi-
cal accounts of lives but is very much a technique of existence and a “performative philoso-
phy” as Walther writes in his exposé (2).
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father. The return is to be understood literally and philosophically. It considers not
only a return but also a method of writing the future by writing through past and
therefore present.
His academic writing is entangled with his life since the place where Eribon
writes from – now as a Sociology professor in Amiens – is itself marked by his
situation of double oppression as a queer person with a working-class background.
As I want to propose, this is not only his topic in terms of content but informs his
method or say, technique of writing. This writing style is very much entangled
with the production of subjectivities, reminiscent of Michel Foucault’s aesthetics
of existence (2005, 1986).2
Habitus
In his semi-autobiographical, semi-theoretical book Retour à Reims, Eribon invites
the reader to think of the university as an institution not only key to the regu-
lation of knowledge production but also to the act of learning as gaining access
to symbolic and economic capital, which in turn stabilizes social hierarchies. In
other words, Retour à Reims contributes to the ongoing debate and class struggles
not only between France’s elite school and university system with its prestigious
Grand Écoles in Paris on the one hand and the regional schools in the periphery on
the other, but also beyond its borders. The German education system, for example,
has often been described as one that perpetuates class differences and having ‘very
low social mobility’. In fact, studies have repeatedly revealed how non-permeable
the German education system is compared to other European countries.3 Eribon’s
2 In Germany especially, Retour à Reims has been widely acclaimed and was broadly discussed
as an academic bestseller. A play has been written based on Retour à Reims and an opera has
just premiered in Berlin. It has even been cited in the German Bundestag. Its reception was
accompanied by Eduard Louis’ biographical book En finir avec Eddy Bellegueul. For the discus-
sion in Media Studies, see the issue Class of ZfM, edited by Ulrike Bergermann and Andrea
Seier (2).
3 For example, the recent PISA study showed the relation between social background and
grades in school, especially reading capacities, which are much more elaborate even at a
young age among children from academic families. OECD states: “Chancengerechtigkeit
bleibt eine der Herausforderungen für das deutsche Bildungssystem. So hat sich in Deutsch-
land seit der letzten PISA-Studie mit Leseschwerpunkt (2009) beim Leseverständnis die
Abhängigkeit der Leistung von der Herkunft noch verstärkt.” / “equal opportunity is one
of the challenges of the German education system. Since the last PISA study with focus
on reading (2009) the connection between reading capacities and social background
concerning reading understanding have even becomeworse.” Press release OECD PISA study
2018: http://www.oecd.org/berlin/presse/pisa-studie-2018-leistungen-in-deutschland-insges
amt-ueberdurchschnittlich-aber-leicht-ruecklaeufig-und-mit-grossem-abstand-zu-den-spitz
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works are thus extremely insightful in that they highlight and address these ex-
periences from within and from a more distanced perspective as a professor and
author. In his writing, he folds inside and outside, creating an act of subjectivation
(Walther 2018: 4).
In his biography, Eribon demonstrates how much of the power of the social
world works through learned and internalized self-exclusion from institutions,
particularly in higher education. This is what Bourdieu has long argued since his
extensive studies in La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement / Distinction: A Social
Critique of the Judgement of Taste, originally published in 1979. As an illustration, in
Retour à Reims, Eribon gives an account of how his school choices were influenced
by what he himself describes as a stubborn inner drive for self-exclusion by not
attending classes and engaging in political activities (2013: 176). Selecting Spanish
classes instead of German for example, he adds, results from a lack of knowledge
that academic families inform and often ‘silently’ guide their children that as a
future Humanities scholar in the French philosophic-centric system, some knowl-
edge of German is required to read the German philosophers. (Ibid. 177-178)
Bourdieu, as it is well known, hails from a rural non-academic family in the
Pyrenees and became France’s sociology superstar in the second half of the 20th
century by passing through the elite system at the École normale supérieure, Sor-
bonne. He went on to hold a chair for Sociology at Collège de France without ever
losing his critical perspective on the academic world. In fact, most of his success
is built (as he writes) on his critical distance as an outsider to the academic sys-
tem, which provided him with an analytical clarity and almost brutal sharpness in
critiquing that said system. This is what he has described at the end of his life in
Sketch for a Self-Analysis as a so-called “cleft habitus, inhabited by tensions and con-
tradictions” (Bourdieu 2008: 100), enabling him to clearly see many mechanisms
of how the social world reproduces itself on a daily basis.
The dominant mechanism of power in terms of social reproduction is the habi-
tus, stemming from habit, practice, or repetition of customs and behavior.The prin-
ciples of the habitus include the force of gravity of the reproduction of doxa through
hexis, meaning values, opinions, and cognitive schema as well as bodily inscribed
sets of behavior, feeling, pleasure, speech, etc. (Bourdieu 2008: 141). The doxa is the
hexis: the position or attitude towards the world equals its cognitive schema and
vice versa. (Ibid.: 184ff) The overall principle of the habitus is a constant effort ap-
plied to sustaining an equivalence between habitus and habitat, or social place and
body. Here, too, correlate sites with sides. The mechanism of their amortization is
socially determined. A habitus always seeks to be in sync with a place. People from
families of non-academic or informal education often lack the impetus und the
enreitern-03122019.htm, translation JB. See also PISA 2018 results, “where all students can
succeed,” Volume 2, chapter 4 “social diversity and equity in learning outcomes” (83-105).
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social, economic and mental security to attend university and even the networks
that help kick-start, sustain, or complete an academic education or career – or
make sense of this form of abstract education.4 Alongside values, modes of think-
ing, behavior, dress, and tastes in art, food, clothing, and furnishings reveal one’s
belonging to a social group. Groups seek to include what they know: a group will
includemembers with similar affinities, and a person having a background in a cer-
tain milieu will orient herself towards such a (familiar) milieu. Increase in formal
education by university education will therefore often lead to an alienation between
the family and a student, as seen in Eribon’s account (2018: 115). In this way, people
can become refugees of class (in the German translation ‘Klassenflüchtlinge’). So,
much more than being formally inaccessible, the social world consists of informal,
habitual, and invisible regulations that prevent people from accessing positions of
high symbolic and economic capital. One form of capital often leads to the other
and relates to the former.
Exclusion thereby works in a double manner: Not only will those who profit
from exclusion stabilize them, but also those who are excluded reproduce them
with their actions and involuntary acts of self-exclusions. Bourdieu outlines a prac-
tical sense of one’s place:
“The knowledge supplied by incorporation of the necessity of the social world,
especially in the sense of limits is quite real[…] like the submissionwhich it implies
and which is sometimes expressed in the imperative statements of resignation:
‘That’s not for us’ (or ‘not for the likes of us’), or, more simply, ‘it’s too expensive
(for us)’.” (Bourdieu 2008: 185)
Because the social world gains a relative stability, making itself appear eternal,
patterns of thinking, feeling, and judging seem to be naturalized. Hexis and doxa
will act as mutual mirrors and orient the subject towards the familiar social world
and will act as if the social world is eternal by naturalizing social hierarchies. Em-
bodied patterns of recognition will lead to cognition and perception that stabilize
these patterns (Bourdieu 2002). Following Bourdieu’s theory of practice as well as
Eribon’s report of his childhood and youth, social exclusion operates in a very bod-
ily way: “So as the child of a worker you experience in your very flesh the sense of
belonging to the working class” (Eribon 2013: 99).
4 See for studies about social reproduction in academia andapracticed-based concept of “habi-
tus sensitive teaching” in cultural and film studies Eckert/Martin 2019, for social security esp.
279-280. Eckert and Martin propose a concept of in-class-writing as a strategy to include di-
verse students and to informally address and prevent class hiatus in teaching that is often
based on oral exams and therefore oral self-representation. On the contrary Eckert and Mar-
tin suggest a self-empowerment in writing practices according to bell hooks.
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The social background is inscribed into the body: reproducing what this body
learned, by which principles it is formed on the one side, and on the other, the
socially formed body contains an affective power that orients it towards places,
positions, and hierarchies – and even desires and wishes. The body is the embod-
iment of a biography that inscribes itself not only superficially into one’s thinking
but produces a body open or foreclosed to certain impulses, such as learning and
thinking, etc. Often affective registrations like feeling comfortable in a place, be-
longing to a place (like the classroom, a conference venue, etc.) create an affinity
that prompts engaging with such places. Or, vice versa, feeling awkward in a place
by feeling clumsy or shameful about one’s speech, manners, accent, etc. leads to an
avoidance of these exact situations and places. In other words, the habitus is first
and foremost a set of affects that determine one’s bodily response to the world: “the
body is in the world as the social world but the social world is in the body” as Bour-
dieu summarizes it in his late work Méditations pascaliennes (2008: 152). Shame of
inappropriate behavior, of not knowing codes or manners, or even laughing about
these codes is a “political feeling” (Cvetkovich 2012: 132). For Eribon, it is the shame
of being seen as having a worker’s background that stimulates the dominant affect:
“Comme c’est compliqué, la honte! Un affect qui s’insinue partout, surgit tout le
temps, sous des formes multiples, se déplace selon les situations, les espaces so-
ciaux et relationnels dans lesquels on se trouve (au point de s’inverser du tout au
tout : honte de ce que j’étais devenu devant ceux que j’avais quittés pour pouvoir
le devenir en ayant honte d’eux)” (Eribon 2016 : 85-86).
 
“How complicated shame is! An affect, which insinuates everywhere, appears all
the time inmultiple forms, which shifts according to situations, to social and rela-
tional spaces one finds herself in (up to the point where it is completely reversed:
shame for what I became, in front of those I had left to be able to become this by
being ashamed of them)”5
Following Bourdieu’s praxeology, Eribon analyses his social background, his affects,
and his way into academia, which he vividly describes as a constant struggle in a
world absolutely alien to him in the first place. In his report he depicts his queerness
as both a vehicle into a different social world and an impetus to leave as he could
not stay in Reims and reproduce his family’s patterns of living. On the one hand,
being gay was why his place of origin could not facilitate him with an environment
he could live in. His psychological survival was nearly impossible in Reims. Homo-
phobic violence and discrimination in Catholic France in the early sixties forced
him to leave for Paris and later, University of California Berkeley and Princeton.
5 Here and below, my own translation, with the essential help of my colleague and native
speaker, Marion Biet, to whom I am very grateful for her indispensable corrections.
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On the other hand, being gay facilitated his access to networks providing him with
his first jobs as an author.
His writing is not in a traditional sense autobiographical but a way to explore
the political in his personal history, recalling this basic feminist axiom. Shame for
example is not something personal since it belongs to the realm of social and polit-
ical feelings (Probyn 2010: 81). Similarly, so is the I: The I is never just an individual
being owned and known by the individual but partly impersonal as Eribon explains
in regard to Annie Ernaux’ biographical writings that often avoid the personal pro-
noun I (Ernaux 2018):
“Car si je dis ,je‘ tout au long de Retour à Reims, ce ,je‘ est toujours-déjà pris dans
les filets et les jeux du monde social, et donc, d’une certaine manière, c’est un
,je‘ non personnel, ou ,impersonnel‘. C’est d’ailleurs le cas de tout ,je‘, puisque le
,moi‘ est toujours produit par son ancrage dans le monde social, son inscription
dans l’histoire (les époques dans lesquelles on vit) et la géographie (les lieux –
notamment les milieux – dans lesquels les vies se situent)” (Eribon 2016 : 89).
 
“(Because) when I say “I” all along in Returning to Reims, this ‘I’ is always already
caught in the nets and games of the social world and therefore, in a certain way,
this is a non-personal or an impersonal “I”. This, by the way, is true for every “I”
since the “me” (moi) is always produced by his situatedness in the social world, in
history (the epoch one lives in) and in geography (places – and most importantly,
the milieux — in which these lives are situated)”
Here, the places in particular – lieux and milieux as Eribon writes, are sites of
de-/subjectivations of shame or of the illusion of the career awaiting one’s becom-
ing (Bourdieu 1986).
As I want to argue in more detail, Eribon does not use his biography and the
“I” simply as an example but takes the social scenes of his life as well as those of
his mother’s in his later works as a point of entry into an exploration of the power
structures of France’s class society in the last decades.
The very key topic for participation, as is the topic of this volume, is education
and the education system. In what follows, I reflect on teaching as a practice in
the German academic context in order to analyze a few key aspects of exclusion
and self-exclusion. The expression self-exclusion by no means places blame on the
victims, on the contrary, it starkly underlines the power issue: both terms are in-
terconnected since exclusion works as an indirect, unconscious form of power that
is at the same time inscribed into the body and internalized through the habitus.
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Teaching
What does the above mean for my own teaching and learning? I do not wish to in-
clude biographical episodes like Eribon’s in teaching or install a culture of confes-
sion inmy seminars. Although I encouragemy students to test theories or concepts
with their daily experiences, I want to propose that techniques of writing are not
limited to a self-mirroring. Instead, it should facilitate teaching that is mindful of
this very powerful and responsible practice (Eckert/Martin 2019).
“A master’s degree? That’s not something for me,” was the response a student
gave mine when asked about continuing her studies upon the completion of her
undergraduate degree. The power of self-exclusion underlying her blunt answer
struck me.The student was being graded outstandingly (I am consciously avoiding
the problematic word talented here) and displayed a scientific interest in all her
projects. How could I respond to her? How could I make her aware of what I con-
sider to be an act of self-exclusion based on her social background without using
words and terminology that would cross personal boundaries by analyzing a so-
cial background that I could only assume existed. One could give positive feedback
and suggest practical possibilities about a master’s program and other supporting
practices. But where does one draw the line between offering support or guidance
and imposing one’s own or the university’s sets of values?
It is my field, academia, science, that I value somuch and aim to defend against
anti-intellectual impulses such as the extreme right that is currently spreading
across Europe.6 As scientists, we tend to value our respective fields of knowledge
production so much higher than others, and there is much informal and practical
knowledge in the world that holds worth for people. Furthermore, do I really want
to encourage a future in academia to someone in times of omnipresent job pre-
carity, a lack of possibilities, and self-exploitation? Isn’t that the same principle of
self-reproduction Bourdieu criticizes and of which I am already part?
Despite all these rationalizations and self-preventions, it is one of the many
situations which I observe as an act of self-exclusion. And there are many more
nuanced ones and even further examples from my colleagues at different univer-
sities. Usually it is not someone that tells the students that they do not belong to a
place or that a certain career path is blocked; more often than not it is the body that
tells a person where – in the most violent and direct sense of the word – their place
6 This was discussed in a workshop within the conference “Taking Sides – Theories, Prac-
tices, Cultures of Participation in Dissent” with Athena Athanasiou in Konstanz in summer
2018 from which, among other activities, this book has materialized: The political situation
characterized by austerity, neoliberal attacks on the university and right-wing opposition to
academia often forces one to defend a place that has for so long excluded women, subaltern
and other groups – and still partly does so.
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is.When someone feels comfortable or uncomfortable, motivated, or excluded, the
body will register these conditions of thinking and enfold the effect into thinking
before self-reflection starts, and consciousness kicks in. Self-reflection and con-
sciousness are by no means always rational choices or free of an embodiment of
social background.7 However, investments in ambition and self-empowerment –
which should not be underestimated – have also been critiqued by feminist schol-
ars because of their overemphasis on the one-dimensionally strong and neoliberal
subject that emerges instead of a collective solidarity and a perspective of structural
power (McRobbie 2009).
The question of how to educate critical, self-reflective subjects is not new, but
co-existent with emancipatory and decolonial movements leading to critical peda-
gogics such as bell hooks’ (1994, 2003, 2010) teaching trilogy. However, the problem
persists in everyday teaching: How to demonstrate the ubiquity of various and even
paradoxical power relations to students without making them feel even more pow-
erless? How to avoid addressing students as neoliberal subjects who can fully con-
trol their life choices and change them with pure will and effort? The latter solution
would underplay the power situations that are structural. That is, the individual is
not to be blamed for them, but first and foremost, there is emancipatory power in
thinking that needs to and can be learned. Teaching in one of the less permeable
education systems in Europe, with the highest rate of social reproduction in posi-
tions, such exclusions and self-exclusions need to be confronted, even if, as isolated
teachers, it might not be our individual endeavor to change them. It is a systemic
situation but at the same time we deal with individual social backgrounds in the
classroom every day.
One approach to making conditions of teaching and knowledge production
transparent is to ‘situate’ someone on the social landscape. Much power stabilizes
itself by backgrounding itself or becoming invisible. But when we aim to make
power relations visible, we are often in a situation in which we do not want to be
victims or turn someone into a victim of power relations. That is, you make a per-
son feel powerless or at least seen and marked in the field of power relations. But,
again, the social world, as Bourdieu writes, gains its relative stability from peo-
ple thinking their choices are theirs. Who owns their choices? – as he refers to in
“a biographical illusion.” The self-transparent subject making “rational choices” is
an illusion as is the idea that someone could entirely self-analyze themselves and
remove social backgrounds on that basis. This, furthermore, stabilizes current ne-
oliberal regimes of individualization.With regards to the reaction to Retour à Reims,
Eribon reflects on this mechanism of being ‘placed’ on the social map:
7 Self-reflection and consciousness are by no means always rational choices or free of an em-
bodiment of social background.
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“Je les situais dans l’espace social, et donc dans la hiérarchie sociale. Ce n’est jamais
agréable : cela ne correspondait pas à lamanière dont ils se pensaient eux-mêmes.
Un point de vue est toujours situé,mais il ne s’éprouve pas toujours comme tel (ou
peut à la fois s’éprouver et se dénier comme tel [...])” (Eribon 2016: 78).
 
“I situated them in the social space and therefore in the social hierarchy. This is not
always pleasant: it did not correspond with the way they imagined themselves. A
standpoint is always situated, but it isn’t always felt as such (or can at the same
time be felt and be in denial of itself[…])”
Although some reforms in pedagogics and academia have led to more social het-
erogeneity in the classroom, there is, in general, scant reflection in my field of
how learning and networks form careers, theoretical schools, etc.When self-reflec-
tion does occur, it often takes place in semi-professional, often privatized spaces,
deemed as gossip and not as necessary reflection. Learning is not just a cogni-
tive act, but a cultural, gendered, and social one, among many others. It involves
bodies in spaces. I have not, thus far, even begun to consider the historical and lo-
cal (among others) exclusion of groups from the university which would extend to
many more formal cases of exclusion – those we will not encounter in our teaching
as I did with the student in the above-mentioned situation.
These encounters inform the system of self-production in academia in which
projections of one’s own biography are projected onto a young scholar’s life: One
sees him or herself in the next generation and therefore builds a school. In this way,
the principle of one’s own life is stabilized by the reproduction of the rightness of
one’s existence. In academia, not only schools and ways of knowledge production
but also subjectivities become key to the system of reproducing of biographies and
careers (Bourdieu 1986: 1995).
Learning is made up of diverse variables amongst which is the motivation to
read complex texts, to trust that these texts can open ways to understanding the
world, to stay with a subject even if it is very challenging, and, very importantly
and key for every discussion about power at the university, to speak up in the class
room.Didactics address the problems of multiple types of learning and of methods
adapting teaching to learning styles. Yet, students with academic parental back-
grounds often adapt much more easily to the academic world. They are able to
mobilize knowledge about the importance of reading techniques, of establishing
networks even as early as the undergraduate level, to have an opinion when it is
asked for, and to mimic a neutral commentator when not.The adaption is intuitive
and seems almost “magical” (Bourdieu 2008: 169). It actualizes itself in reading the
signs and behaving ‘properly’.
It is worth underlining once more that not all these issues can be addressed
by us as individual professors since they are obviously structural ones. But we can
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attend to these by asking ourselves what will happen if we provide spaces for other
voices to speak up, to facilitate spaces (and I mean literally physical space) that
undo blockages to speak up as well as responding to less elaborate comments in the
classroom. How can we avoid the danger of disciplining students into an academic
habitus in discussions with the underlying paternalizing idea (in the back of our
head) of wanting to ‘help’ them? And how can we address structural issues of our
very situation without transgressing personal and professional boundaries?
These are pressing issues for scholars today and it often seems as if there is
never enough time and space in our daily lives to turn to these questions for a
genuine democratization of the university. Indeed, it is by no means a singular en-
deavor to solve these. It is, however, very much in our reach to re-connect spaces
of teaching and research where situated knowledge production could take place. I
do envision to some extent (see at least at some level) finding a solution by exper-
imenting with methods and styles of writing. That is, importantly, to understand
what is so important in Eribon’s writing and not to reduce it as an instrument
for socially analyzing the students in the classroom. More importantly, a new un-
derstanding of what methods do when we deploy them is required. Techniques of
writing have the potential to reflect and inflect power relations. To situate writing
is a key aspect of making power relations perceivable and debatable.
Writing
Eribon is not the first to experiment with biographical writing, oscillating between
personal experiences and theory. In his work he is deeply influenced by writers like
Annie Ernaux and John Edgar Wideman. Writing, for Eribon, is not only reflec-
tion and retrospective but a technique of subjectivation that opens up to future
becomings. According to Gilles Deleuze, writing is becoming (1998: 1). It can be a
technique of transformation; a performative practical thinking through one’s own
conditions of existence.These conditions are not necessarily an object but a field of
thinking in Eribon.The social milieu becomes a power saturated conceptual milieu
through which he thinks. According to Eribon, writing can become an “existential
territory” (Guattari 1996: 134). And, as I want to discuss in more detail, writing is
not about one’s identity or habitus, it is about an existence in writing, a becoming
in a technique – given the technique is not an instrument but a technical milieu
(technical as in the meaning of téchne).
Donna Haraway (1988) and Didier Eribon (2013, 2016), two thinkers speaking
from very different genealogies, places, and traditions, both underline the impor-
tance of situated knowledge and a voice that is situated rather than speaking from
a universalist point of view (often the white, male, heterosexual, bourgeois and
able bodied point of view). In their very different yet connectable ways, Eribon and
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Haraway address the situatedness of the production of knowledge. In Eribon, I
perceive situatedness to be a method (technique) (he uses the term “méthode” to
describe his writing (Eribon 2016: 87)) of what I suggest is ‘writing of social imma-
nence’ and through which he writes about his milieu and biography without taking
it simply as an example of oppression. Rather, it becomes a complex scene in which
he is involved and which has constituted him.The scene is multilayered and fractal;
constituted not only by himself and his family but also friends, the university, and
many theorists he engages with among which are Foucault and Bourdieu. Here,
theory and experience are sides of a complex and ongoing dialogue that constantly
feed into one another, providing sides/sites for subjectivations.
With the concept of social immanence, I propose a practice of situating oneself in
the social world as a gendered being with a racial and cultural background amongst
others.What oftenmakes it so difficult to speak from a position that can bemarked
in a social hierarchy is the renunciation of (to give up) immunity which is postu-
lated by academia. Speaking from nowhere is an ideal that ignores concrete bodies,
partial perspectives, etc. Objectivity here is often taken as neutrality.However, neu-
trality is in turn never neutral – because there is no neutral position in the world
from which to speak (Haraway 1988, Barad 2007). Objectivity might be understood
as coming to life in the very articulation of situated knowledge. The acknowledge-
ment of one being formed by others often goes along with fear of contingency of
the social world. To be positioned means to be vulnerable and overshadowed by
fear of being powerless. In fact, situatedness does not reproduce but changes the
side Eribon writes from.
What Eribon demonstrates in his writing is that knowledge is not something
pure that becomes polluted by secondary social conditions but always emerges
from specific backgrounds (Lagasnerie 2017). “Thinking with,” as is proposed by
Haraway, is constitutively connected not only to cultural or historical but also so-
cial situations. Thinking and feeling as well as learning and the affective body are
constitutively intertwined. Once more, in line with Bourdieu and Eribon, affect be-
comes a bodily technique of power by making bodies feel uncomfortable or com-
fortable in certain milieus. It is precisely this affective power that transforms them
into bodies with the (in)ability (including the desire) to learn.That feeds their trust
in the outcomes of learning – or, contrarily, does not.
Thinking through the milieu is how Isabelle Stengers (2005) describes scientific
practices by which she not only means the social but also the non/human milieu.
Based on thinking though the milieu, writing through the milieu is a technique
combining queer and class movements in Eribon. For him, his place of childhood,
Reims, did not facilitate a milieu he could exist in and thus, he had to leave this
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place in order to survive.8 As a gay man, his social milieu forced him into self-
denial and flight. This writing about the past is also directed towards the future
since it enables him not only to reconstruct but also to construct a place of writing: a
technique of existence as a mode of “immanent critique.”9 In his books, he starts
his analysis with a situation and a place, and this brings him to his life today: All
his writing is a movement back and forth between place and time: Paris, Amiens
(where he teaches at the university), and Reims, forming a constant struggle for
a position and a side/site of articulation. This movement is, nonetheless, a vector
of becoming even though it starts with destruction and shame. Struggle does not
mean a lack of side/site but rather conveys or even embodies a process of de/sub-
jectivation: a written existential territory. Eribon is writing himself in and out of his
childhood milieu; he is writing himself from a precarious position, not a sovereign
one, a position of being hurt and of existential vulnerability, as Judith Butler con-
ceptualized throughout her late works (2009, Butler and Athanassiou 2013).
Writing in and with vulnerability in this case becomes an existential technique.
Eribon begins Retour à Reims with his family, specifically his mother’s and grand-
mother’s living and working conditions. In this way, he repeatedly writes about
(subjective) lived experience as a starting point for (objective) power analysis.
Rooted in the social world and daily life as a site of constant struggle, he reports
scenes of power from school, the factory, and the retirement home where his
mother spent her final years. During his career as a scholar and author, it was
his class background and not his homosexuality that caused his painful shame,
as he has noted in various interviews. This is also what can be termed “writing
shame” (Probyn 2010): In one of his latest books Principes d’une pensée critique (2016),
the affect of shame caused by his class background stimulates and modulates
positions of critique instead of preventing him from thinking. It is, furthermore,
a notion of critique whose starting point is not a detached and distanced analysis,
but with one’s affective existence in the social world: A feeling that makes the
conditions of existence felt.
“Une émotion, oui ! Car si la pensée critique ne peut pas être éradiquée, c’est bien
parce qu’elle ne se limite pas à énoncer des analyses destinées à porter au jour
des réalités objectives : elle communique aussi des affects grâce auxquels nous
sommes à même de saisir la force de vérité que contiennent ces analyses et, par
conséquent, de résister, au nom de ce que ces affects nous permettent d’appré-
hender et de comprendre, à toutes les tentatives pour effacer les conceptions du
8 In Bourdieu, the concept of habitus is also developed in relation to space and time: In the
colonial situation Bourdieu introduced his notion of a habitus that cannot actualize itself in
relation to space and place since French colonialism fundamentally destroyed the subjects’
milieu (Bourdieu 2010).
9 For the discussion of immanent critique, see Massumi (2010).
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monde social qui parlent des classes, de la domination, de l’oppression, de la vio-
lence, etc.” (130).
 
“An emotion, yes! So if critical thinking cannot be eradicated, it is precisely because
it is not constrained to the realm of analysis aiming at bringing out the objective
reality: it also conveys affects thanks to which we are able to unfold the power of
truth contained in these analyses and therefore, in the name of what these affects
enable us to understand and comprehend, to resist all attempts to efface concepts
of the social world speaking of classes, domination, opression, and violence etc.”
Writing one’s critical biography is, in the first place, a feminist practice and Eribon
situates himself in this tradition and often repeatedly identifies with experiments
like Simone de Beauvoir’s, Annie Ernaux’, and others’. About Saidiya Hartman’s
semibiographical account Lose yourmother (2008), in which she returns to the places
of slavery on Africa’s west coast, there seems to be a similar feminist methodology
as Ann Cvetkovich writes: “Hartman extends the feminist use of memoir as a re-
search method by underscoring the historical and archival value of personal nar-
rative. She must write a ‘history of slavery that is a personal story’.” (Cvetkovich
2021: 137)This is evidently a strategy of undoing the boundary between the private
and the political: Today, the politicization of one’s own biography could even be a
side/site of experimentation to resist neoliberal forces of individualization and the
production of self-responsible, economic subjects.10
Eribon’s self-analysis are never just objective and neutral self-rationalizations
enabling a masculinist self-creation. Regarding self-objectivation, he departs from
Bourdieu who has conceptualized these techniques in depth.They are creative and
emancipatory practices, as he underlines: Writing a self-analysis is a practice in
which one radically thinks through one’s social make-up without reproducing its
underlying dynamics of determinism. Additionally, self-analysis is also a form of
resistance against the neoliberal regime of self-improvement and identity man-
agement.11 It could be related to what Butler famously wrote in Gender Trouble in
the beginning of the 1990s about the subject of feminism being based not in same-
10 In neoliberalism, the individual is responsible for her own ‘failure’. Shame, resulting from
this, intensifies this process even more: “La honte isole! Nous le savons. […] On se déteste
soi-même, et donc on déteste les autres, qui sont d’autres soi-même“ (115). “Shame isolates!
We know it already. One hates oneself and therefore one hates others, who are only another
self”.
11 The German title of Butler’s/Athanasious’ Dispossession (2013) expresses this more clearly
than the English one: Die Macht der Unterdrückten. Translation by Thomas Atzert. Zürich,
Berlin 2014.
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ness and identity but difference and heterogeneity: writing (in) difference ([to] one-
self).12
In Foucault’s Hermeneutics of the subject, which Eribon as his biographer knows
very well, subjectivation is a technique to create new forms of desire (Eribon 2016:
215ff.). Unlike confessions which belong to an epistemic power of subjectivity, sub-
jectivations can also be acts of inflecting power, as Elspeth Propyn suggests: “Think-
ing, writing, and reading are integral to our capacities to affect and to be affected.“
(Probyn 2010: 77)
Eribon’s writing can be described as this very inflection of the powers of shame:
“La honte et l’abjection constituaient pour eux [Genet and Jouhandeau] le point
d’ancrage et d’appui d’une reformulation de soi, d’une esthétique de soi. […] La
honte, l’abjection deviennent donc des leviers pour des pratiques transforma-
trices. Ce sont des chemins qui mènent quelque part, même si on ne sait pas très
bien où.” (221).
 
“Shame and abjection figured for them [Genet and Jouhandeau] as an anchor
point and as point of departure for a reformulation of the self, for an aesthetics
of the self, […]. Shame and abjection become instruments for transformative
practices. They are ways, leading to somewhere, even if you do not know exactly
where.”
In writing, the academy does not produce knowledge alone. It is widely claimed
that we do write parts of our subjectivity into the processes of knowledge pro-
duction. We not only construct subjective knowledge in the form of texts but con-
versely, one can write subjectivity anew by reformulating one’s social heritage. Ac-
cording to Foucault, existential practices of subjectivation exist in different forms
like bodily practices, diets, exegesis, etc.13 For Foucault in the 1970s and 80s, new
forms of queer subjectivities were possible. New gay movements and life forms are
also essential / key for Eribon to escape the homophobic background of his social
milieu.
Deleuze reads these new forms of existence as individuations, with reference to
Foucault and particularly Gilbert Simondon (following Foucault but having Simon-
12 Eribon obviously writes from a different conceptual background than Butler but in Réflexions
sur la question gay as well as in Retour à Reims and La société comme verdict (2013), there is an
insistence on the performative act of assembly in contrast to a politics of representation of
already existing subjects, which Butler also emphasizes in Notes toward a performative theory
of assembly (2015).This might seem a dangerous point of comparison since Eribon bases his
writing on a critique of psychoanalysis, which is key to Butler’s writing and understanding of
precariousness.
13 Subjectivation is a process of iterative acts and not a substance expressing itself in acts of
speaking (andwriting), claims Butler in Bodies thatMatter (1995) and Gender Trouble (1990).
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don in the back of his mind) (1997: 116). According to the latter, individuation does
not necessarily result in the individual.14 The individual is more of a new platform
for becoming, a metastable milieu.15 Deleuze describes writing with Félix Guattari
as a relational practice of building a series of acts of writing. Not only a text but a
subjectivity emerges from this act: he describes this as an act of creating a series
between both writers and the text. Both become intercessors (“Intercesseurs”)/me-
diators for each other, helping each other to articulation. (Ibid.: 121-134) The series
consists in acts of writing and acts of becoming. Becoming and writing are pro-
cessual passages intersecting with each other.
There is an existential dimension to this writing which has consequences for
media theory as well: the performative act of writing becomes an existential one
creating an existence in writing.16 Similarly, for Probyn, “shame is produced out of
the clashing of mind and body, resulting in new acts of subjectivity consubstantial
with the words in which they are expressed.” (2010, 81) Furthermore, according to
Probyn, shame can be recoded in writing. For both Probyn and Deleuze, writing is
becoming and does not just represent it.17
14 Simondon emphasizes the process more than the individual herself: “In order to think in-
dividuation, being must be considered neither as a substance, nor matter, nor form, but as
a system that is charged and supersaturated, above the level of unity, not consisting only of
itself, and that cannot be adequately thought using the law of the excludedmiddle. Concrete
being, or complete being – that is, preindividual being – is being that is more than a unity.”
(Simondon 2009: 6)
15 “The individuated being is not all of being, nor the first being; instead of understanding individ-
uation starting from the individuated being, the individuated beingmust be understood starting from
individuation, and individuation from preindividual being, according to several orders of magni-
tude.” (Simondon 2009: 10) The metastable is neither stable nor unstable: it is stableness
as far as new becomings are based on it. To explain this, Simondon uses the image of the
crystal growing on a solution. Eribon himself works with metaphors of figure and ground as
Simondon does in his metaphor of the individuation as crystallization: “Car la cristallisation
que constitue le ‘je’ est toujours fragile, provisoire, aléatoire, et, surtout, partielle. Le ‘je’ est
hanté par les autres ‘je’, qui sont nécessairement exclus, effacés, expulsés du présent, mis de
côté,même si ce n’est que provisoirement, pour qu’un ‘je’ puisse émerger et se définir comme
tel” (51-52). “Because the crystallization that the self constitutes is always fragile, temporary,
aleatory, and most importantly, partial. The ‘I’ is haunted by other ‘I’’s, which are necessary,
excluded, cut out and effaced from the present and who are even just put aside temporarily
to let an ‘I’ emerge and become one as such.” Here, Eribon points to the powerful dimension
of ‘emergence theory’: Reminiscent of Simondon’s theory of the transindividual in structure,
it brings forth a whole different genealogy, requiring a more in-depth reading of both.
16 Here, Probyn again links the interest over the last few years in writing methods to the inter-
est in the affective registers of power: “The gulf between research and writing is becoming
especially fraught with the increase in academic studies about emotion and affects” (2010:
74).
17 Probyn advances the act of writing as “corporeal activity” (2010: 76).
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Shame is the affective code of producing a site of subjectivity which immo-
bilizes not only a self but also an affective power of working through one’s social
background. This can be linked to Butler’s and Athena Athanasious’ description of
the agency of the powerless which is effectuated precisely by acknowledging one’s
own situatedness in a milieu. Shame also enables the production of insights into
power relations as Ann Cvetkovich argues:
“[…] it has become important to take seriously the institutions where we live […]
and to include institutional life in our approaches to intellectual problems. At this
point, theory and affect are not polarized or at odds with one another, and Public
Feelings operates from the conviction that affective investment can be a starting
point for theoretical insight and that theoretical insight does not deadenor flatten
affective experience or investment.” (Cvetkovich 2012: 133)
Following the approach of the political affects group Public Feelings, of which
Cvetkovich is a founding member, affect can cause thinking – at the very side/site
of one’s own existence. Take for example the site of the university. Specifically, by
feeling shame (or depression which is her more specific topic), one can learn about
one’s own embeddedness in power relations. As Probyn also argues, we can learn
from the body, from shame. These feminist strategies also resonate in Eribon at a
point where he writes much more from a Foucauldian perspective and less from
a Bourdieuan: he invents strategies that inflect shame and build a technique of
“writing shame,” to deploy a term by Probyn.
Eribon re-owns his past through his writing and at the same time, he writes
a nexus of historical and social belonging which undoes this individualized self.
Furthermore, he writes a future by creating an existential form precisely through
the creation of a public rather than a private self; a self as historical embedded
becoming.This does not come out of the blue, it is not awillful act ofmasculine self-
creation, but a collective formation, a concept with which he responds to theories
of negativity in queer theory:
“[…] je voudrais opposer l’idée d’une créativité, d’une invention – individuelle et
collective – de soi qui repose sur l’idée d’un futur, d’une transmission de l’héritage
(il faudrait dire : de multiples héritages […])” (217).
 
“I want to respond with the idea of creativity, of - individual and collective - inven-
tion of the self, which is based on the conception of a future, of a transmission of
heritage (one should say: of multiple heritages).”
Hemeticulously works through themilieu of his past existence.Doing and undoing
are producing some sort of agency here. The agency of the dispossessed, as Butler
and Athanasiou would describe it.
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Nowadays, humanities increasingly deal with methodology. Methodology does
not imply the adaptation to a fixed procedure, what Stefano Harney (2018) terms
logistical knowledge of the neoliberal university. Rather, in the genealogy of think-
ing along the lines of Foucault, Deleuze, and Eribon,media technics are techniques
of existence, of “self-fashioning” (Eribon 2016: 219), like writing. The production of
knowledge is not only a representation of the world detached from the subject,
but an act of co-becoming of subject and knowledge. Not subjective knowledge,
but subjectivation in knowledge production could provide a framework for critical
scholarship.
By Eribon’s methodology, habitus (self-) analysis, facilitates the production of
situated knowledges that acts through and in the body by writing through one’s
social background. This might sound phenomenological, but it addresses no par-
ticular subject but subjectivities in the plural: collective individuations.These tech-
niques intra-act in specific ways with contents and they produce a specific assem-
blage of knowledge: assemblages of methods and knowledge.They produce subjec-
tivities, as Guattari once termed these self-relations coexisting in one body, around
a body and in between bodies (1995, 2015: 167).
A (writing) technique cannot be isolated from its contexts as Eribon illustrates
by addressing the social background and the power of the social world. Knowl-
edge and subjectivation in Retour à Reims and his other recent books go hand in
hand with the biographical background because this is his subject; a technique of
becoming by returning to the scene of constitution, which will never be fully possi-
ble.18The biographical turns this into a genre that is apparently well-known to the
reader. Nevertheless, this form of situated knowledge can exist in all sorts of texts
in our everyday academic life. As we write, we reproduce a site/side of knowledge
production and create acts of subjectivations as well as existential territories from
which new acts of speaking and writing can emerge.
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An Exploration of Positionalities of Critique Considered
Regarding the Institution of Higher (Arts) Education
Sophie Vögele
How is it possible to criticize predominant structures and institutionalized pro-
cesses in order to achieve transformation? What are dispositions of critique and
their specific positionalities? How,while theorizing critique, canwe take account of
current power relations that are grounded in a colonial legacy? These are the main
questions I would like to touch on and partly tackle in this chapter.My focus thereby
is on the workings of tertiary education andmodes of intervention into these insti-
tutionalized settings. In the first section, I consider how critique contributes to the
functioning of institutions. I am interested in the relationship between structures
and institutions that define the normative order and the positioning of critique as
well as their potential for transformation. In my second section, I look into dis-
sident participation as a mode of critique. In my third section, I briefly question
challenges to specific positionings.The fourth section draws on my earlier and on-
going research on in- and exclusion within Higher Arts Education to introduce a
perspective anchored in empirical considerations. In my last section, I highlight
the significance of introducing a post_colonial1 perspective to the discussion and
considerations of dissident participation and theorizing critique in general.
1 Notation of post_colonial with the underline represents the complex entanglements and
historical contingencies that bind the colonial past to the present. Furthermore, the criti-
cal epistemology that questions colonial patterns of discourse in public, arts, and in science
is emphasized (also see Hostettler and Vögele 2016).
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How critique contributes to the functioning of institutions
In his work On Critique Luc Boltanski explains institutional structures to produce
a specific norm, entity, and continuity (2011). Thereby, the structures not only con-
firm a value but contribute widely to the value’s creation (Boltanski 2009: 122). He
writes: “Far from being limited to confirming a value, in large measure they help
create it.” (2011: 78) Thereby, normative structures and their value systems are set.
Boltanski explains that by transforming small gaps of differences into distances and
thereby categorizing individuals and social groups, differences loaded with signif-
icance initiate a powerful multiplier effect in demarcation. Moreover, institutions
must continually be subjected to a process of re-institutionalization to maintain
their form and prevent them from ‘unraveling’ (ibid.: 80). Beyond their reproduc-
tion, they primarily have the function of self-justification (Bogusz 2010: 139f). This
has the effect of naturalizing the occurrence of institutional structures and con-
cealing their continual reproduction. The working of institutions enables the re-
identification of abstract authorities and hence also their stability through time
and space. This is the main reason for them to appear attractive and to re-enforce
adherence to the existing structures (Boltanski 2011: 78). Institutional structures
are also simultaneously a source of experienced power-relations and violence. Ac-
cording to Boltanski, critique must therefore be positioned from the vantage point
of denouncing the institutions’ power and symbolic – or epistemic – violence. The
existence of symbolic violence is themain justification of critique, whose first move
is to unmask and denounce the violence concealed in the folds and interstices of
the institutional structures. Critique has the task to re-describe the mechanisms
of institutional confirmation by rendering visible the violence held within it (ibid.:
96). Critique, in Boltanski’s understanding, actually is inscribed in the tensions
contained in the very functioning of institutions: “My main argument is that the
tension incorporated by institutions harbours the possibility of critique, so that the
formal genesis of institutions is inextricably a formal genesis of critique.” (2009:
152, 2011: 98) In addition, Boltanski views critique as potentially taking on simi-
lar modes of domination that institutional structures themselves employ: “Modes
of domination are necessary to the extent that institutions themselves are more
strongly associated with the perpetuation of the asymmetries and forms of ex-
ploitation at work, and/or that the voice of critiquemakes itself more loudly heard.”
(2011: 117)
Judith Butler’s discussion of Michel Foucault’s text What is Critique (1978) adds
a further dimension to the understanding of how critique contributes to the func-
tioning of institutions in general. She too explains critique as always being of an
embedded practice (2001: 1). The moment in which it is abstracted from its oper-
ation and made to stand alone as a purely generalizable practice, critique loses its
character: critique only exists in relation to something other than itself. In a general
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sense, Butler notes that according to Foucault, critique is a practice in which we
pose the question of the limits of our most sure ways of knowing.This is guided by
the inquiry into the relation of knowledge to power that produce epistemological
certainties.These turn out to support a way of structuring the world that forecloses
alternative possibilities of ordering (ibid.: 2). Critique, thus, is to unveil other and
new realities by leaving established grounds of validity. However, as Butler points
out, this is particularly risky: “The problemwith those grounds is precisely that they
seek to foreclose the critical relation, that is, to extend their own power to order the
entire field of moral and political judgment.They orchestrate and exhaust the field
of certainty itself.” (Ibid.: 6) The position of critique seems to be located in the task
of constantly risking the denunciations of those who naturalize and render hege-
monic the very moral terms put into question by critique itself. Butler explains that
in the understanding of Foucault, critique is a multiple act in that is the stylized
relation to the demand upon it, and that, within a specific stylization of critique, a
subject is produced that is not readily knowable within the established structure.
(Ibid.) In this context, Foucault talks about desubjugation; whereby, a desubjuga-
tion from the established grounds occurs when a mode of existence is risked – a
process of self-making through disobedience. The self is compelled to form itself
within practices that are more or less in place – a process characterized as modes
of subjectivations (ibid.). Foucault’s understanding of critique thus suggests that cri-
tique alsomeans re-composition and invention (ibid.: 1).However, as Butler further
emphasizes in her text Critique, Dissent, Disciplinarity (2012) “critique has something
to do with a disposition of the subject.” (Ibid.: 18) This entails questioning the basis
of critical inquiry. Butler concludes that critique is a political dissent. It is a way
of objecting to illegitimate claims of public and governmental authority that “can-
not be sustained without institutional supports.” (Ibid.: 20) Now, if critical practice
opens up this new possibility for elaborating the subject as Butler demonstrates,
how can we understand this process and the disposition necessary for the position-
ing of dissidence? As this consideration seems to suggest, subjectivity that occurs
in self-making through disobedience is sustained through institutional structures.
Dissent relates to modes of knowledge that articulate modes of governmental au-
thority (ibid.: 24). By stating that dissent is established inside the purview of the
polity and simultaneously as the principle by which a departure from an estab-
lished polity can take place (ibid.: 25), Butler suggests that dissent is located both
inside and outside of the very grounds it questions.
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Terms and conditions for dissident participation
In the first section of my chapter, my aim was to sketch out how critique relates to
the established structures and institutions. However, the question of how critique
and dissent can be transformative despite their embeddedness remains. Posed the
other way around: which context enables critique to have the potential of re-com-
position and invention as Foucault terms it? What further, additional, or even con-
tradictory ways of understanding and conceptualizing critique are necessary to
contribute to an understanding? To start tackling these questions, I am particularly
interested in investigating if critique can be articulated from a positioning within.
Thereby, I mean to ask, in what terms embeddedness allows for which degree of
radicality in critical inquiry or, on the contrary, renders certain lines of question-
ing impossible. How transformative, re-composing, and inventive can critique be?
What kind of not-knowable subject can possibly be producedwithin the established
structure?
To at least address these questions partly, I would like to look into dissident
participation as a form of critique. I thereby assume that the positioning of dissident
participation is a less risky form that does not imperil its existence, but remains
in acceptance of the structures, partly embracing them as they sustain one’s own
position. To tackle dissident participation, I will confine the discussion to the realm
of Higher Education and thereby predominantly refer to Sabine Hark’s extensive
study (2005), in which she discusses the position of feminist and gender studies
in the field of academia. Hark interrogates the potential of a critique from within
academic structures, and states that inclusion into the structures subject to critique
is a necessary condition for producing findings and understandings outside the
hegemony (ibid.: 68). She writes:
“To change a field means to first of all change the rules of the game. The transfor-
mation of the rules, however, does not only demand a certain degree of virtuosity
in understanding and navigating them, but it asks for – and this is precisely where
the challenge and precarity of an ascertained critical project is located – the accep-
tance of the rules – and be it out of pragmatic necessity.” (Ibid.: 70, translation
S.V.2).
2 Original quote: “Denn ein Feld zu verändern bedeutet vor allem, die Regeln des Spiels zu
verändern. Die Transformation der Regeln setzt allerdings nicht nur eine gewisse Virtuosität
im Umgang mit den Regeln voraus, sie verlangt zunächst – und genau hierin besteht die
prekäre Herausforderung für das sich herrschaftskritisch verstehende feministische Wis-
sensprojekt – deren Akzeptanz –, und sei es aus pragmatischen Gründen.”
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Thus, we must inevitably acknowledge the very structures subject to critique as
entry into them is necessary to developing ground-breaking critique and achieving
change. Hark subsumes this as a “dissident participation”:
“Dissidence and participation are, in other words, intricately enmeshed: partici-
pation, and yes, acceptance of the reigning rules of the game is the paradoxical
premise for achieving change. […] we actually (would like to) object the powers
from which our being is dependent.” (Ibid.: 73, translation S.V.3).
Abolishing the structures is therefore not the primary goal of dissident participa-
tion. Rather, in Hark’s understanding, we are forced to work within the structures
if we are to understand and develop effective possibilities of critical practices of
knowledge. It is, then, a task of dissident participation to uncover the workings of
institutional structures and systematic obscuring of their reproduction, and search
instead for ways that offer other dealings with these structures (ibid.: 392).
In Hark’s terms, attaining power within the structures requires a specific an-
chorage into them. Although such a positioning within participation admittedly
seems to enable a better access to the structures subject to change, the problem of
the blind spots remains.They are not lapses but inevitably form part of the strategy
by allowing a more enabled participation within the dominant discourse (Thomp-
son 2004:39). Through participation, the intervention into the structures becomes
more effective, but it is very likely that the ability to question power relations and
privilege diminishes. This recalls Boltanski’s understanding of critique in which
the back and forth between effective intervention and lessened critique is essential
to the existence of institutions – thus benefitting the normative structure. Boltan-
ski’s and Foucault’s explanations suggest that critique, especially if accepted by the
structures, always remains tied to the institution it criticizes – and is governed
by its hegemonic structures, eventually optimizing it in Boltanski’s terms (2009:
156). This observation allows the understanding that dissident participation (in the
realm of Higher Education) renders palpable the proximity of affirmation and dis-
sidence, participation and transformation, subversion and normalizing, and cri-
tique and regulation. It reveals how dissident participation is challenged to con-
stantly be aware of its own immanence, privilege, cooption, and blind spots (Hark
2005: 250) – while navigating these contradictory dimensions and believing in its
own critical and transformative agency. The work by Sara Ahmed On Being Included
(2012) is a very conclusive account of the proximity between the endeavor to fight
discrimination within institutional structures of Higher Education that ultimately
3 Original quote: “Dissidenz und Partizipation sind, mit anderen Worten, unauflöslich
verknüpft: Teilhabe, ja Akzeptanz der herrschenden Spielregeln ist die paradoxe Vorausset-
zung für Veränderung. […] dass wir nämlich gerade den Mächten widersprechen (wollen),
von denen unser Sein abhängig ist.”
230 Sophie Vögele
enforce institutional racism. Hark, in her account, suggests locating oneself on the
margins between the inside and the outside of the institution to acquire the struc-
tures rather than being subjectivated. To be able to take on this defiance an oscil-
lation between scientific and activist positions is necessary. This could come close
to the undoing of structures in Athena Athanasiou’s understanding.4 She states
that critique takes a side insofar as it always also is undoing the structures subject
to its inquiry. At the same time, she endorses that dissent has to be understood
as refusing to take a side; that dissent is against. She says: “Taking on a side/site
refers to disciplinary bonding and is strongly linked to boundary. It can be very
normative. But it also entails dissent: critical agency refuses to be complicit with
the structures.”5 She explains that the dissent entails contradicting by participating
and that it has to perform doubly in a dissonant temporality that conquers rather
than preserves the futurity. It is about transforming and appropriating the struc-
tures rather than abolishing them.This could possibly relate to the process of self-
making in disobedience by Butler discussed above.
Challenges to the positioning of dissident participation
The discussion so far suggests that in order for a critique’s radicalism to be un-
derstood and perceived as such, it has to maintain a certain relationality and to be
tied into the dominant system to avoid becoming unintelligible. This leads me to
the assumption that any actor or activity in critique necessarily occupies a place of
dissident participation. However, although seemingly critique always is complicit
with the structures it hopes to manipulate – especially within dissident participa-
tion –, contradictory and simultaneous workings of dissent do have a radical und
un-known potential for transformation. The consideration I would like to briefly
raise here and suggest developing further, is the one of theorizing the positioning
of the dissident participant: critique being understood as relational, the position-
ality of dissident participation becomes a circumscribed space. Taking into account
the intersectional working of societal discrimination, dissident participation in
quest of a certain critique within a specific structure cannot be occupied by any
person in the same way. Subjectivities marked by gender, sexuality, race/ethnicity,
class, body, etc. necessarily are allocated to a specific realm within the structure
4 This talk by AthenaAthanasiouwas entitled Taking sides, orwhat critical theory can (still) do and
held during the conference Taking Sid(t)es on 28.–30.6.2018, in Konstanz. It was convened by
the research groupMediale Teilhabe. For more information, refer to: https://mediaandparticip
ation.com/2018/06/27/taking-sides-conference/, last access 10.24.2020.
5 This quote of AthenaAthanasiou is taken frommynotes during the conference TakingSid(t)es.
For the full argument see her chapter in this book.
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and thus also to specific ways of being able to articulate dissident participation.
The blind spots pointed out by Hark and briefly touched on above, decisively, prob-
ably are not random, but inherently tied to the position of a particular dissident
participant. This means that a person with other blind spots cannot be there as a
dissident participant. Dissident participation is tied to a specific positioning that
asks for particular subjectivities and identity markers. This pertains to questions
of survival such as who will be a subject and what will count as a life addressed. In
reference to desubjugation by Butler (2001: 9f), she asks
“Who can I become in such a world where the meanings and limits of the subject
are set out in advance for me? By what norms am I constrained as I begin to ask
what I may become? And what happens when I begin to become that for which
there is no place within the given [norms and structure]?” (Ibid.: 6).
Indeed, certain subjectivations are not part of the established framework of refer-
ence. How can they have access to dissident participation? And how can they avoid
being jeopardized by the riskiness of critique?
Against the backdrop of these questions, it seems even more challenging to
understand dissident participation with a potential for radical transformation. In
her talk, Athanasiou too took up this question by asking who can this critical I
be? She went on stating that it cannot be the self-willed individual of neoliberal
formations. Instead, it has to refer to a performative situational subjectivation that
is political, reigned by critical reflexivity, and based on responsiveness, collectively
moved and moving others.
The Critical I and ‘post_colonial’ Implications:
The Case Study of Swiss Art Schools
Two interrogations about who the critical I can be and which positionalities actu-
ally enable dissident participation, are at the center of this chapter. Questions arise
such as ‘who is heard through which channels?’ ‘who can take on what kind of posi-
tioning?’ ‘who can talk about what and in which way?’ My assumption is that there
are post_colonial implications to the consideration of these interrogations and that
engaging them with the theorizing of dissident participation is very fruitful. To
start unpacking some of this, I would like to refer to the field of Higher Education
and briefly touch on research about in- and exclusion in Swiss art schools.
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The project entitled Art.School.Differences (2014-2016)6 interrogated processes of
in- and exclusion in Swiss art schools with a special focus on the admission pro-
cess (Saner, Vögele, and Vessely 2016).7 In a very brief nutshell, I would like to point
out some of our main findings about impossible positionalities within these insti-
tutions. Our findings are embedded in research that found that higher art and
design education was “a preserve of the privileged” (Malik Okon 2005). Various
studies circumscribe this privilege in terms of social class, race, ethnicity, gender,
sexuality and body (Burke and McManus 2009; Guissé and Bolzman 2015; Henry
et al. 2017; Kuria 2015; Lange-Vester and Sander 2016; Rothmüller 2010; Seefranz
and Saner 2012; Stich 2012). In their selection processes, art schools tend to con-
stantly re-instate privileged groups of students. Especially in their intersectional
working, the social conditions of the favored maintain existing privileges and al-
low for the ignorance of the latter. We, in our research, mainly interrogated the
processes and mechanisms through which discriminations happen. The need to
select, the deliberative process of decision making, and the openness of selection
criteria within juries and the admission process in general, effected the choice of
a very normative student cohort in that it is very similar to those present in the
institution (Saner, Vögele, and Vessely 2016, chap. 5, chap. 5.3.4). Juries chose can-
didates that they deemed most likely to reflect the specific values of the institu-
tion in terms of class, ethnicity, gender, and body. Our data analysis furthermore
finds that the non-normative students missing from art schools are lower class,
have experiences of migration, have non-normative bodies and/or genders, or are
older. Class appeared to be the most decisive category in that the few students and
candidates accepted from the lower class were all Caucasian. Physical ability was
also a consideration concerning students’ flexibility and perceived endurance for
long working hours.8 Along with the predomination of bodily normativity, social
competencies or a reputable network were highly valued – sometimes more than
artistic practice.Within the selection process, these exclusions and discriminations
remained unnoticed and their institutional anchorage blurred (ibid.: chap. 5.5). In-
deed, when discrimination is recognized within such kinds of structures, it is usu-
6 Togetherwith a team, Philippe Saner and I co-lead the project initiated by the Institute for Art
Education, IAE, at the Zurich University of the Arts ZHdK. The Haute Ecole d’Art et de Design
(HEAD – Genève) and the Haute Ecole de Musique (HEM Genève – Neuchâtel) were cooper-
ating partners along with the ZHdK in this self-reflexive interrogation of in- and exclusions
to art schools.
7 For more information on the research, publications as well as subsequent initiatives and
projects, refer to bit.ly/a_s_d, last access 10.24.2020.
8 Sarah Whatley talked about the “tyranny of ability” in this regard. She proposed this very
trenchant term during the conference Disability and Performer Training – A Colloquium offered
by the research project DisAbility on Stage, Institute for the Performing Arts and Film (IPF),
ZHdK, 10.25.2016, Zürich.
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ally attributed to either individual (racist and sexist) misbehaviors of certain fac-
ultymembers and employees or relegated to societal and historical events (Williams
1985:331).We termed this structurally and institutionally facilitated discrimination,
and accompanying ignorance of privilege, institutional normativity (Saner and Vögele
2016: 202; Saner, Vögele, and Vessely 2016) in reference to research led by Ahmed,
Shona Hunter, Sevgi Kilic, Elaine Swan, and Lewis Turner. Ahmed et al. found an
“Institutional Whiteness” at work –meaning that institutional structures privilege
white people at all levels (Ahmed et al. 2006: 73). By introducing institutional nor-
mativity, we draw attention to the fact that, alongside skin color, ability, a middle
class or privileged backgrounds, and a certain gendered and ethnicized aesthetic
understanding are set as the norm within institutions. Institutions reproduce and
reinstate this norm beyond their student body with faculty and other members,
albeit tacitly and unreflectively. I termed this the camouflage of discrimination
through normalization (Vögele 2020). This institutional normativity and the cam-
ouflage of discrimination through normalization is enhanced through processes
of Othering. We, on different occasions, encountered a great desire for the Other,
more precisely an interest in being creatively inspired by someone exotically Other.
Among jury members, this interest often was articulated as a great opportunity to
enrich the status quo of the institution.This articulates itself as a particular case of
tokenisation that is an appropriation or even usurpation of the Other. We also en-
counteredOthering that articulated itself in the refusal of the foreign and unknown
(Saner, Vögele, and Vessely 2016, chap. 5.5.3, 6.3). However, Othering as a desire for
the Other is inherently hierarchized and thus enforces power relations (Hall 1997).
It entails not only a denial of the Other but also the means to reinvigorate existing
racist and sexist differentiations (Mecheril and Plösser 2009).
These considerations of institutional normativity and Othering clearly show
that, within the art schools under investigation, an array of subjectivities are im-
possible: lower class, racially or ethnically marked persons, termed as disabled by
majoritarian discourse, trans*-persons, identified as queer and critical subjects,
etc. These exclusions are not particular to art schools but mirror the outcomes of
societal processes of exclusion present in the field of Higher Education in general.
Such processes are the continuing effects of colonial power relations and thus re-
quire a post_colonial perspective to perceive, chart, and renegotiate them (Vögele
2020). Considering this, the question about which positionalities could allow for
dissident participation within the structures set by art schools remains. Or put
differently: what exactly is the premise of dissident participation, and what kind
of subjectivity can possibly access it? Additionally, questions arise on the ways in
which historically grown power-relations grounded in colonialism with effects on
current racism, classism, sexism, and ableism enable or hinder the critique of
(western) institutional structures. What kind of critique can possibly be articu-
lated in a situation of institutional normativity, Othering, and the camouflage of
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discrimination?What is the in-between here, and who can inhabit what kind of in-
between? How can such limiting structures be adapted in order to be less discrimi-
nating? Referring to Boltanski’s perspective,we could ask: in what ways can critique
go beyond re-instating the predominant structures and transform them by inte-
grating a previously concealed perspective? Is this practice at all possible without
totally abolishing the structures (of the art school)? And maybe most importantly:
how canwe avoid putting certain subjectivities evenmore in peril through critique?
Dissident Participation that is Political, Reigned by Critical Reflexivity,
Based on Responsiveness, Collectively Moved, and Moves Others
As I suggested earlier in this chapter, I think, it is necessary to consider the po-
sitioning of dissident participation from a post_colonial perspective. Against the
backdrop of the led considerations, the ongoing societal processes of discrimina-
tion, largely effected by power relations that were implemented through colonial-
ism, have to be accounted for. By introducing a post_colonial perspective to the
theorizing of dissident participation, I suggest that rejection and other forms of
Othering can be addressed and challenged. Decolonizing strategies have to be mo-
bilized in order for dissident participation to deploy a simultaneous contradiction
and adherence as a potential for transformation. The art seems to be performing
institutions beyond interiority versus exteriority while defending them as a site of
critique: critique entails the performing of institutions in a counter-institutional
way.9
For this thinking, it is helpful to read Ruth Sonderegger. She exposes critical
theories, as put forward by Boltanski and Foucault, to “implicitly at least, aim at a
fusion of all requirements of critique.” (Sonderegger 2012: 260) However, Sondereg-
ger is critical of endorsing an encompassing conception into critique, claiming in-
stead an inherent finitude (ibid.: 261). Thereby, she seems to suggest that theories
of critique must be contradictory in order to approach their potential, a charac-
teristic I have stressed above regarding Athanasiou. Sonderegger emphasizes that
critique must endorse a collective practice in its theorizing and conceptualization.
She mentions a collective perceiving, as in feeling, moving, or talking differently
than our environment would predict (ibid.). Indeed, a post_colonial perspective
anchored in heterogeneous theoretical traditions and disciplines entails a critical
stance, which is always a critique of both the forms of knowledge and the forms of
practice that correspond to them. Furthermore, a post_colonial perspective located
at the margins to activism allows being practical and emancipatory in the sense,
that it aims not only to understand but also to contribute to a transformation of the
9 Taken frommy notes of the talk by Athanasiou during the conference Taking Sid(t)es.
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social world that is already under way. Finally, post_coloniality addresses critique
as being immanent, focusing on the internal contradictions and crises of a specific
social order and its social imaginary. Accordingly, it cannot be reduced to a purely
normative undertaking, but involves empirical analyses. Analysis and critique are
thus inextricably linked and unveil the potential, to tackle institutions in a counter-
institutional way.
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Change by Changing Smartphone-Users?
The Fairphone as an Experimental Sid/te
Isabell Otto
The Virtue of Fair Smartphone Practices
“This is not a phone. It’s an opportunity to change the industry” – “The phone that
cares for people and planet” – “Change is in your hand”.1With slogans like these the
Dutch company Fairphone promotes their fairly,modularly produced smartphones
– the Fairphone. Following the company’s intention statement, this ‘change’, has
two implications. Firstly, Fairphone B.V. is invested in transparent, pro-social pro-
duction chains. They seek to make a difference by avoiding components sourced
from problematic labor conditions, e.g. child labor; obtaining integrated resources
like tin, tantalum, or gold from mines that are not financially entangled in civil
wars or other conflicts. Secondly, the modularity of the fair smartphone means
its users can repair or upgrade parts themselves by ordering and replacing each
individual component.
Fairphone calls on their customers to resist the smartphone-industry and its
standard, non-durable devices that are harmful to the environment, through prac-
tices of tinkering and rebuilding. The Fairphone is not only ‘fair’ in terms of fair
trade but also because it invites users to secure a long lifespan for their phones and
thereby conserve natural resources. However, these ideals are not easily achievable.
Fairphone founder, Bas van Abel, has noted arising “dilemmas when you want to
change an industry that you are a part of” while attempting to produce profitable
products: “If you try to do things differently you run into every single wall that this
systemhas to offer.” (Garrigou 2018)The demands of customers to participate in the
fair and environmentally sustainable practices of Fairphone’s businessmodel follow
similar dilemmas: Users are invited to join the commodity circle by buying smart-
phones or phone-modules and thus securing Fairphone’s profit. At the same time,
1 The first Fairphone slogan was announced in 2018 (https://web.archive.org/web/20180914145
416/https://www.fairphone.com/en, September 14, 2018), the second is part of the campaign
for Fairphone 3 (https://web.archive.org/web/20190919034911/https://www.fairphone.com/en
, September 9, 2019), the third is a general tag line, i.e. printed on the Fairphone’s battery.
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they are requested to resist the smartphone industry (including Fairphone B.V. and
its profit orientation). Fairphone’s business strategy shows that resistive practices
and (economical) power structures are inseparable form each other. Additionally,
the subject formation within and by these practices – in our case: the becoming of
a ‘Fairphone-user’ – at the same time paradoxically endangers her subjectivation
as ‘smartphone-user’, which I want to understand (and explicate below) as a ‘hy-
brid actor’ (Latour 1994: 33) with reciprocal bonds, or ‘attachments’ (Hennion 2017)
between human and device.
The complex entanglement of resistant practices and subject formation is elab-
orated on by Michel Foucault in his late writings on “The Subject and Power” (Fou-
cault 1982) and reflected by Judith Butler in her discussion of Foucault’s concept of
“Critique” as a specific form of resistance or rather: a special virtue of the subject.
(Cf. Butler 2001; Foucault 1997) According to Foucault, power and resistance are so
closely intertwined that, in his proposition to study power, he suggests using re-
sistance as “a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations”. (Foucault
1982: 780) Investigating resistant practices or “attempts made to dissociate these
relations” can thus show, “what power relations are about”. (Ibid.) Foucault is not
interested in resistance to a certain authority or in an opposition to a concrete
institution of power, but in withstanding a general “technique” of power “which
makes individuals subjects”. (Ibid.: 781)
Thus, what is brought to light by discussing Fairphone’s claim for fairness? Fol-
lowing Foucault, it is not so much the (resistance against) power structures of the
smartphone industry but the struggles of the individuumwithin power relations of
the smartphone production cycle and accordingly the struggle with its subjectiva-
tion as a smartphone-user. The calls to change the industry are of less importance
here than the demands on users to change themselves. The practice of ‘critique’ in
Foucault and Butler’s perspectives is significant for describing this change in the
self: “To be critical of an authority that poses as absolute requires a critical practice
that has self-transformation at its core.” (Butler 2001: 5) When Foucault and Butler
describe the transformation of the self in and through practices of critique, they
are not simply concerned with resistance but with a certain virtue which has both
ethical and aesthetical implications: an “art of voluntary insubordination, that of
reflected intractability” (Foucault 1997: 47; cf. Butler 2001 5, 6) or even a performance
of “self-stylization” (Butler 2001: 10), a “release from its usual discursive constraints”
(ibid.: 9), which has nothing to do with a foundationally resistant ‘nature’ within
an ontological subject.
This theoretical framework also touches questions that arise with the above-
mentioned dilemmas of Fairphone-users and allows positing themmore precisely.
How can we rethink the demand on customers to simultaneously participate and
not to participate in the commodity circle of the smartphone industry as a specific
positioning of the subject in assemblages of power? As Foucault argues, the mean-
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ing of ‘subject’ is twofold: “subject to someone else by control and dependence; and
tied to [their] own identity through a conscience or self-knowledge. Bothmeanings
suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to.” (Foucault 1982:
781) Resisting this form of power accompanies not only an artful attitude of knowl-
edge and awareness of the power relations the subject is bound in; the subject also
risks its “very formation as a subject”, (Butler 2001: 8) because the production of
the subject is bound to the very norms its attitude of critique opposes to: “[I]f the
selfforming is done in disobedience to the principles by which one is formed, then
virtue becomes the practice by which the self forms itself in desubjugation, which
is to say that it risks its deformation as a subject”. (Ibid.: 10)
In this chapter, I want to reflect on resistant practices that the Fairphone en-
ables and demands as forms of sid/te-taking. The core of my argumentation is the
attachment of smartphone and user as a subjugating technique of subject forma-
tion within the power relations of smartphone industry. Which constraints can a
fair smartphone-user artfully release and what are simultaneously the risks of her
attitude of critique?
The Site-Taking of Smart Phone Users
The taking of public places as political resistant practice is closely linked to the
visions of collectivization by mobile phones, especially in the early phase of their
distribution. One of these visions is phrased by Howard Rheingold in his book
Smart Mobs from 2002. He defines ‘Smart mob’ with the term “Mobile Ad Hoc So-
cial Networks”, brought up earlier by computer scientist Gert Kortuem and others
(2001).2
One prime example for the potentials of a smart (phone) mob in Rheingold’s
argumentation is a historical event in the Philippines: “On January 20, 2001 Presi-
dent Joseph Estrada of the Philippines became the first head of state in history to
lose power to a smart mob.” (Ibid.: 157) Within one hour, after a text message with
the call “Go 2EDSA,Wear blck” had been initially sent, more than a million citizens
assembled on Epifanio de los Santas Avenue (EDSA), a historical site of a much
earlier, peaceful demonstration in 1986. The precondition for this event was the
2 “Both terms describe the new social form made possible by the combination of computa-
tion, communication, reputation, and location awareness. The mobile aspect is already self-
evident to urbanites who see the early effects of mobile phones and SMS. Ad hoc means the
organizing among people and their devices is done informally and on the fly, the way texting
youth everywhere coordinate meetings after school. Social network means that every indi-
vidual in a smart mob is a ‘node’, in the jargon of social network analysis, with social ‘links’
(channels of communications and social bonds) to other individuals.” (Rheingold 2002: 169f.)
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early and large distribution of mobile phones in the Philippines and a special rela-
tionship between user and device, which historian Vincente L. Rafael calls ‘manic’,
describing it as an over-identification with the phone:
“The ‘manic’ relationship to the cell phone is just this ready willingness to iden-
tify with it, or more precisely with what the machine is thought capable of doing.
One not only has access to it; by virtue of its omnipresence and proximity, one be-
comes like it. That is to say, one becomes an apparatus for sending and receiving
messages at all times.” (Rafael 2003: 403)
Since the mobile phone can be “idealized as an agent of change, invested with the
power to bring forth new forms of sociality” (ibid.: 402), an envisioned ability to
act as part of a powerful crowd arises in the ‘cell phone-user’ from this manic rela-
tionship, instilling the potential to change the political system.
The observation of an intimate attachment with the mobile phone is not con-
fined to Philippine media culture. For the western world, a similar binding was de-
scribed by Sherry Turkle, with the notion of the ‘tethered self ’ (Turkle 2008). Along
with her intimate relationship with the mobile phone, the user gets a personal ad-
dress that goes hand in hand with the potentials and demands of being always and
everywhere connected and available (cf. Linz 2008) – a hybridization of human
and device that even intensifies through the internet connectivity of smartphones.
In Foucauldian terms, one can argue that through the attachment (cf. Hennion
2017) of mobile phone and user, human individuals become subjectified as ‘mobile
phone-users’. They not only become tethered to their phones but are also tied into
social, technical, political, and economic power relations.
Seen in this light, the imagination of the smart mob that overturns a political
regime neglects this enmeshment of the mobile phone-user. It conceptualizes the
phone as a powerful tool or: a handy vehicle for resistant communication that en-
ables a revolutionary site-taking. At the same time, the ‘smart mob imagination’
disregards the mobile phone as a ‘site’, that is itself steeped in power relations.
The Philippine example is especially evident here: The Philippines are among those
countries providing the electronic industry with child-mined gold that is built into
mobile phones and other electronic devices because of its qualities as a conduc-
tor of electricity.3 In comparing the ‘smart mob’ to the ‘fair phone imagination’ of
change we can recognize the difference between political resistance and resistance
as ‘critique’ in Foucault’s terms. Political resistance concerns the mobilization of
3 The report Gold from Children’s Hands. Use of Child-Mined Gold by the Electronics Sector (Schip-
per/de Haan/van Dorp 2015) states: “The quantities in each device might be small, but they
add up to a large amount of gold. In 2014,more than 1.2 billion smartphoneswere soldworld-
wide, containing 37,347 kilos of gold.” (10)
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people using mobile phones as a dynamic communication channel. Critique con-
cerns the subjectivation of the mobile phone-user, her own involvement in power
relations and the virtue to care about herself and others in this relatedness. The
‘smart mob imagination’ states the mobile phone as a means, the ‘fair phone imag-
ination’ challenges it as a mediator, that changes all involved entities (cf. Latour
1994).
Siding with Smart Pigeons and Fair Gold Miners
But to close the gap between Foucault’s virtue of the self and Fairphone’s work
against oppressing labor conditions or environmental pollution we have to regard
another theoretical position and another exampleUS-American biologist, philoso-
pher of science and literary scholar Donna Haraway pleads for Staying with the Trou-
ble. In the face of environmental disasters, climate change, and species extinction,
Haraway seeks ways to “live and die well with each other” (2016: 1) on a damaged
planet – beyond despair and hope. ‘Making kin’ is her slogan-like approach to the
problem.What she has in mind are not the genealogical or biogenetic kinships. In-
stead, she calls for demonstrating, enduring, and redesigning the close relatedness
of humans, plants, animals, and technologies.Haraway’s books are known for their
provocative, fabulous, and exaggeratedly formulated programming. In Staying with
the Trouble she is anxious to counteract an exceptional human position. Instead,
she emphasizes a “multispecies becoming-with” (ibid.: 10) that enables a mutual
empowerment, a partial recovery, a revival of destroyed habitats for going on to-
gether. For this utopian-visionary draft Haraway chooses the term ‘Chthulucene’,
which refers less to an era than to a place of time, a “thick present” (ibid.: 1). The
book has an obvious activist gesture: “Living-with and dying-with each other in the
Chthulucene can be a fierce reply to the dictates of both Anthropos and Capital”,
(ibid.: 2), Haraway says introductorily.
In her speculative fable, Haraway refers to examples from artistic and scien-
tific activism.The Cat’s Cradle becomes a guiding figure for a practice of resisting,
writing, and thinking. Similar to a network of string figures that are passed from
hand to hand and change in the process, people are variably connected to kindred
non-human things or beings. Through this line of thought, Haraway also calls for
a way of thinking that connects the most diverse elements with each other and
invents new stories with open ends which can be enmeshed further and further.
Thus, her book also aims at the invention of new research practices and explores
them in numerous examples.
One of Haraway’s cases is presented here in detail because of its similarities the
‘fair phone imagination’. PigeonBlog is a project that artist, activist, and scientist
Beatriz da Costa carried out in the summer of 2006 as a collaboration of racing pi-
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geons, artists, activists, engineers, pigeon fanciers, and do-it-yourself electronics.
The project is an environmental activist experiment. It aims to collect data on ur-
ban air pollution in California and publish it on the Internet. In addition, the goal
is to promote resistant practices through cross-species co-production. (Cf. ibid.:
16-29; da Costa 2008) Haraway discusses PigeonBlog as a way to facilitate recovery
from fundamental environmental damage. It is about repairing polluted neigh-
borhoods and social conditions, she argues, people and racing pigeons enable each
other reciprocally through an intimate connection with communication technolo-
gies. (Cf. Haraway 2016: 20) In months of development work, the pigeons are fitted
with backpacks containing various modules that are also built into mobile phones,
as da Costa explains:
“The pigeon ‘backpack’ developed for this project consisted of a combined GPS
(latitude, longitude, altitude) / GSM (cell phone tower communication) unit and
corresponding antennas, a dual automotive CO/NOx pollution sensor, a temper-
ature sensor, a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card interface, a microcontroller
and standard supporting electronic components. Designed in this manner, we es-
sentially ended up developing an open-platform ShortMessage Service (SMS) en-
abled cell phone, ready to be rebuilt and repurposed by anyone who is interested
in doing so.” (Da Costa 2010: 35; cf. Haraway 2016: 21)
According to Haraway, the project tries to enable cross-species trust and knowl-
edge so that the connection between birds, technology, and people can actually
be fabricated. This takes time and must be done carefully, in learning processes
of all participants, e.g. with “lots of fitting sessions and balance training in lofts”
(Haraway 2016: 22) and overcoming objections of animal protectionists. But then,
according to Haraway’s positive reading of the project, arises a mutual empower-
ment for care and responsibility: The official apparatus for measuring air pollution
in California is installed in such a way that it cannot fully comprehend the health
impact on humans and other living beings. In contrast, technologically advanced
smart pigeons with their “multispecies team” are able to collect data continuously
‘on the fly’, even at critical altitudes or near the ground.They “trace the air in string
figure patterns of electronic tracks” (ibid.): The data can be published and visual-
ized in real time on the pigeon’s ‘blog’. The visualization of pollution areas by the
pigeon data can thus also show social inequalities in the habitation of damaged
habitats.
But the dynamic network of relationships has an openness that can become
problematic. PigeonBlog was conceived as an environmental-activist project, but
its reception has not only been understood in this sense. In the course of the great
public response to her project, da Costa also received an offer from an engineer
to jointly submit a research proposal to the Defense Advance Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) for the development of flight monitoring devices modelled on pi-
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geons. The great openness of the project makes it suitable even for military con-
texts. (Haraway 2016: 22)
What it makes instructive for me to compare PigeonBlog in Haraway’s per-
spective with the strategies and tactics of the Fairphone is an aspect both cases
have in common: the work on the technological connection between humans and
other things or beings that is directed against standardized industrial default.
While Fairphone invites their users to open, disassemble, repair, and reassemble
the black box smartphone, Costa assembles modules of mobile phone technology
and expands pigeons into partial phones. Both examples take the mobile phone as
a building site, as an experimental constellation. These steps are taken before ev-
ery form of resistant sid/te-taking – e.g. against the pollution of underprivileged
neighborhoods or the harmful work of children in gold mines. Using Haraway’s
view of the PigeonBlog and the critique made by Fairphone resistance we can fur-
ther clarify that: In the virtue of critique the power relations of the mobile phone
are not taken for granted but contested in an experimental taking of the phone as
a building site.This is not a simple opposition in the sense of a binary antagonistic
gesture. The user-subject experiences itself in a confusing network of various kin-
ships, where changing a situation can only mean tomake new kin and to transform
the self, likewise.
Outsmarting the Smartphone?
Let us have a closer look at the Fairphone as an experimental building site in or-
der to better understand, what transformation of the self in this framework could
mean. Opening Fairphone’s black box can be described as hacking. Hacking is a
practice of transformation, a reformatting of systems, structures or constellations
by testing and actualizing previously only virtually available possibilities. In this
respect, hacking is not an oppositional resistant practice, but a playing with pos-
sibilities and system states that have not yet been put in effect. According to me-
dia studies scholar Claus Pias, the hacker is an ambivalent figure, both subversive
and state-supportive. Hacking oscillates between data theft and protective prac-
tices against governmental or corporate interference in the private sphere. (Cf. Pias
2002) Practices of hacking have been developed in historical situations of program-
ming digital computers. However, the term ‘hacking’ has now been transferred –
almost inflationary – to different cultural and social areas. In this broader sense,
hacking generally refers to the changeability of routine processes in politics, cul-
ture, and society. (Foit/Kaerlein 2014)
Fairphone’s strategies in this broader sense can be described as hacking of the
smartphone industry. The production of fair and sustainable smartphones should
increase the demand for these devices and thus transform the industry as a whole.
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What makes it plausible to describe this cooperate strategy as hacking is a circum-
stance mentioned by Pias: The hacker is located at the border between the visible
and the invisible. Hacking shifts the boundaries of the inaccessibility of digital
computers. It makes data and processes transparent, brings secrets to the public,
and thereby creates new areas of secrecy. (Cf. Pias 2002: 254) This also applies to
the smartphone, which is, among other things, a mobile digital computer. In this
sense, Fairphone is pursuing the idea of hacking by strategically linking the trans-
parency of production chains with the openness of the device. Fairphone reveals
the blueprints of their devices as well as the source codes of their software. It is
transparent both in terms of open source hardware and software and ethics. In its
corporate strategies, Fairphone combines ethics with hacker ethics of open access
and free information. (Cf. Levy 1984)
With this concept the small Amsterdam company literally invites its users to
undertake hacker practices. Every Fairphone 2 comes with a default open operat-
ing system based on Android, originally developed by Google. The operating sys-
tem Fairphone Open OS enables the users to get the so-called ‘root rights’ over
the smartphone, that is to get almost complete access to the system. The users
thus become ‘superusers’. On an online platform about IT security, developer Ras-
cal Privy demonstrates that by this makes it possible to bypass Google’s default
settings and, for instance, to install an Internet browser on the Fairphone via an
alternative provider of software products, which protects user privacy, and does
not collect any data about visited websites or online purchases. (Cf. Privy 2017) Ac-
cording to the blog’s announcement, Privy’s experience report is not only helpful
for “Fairphone enthusiasts, but also for users who want to free themselves from
the ‘tentacles’ of the big data collectors”. (Ibid, trans. IO) Accordingly, a Fairphone
includes the necessary tools with which its users can counter the grasps of the
smartphone industry with resistant practices.
The company’s request for users to repair their own Fairphone is similarly per-
ceived by hardware hackers and electronics hobbyists as an invitation to redesign.
On the site of the collaborative hardware development community HACKADAY.IO,
Christoph Kirschner posts a manual entitled “Hacking a Fairphone”, in which he
describes how the mobile device can be extended by three capacitive keys, i.e. keys
that react solely to touch, and how the access possibilities of the phone can thus
be specified.The open development environment of the Fairphone is the necessary
prerequisite here, too. (Cf. Kirschner 2018)TheDutch electrical appliancemanufac-
turer Aisler publishes Kirschners do-it-yourself project in the form of an AISLER
Genius Box, which includes everything hobby electronics enthusiasts need for this
Fairphone extension, the key module, all other individual parts, and even a tem-
plate for simply soldering the new components together. (Cf. Bouschery 2018)
Do we encounter technologies of the self in these hacker practices that are, in
Foucault’s sense, both critical and virtuous? There is a lot to be said against it, that
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should not be omitted: The described Fairphone practices are based on the myth of
a comprehensive power to act. The self-proclaimed ‘hackers’ present themselves as
an intentionally acting human and usually male user subject who retains control
over the technical object and, just like himself, can free it from the tentacles of the
smartphone industry.Here in particular, the connection between hacking and Fair-
phone’s ethicallymodular corporate strategy is particularly close, and they share the
same problems: In their plea for sustainability, ‘repair cultures’, i.e. communities
of repairing or handicrafts that come together in repair cafés, for example, are also
shaped by the idea of self-empowerment, the ability to act and the promise of com-
munity building. Repairing produces long-lasting, reused, or recycled things from
short-lived industrial products. It is to be understood as a transformative practice
of material objects.The creativity of repairing can be designed – similar to hacking
– as an appropriation practice of ethically correct action in order to save the planet.
(Cf. Krebs/Schabacher/Weber 2018; Schabacher 2017)
Hacking and repairing in this sense are based on the idea of a positively
‘abused’, transformed, or extended technical function tied to a human inten-
tionality of purposes. An idea that, to take up once again Claus Pias’s (2002:
261) theses on the hacker, does not make sense for digital computers – and thus
neither for the smartphone.With the instructions being so conveniently presented
on Fairphone’s community website in the form of clickable requests for actions,
the question arises whether this is a form of activism at all.4 Comparably, in
the packed and delivered Fairphone hack packages, soldering template included,
activism appears rather as a customer service. Steven Levy formulated the slogan
“Mistrust Authority/Promote Decentralization” in his Hacker Ethics already in 1984.
Based on this ethic, the questions regarding Fairphone hackers are: Who is the
untrustworthy authority, which center do hacker practices want to attack, and
from which periphery? Hacker practices resemble more the forms of political
resistance that take the smartphone as a handy (and here: transformable) tool
of a subject that conceives of itself as powerful and potent. Hacking myths of
outsmarting the device do not consider that the subject is interwoven in power
relations and that every change in this relatedness concerns its very position as a
user-subject.
4 Cf. “Welcome to the Fairphone Community, https://www.fairphone.com/de/community/?ref=
header, last access 7.16.2020.
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The Paradoxical Claim, not to be Governed Thusly
To analyze this in a final step I want to come back to one of the introduced Fair-
phone slogans: “This is not a phone. It’s an opportunity to change the industry.” Ob-
viously, it is advertising that is supposed to work within the industry.The company
Fairphone does not take an external standpoint, but pursues change from within,
which cannot avoid being shaped by at least some economic interest and can by
no means completely clear itself of the grievances it seeks to change. These are not
the clean hands of heroic resistance, but resistant practices with dirty hands that
result from an unmanageable pluralization of possibilities. However, I ammore in-
terested in the first part of the slogan: “This is not a Phone”. In the Fairphone Com-
munity Forum, one user can serve as an example for numerous users who express
their despair with the problems of the device: Her Fairphone 2 has a bad battery
and even after trying a new one the device does not get through the day with one
battery charge.Themicrophone is already defective again after being replaced three
times. The opening of the camera or of other apps takes a long time, apps crash
and send error messages once opened. “I want to love you Fairphone but I can’t!”,
she closes her post. A ‘Fairphone Angel’ writes back to her and explains in detail
how the company is working on improving these shortcomings. However, he ends
with the following words: “The Fairphone stands for other values: for movement
and for change. It’s about the idea, not the smartphone.” (Fairphone Community
Forum 2018)
The resistive Cat’s Cradle that the Fairphone involves its users in, by working on
the smartphone industry, opens – again with Haraway – “partial and flawed trans-
lations across differences” (2016: 10). It initiates new forms of relationships, a con-
stellation of participation that imposes itself to the participants and produces all
participating entities anew. In this constellation, the smartphone does not appear
as a reliably functioning device that follows human intentions. Rather, it proves to
be an independent and dysfunctional mediator. The complexity of the heteroge-
neous relations of a fair smartphone is difficult to acknowledge and to withstand:
“Es ist aus”5 – that is the title of an article in the weekly newspaperDie Zeit, in which
a frustrated user describes her failing relationship with a Fairphone. (Djahangard
2017) The Fairphone opens up a resistant medial participation in which the exclu-
sive relationship between human and device, the intimate bond that the smart-
phone makes possible, is constantly at stake and the user at risk of losing herself in
an unmanageable multitude of cross-species relationships. Following the threads
from each part of the phone to its production conditions and the well-being of the
involved actors complexifies the attachment of user and devices and accordingly
the becoming of a user-subject. But it is precisely in this opening, I would like to
5 The title plays with a double meaning in German: “It is over”/“It is off”.
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conclude, where the resistant potential of Fairphone practices lies – where a Fou-
cauldian form of critique can emerge. It is an uncomfortable and straining way to
throw sand into the gear of the smartphone industry, that goes hand in hand with
changes in the subjectivation of smartphone-users. It is a plea ‘not to be governed
thusly’ in Foucault’s sense. Not a big heroic upheaval like the smart mob or hacker
utopians have in mind. But a resistance in small steps that involves the subject by
paradoxically challenging its very position; a resistance that disturbs, shifts, and
irritates.
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4. Theories of Critique

Segment Introduction
Roberto Nigro, Erich Hörl
In his well-known commentary on the Kantian Text What is Enlightenment, Michel
Foucault writes: “The question which seems to me to appear for the first time in the
texts by Kant […] is the question of the present, of present reality. It is the question:
What is happening today? What is happening now?What is this “now” in which we
all live and which is the site, the point [from which] I am writing?” (Foucault 2010:
11).
In his commentary on Foucault, Pierre Macherey (1989) has brilliantly shown
that in this text by Kant we see the appearance of the question of the present as a
philosophical event to which the philosopher who speaks of it belongs.The question
also is: what is the present to which I belong?What does it mean to be a subject? To
be subject means to belong both as an element and as an actor to a global process
that defines the field of possible experiences. The subject does not exist in isola-
tion but co-exists with other subjects and is part of a global process. According to
Foucault, Kant’s text speaks about the membership of the subject to a certain ‘we’.
Foucault also asserts that this question about the present emerging for the first
time in the Kantian text will find another example later. However, although he does
not specifically name another author, one can legitimately believe there was more
than one. For instance, we can imagine that Marx gave a very specific answer to
this question when he showed that any form of critique of the present must also be
a critique of capitalism. This is the kind of temporality to which we belong: Cap-
italistic relationships define the field of our possible experience. It is as if Marx
suggests that it is impossible to define the ontology of the present without center-
ing the analysis on the critique and genealogy of capitalism.
But let us now imagine that we had to answer these questions today. What
could we say in this regard? What is this “now” in which we all live, and which is
the site from which we are writing?
We would like to suggest a possible answer to this question. It seems that the
most appropriate answer in this case would be to situate our present from within
the singular plural event known as 1968: a name and an event that entails, of course,
a plurality of meanings.
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1968 was a global event under whose name we can gather together different
temporalities and events: “anticolonial and anti-imperialist struggles, antiracist
movements, feminist movements, worker revolts, various forms of refusal of capi-
talist discipline and control, and numerous others”, if we wanted here to follow the
account given by Hardt and Negri in their book Assembly (2017: 64).
1968 was a historical conjuncture, an encounter, a disjunctive synthesis also
characterized by epistemological breaks, by the emergence of new questions and
problematizations ranging from the debate on human sciences to the emergence of
structuralism, from the crisis of ancient forms of Marxism to the rise of heterodox
currents of Marxism, from the appearance of the nouveau roman to the beginning
of the nouvelle vague, to name but a few intellectual, important changes.
Maurice Blanchot gave an interesting account of 1968, when he defined it as
a happy meeting, “like a feast that breached the admitted and expected social
norms” (1988: 29). For him, 1968 was explosive and spontaneous communication,
an event that could affirm itself without project. It was la prise de parole in the words
of Michel De Certeau, the capture but also the dissemination of different undisci-
plined speeches. 1968, if we wanted to refer here to an interesting formulation by
Michel Foucault, was in its broader sense “the insurrection of subjugated knowl-
edges” (2003: 7). What is quite important to note in connection with the analysis
of Foucault is that the appearance of these disqualified or inferior knowledges,
i.e., knowledges stemming from below, maps the emergence of multiple points
of resistance and of critique: a microphysics of points of resistance disseminated
throughout society.
Bearing in mind all of these aspects, let’s now note a paradox: when people,
probably for the first time with such intensity, started to speak by using their local,
marginal, ‘from below’ knowledge (“and this is by nomeans the same thing as com-
mon knowledge or common sense but, on the contrary, a particular knowledge, a
knowledge that is local, regional, or differential, incapable of unanimity and which
derives its power solely from the fact that it is different from all the knowledges that
surround it,” (ibid.: 7-8)), a specular movement also started and began to denounce
the loss of impetus of critique, its disenchantment, paralysis, and unraveled power.
It is worth mentioning that we are still part of this movement or feeling that we
can probably define as a form of critique of critique.
One could say that the two tendencies (people starting to speak, on one hand,
and the denunciation of the loss of impetus of critique, on the other) do not inter-
sect at the same level since the latter has to be interpreted as the attempt to warn
against the coming dangers stemming from the beginning of the counter revolu-
tion. Counter-revolution has to be interpreted as the (long) process intended to
iron out 1968. May 68 did not happen, or as Gilles Deleuze elsewhere also wrote: “It
was a competition to see who could piss on May 68 the most” (Deleuze 2007: 144).
With their article published in 1984 under the title May 68 did not happen, Deleuze
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and Félix Guattari noted the incapacity of French society to assimilate Mai 68. A
double incapacity involved in the term ‘assimilate’, as Étienne Balibar points out,
since it implies both a lack of comprehension and the inability to swallow it (2020:
89).
However, not all discourses denouncing the loss of intensity of critique warned
against the dangers stemming from the counter revolution. On another level the
denunciation of the loss of impetus of critique also met and still meets the detrac-
tors of 1968.This has to do with the fact that some analyses recognize the seeds for
the triumph of neoliberal rationality in the spirit of 1968. It is a widespread thesis
that takes different forms in the analyses of different authors. For Slavoj Žižek, for
instance, the spirit of 1968 is essentially individualist and bourgeois: hence it pre-
pared the triumph of neoliberalism. From a different perspective, authors like Luc
Boltanki and Ève Chiapello see that a large part of the critique of 1968 at work in the
student’s movement, in particular, has been largely recuperated and used to mod-
ernize the system of production. Even though these positions do not complement
one another, they share the idea that the emergence of a neoliberal governmental-
ity is not only the result of a counter revolution but also the deployment of seeds
ingrained in 1968. Against these assumptions, one should assert the necessity to
pay attention to the meaning of the idea of individualism, since it is a concept that
seems to be at the root of both 1968 and its deployment in neoliberal practices. As
Balibar remarks, the idea of individual freedom takes two different meanings and
even opposite trajectories depending on whether it is considered from capitalist,
market-oriented logic or from a working-class autonomy perspective (ibid.: 113,
footnote).
As you remember, our initial point in these pages or, if you like, our thesis here,
was based on the following apparent paradox: the more forms of critique spread,
the more the feeling that critique is losing its intensity grows. The more different
forms of critique and resistance emerge and are disseminated in different points
of society, the more a feeling of melancholia pervades us.
It would be no consolation to remark that if we deserted for a moment our
focus on short cycles of history to devote our attention to long periods of time, the
situation would not improve.
Certainly, it makes sense to say that in order to grasp the ontology of the
present, in order to understand how we have been trapped in our own history,
one should equip him- or herself with bifocals, as Pierre Rosanvallon suggests: On
one side, the focal length of a short history like that which began in the 1960s and,
on the other side, that of a long history dealing with the modern project of eman-
cipation (Rosanvallon 2018: 12-13).
However, despite enlarging the focal length, the sentiment of melancholia re-
mains. It is likely that we are so accustomed to this feeling of powerlessness from
before the Leviathan that we will never be rid of it. One should incidentally re-
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mark that Walter Benjamin coined the concept “left-wing melancholy” in 1931, not
to indulge a negativistic quiet, but to investigate possible transformative politics.
Next, the melancholic mood took other forms in some of his fellow travelers.
With Adorno and Horkheimer, for instance, we instead face a pessimistic per-
spective.The Frankfurt School philosophers developed in-depth studies about new
forms of authoritarianism, domination, and submission of the entirety of soci-
ety to the market-oriented logic of capitalism. In particular, their focus is on the
subsumption of culture and social relations. They also destroy the myth and illu-
sion that art, or culture in the broader sense, could still constitute the last bulwark
against the expansion of capitalist valorization. In their account, the emergence of
the cultural industry cannot but shatter this last hope since the cultural industry
only subdues and closes the creativity of the artist. Thus, Adorno and Horkheimer
give an interpretation of capitalist domination where its power is omnipresent and
totalitarian.
If we cross the line, that is to say go beyond left-wing melancholia, we can
recognize the same diagnosis in the account of other influential thinkers. Like
Horkheimer and Adorno, Heidegger also maintains that the theories of progress
have reached their point of exhaustion. Heidegger even enlarges the focal length by
encompassing a metaphysical perspective. In that way the genealogy of capitalism
and technological devastation can be retraced back to the Greek/western meta-
physical rationality which began with the platonic moment. We could still include
other authors in our broad account. During the 19th century different authors from
very different perspectives have studied the processes of industrialization, ratio-
nalization, automation, and massification of society. From the representatives of
the Hegelian left through Nietzsche, Freud, Weber, Heidegger, Bloch, Sartre, and
the philosophers of the Frankfurt School, to name a few, there was a keen interest
in the study of the new challenges stemming from the industrialization and mas-
sification of society. These authors did not work on the same object, indeed their
research had very little in common. Yet they all contributed to an understanding
of the development of productive forces and the relations of production on an ab-
stract and impersonal level. In this regard, a common point between these dis-
parate research topics can be formulated as that they all contributed to liberating
the philosophical way of thinking from metaphysical residues. By doing so, they
allowed social and economic transformations to be considered in historical terms
(De Feo, 1992: 347-348). This was certainly an important contribution.
However, they also completely overturned the understanding of the processes
they were analyzing. Their theoretical patterns became the starting point for an
ideology of totalitarian and technological domination of capital. This was also the
starting point for catastrophic and pessimistic interpretations concerning the fall
of critique and the disappearance of any form of resistance.
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Nevertheless, we have to acknowledge that the web of misunderstandings and
illusions in which contemporary thought is caught stems from its failure to register
that critique only speaks the language of subjectivity and that subjectivity cannot
be reduced to an effect of capital and technological domination. In forgetting that
subjectivity is both constitution and subversion, dominant forms of contemporary
thought have become entangled in the illusion that the disappearance of the subject
could only lead to the fall of critique. Classical philosophy, henceforth deprived
of a subject and unable to analyze new emerging forms of subjectivity, ended up
hypostatizing critique in a movement that constantly address itself could not but
engender the twin figures of nihilism and powerlessness.
Against this nihilistic trajectory, one should recall that critique is an alethur-
gic practice (a manifestation of truth in the broader sense given by Foucault to these
terms) revealing itself through subjectivity. If onewants to recognize the new forms
of critique, one has to simultaneously study the metamorphosis of subjectivity.The
fragmentation and dissemination of critique today reflects the fragmentation of
subjectivity. One can consider this fragmentation as the result of new modes of
capitalistic production. But simply viewing life and subjectivity as invested, subju-
gated,managed, and controlled by capitalistic processes remains insufficient as life
and subjectivity are constantly solicited, produced, and formed. In the interstices
of these processes, life resists and resistances multiply. In this regard, we have also
to witness that the term subjectivity as we are using it no longer refers to just a
human or anthropological dimension, requiring instead the articulation of a new
conception of human. Subjectivity is the name for the social machines. This term
does no longer implies an opposition between human being and machine and does
not lead to ideas of dehumanization and alienation. Gilbert Simondon recognizes
that humans and machines belong to the same ontological level. What resides in
machines is a human reality, a human gesture fixed and crystallized in machines.
His reflections can be put in continuity with the words of Deleuze and Guattari,
who in the Anti-Oedipus affirm that the question does not consist in comparing hu-
mans and machines but in putting them in relation. to show how humans are a
component of machines In 1992, Guattari also wrote:
“It’s a question of being aware of the existence ofmachines of subjectivationwhich
don’t simply work within the ‘faculties of the soul,’ interpersonal relations or intra-
familial complexes. Subjectivity does not only produce itself through the psycho-
genetic stages of psychoanalysis or the ‘mathemes’ of the Unconscious, but also
in the large-scale social machines of language and themass media- which cannot
be described as human.” (Guattari 1995: 9).
It is probably by pursuing this analytical trajectory that we will be able to overcome
the feeling of powerlessness and nihilism and be able to grasp the powers of a non-
teleological critique, even in the misery of our present time.
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The following essays focus on three modalities of critique: Didier Debaise con-
trasts different ways of side-taking within metaphysical thinking in his contribu-
tion “Critique of Naturalist Thought: From Naturalism to Perspectivism in Con-
temporary Thought”. He formulates a critique of the modern concept of nature
that follows a bifurcation between ‘real’ and ‘apparent’ nature and subjugates the
multiplicity of beings in a unified order. Following Alfred North Whitehead (and
referring to Eduardo Viveros de Castro et al.) Debaise outlines a metaphysical per-
spectivism and thus an alternative way of inhabiting the earth and including dif-
ferent modes of existence. In this theory of critique every being is conceived as a
subjectivity with a specific perspective, where everything that exists is viewed in
the same univocal logic and all subjectivities are conceived on the basis of their
possessive relations to the world.
In his critical audiovisual analysis in his contribution “Flows of People. Com-
ments through Migration Discourse in the Video Bibby Challenge” Mathias Denecke
discusses the close relationship between ‘water’ and ‘migration’ via concepts such as
‘refugee flows’ or ‘waves’. Denecke is particularly interested in the political dimen-
sions of these concepts, which migrants discursively seem to produce as ‘not yet
controlled’. By considering the filmic footage as well as means of sound production
the chapter shows how the video Bibby Challenge contributes to recent migration
discourse by posing the question, “what remains unheard when we speak of the
refugee flow as a matter of course?” (273) Denecke refers to the history of the con-
cept ‘liquid crowed’ in order to open up the metaphorical relations between people
and aspects of water. The chapter shows that it is precisely the metaphorical con-
nection to ‘flow’ and ‘liquidity’ that designs movements of people as controllable
and steerable.
In his chapter “Being Lonesome Amongst the Many. Of Bloom and Multitude”
Michel Schreiber concentrates the term multitude in conjunction with current
modes of production and existence. He interweaves and transverses publications
by Paolo Virno with Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, who describe “subjectiv-
ity as [an] unstable and ever changing” (281) part of production. Reading their
concepts through the lens of Tiqqun, Schreiber shows “how subjectivity is simul-
taneously produced and neglected through a preliminary sharing” (282). In doing
so he evolves a new critical analysis of the term of multitude and asks whether we
encounter Bloom, who is lonesome among others and self-estranged, within the
multitude? With Tiqqun he wants to step back from the “analysis of becoming,
relationality, and processes and go somewhere else.” (285) Bloom is outlined
by Schreiber as a circular (argumentation-) figure of a schizophrenic existence,
marked by a principle incompleteness, a radical insufficiency. Describing this as
the base of human existence Schreiber concludes, “subjectification of the many
as a singularity in multitude cannot exist without the desubjectification of the
singular beings in their mode of existence as Bloom.” (289)
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Critique of Naturalist Thought
From Naturalism to Perspectivism
in Contemporary Thought
Didier Debaise
I will start from an assumption: the moderns invented a concept of nature in order
to inhabit the earth.This hypothesis seems tome to be a good guide for articulating
a set of transformations that have taken place in recent decades concerning the
variety of ways of inhabiting the earth on the basis of inter-capture operations
between anthropology and metaphysics (cf. Descola 2013 and Viveiros de Castro
2014). If it is essential to question this invention of nature today, it is not only
because it defines the status and function of the categories of metaphysics, right
up to its contemporary iterations, even obviously when they do not have nature as
their explicit object, but because the invention of nature constitutes a necessary
condition for thinking about the consequences of the ‘new climatic regime’ (Latour
2017).
Let us begin by taking this hypothesis in its most immediate form. By connect-
ing nature to the question of themoderns, the hypothesis implies two fundamental
displacements which clash with the current vision of nature. First of all, it mobi-
lizes the idea that nature is historic or,more exactly, in terms that I take fromAlfred
North Whitehead, that it is epochal. By this we mean that nature, in the form that
we have inherited it, would have had a moment of birth, a temporal origin, and
that it would have developed, consolidated, and propagated throughout different
spaces, within different regimes of existence, to the point of merging with all the
dimensions of modern experience. We can situate in the invention of the modern
sciences, on the basis of the gestures and experimental operations that began the
moment at which this nature was constituted. This period has come to its limit
today, to the point of toppling over.
Next, by affirming that the moderns have invented a concept of nature in order
to inhabit the earth, we set forth a difference between ‘nature’ and ‘earth’. Let us
clarify the difference: the earth would be the common soil that we could inhabit
in multiple ways, while nature would mark a particular way of relating to it. The
confusion that we ended up taking for granted between nature and the earth is not
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the result of chance or an accident external to the implementation of the concept
of nature: it is one of the tendencies inherent in the concept, a tendency towards
hegemony – a propensity for the concept of nature and the categories that imple-
ment it to overshadow all alternatives, even if it means annihilating other ways of
relating to and inhabiting the earth. The concept of nature has thus become the
site of all the political redefinitions of the moderns: a tool for the domestication of
their knowledge and their practices, an instrument of the domination of others by
the imposition of a single manner of inhabiting the earth.
I would like to question the way in which nature became for the moderns an
operator for the disqualification of minority knowledge practices and a tool for the
colonization of others.
The Modern Invention of Nature
What is nature for the moderns? It is above all a matter of gestures and opera-
tions. Among the multiplicity of gestures, it seems to me that two deserve spe-
cial attention. I take them from Whitehead, who evokes them for the first time
without defining them in terms of gesture or operation in one of his first philo-
sophical books,TheConcept of Nature. They form one of the constant obsessions that
run throughout his work. He calls them bifurcation and localization. Nature is
the product of this double operation. What is bifurcation? InThe Concept of Nature,
Whitehead expresses it in the form of a protest:
“What I am essentially protesting against is the bifurcation of nature into two sys-
tems of reality, which, in so far as they are real, are real in different senses. One
reality would be the entities such as electrons which are the study of speculative
physics. This would be the reality which is there for knowledge; although on this
theory it is never known. For what is known is the other sort of reality, which is the
byplay of the mind.” (Whitehead 1920: 30)
To understand this passage and its importance today, we must understand what
this bifurcation operation is and what made it necessary.
It is above all an absolutely practical and essentially local question which makes
it necessary. Given a natural body (physical, chemical, biological, etc.), how can we
distinguish, or more exactly extract, the relatively invariant qualities which would
be essential to it and which would characterize it in its own right? This ques-
tion is properly posed in an experimental framework (Stengers 2000: 82) based
on the techniques and formalisms that made it possible to generalize the status
of the qualities of bodies. It is expressed philosophically in the great distinction
that forms the constant obsession of modern philosophy, that of primary and sec-
ondary qualities. What is first is therefore the gesture of dividing bodies; what
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derives from it is the economy of qualities which will then determine the distinc-
tion of substances that gives rise to dualism. The great ‘error’ of the bifurcation
and the reason for its hegemonic propensity, which is unjustified from the point of
view of the operation, must not be located in the experimental practice in which it
finds its origin, but in its reification. By a strange movement, the terms that issue
from the local, located gesture placed on the inside of bodies, resulting from an
experimental, artificial division, acquire an ontological status in their own right.
We will not cease to be astonished at this fundamental inversion in the consti-
tution of the concept of nature: from the fact that it is always possible to extract
heterogeneous qualities from bodies, we have deduced that nature was made up
of distinct regimes of qualities of which bodies would be the expression. On the
one hand, there would be ‘real’ nature with its own qualities which are expressed
in terms such as matter, extended substance, etc.; on the other, ‘apparent’ nature,
with its own regimes of existence and entities such as spirit, value, sense of im-
portance, and aesthetics. It is a question of seeing all the operations of disqualifi-
cation that are implemented behind the ‘innocence’ of an operation of knowledge:
the exclusion of secondary qualities, that is, values, aesthetic dimensions, and sub-
jective apprehensions referred to as ‘simple psychic additions’, which is to say, ex-
ternal to nature, and the disqualification of all knowledge practices based on these
secondary qualities. The bifurcation became a veritable war machine against all
forms of interested knowledge attached to beings and situations, returning them
to merely subjective, superficial knowledge restricted to the perspectives of those
who used it. As Isabelle Stengers writes: “We live in a veritable cemetery for de-
stroyed practices and collective knowledges” (Stengers 2015: 98).
But this gesture of bifurcationwould have been incomplete by itself, for it left an
obscure zone in its wake. The whole modern experience of nature deployed within
the bifurcation points to these primary qualities of bodies which are both consti-
tutive of experience and inaccessible to it. In order to give sense to the complete
scene that it produces, it cannot avoid a proper qualification of the natural bodies
themselves.The obscure zone, staged, dramatized, and intensified to its maximum
comprises the primary qualities. The question, left open by the bifurcation, is how
to positively qualify bodies once they are dissociated from their phenomenal di-
mensions. In order to see how this qualification is made possible, we must under-
stand the second great gesture of the instauration of nature, a gesture which also
prejudges everything, determining the set of ontological categories that will come
to give meaning to nature.
In Science and the Modern World, Whitehead defines “localization” as follows:
“To say that a bit of matter has simple location means that, in expressing its spa-
tiotemporal relations, it is adequate to state that it is where it is, in a definite finite
region of space, and throughout a definite finite duration of time, apart from any
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essential reference of the relations of that bit of matter to other regions of space
and to other durations of time.” (Whitehead 1948: 58)
Everything occupies a point in space and time. A thing is real insofar as it is local-
izable in space and in time. By contrast, it will be said that a thing is unreal from
the moment that we cannot locate it in a precise space and time. To the question
‘what is matter?’, the simplest answer that can be given is: “an expanse of space
in a moment of time.” But how could we localize an extension, a point in space, a
moment in time, without already having at least a geometry, a determination of
space, a priori, and a timeline? In other words, how can one speak of matter as
it is defined by its localization without a formalism of space and time? It is this
strange gesture that completes the ‘bifurcation’ and which provides formalism by
constructing it in order to qualify what is real as a set of localizable entities.
In this sense, I agree entirely with Latour’s diagnosis, in An Inquiry into Modes
of Existence, that the fabrication of the modern concept of nature is the result of an
“amalgamation” between distinct regimes of existence. He writes:
“this amalgam is ‘material world,’ or, more simply, ‘matter.’ The idealism of this
materialism—to use outdated terms—is the main feature of their anthropology
and thefirst result of this inquiry, the one that governs all the others.” (Latour 2013:
98)
As with bifurcation, we are dealing here with a local gesture that finds its raison
d’être and its consistency in the necessities and techniques of experimentation. It
is not the gesture that is problematic, but its reification, the moment when the act
of localizing is lost and only an abusive definition of the real as localizable matter
is retained; it is the becoming-ontological of the act that is the source of the innu-
merable false problems inherited by the metaphysics that take up the effect of the
operation and forget the cause. Now, this definition of the real as a set of realities
localizable in space and in time was again at the origin of a set of disqualifications:
attachments to non-localizable beings, and to the practices and rituals in which
these attachments are realized. Localization was behind reducing the practices of
‘others’ to the simple ‘beliefs’, ‘representations’, and ‘fetishisms’ through which the
moderns deal with reality. I see, in these two gestures and their reification, the
origin of the modern invention of nature. Established on the basis of principally
experimental questions, they were transposed by the corresponding operations of
reification and deployed at all levels of modern experience without translation or
particular attention to different domains. This is what I intend by the naturalist
origin of modern metaphysics. According to the converging observations of Henri
Bergson, William James, John Dewey, and Whitehead, this is what remains en-
tangled in a multiplicity of false problems linked to the translation of operational
gestures into real entities, which are then taken to be originary themselves.
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The Perspectivist Experience
Nature no longer seems to be able to fulfill its functions. It articulated beings at the
cost of innumerable subtractions: the reduction of modes of existence to only two,
the subtraction of secondary qualities, the strict delimitation of subjective experi-
ence, the exclusion of a set of knowledge practices, etc. It is this diagnosis which
is at the heart of the necessities from which a metaphysics of another kind is con-
stituted, a perspectivist metaphysics which is becoming more and more vivid (cf.
Latour 2002, Despret and Galletic 2006, Viveiros de Castro 2014, Montebello 2015).
I would now like to lay out some of its requirements. Above all, perspectivism in-
tends to replace the idea of nature. The general feeling which animates it is that
everything which had been excluded from nature, set aside or reduced to the sta-
tus of a superficial aspect, is returning in force, imposing itself through ecological
transformations and by representing the voice of new spokespeople who replace,
at the heart of nature, the dimensions that had been temporarily excluded from it.
Everything must be re-articulated on the basis of a new requirement: philosophy
can no longer exclude anything.
This philosophical decision traverses Whitehead’s speculative thought and I
would like to grant it all its contemporary relevance. It is a posture that consists
in placing on the same plane, on the same surface, everything that had been hier-
archized and differentiated, replacing secondary qualities, a sense of importance,
values, aesthetics, relationships, on the inside of beings. There should no longer
exist domains founded a priori by successive bifurcations, of the real and the sub-
jective, being and appearance, fact and value. Rather everything should be relocated
within each being, in the importance of the relationships it weaveswith every other.
A universe specific to each being, a singular way of existing, with its tendencies,
its attachments, its aspirations and its renouncements: this is the sentiment that
we will call perspectivist in metaphysics. Perspectivism redoes the oppositions of
naturalistic metaphysics almost term by term; it undoes the idea of nature so as
to maintain only the secondary dimension, the effect of a particular mode of the
arrangement of beings, a singular organization of perspectives. In short: nature is
no more than a provisional economy of perspectives. Recently, Eduardo Viveiros de
Castro recalled its importance as a mode of interpretation of animism:
“This double, materialist-speculative twist, applied to the usual psychological and
positivist representation of animism, is what we called ‘perspectivism,’ by virtue
of the analogies, as much constructed as observed, with the philosophical thesis
associated with this term found in Leibniz, Nietzsche, Whitehead and Deleuze.”
(Castro 2014: 55)
I propose to establish three operations inherent to the establishment of a meta-
physical perspectivism. As I am unable to avoid being too cursory on a subject
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which would require particular attention to the differences and variations of con-
cepts, I would only like to indicate the elements of metaphysical perspectivism in
the form of general prescriptions. First of all, make of every being a subjectivity.
Whitehead expresses it very clearly when he writes in Process and Reality that “apart
from the experiences of subjects, there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothing-
ness.” (Whitehead 1978: 167) It is undoubtedly this central element of perspectivism
that is the most difficult to grant as the notion of subjectivity seems inevitably
associated with a set of categories (intentionality, consciousness, anthropological
experience) which at first glance reduce the field of its application or extension.
In what sense could this concept of subjectivity be of any help in articulating all
beings more broadly than the concept of nature? Is it not even more beholden than
the concept of matter to the bifurcation operation which we have made the cen-
tral term of modern experience? How can we understand the rejection of naturalist
metaphysics when we take up a term that was so strongly associated with it as that
of intentionality and affirm, in the manner of Viveiros de Castro, that “every ex-
istent is a center of intentionality apprehending other existents according to their
respective characteristics and powers”? (Castro 2014: 55)
What a strange vision it is that animates perspectives and which is expressed
in the obsessive questions that traverse the multiplicity of the philosophies that
put it to work: what would become of intentionality if it were applied to all levels
of existence? What sort of subject would emerge if one made desire (in the manner
of Tarde) the very stuff of beings? More than a description, or a general conception
of existence, it must be seen as a methodological decision for each category that
seems to us to define human exceptionality, grant itmaximum extension, and place
it at all levels of existence. It is then subjectivity, in the anthropological sense of
the term, which finds itself decentered as it becomes a particular mode, a singular
perspective that is established within a larger logic in which it takes shape, is just
one focus among many, and by no means the model or the cause. If perspectivism
takes subjectivity as the starting point for a metaphysical investigation, it is not
out of the desire to consolidate its form, nor because it would be the limit of all
experience and the authentic foundation of any investigation in a kind of homage
to correlationism.On the contrary, it is with a view towardsweakening the evidence
for exceptionalism is neutralized by the operation of extending the categories that
set it to work.
Next, register all beings within the same univocal logic. At first glance, all per-
spectives are on the same level, manifest the same principles of existence, and are
composed of the same fabric. As Whitehead writes, using a neologism:
“Actual entities (subject of perspective) differ among themselves: God is an ac-
tual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space. But,
though there are gradations of importance, and diversities of function, yet in the
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principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level.” (Whitehead 1978:
18)
There should be no exceptions, no leaps in principles; this is a radical rationalism
as the schemas and categories of perspective must be identical everywhere, meet-
ing the same requirements. This obviously does not mean that all perspectives are
equal, that they are basically similar or that their diversity is only apparent, which
would imply a kind of flat democracy of beings. As Whitehead writes, there are
“gradations of importance, and diversities of function.” How then are we to ex-
plain that hierarchy exists on univocal grounds? Plurality is first, but how does one
subject relate to another, under what modality, how does it differentiate itself, and
by what means does it impose a certain version of the universe? All of these ques-
tions can be treated within the framework of generic principles whose purpose is
to highlight how the subject exists. Univocity has, as its object, the how, manners,
and modes of existence.
Finally, make perspective a possessive activity. From Friedrich Nietzsche to
Viveiros de Castro, via Gabriel Tarde andWhitehead, we can identify a generic fea-
ture of perspective, a veritable principle of individuation. The terms vary – taking,
capture, possession, integration, or even grasping – but the features associated
converge. Tarde expresses it as a ‘universal fact’: “Every being wants, not to make
itself appropriate for external beings, but to appropriate them for itself.” (Tarde
2012: 55) And he made it the program of a philosophy yet to be invented:
“All philosophy hitherto has been based on the verb Be, the definition of which
was the philosopher’s stone, which all sought to discover. Wemay affirm that, if it
had been based on the verb Have, many sterile debates and fruitless intellectual
exertions would have been avoided.” (Ibid.: 52)
Subjects, as beings of perspectives, therefore do not precede their relations to the
world; they are constituted through them. What is first, on the contrary, are the
acts of possession, the taking, the whole economy of having of which Tarde speaks.
How does one being capture another? By what means and with what intensity does
one make the other the material of its own existence? Deleuze expressed it most
clearly in the portrait he drew of Whitehead in the chapter devoted to him in The
Fold:
“Everything prehends its antecedents and its concomitants and, by degrees, pre-
hends a world. The eye is a prehension of light. Living beings prehend water, soil,
carbon, and salts. At a given moment the pyramid prehends Napoleon’s soldiers
(forty centuries are contemplating us), and inversely.” (Deleuze 1993: 78)
Subjects therefore extend to infinity by the step-by-step capture of all other beings;
they experience themselves, their value, their importance, their aesthetic traits
266 Didier Debaise
through their possessive activities. It is as if, by the repetition of the activity of
prehension, of capture or of possession, subjects acquire an increasingly private
life, an experience of themselves, a subjectivity all the more intense as it is consti-
tuted by the experience of other subjects. Thus, taking account of a subject means
following the ways by which it appropriates others, translates them into its own
logic and gives them a value in the image of its own type of existence.
By way of conclusion, I would like to revisit the hypothesis that I formulated
at the beginning: the moderns invented a concept of nature in order to inhabit the
earth. I tried to pinpoint what they thought they found there, namely the possi-
bility of unifying the profusion of beings, entities, and things that are all more or
less resistant to a unitary inscription. The moderns could only achieve this unifi-
cation at the cost of multiple subtractions and abusive hierarchies. Forgetting the
operational nature of their abstractions and functions, forgetting in other words
their constructions, they reified their abstractions until they ended up believing
that they were dealing with nature itself. Metaphysics followed suit by defining the
general frameworks of being and thought, as well as the conditions of truth for
these strange reified abstractions. If this diagnosis is correct, then it is without a
doubt the concept of nature itself whichmust give way to other ways of articulating
beings and instaurating new compositions (Latour 2010). Metaphysical perspec-
tivism presents itself as an alternative to naturalist metaphysics, as another way
of articulating beings and inhabiting the earth. It in no way pretends to reach a
better-founded reality, a reality of which naturalism would be a distortion.We will
find in perspectivism no claim to define an authentic metaphysics, no search for
adequation to a presupposed reality whose features it would reveal. Perspectivism
is just as artificialist, constructivist, pragmatic in its functions, and as fabulatory
as naturalist metaphysics was before it got lost in its disastrous reifications. What
distinguishes it radically from naturalist metaphysics is that perspectivism aims to
exclude nothing: neither beings nor modes of existence.
 
Translated by Tano S. Posteraro
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Flows of People
Comments through Migration Discourse
in the Video Bibby Challenge
Mathias Denecke
Designed as floating housing for people working in coastal regions or at sea, the
Bibby Challenge1 is an accommodation barge that can house up to 670 people. From
February 1995 to February 2003, the city of Hamburg hired the Bibby Challenge,
among others, to provide accommodation for refugees, particularly from Eastern
Europe.2 Adnan Softić’s video includes archival photographs and footage by artist
Marilyn Stroux, who filmed life around and on the Bibby Challenge.3
Figure 1: Bibby Challenge
Screenshot Bibby Challenge (TC 08:04)
1 The idea for this contribution was developed in a panel discussion on the metaphoricity of
water with Adnan Softić at “Hallo-Festspiele” 2018 in Hamburg.
2 For the client list, see https://www.bibbymaritime.com/why-choose-bibby; last access
05.20.2021.
3 In addition to “high quality en suite” housing, the company BibbyMaritime Limited promotes
the comfort of the Bibby Challenge with the ship’s large restaurant, bar, fitness room, and
“games room”. See http://www.bibbymaritime.com/bibby-challenge/; and https://www.bibby
maritime.com/our-fleet, last access 05.20.2021.
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The video was part of an installation shown in the exhibition “Mobile Worlds”
(2018) at the Hamburg Kunst- und Gewerbemuseum.4 It provides the foundation for a
critical reading of the recent European migration discourse in this chapter. Of de-
cided interest is the way in which the video produces the connection between water
and migration on the basis of the filmic fabrication of the Bibby Challenge. Here,
the “audiovisual production has to be taken seriously as the ‘fabrication’ of a spe-
cific knowledge space within and through which something that is supposed to be
represented first comes into being.” (Bippus/Ochsner/Otto 2016: 264-265; empha-
sis in original) This filmic fabrication is not to be confused with “depiction.” (Ibid.:
266) Where the video visually focuses on images of people on boats in a global-
historical context, the spoken commentary deals with metaphors associated with
water. Functioning as a commentary on migration, this can especially be noted in
the production level of the sound. Close analysis of the video’s complex audiovisual
commentary highlights issues in the discourse on migration. In particular, the re-
lationship between the terms ‘refugee flows’ or ‘waves’ and associations with water
can be critically addressed. On the one hand, these metaphorical associations are
not apolitical as they are part of discursive power structures (Foucault 1982). On
the other hand, this reference, i.e. the invocation of the reference to water, is itself
subject to certain politics. In concrete terms the latter refers to the motivation to
describe power relations that remain largely unheard through the seemingly self-
evident talk of the refugee flow. Yet the images, the voice-over, and the found-
footage material from the 1990’s, as well as its actualization today, explicitly point
towards the historicity of migration.Therefore, I will include the metaphorical his-
tory of the “liquid crowd” (Gleich 2017) in order to contrast it with contemporary
talk about refugee flow. Going beyond the ‘image’ of water, to take the question
of control into account, elucidates a certain political agenda where migrants are
discursively produced as not yet controlled.
Within the filmic layers as sides of audiovisual production, the discourse on
refugee flow presents various points of view, or sites. Following the concept of “‘me-
dial participation’” (Bippus/Ochsner/Otto 2016: 261),5 in these sites “the conditions
for in- or exclusion can change and […] the specific challenges for participants and
4 The video Schiffe mitWaren und Stoffen stoßenmit ihrenWellen die Bibby Challenge
an (in short: Bibby Challenge) was shown as a multi-channel installation (10 min, 11 sec.). In
addition to two video projections, a model of the Bibby Challenge was illuminated in a dis-
play case. Several soundtracks were included, which were only audible at certain points in
the room due to their ceiling placement and focused output.
5 “By using ‘medial participation’ as a key concept, the research group proceeds on the suppo-
sition that participation is located inmedia-cultural exchange processes. This reconceptuali-
zation is founded on a process-related understanding ofmedia, which allows the description
of the relations between demand and entitlement in the assemblages of subjects, technolo-
gical objects, practices and communities.” (Bippus/Ochsner/Otto 2016: 261)
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non-(or not yet)-participants are posed. These configurations are regarded as so-
cio-technical power structures.” (Ibid.: 262)The analysis of these sites addresses the
way the talk about flows “mobilizes (discourses of) interactions between humans,
practices, and technical objects.” (Ibid.: 264) As Bippus, Ochsner and Otto point
out, “participation essentially focuses on the addressability of future participants
(and non-participants alike!) in complex socio-technical arrangements.” (Ibid.: 267)
Audio-Visual Production of the Relationship
Between Migration and Water
Arrangements of stills separated by black screen define the first half of the video.
These single images and subsequently shown film sequences focus on crossings of
people over water and their temporary accommodation on boats. Archival footage
of the Bibby Challenge is shown in split screen aswell as inmontagewith depictions
of overcrowded ships and inflatable boats. Historical pictures, like the raft of the
grounded Medusa by Géricault6 and a section-view of a slave ship, are put in rela-
tion to the Bibby Challenge.The slave ship is directly followed by Massimo Sestini’s
2015 award-winning press photography of a boat withmigrating persons.7Through
this interplay of footage from the residential containers and the other images, the
video marks a semantically loaded connection between water and migration. Es-
pecially the images invoke a historical and global context. Hereby, the montage
puts Bibby Challenge into an ambivalent context of globalization and the history of
people moving and being moved. Underlining this visual montage, the voice-over
accompanies these pictures and claims: “This is not a boat.” Commentaries, spo-
ken by a female and a male voice, expressly take up a figurative sense of the Bibby
Challenge anchored on the city docks: “We also do swim. Here, too, one has no
firm ground under one’s feet.” (TC: 00:06:35-00:06:45) What initially refers to the
prevailing living conditions in the containers can easily be understood as a reflec-
tion of an imagined observer ‘on land’: “Even here in this country one has neither a
job nor an apartment forever. No furniture anyway. Also, very often no friends and
family.” Ideas of work, family or home are dynamized in connection to the figura-
tive talk of water: “The constant of the home, the firmness of it, the habits, are not
to be held tight.” (TC: 00:06:48-00:07:20) Permanent floating of the housing unit
sets allegedly fixed concepts in motion by transferring them metaphorically into
the liquid and volatile state of water. “The fortress and everything that was fixed to
it has long collapsed. The home is in crisis. Seen in this light, we are all displaced,
aren’t we?” (TC: 00:07:21-00:07:39). Applying non-metaphorically to the persons on
6 Théodore Géricault, “The Raft of the Medusa”, oil on canvas, 1819, Louvre.
7 Massimo Sestini, “Rescue Operation”, photography, 2015.
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board the floating containers, this also indicates an imagined observer, who over-
looks a larger history in terms of a global history of migration. What can be inter-
preted as an argument on permanent movement of people within the larger scope
of civilization history has distinctly negative connotations: “Ships with goods and
materials from all over the world bump into the Bibby Challenge with their waves.”
(TC: 00:09:05-00:09:13) Here, the former layers of observation merge. Migrating
people are paralleled with the idea of a global circulation of “goods and materials,”
whose proximity to an economic logic dehumanizes them to mere items.8
Revolving around the anchored residential containers as a fixed point, the video
further hones in on the relationship of water and migration. Considering the fig-
urative sense of water and indicating its ambivalent meanings is not just an acces-
sory to the video, but forms its core. Pointedly, the spoken comment both refers
to the fact that the conveyed meanings of water render migration describable and
highlights the problems that arise when notions of water are equated with migrat-
ing humans. Before discussing this equation in detail, this position is strengthened
by the sound production.
Sound Production
In addition to the spoken commentary, background sounds from the found footage
organize the auditory level. Yet they do not correspond to ambient sound recorded
on site, but are produced retrospectively. Although corresponding to a common
practice in documentary filmmaking, it proves interesting here precisely because
of its particularmode of production. In his performances including the Bibby Chal-
lenge Adnan Softić discloses what can be recognized by paying close attention: the
sounds are all produced with cleaning utensils. A cleaning rag, wrung out into a
bucket of water corresponds to light waves hitting the ship, while a window scraper
imitates the screeching of seagulls. In addition, andmore obviously, there are drip-
ping tap and teeth brushing sounds (from TC: 00:03:02), as well as a slowly swelling
vacuum cleaner noise (from TC: 00:06:28). Softić’s video plays with negatively oc-
cupied conceptions of water conjured by the figurative sense of ‘cleaning’, referring
to conservative ideals of ‘purity’, ‘homogeneity’ and ultimately to ‘purge’.9 Marking
the difference between atmospheric sounds as taken for granted and the negative
connotations created through produced ‘cleaning’ sounds, the video addresses the
seemingly self-evident meaning of the figurative sense of water. By playing with
the difference between the sounds heard initially and upon closer listening, the
specific production of atmospheric sounds confronts the relation of migration and
8 See also Mbembe’s (2017) argument.
9 See also the texts read by Adnan Softić during performances.
Flows of People 273
the self-evident talk about flows. Considering the sound production using cleaning
utensils alongside the off-commentary’s problematizing of the ambivalent notions
of water metaphors leads to the question: what remains unheard when we speak
of the refugee flow as a matter of course? And this question can be translated into
the recent discourse of migration.
Criticizing the talk of refugee flows has a broad bandwidth, ranging from on-
line and blog entries, magazines, and newspaper articles to political speeches and
scholarly debates. In turn, the criticism refers to the talk of refugee flows both in
news coverage about migration and in public statements by politicians. Critical po-
sitions note that the talk of flows, waves, and tsunamis is about water metaphors
that determine our perception of the so-called refugee crisis. In general, they aim
for a picture-like quality: “It’s the image of refugees or migrants as water, as in
‘waves of refugees’ or ‘the flow of migrants’. It can also become a ‘flood’ or a place
can be ‘swamped’ by recent arrivals.” (Goyette 2016; cf. Packer 2016) It is already in-
dicated here that water metaphors often refer to catastrophes (Albisser 2016), with
which their use proves to be political (Parker 2015: 8; cf. Agnetta 2018: 19) or ideo-
logically motivated in the discourse on migration (Mujagić 2018: 108-109; 123). “The
metaphor of refugees as water tells a shrill story. Fugitives are not victims, but a
threat.” (Wehling 2016; cf. Parker 2015: 7) According to Eisenberg, terms such as
‘stream of refugees’ also imply “that we must protect ourselves against it, defend
ourselves, build dams, otherwise we will sink, we will be flooded.” (Eisenberg 2015:
2) Agnetta notes that the metaphor of the stream of refugees “subtly favors the de-
scription of the fugitive as a reified threat.” (2018: 20) Thus, in language terms, mi-
grating people are tailored as part of an indistinguishable, threateningmass. Kainz
and Petersson argue that “the attribution to people of qualities ascribed to water
runs the risk of metaphorically dehumanizing them due to the substance’s lack of
shape and colour and the impossibility of distinguishing one drop from another.”
(2017: 54) Albisser emphasizes this finding and states that “a collective reification
and dehumanization takes place.” (2016) According to Shariatmadari’s conclusions,
migrating people are ‘dehumanized’ by being compared with the forces of nature
(2015). To the same extent, this logic fuels fears of the unfamiliar as a danger, which
is why the inclusion of water metaphors in the talk of migration proves to be racist
overall (Lee 2007: 3).10 “A flood is submerging and destructive, a tsunami is even
deadly and destroys everything”, Biermann writes. “Whoever says something like
this in connection with refugees wants to stir up fear of them, wants to intensify
racism and xenophobia” (2015).
According to these passages, the politics of the talk about refugee flows as the
interplay of creating an ‘us’ and a (threatening) ‘them’ is unheard.What seems to be
10 Cf. Goyette 2016. For a detailed description of the interweaving of language and violence, see
Krämer 2010; Hornscheidt in this collection.
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taken for granted in the speech about the stream of refugees aims at catastrophic
connotations of water and its consequences in connection with migration. Its use
has become so engrained in the news coverage that possible negative connotations
cannot be described directly and therefore are no longer the subject of discussion.
Corresponding with the video, the critical positions stress the ambivalence of the
figurative speech of water and its self-evident meaning. However, contrary to the
video, historical references only play aminor role in the discourse criticism. Similar
to the historically charged pictures in the video, the found-footage material relates
to a certain history of people moving and water. Recordings of the Bibby Challenge
take a material and thematic detour through their actualization in the video and
therefore relate to a past tense. In the following, I connect a possible history of
the relationship between people and their metaphoric description with notions of
water.
On the History of the “Liquid Crowd”
Sketching a history of flows, Moritz Gleich (2017) unravels the metaphor of the
“liquid crowd”. At the core of his analysis is the “petty door” at the entrance of the
Crystal Palace, which was built by Joseph Paxton in 1851 as part of the first World
Exhibition in London. This entrance mechanism forms a technical “threshold that
could henceforth be crossed in one direction only, at a limited speed, and in an or-
derly manner.” (Gleich 2017: 56)11 The flow of the crowd is inextricably intertwined
with power relations. Gleich notes that this regulated entrance for large masses
of visitors is exemplary in a far-reaching discussion involving “[u]rban planners,
architects, and engineers” (ibid.), concerned with “the question […] of how best to
control and organize the movement of large numbers of people.” (Ibid.: 46) Specif-
ically,
“the motif of ‘flow’ came to play a pivotal if not preeminent role in the resolution
of the problem. For the numerous techniques and procedures developed for ob-
serving, controlling, and steering people in motion drew for their description – to
varying degrees but almost without exception – on images and concepts of flux
and fluidity.” (Ibid.)
Due to its figurative character, flow is understood as metaphorical speech. Gle-
ich argues that it “draws on the image of flowing or eddying waters to convey the
11 The “petty door” is part of an ensemble of techniques, including the “ground plan”, which
provides different paths. “The primary concern was to keep the crowd moving at all times so
as to assure its steady and equal distribution throughout the space.” (Gleich 2017: 55)
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potentially incalculable features of a moving crowd: its dynamics, volume, and di-
versity.” (Ibid.: 46; emphasis MD) The linguistic function of flow is not exhausted
in its metaphoricity.
Using an early example of urban planning which seeks to direct ‘streams of
passers-by’, Gleich illustrates a time-specific (non-)discursive ensemble. First, the
“ever-more-regular occurrence of large human crowds in motion” especially in ris-
ing metropolises must be taken into account, which in turn is made describable via
“the positively connoted image of a stream”. Then, “a specific system of discursive
production” is applied in which “the liquid crowds no longer represented an un-
controllable or accidental phenomenon but were raised to the status of an operable
entity that could be planned, produced, and controlled by resort to the image of
flow.” (Ibid.: 51) Thus viewed, flow provides architects and planners with a means
of making the incalculable crowd describable. And this raises the talk of flow into
the “status as a regulatory discursive practice, above and beyond any merely con-
tingent metaphorical function.” (Ibid.: 52)
These efforts to perceive people and their movements as flow are united in the
fact that they no longer read the stream as ametaphor. Instead the controlled crowd
is the liquid flow: “techniques and procedures specifically directed toward the ob-
ject of the moving crowd […] were rooted, technologically as well as symbolically,
in an understanding of the human crowd as a fluid ‘stream’.” (Ibid.: 57) The disap-
pearance of the metaphorical character of the flow provides a “strategic element”.
And therein lies the essence of Gleich’s considerations: “it allowed the physicality
and dynamism of the moving crowd to be referenced as a natural and calculable
nexus” (ibid.). The transition point is at the moment where the mass becomes con-
trollable, i.e. calculable. Gleich adds: “The formerly chaotic ‘stream of people’ – inti-
mating absolute unpredictability and uncontrollability – could be seen in the motif
to have been domesticated by cultural and architectural techniques and converted
into a term for an organized and organizable movement.” (Ibid.: 57)12 Altogether,
Gleich illustrates the historical course in which the ‘flowing of the crowd’ becomes
“naturalized”. Following the metaphorology of Hans Blumenberg, it becomes “‘in-
distinguishable from a physical proposition’” (Blumenberg quoted in Gleich 2017:
59). Importantly, the transition from flow as a metaphor to flow as the designation
of a crowd moving in a controlled manner cannot be unrelated from questions of
power. This is already implicit in the petty doors as they force the body to move
in a particular way. Functioning as borders in order to regulate a large mass of
12 The discourse finally came to a halt around 1900. Ludwig Boltzmann “transferred the cha-
racteristics of atomistic physics to a human crowd. In applying concepts of mathematics and
physics to the representation of a human crowd, Boltzmann made of the latter a calculable
fluid. Thus, at the close of the nineteenth century, Boltzmann laid the discursive as well as
scientific foundations for crowd descriptions through fluid dynamics.” (Ibid.: 58)
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persons, they are the materialization of decisions which can be grasped with the
concept of “governmentality” (Gleich 2017: 49; Foucault 2005: 247-269). Therefore,
the flow became “a vehicle for a system of governance that no longer sought to sup-
press mass phenomena but to promote, support, and optimize them by regulatory
means.” (Gleich 2017: 57)
Steering the (Migratory) Flow
Considering the so-called refugee flow today from the point of view of a water
metaphor, against the backdrop of its ‘naturalization’, the metaphor has reap-
peared. Analyzing the difference between the historical meaning of the flow of
people at the end of the 19th century, including its conventionalization, and the
current analytical readings in terms of a natural catastrophic view of refugee flows
is fruitful. Once again it is stressed that the relation to water is productive and
problematic at the same time. Although the flow metaphor seems to make large
movements of people easily graspable, it is inevitably accompanied by negative
connotations like the dehumanization of persons. Additionally, it is possible to
compare where the respective moment of control sets in. The control of refugee
flows starts at a different imagined point than the flow generated by petty doors.
While, for Gleich, the flow of people is thus a mechanically induced effect, the
refugee flow is connoted as still uncontrolled and uncontrollable. People flows
controlled by the door mechanism contradict the assumption invoked by the
natural catastrophic imaginary of the flow, according to which this flow must first
be contained in a controlling manner (cf. Mujagić 2018: 115-121). Viewing today’s
flow of refugees in light of the question of control, a political agenda becomes
discernible. To this end, the off-commentary of the Bibby Challenge video asks: “If
we look at the whole thing as a transport metaphor, then what is the state? Should
it be a vehicle, or a road, or a way?” (TC: 00:03:33-00:03:42) Thus, flows are not only
portrayed as related to natural catastrophes, but – as Gleich indicates – also refer
to a form of “governmentality” (Foucault 2005: 247-269). Contrary to the history of
the metaphor, in the contemporary discourse on migration the flow is depicted as
still to be steered.
The metaphor allows to describe the work of the state as the “art of steering”
although the state less steers ‘the ship’ (Foucault 2005: 249-250; 267, note 7) than
aims to control the flows. It refers to a political agenda that goes beyond a sug-
gestive negative politicization of the migration discourse through the metaphor.
The gap in between a regulated flow of people produced by petty doors and con-
temporary’s talk about uncontrolled flows of people hints towards the violence of
political measures necessary to produce a controlled flow. In the case of flows in
the World Exhibition, mechanical doors sufficed to make the mass of people move
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in a regulated manner. However, since today’s flows are connotated with natural
catastrophes, from a governmental perspective this requires more forceful steer-
ing. Mechanisms of regulation are applied where refugee flows are perceived as
the most threatening: ‘Floodgates’, ‘locks’, and ‘sluices’ then find their administra-
tive pendants expressed in demands for an expansion of border protection. Fur-
thermore, it materializes in the development of identification techniques and the
organization of fleeing people according to a distribution key, in specific facilities
such as – specifically in Germany – anchor centers, as well as eventually in the at-
tempt to contain so-called causes of refugee flight preventively through economic
programs. Petersson and Kainz note that “metaphors depicting natural events and
disasters tend to frame restrictive political action as a key element in order to retain
state sovereignty and control over national territories.” Seen in this perspective,
“the primeval forces of nature alluded to in these metaphors locate political mea-
sures concerning immigration on a spectrum ranging from palliative measures at
best to utterly futile at worst.” (2017, 54; cf. Mujagić 2018, 115)
This perspective is exemplarily underscored by WilliamWalter’s analysis of the
British government’s document Secure Borders, Safe Haven released in 2002. Also,
pertaining to the logic of (forceful) exclusion in order to produce and maintain an
inclusive us, Walter strikingly notes that “[t]he pre-eminent task of government is
to attract and channel flows of resources, whether investment, goods, services, and
now flows of (the right kind of) people into one’s territory.” (2004: 244) In the doc-
ument Walter registers the government’s “political ambition […] to combine two
forms of security – the imperative of economic security which now entails attract-
ing mobile human capital, and personal and internal security.” Hence, there is “the
quest to make the border into a membrane, a tissue which can filter movements
across its threshold.” (Ibid.: 255)13 This illustrates the mechanism by which the de-
liberate inclusion of a specific group of people inevitably leads to signification of
‘others’ who are not welcome and therefore are excluded. Within this framework,
the flow of refugees is degraded to a control variable that still needs to be regulated.
Consequently, it makes no difference whether “goods and materials from all over
the world” (TC: 00:09:05-00:09:13) or fleeing persons arrive. The orchestrated con-
trol of refugee flows appears in the residential containers anchored off Hamburg.
They are the product of a political agenda according to which refugees may stay on
a ship on the shore but not enter the country as a politically sovereign territory.14
13 Thanks to Milan Stürmer for mentioning this paper.
14 The image of a boat with fleeing people anchored outside national borders is updated in the
summer 2019 in view of lifeboats being refused entry into northern Mediterranean ports.
In this regard, Mujagić concludes “that metaphor use is not just a matter of rhetorics, but
that this particular word choice actually depicts a reality wheremigrants are prevented from
entering countries they come to by physical obstacles.” (2018: 121)
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What remains widely unheard in the talk of ‘refugee flows’ is the historically
conditioned, negative semantic charge. Making it recognizable thus requires a se-
mantic shift of the metaphor. Instead of a detour via associations to water, the
flow of refugees must instead directly carry its political semantics with it; it de-
mands a reconnotation. Jeanne Féaux de la Croix (2014) underscores this necessity
and problematizes the metaphor of flow in the sense of a ‘self-evident image’ bor-
rowed from nature. She asks: “But are streams and rivers truly the root image of
‘flow’ talk?” (2014: 98) In view of “globalization” and specifically the talk of migra-
tion “by now the root metaphor may have shifted”, which in turn results in “a new
dynamic of word associations”. She concretizes that “flow would come to have […]
a far more political taste.” (Ibid.) It is not a matter of finding another idiom for the
flow of refugees, but of challenging both the seeming self-evidence of its mean-
ing as well as the reference to natural catastrophes.15 In particular, the negative,
dehumanizing control logic must be a reflexive part of the talk about migratory
flows. Including the regulatory aspect of the metaphor through its history, the talk
of refugee flows is describable in the logic of governmentality that perceives fleeing
persons as a variable which is controllable by the state. However, this resemanti-
zation does not simply mean assigning a different meaning to flow, but rather to
capture precisely this control function in its historicity.
Inscribed into themultiple layers of the video, this “political taste” (ibid.) is con-
tained in the very sentence: “this is not a boat”. Referring to such ships that cannot
be considered adequate vehicles, the same holds for the Bibby Challenge. Anchor-
ing before the city of Hamburg, it does not fulfil a conventional boat’s function to
transport people from one place to the other. And this insufficiency pertains to the
metaphor of refugee flow, too. Concerning its linguistic function, it does not trans-
fer from one meaning to another. The docked Bibby Challenge itself is a metaphor
for the metaphor. With respect to the Greek metapherein, i.e. to “carry over”,16 the
transfer itself is suspended. Hence, the metaphor proves to be deficient of its “po-
litical taste”, as it isn’t ‘carried over’ with it. As a result, the metaphor ‘flows of
people’ refers to more than notions of water, and it has to become self-explanatory
that talk about ‘migrant flows’ is part of a dehumanizing control logic that depicts
migration as a regulable variable.
15 However, Walters provides a good example for another metaphor, i.e. “antivirus software”:
“The image is of the state/home as a computer terminal located in a proliferating network
which is both a space of resources and risks. The asylum system is a core element of this
scanning infrastructure regulating the passage of flows which traverse the state/home. Pro-
perly organized it is to work in the background, effectively and silently. It blocks malicious
incoming traffic, while the non-malicious can smoothly cross its threshold.” (2004: 255)
16 https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=metaphor, last access 05.20.2021.
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Being Lonesome Amongst the Many
Of Bloom and Multitude
Michel Schreiber
“What tremendous happiness not to be
me! But don’t others feel the same way?
What others? There are no others.“ (Fer-
nando Pessoa – What Happiness)
In this chapter I will argue for an experiment in political thinking which has an un-
usual accomplice at its core: the existentialist notion of a neglected existence by the
name of Bloom. Being Bloom is being simultaneously lonesome amongst the many
and stranger to oneself. It therefore poses a myriad of questions to the concept of
the many as a singular subject: multitude. The tension created by these different
formulations of subjectivity can be made productive and be of great importance in
analyzing our current modes of production and existence.
By combining different standpoints of post-operaist and autonomist thought
I will look at present forms of subjectivity from three angles that are alternately
individual, overlapping, and diametrically opposed. All three texts were published
within the first decade of the 21st century. Tiqqun published their Theory of Bloom
in 2000, Paolo Virno gave his lecture on A Grammar of the Multitude in 2001 (2004),
andMichael Hardt and AntonioNegri published their ideas onwhat they are calling
Commonwealth at the end of the decade in 2009. From the early years of our century
these authors describe subjectivity as unstable and ever changing. They agree on
the fact that subjectivity is not a durable, constant, or given category but part of a
process of production. To these authors subjectivity, especially in its different forms
of being produced, is a term at the center of political thought. Hardt/Negri put it
this way: “A key scene of political action today, [...] involves the struggle over the
control or autonomy of the production of subjectivity” (2009: 11). Hardt/Negri and
Virno describe the current form of subjectivity as the result and basis of a certain
mode of production (Hardt/Negri 2009: 11; Virno 2004: 41).The form of subjectivity
they encounter in the era of global, post-fordist capitalism is that of the mass, of
the many as singularity, multitude.This term, rooted in Spinoza (1994) and Hobbes
(1949/1987), is used by Hardt/Negri and Virno in both similar and divergent ways
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(cf. Lotringer 2004). Rather than provide a stringent differentiation of the term in
the respective works, I will examine the convergences and differences through the
lens of Tiqqun.
Virno stresses in his lecture thatmultitude characterized by a preliminary shar-
ing “is itself the base of today’s production” (2004: 41). Hardt/Negri note in their
preface that “[t]he multitude makes itself by composing in the common the singu-
lar subjectivities” (2009: 11). I want to suggest that we can gain insights into the
way the multitude is composed in the common; how subjectivity is simultaneously
produced and neglected through a preliminary sharing by looking at it through the
eyes of Tiqqun’s ‘Bloom’. For Tiqqun, Bloom is “like the sorry product of the times
of multitudes”, “[l]ast man, man of the street, man of mobs, man of the masses,
mass-man, is the One [...].” (2000: 15) As a product of the times of multitudes, as
One, the figure of Bloom allows for a new critical analysis of the term of multi-
tude; a critique that neither neglects nor renounces the term per se but aims at
refocusing on the singular being rather than the always produced and continually
reproduced multitude. Who do we encounter within the multitude? Bloom. This
critique is formulated as a siding with an existentialist truth raised to the point of
departure for a different political thought.
“And that truth is that we are the tenants of an existence that is exiled in a world
that is a desert, intowhichwewere thrown,without amission to accomplish,with-
out assigned place or recognizable filiation, in complete neglect. We are at the
same time so little and ever too much.” (Tiqqun 2000: 16)
Therefore, the following will be an attempt to critique certain notions of the multi-
tude by acceptingme being Bloom to start my political thought from the realization
that “[t]here is no social question of insecurity or marginalization, but this existen-
tial, inexorable reality that we are all alone, alone in rending it before death, that
we are all, for all eternity, finished beings.” (Tiqqun 2000: 16)
This text is obviously not fit to provide a discussion on the entirety of the dis-
course.Therefore, I will focus on three aspects that I think are crucial to the debate
I engage in. First, I am going to discuss the notion of the becoming of the multi-
tude in contrast to Tiqqun’s idea of finished beings. My second focus will be how
mass and individual as well as sociality and subjectivity relate to the social indi-
vidual. Lastly, I will shed light on the relation of bio-politics and economy as it is
precisely this relation that simultaneously produces and negates subjectivity.
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Becoming and Finitude
Multitude is “the mode of being of the many” (Virno 2004: 22). This is the mode in
which the many singular subjectivities come together to form the singularity of the
subjectivity of the multitude.The concept of multitude does not oppose the idea of
being ‘One’;
“rather, it redefines it. Even the many need a form of unity, of being a One. But
here is the point: this unity is no longer the State; rather, it is language, intellect,
the communal faculties of the human race. The One is no longer a promise, it is a
premise.” (Ibid.: 25)
Being the premise of Virno’s thoughts, multitude becomes a starting point, “the
base which authorizes differentiation” (ibid.). The multitude as a singular subjec-
tivity is therefore nothing less than producer and product. Being itself a result of a
certainmode of production, it is the starting point and authority of differentiation.
It hence brings forth the singularities of which it is composed of as One. Multitude
always already is, it is produced and it is producing.
Hardt/Negri rely on Gilles Deleuze when they describe their project as a reori-
entation of the ethical horizon “from identity to becoming.” (2009: 11) With Deleuze
they stress that it “is not what we are but rather what we are in the process of be-
coming – that is the Other, our becoming-other.” (Deleuze 1992) Before investigat-
ing this Deleuzian concept, I will show how multitude is thought of in its mode of
being: the becoming-other. Hardt/Negri are even more direct than Virno in their
post-modern formulation of multitude: “The multitude makes itself by compos-
ing in the common the singular subjectivities that result from this process.” (2009:
11) Virno is afraid “to sing out-of-tune melodies in the post-modern style,” (Virno
2004: 25) yet here we are: Multitude is a post-modern subjectivity producing that
of which it composes itself. Therefore, it is a mode of being, but only if being is
a mode of becoming. Multitude is differentiation and the One from which differ-
entiation is possible. Thus, multitude is clearly something incomplete, unfinished,
and ever changing. I suspect this is why Virno decides to call on Simondon’s idea
of metastability and individuation (Virno 2004: 78; Simondon 1989). By doing so he
intends to show that individuation takes place
“within the collective endeavor to refine our singularity, to bring it to its climax.
Only within the collective, certainly not within the isolated subject, can percep-
tion, language, and productive forces take on the shape of an individuated expe-
rience.” (Virno 2004: 79)
But Virno and Hardt/Negri – with Virno being less quick in his conclusions – seem
to overlook or simply neglect the singular subject, that singular self amongst the
many, the single part of the partiality of the multitude. In their attempt to stress
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the possibilities of the many, the force that can be created through becoming mul-
titude, they overlook the coexisting modes of being that are occupied by the sin-
gular subjectivities that produce multitude. Of course, one could argue that it is
impossible to know every singular subjectivity and its mode of being. However,
this automatically buys into the capitalist lie of individuality. In contrast, Tiqqun
provide us with a description of a mode of being that is the great negator of dif-
ference and differentiation: Bloom. For Tiqqun, Bloom is anonymity and unifier at
the same time. Bloom is unity in anonymity. Virno seems to have a similar notion
when he describes Simondon’s idea of the subject on which he rests his argument
for the individuation of the multitude: “The subject is, rather, a composite: ‘I’, but
also ‘One,’ unrepeatable uniqueness, but also anonymous universality.” (Ibid.: 78)
He continues: “Either an ‘I’ that no longer has a world or a world that no longer
has an ‘I’: these are the two extremes of an oscillation which, though appearing in
more contained forms, is never totally absent.” (Ibid.) Virno seemingly forgets to
reflect on this when describing the positive features of multitude – or he is not
able to fit the notion into his argument.1 But it is easy to connect these ideas with
the “sorry product of the times of multitudes,” (Tiqqun 2000: 15) with Bloom. For
Bloom names a historical shift in the Stimmung in which we are, with which we
are, and by which we conceive of the world and ourselves as: “that which corre-
sponds with the moment of retreat of the subject from the world and the world
from the subject.” (Ibid.: 22) Being the product of multitude that is the product of
differentiation which is always subjected to differentiation again and again, Bloom
lives a life that “experiences itself negatively, in the indifference, the impersonality,
the lack of quality.” (Ibid.: 23) It is exactly for the lack of phenomenological sta-
bility that Bloom is thought of as somehow being closely connected to a mode of
becoming: “Incompleteness is the mode of being of all who stay in contact with
the power, the form of existence of all who are dedicated to becoming.” (Ibid.: 33)
The singular self of the times of multitudes is “the witness of its own desubjec-
tification, of its interminable becoming-other.” (Ibid.) The locus of differentiation
will remain in itself indifferent. With this I return to Deleuze’s quote stressing the
need for our becoming-other that became the focal point for Hardt/Negri. For as
we have seen by now, the description of a mode of being focused on becoming-
other does not necessarily lead to becoming One as many, as multitude. It can just
as well lead to witnessing your own desubjectification and incompleteness. Bloom
is the singular, lonesome subjectivity within the coming multitudes of our time.
1 Virno describes the individuation of the multitude as a second degree individuation. Within
the first degree individuation of the singular being within the many of the multitude there
are a lot of different struggles between for example the pre-individual and the general intel-
lect etc. But to Virno it ismore important to stress the individuation of themultitude asmany
for it is therein, in the collective that individuation can actually take place. (Virno 2004: 77)
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Bloom “is not alone in being alone, all men [sic!] have that solitude in common.”
(Ibid.: 96) But how should there be familiarity in becoming other again and again?
The ever-changing relation of Bloom to multitude, creating it and being produced
by it, ensures that “[i]ts becoming is a becoming-stranger.” (Ibid.: 77)
To evade that strangeness, that perfect alienation, that indifference and counter
the power impacting our bodies and lives that is closely connected to becoming –
as it is only within a mode of becoming that bio-power can develop its impact –
I want to suggest with Tiqqun that we step back from our analysis of becoming,
relationality, and processes and go somewhere else.
Virno stressed that bio-power is closely related to the mere potentiality that
is work-force (Virno 2004: 81). Speaking with Virno we could say bio-power is in-
terested in controlling workforce because it is the potential to work. Bio-power is
interested in controlling our becoming-workers, the future aspects of our ability
to be productive, rather than our working bodies and minds as they are now. This
notion brings the experiment mentioned at the very beginning of this text into
play: Rather than focus on that which is controlled through the myriads of elec-
trodes comprising the world-wide net of bio-power or interests in controlling and
exploiting the commodity of our potential to work, I suggest to start by acknowl-
edging that “[t]here is no social question of insecurity or marginalization, but this
existential, inexorable reality that we are all alone, alone in rending it before death,
that we are all, for all eternity, finished beings.“ (Tiqqun 2000: 16) There are a lot of
implications in this notion. But I want to stress the existentialist aspects:
“Insignificance and anonymity, separation and estrangement are not the poetic
circumstances that the melancholic inclination of certain subjectivities tends to
exaggerate: the impact of the existential situation thus characterized, the Bloom,
is total, and above all political. Whomever is without community is sacer.” (Ibid.:
115)
Empty Multitudes
The topic of this short chapter is not one of a division of public and private prop-
erty, for: “what is there left to own?” (Ibid.: 89)2 I will rather concern myself with
the question of poverty and misery and that of sacredness. In ‘Commonwealth’
Hardt/Negri claim that Multitude is the name of the poor (2009: 39). To them the
poor does not address those who have very little or nothing. It tries to speak “to the
2 Hardt/Negri and Virno go into great detail to explain why this division is no longer needed
(Hardt/Negri 2009: 3; Virno 2004: 40).
286 Michel Schreiber
wide multiplicity of all those who are inserted in the mechanisms of social pro-
duction regardless of social order or property.” (Ibid.: 40) They mark the conflict
within their conception but stress that it is at the same time a political one. For it
is the productivity of that conflict that “makes the multitude of the poor a real and
effective menace.” (Ibid.) They surely have a point. Walter Benjamin already knew
that
“[w]e have become impoverished. We have given up one portion of the human
heritage after another, and have often left it at the pawnbroker’s for a hundredth
of its true value, in exchange for the small change of ‘the contemporary’.” (1996:
735)
Benjamin also does not speak of financial poverty or lack of wealth.The poor in his
case lack experience and human connection to others and to life. The many in his
argument are those who have to adapt and begin anew again and again (ibid.). But
are the many per se multitude? We could easily think of becoming poor as a process
of singularization but not of the many as One but a singularization of each on their
own. Poverty then is something common although not shared, just as property and
wealth. If we understand poverty in this way, it becomes a metaphysical variable
influencing the mode of being that is Bloom:
“Ultimately dispossessed, disqualified of everything, mutely estranged from its
world, ignorant of itself as of that which surrounds it, the Bloom realizes at the
heart of historical processes, and in its fullness, the absolutely metaphysical
breadth of the concept of poverty.” (Tiqqun 2000: 79-81)
Making use of that concept in connection with the existentialist understanding
of the mode of being of Bloom, they contrast poverty with the concept of misery.
Poverty is described as the state of “[those] who can use everything, having nothing
of [their] own” whereas misery is the state of those “who can use nothing, being
that [they have] too much, lack time and [are] without community.” (Ibid.) With
this Tiqqun argue that we actually encounter misery, not poverty, when looking
at Bloom. Therefore, they encourage us to share poverty instead of the misery of
the wealthy as that would mean ceasing to be Bloom since Bloom only understands
the language of exchange value. (Ibid.) Sharing poverty would mean giving up on
everything that denotes value to another thing, establishes rank or class, or cre-
ates a social heterogeneity that then creates a multitude and its political body and
thus produces the differentiations that are at the end effects of misery. To me, this
notion was crucial when thinking about the relation between singular subject and
multitude as it is here that it becomes clear that multitude as a mode of production
brings forth the crises of the singular subjectivity, the social individual. Multitude,
as something that is becoming as it is produced and producing the singular sub-
jectivities it is made up of, can be no more than a descriptive tool to uncover the
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current mode of production of our being together as perfect strangers. Multitude
as a place of a probable shared solidarity is something to be created by the finished
beings that are Bloom through sharing their lack of experience in hoping to inten-
sify life itself. Benjamin remained optimistic: “Let us hope that from time to time
the individual will give a little humanity to the masses, who one day will repay him
[sic!] with compound interest.” (1999: 735)
But hope, just as becoming, is aimed at things to come. For now, it seems, the
giving of humanity to themasses seldom occurs. Because Bloom is sacred. Bloom is
without community or represents the many lacking the ability to form a self. Being
of the masses, Bloom is produced by the mass Bloom produces. As pointed out
before, this leads to an indifferent life. Bloom is always either mass or individual,
with each one as the negation of the other. In being individual Bloom is the most
generalized individual there is: Absolute interiority or absolute exteriority. As mass
or multitude Bloom is perfectly indifferent to the mass itself. In this case Bloom
is the many. Living up to the norm of production, Bloom as mass is a generalized
being. According to Hannah Arendt this means a loss of the rights of Man, but not
a loss of the virtues of humanity, whereby these beings “no longer belong to any
community whatsoever. Their plight is not that they are not equal before the law,
but that no law exists for them.” (Arendt 1968: 175f) This generalization takes place
in Bloom and in multitude. It is the paradoxical side of desubjectification that is
not included in Hardt/Negri and Virno but takes place in Tiqqun’s analysis of the
relation between bio-power and spectacle. It is in this very moment that Bloom
becomes sacer. (Agamben: 1998) There only is Bloom as product of the many and
Bloom as singularities composing the many as singularity. But there never is both,
there never is the one and the other. The existential situation of Bloom is one of
schizophrenia. There is the subjectification of Bloom as multitude that produces
generalization, and there is the desubjectification of the single non-subject that is
Bloom as individual. Both are viable to be exploited in the convergences of bio-
power and spectacle:
“Biopower is the benevolent power [...] the power that wants the salute of its sub-
jects, the power that wants you to live. Held in the vice that is simultaneously all-
emcompassing [sic!] and individual, ripening in a double constraint that annihi-
lated us in the same act as it brought us into existence, most of us adopt a sort
of political and hopeless nature: to feign internal death [...]. In subtracting them-
selves from all positivity, these spectres steal from a productive power that very
thing uponwhich it could be exerted: themselves. Their desire not to live is all that
gives them strength to oppose a power that claims tomake them live. In doing so,
they remain in the Bloom, usually burying themselves therein.” (Tiqqun 2000: 30)
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Existentialist alienation
In this last part of my argument I will show the positive effects that the existen-
tialist trick used by Tiqqun can have on our reflections on subjectivity. It is because
of the notion of a somehow finite being that we can think of becoming within bio-
power and spectacle as both subjectification and desubjectification, subtraction of
self and becoming other – although, I admit this sounds strange at first. The sub-
traction of self is closely connected to the idea of a coexisting desubjectification and
subjectification which are the becoming-other. For “THE OTHER IS THE ECON-
OMY IN US” (ibid.: 31). It “posesses us: it is this dissociated body, a simple peripheral
artifact in the hands of” bio-power. (Ibid. emphasis Tiqqun) This understanding of
the Other brings movement into the being that was described as finite, endlessly
finished. It is not a motion of becoming as a social being, of becoming positively
of the mass. The movement we are witnessing is that of a draining of the finished
being. Becoming as negation: “The internal presence of the Other is established at
all levels of our conscience: it is a minor and constant loss of being […]” (Ibid.). I
suggest that this is the condition Virno has in mind when talking of nihilism “put
to work” (2004: 74). To counter this inner loss of being Bloom projects itself even
more violently outside. One aspect of that is that Bloom needs to stick ever more
rigidly to ideas of any kind of social identity. More interestingly for my thoughts
on Bloom and multitude is Tiqqun’s idea that
“we play at being subjects. […] The Bloomdoes not signify that wewould be failing
subjects in regards to the superb sufficiency of the classic subject; instead, it re-
veals that at the base of human existence there is a principle of incompleteness, a
radical insufficiency. What we are is precisely that failure, which can, if it pleases,
designate itself the mask of the subject.” (Tiqqun 2000.: 31-32; emphasis Tiqqun)
With this it appears we have created an inner contradiction. Bloom seems to be
the existentialist truth of a finished being and the principle of human existence
as incomplete and insufficient. Just as Hardt/Negri found the contradiction they
encountered in their reading of poverty to be productive, I suggest we can gain a
lot by taking the ideas of Tiqqun seriously. They allow us to reveal the workings
of all the books and courses and coachings that promise to teach people how to
find their selves, be themselves, or find their inner peace. The inner contradiction
of Bloom is best described in this strange obligation of Bloom to be as self, that
social pressure “to ‘be oneself ’, that is to say, in a strict assignation of residence in
one of the identities recognized by the autonomous Publicity.” (Ibid.: 99) Within
this pressure to be oneself and the impossibility to be as self, the existentialist
contradiction described above has found a materialistic realization. Multitude as
the mode of production brings forth the being called Bloom that is always of the
masses but forced to find an impossible existence as self. To be oneself is just as
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much an imperative as it is imperative to be sociable. Bloom in becoming-other is
becoming stranger to itself. Alienation is then not only a fact of socio-economic re-
alities, it is also an existential reality of the sorry product of the times’ of multitude.
Multitude as the mode of production generates singular beings that are both sub-
jectificated as they make up the singular subject of multitude and desubjectificated
in their negation of self – which they are forced to counter on their journey to be
oneself thus being productive themselves. Alienation has therefore become total.
Being Bloom is being simultaneously lonesome amongst the many and stranger to
oneself. The subjectification of the many as a singularity in multitude cannot exist
without the desubjectification of the singular beings in their mode of existence as
Bloom.
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